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Abstract 
 
Contested Meanings - Imagined Practices: 
Law at the Intersection of Mediation and Legal Profession 
 
A socio-legal study of the juridical field in Turkey 
 
By Seda Kalem 
 
 
 
 This dissertation attempts to explore how the boundaries of the “juridical field” in 
Turkey are imagined by legal professionals operating within this field. The Draft Law 
on Mediation in Civil Disputes which is still in the process of legislative deliberation 
is taken as the primary object of analysis in the context of the controversies it has 
aroused among actors of the juridical field. The hypothesis is that through an 
exploration of the debates around mediation, an empirical understanding of the 
struggles within the juridical field in Turkey can be possible. From within a 
Bourdieusian framework, these struggles are seen as symbolic of the larger universe 
of social and political imaginaries within which the habitus of legal professionals is 
shaped. In this sense, the relevance of such an exploration of the struggles around an 
emerging institution and the implications of these struggles for the imagined 
boundaries of the juridical field is explained in the context of the ideological role of 
law and legal professionals in Turkey’s modernization experience. The analysis of 
representations of mediation in various channels like media, institutional statements 
and online discussion sites supplemented with the data from interviews with actors 
engaged in mediation debates display how the ways in which legal professionals 
compete over the form and the practice of mediation are at the same time symbolic of 
the ways in which they imagine society, law and legal profession. As legal 
professionals think and talk about mediation and as they situate themselves within 
                                                                                       
  
these debates, public/private, formal/informal and modern/traditional emerge as key 
dichotomies around which they frame their opinions on society, law and legal 
profession. In light of the prominence of these dichotomies, it is argued that the legal 
consciousness of these professionals is still very much shaped in reference to an 
overarching modernist paradigm of the Republic. The fact that these dichotomies have 
also been the key axes around which the new nation and its state have been founded 
attests to the prominence of Republican trajectories in shaping the ways in which 
legal professionals imagine the society, the law and the legal profession.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 The Draft Law on Mediation in Civil Disputes1 is currently the subject matter of 
controversies among various actors operating within the juridical field in Turkey.  
Some of these debates seem to develop around professional concerns that deploy legal 
and juridical terminology while some others seem to have a rather political and social 
character as in the case of concerns about the compatibility of mediation with the 
social fabric or its interpretation as a political maneuver to overthrow the Republic’s 
judicial system.  In this dissertation, I aim to develop an understanding of these 
struggles that go into the making of the practice and the institution of mediation in 
Turkey by examining how legal professionals2 think and talk about mediation and 
how they position themselves within the ongoing debates.  
 Within this context, I follow Bourdieu’s take on the “field” which is 
conceptualized as a site of struggle for the monopoly of power over a structured set of 
                                                 
1 Hereafter Draft Law. 
2 I choose to employ the concept of “legal professional” in reference to main actors operating in the 
official world of law. In contrast to the Anglo Saxon use of the term where it is mainly associated with 
practicing attorneys, in the case of Turkey the term has a much wider coverage area that also includes - 
but not limited to- judges, prosecutors, lawyers and notaries. It is in this sense closer to the concept of 
“jurist” employed by some scholars.  It is also important to note here that although I employ the term in 
this way, due to the nature of my research that seeks to explore the internal meanings and practices, I 
do not offer an elaborate definition of the term and leave it up to my respondents to offer a detailed 
account of what it means to be a legal professional. This issue will be developed in the coming parts of 
the dissertation.  
In addition, it is also important to note that due to the nature of my object of study- mediation debates- 
most of the empirical analysis is focused on the legal consciousness of lawyers, theoreticians and 
judges who work as officials of the Ministry of Justice. Actors of the juridical field are of course not 
limited with these groups. For one thing, state prosecutors constitute a significant part of the 
professional activity in this field. Notaries are another group of actors operating in this field given their 
legal background. In addition, there are also other actors who operate in the field and who fulfill quasi-
legal functions if not proper judicial exercise. This group consists of judges of Administrative Courts 
who need not be graduates of law schools yet who are influential actors in the resolution of disputes 
between the State and the individuals. Trademark and Patent Attorneys or arbitration boards can also 
be considered among novel practices within the juridical field. Nevertheless, given the scope of my 
study, the employment of the term “legal professional” during the dissertation will refer to lawyers, 
legal scholars and officials of Ministry of Justice unless otherwise stated.   
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practices characterizing that field. In the case of the juridical field, this 
conceptualization calls for a recognition of the “competition for the right to determine 
the law”. In this sense, situating the debates around mediation within the existing 
struggles of the juridical field, I argue that while positioning themselves in the debates 
around mediation, legal professionals are at the same time imagining law in terms of 
issues such as what and how it should regulate and who should be responsible for 
these regulations according to what sort of criteria.  
 Within this context, this dissertation is an attempt to explore how the boundaries 
of the juridical field in Turkey are imagined in the legal consciousness of legal 
professionals as they position themselves within the debates around mediation as a 
newly emerging institution. Through an analysis of the struggles that take place 
around mediation, this dissertation aims to offer an account of how legal professionals 
draw the boundaries between what can be considered a meaningful practice within the 
field of their operation and how this practice can be integrated within the values, 
protocols and internal logic of the existing juridical field. In this sense, exploration of 
the axes of competition for the right to determine what mediation will look like will in 
turn allow for an empirical understanding of the recognized sources of authority, 
accepted modes of operation and types of symbolic capital valued within the juridical 
field in Turkey. This closer look at the debates around mediation in order to 
understand how legal professionals position themselves within these debates, how 
they justify these positions in relation to their notions of law, how they talk about 
other positions within these debates will also allow for an understanding of the axes of 
resistance within the juridical field to the “influence of competing forms of social 
practice or professional conduct” which in this case is imagined to be exerted by 
mediation (Bourdieu 1987, 808).  
 3
 At this point, a crucial question needs to be raised: Why does it matter to 
understand the struggles and the axes of resistance that are constitutive of the 
boundaries of the juridical field? In my dissertation, I attempt to prove the relevance 
of such an understanding by situating these struggles in the larger context of the role 
of law and the legal professionals in the Republican project of modernization in 
Turkey. Understanding the struggles around mediation which contributes to defining 
the boundaries of the juridical field is in turn a matter of understanding the 
construction of law as a particular social reality which in the case of Turkey’s 
modernization has been a constitutive element of social engineering. This, in effect, 
calls for a consideration of the role that law and legal professionals have played in the 
building of the new nation and its state in line with the Republican ideology.  
 Within this framework, I begin my dissertation with a brief history of Turkey’s 
modernization process and examine the role that law has played throughout this 
experience. In Chapter 1, starting with the modernization movements in the last epoch 
of the Ottoman Empire and moving into the early days of the Republic and 
contemporary Turkey, I demonstrate how law has been used as the basic motor of 
social change. This use of law also has implications for a certain type of legal 
professional who is imagined to be one of the primary executors of the change that is 
to come through legal reforms. For this reason, in Chapter 2, I examine the role of 
legal professionals in Turkey’s modernization process and problematize the lack of 
interest towards a sociological understanding of the role that these professionals have 
come to play in the construction and the sustenance of a unified political community. 
Within this context, I outline the historical forces and relations of power that have 
been influential in the birth, the development and the transformation of the legal 
profession in Turkey.  
 4
 This outline in turn allows for a reading of the legal profession in the context of its 
role as one of the agents of modernization in the history of the Republic from within 
the debates around mediation. With these early developments in the background, by 
focusing on the Draft Law on Mediation in Civil Disputes, through the dissertation I 
also examine the developments in the juridical field in the period after 2004 that has 
been commonly denoted by the official discourse as a period of “judicial reform”. 
This period marks the second wave of sweeping legal changes in the history of 
modern Turkey after the reform process of the early Republican period which was 
characterized by its developmentalist vision of law and its take on the legal 
professional as the signifier of its modernist outlook. I argue that an examination of 
how legal professionals situate themselves in the debates around the Draft Law and 
how they make sense of these positions with respect to their notions of society, law 
and legal profession can in fact allow for an inquiry that seeks to question the validity 
of the modernist vision of law in the legal consciousness of the legal professionals in 
Turkey.  
 The choice of studying mediation in civil disputes, in this respect, is no 
coincidence. Mediation is one of the items on the agenda of this second wave of 
judicial reform and as such the issues raised by legal professionals during these 
debates seem to be reflexive of how they think and talk about these reforms in general 
and how they imagine their effects upon the legal system and the social order in 
Turkey. In this sense, the debates around mediation offer clues regarding the extent to 
which the modernist imagery of law in Turkey as painted by the new nation state is 
still constitutive of the professional, social and ideological dispositions of legal 
professionals.  
 5
 Mediation is also a critical choice in terms of the particular implications of this 
practice upon the areas regulated by official law and the role of legal professionals in 
this regulation. The disputes that are eligible for mediation are outlined by the Draft 
Law as civil disputes arising from matters or procedures on which parties can freely 
agree upon and as such the debates around mediation almost always have implications 
for a certain type of social imaginary. Existing on the margins of formal law3, these 
disputes seem to raise new controversies around familiar dichotomies of 
public/private, formal/informal and traditional/modern. In this sense, debates around 
mediation not only offer insights on the compatibility of the legal consciousness of 
the professionals with the Republican conception of law as a tool of social change and 
the legal professionals as carriers of the modernization project; but they also give 
clues regarding the ways in which the society and its relation with the law is imagined 
by these professionals.  
 Following this background, in Chapter 3, I introduce the theoretical concerns of 
my dissertation. Starting with the larger question on the prevalence of law in modern 
society and offering an account of how this question can be tackled from a variety of 
theoretical approaches, I move onto the literature on studying law from actors’ 
perspective as a relatively novel approach towards an understanding of the ways in 
which law sustains its institutional power.  At this point, I introduce the concept of 
legal consciousness as a possible analytical opening for an exploration of the ways in 
which law sustains its prevalence in the modern world. This introduction makes sense 
in the context of how law reproduces itself as a meaningful category of social 
practice. Legal consciousness seeks to decipher this prevalence by looking at the 
                                                 
3 One of my respondents explained these margins in terms of those disputes that remain outside the 
scope of the “lower limits” established by the law. These are disputes that are not “valued” by these 
lower limits which the respondent defines as “small disputes”. Interview # 7. 
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meaning schemas and perceptions of social actors that circulate in their everyday 
exchanges with the law and legal institutions. My take on legal consciousness, 
however, focuses on legal professionals rather than lay people and offers their world 
of meaning and practice as an equally meaningful departure point for an 
understanding of how law sustains its relative autonomy.  
 At this point, I argue for the relevance of Bourdieu and resort to his concept of 
juridical field for an exploration of the particular relations of power and mechanisms 
of reproduction within the world in which legal professionals operate. Following a 
Bourdieusian perspective I see practices, institutionalization and relative autonomy of 
law to be an effect of social relations. Bourdieu and Wacquant assert that the 
participants of any field “constantly work to differentiate themselves from their 
closest rivals in order to reduce competition and to establish a monopoly over a 
particular subsector of the field” (1992, 100). In this formulation the boundaries of a 
field are imagined to be determined by an empirical observation which would include 
a study of fields that allows for an understanding of “how concretely they are 
constituted, where they stop, who gets in and who does not, and whether as all they 
form a field” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 101). Within this context, in this 
dissertation in the name of bringing in the empirical, I study the emergence of 
mediation in civil disputes in Turkey in reference to its imagined relation with the 
existing juridical field. 
 In Chapter 4, I familiarize the reader with my methodology. In this chapter, I 
describe the different methodological tools that I have used in my dissertation and 
offer accounts of how each method has contributed to my data collection. I believe 
that this quite extensive glance over how I have gathered the data that have been 
analyzed here, why I have chosen the explained methods to gather these data and how 
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each of these methods contributed to my analysis, not only provides reliability and the 
validity for my research; but by covering a multiplicity of sources on mediation, it 
also allows for an opportunity to better contextualize my data within the existing 
flows of information, types of knowledge and universe of influential actors.  
 In Chapter 5, I offer an overview of the emergence and development of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution4 movement with a particular emphasis on mediation as 
an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. Within this context, against a theoretical 
backdrop of the concept of ADR, I acquaint the reader with the historical 
development of such mechanisms especially in the US and the European context with 
a particular emphasis on legislative initiatives at national as well as international 
scales. I then present the international and the national context that have had an 
impact upon the emergence of mediation in Turkey. In this Chapter, I rather provide 
information on the process regarding when talks about mediation started in Turkey, 
what kind of a national and international context made these talks possible, how the 
Draft Law was prepared and how long this process lasted etc. At this point, I pay 
attention to giving general background information on the subject matter and refrain 
from getting into the controversial aspects of mediation. The controversies around this 
new practice constitute the skeleton of my next chapter.  
 In Chapter 6, I offer a detailed analysis of representations of ADR and particularly 
mediation as they have appeared in the written press, in institutional statements and in 
certain websites in the form of blogs or forums. This Chapter is intended to provide a 
background to my next chapter where I analyze my primary data from the interviews. 
An overview of the ways in which debates around mediation have been covered by 
the press, how and when they have appeared as subjects of institutional declarations 
                                                 
4 Hereafter ADR. 
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or in what context mediation in general and the Draft Law in particular have been the 
subject of online discussion spaces is significant for familiarizing the reader with the 
overall setting within which mediation has emerged as a controversial subject matter. 
In this chapter, I also present a brief summary of the issues that I have detected as a 
nonparticipant observer in the two conferences on mediation that I have attended. 
These observations contribute to the general picture of how mediation has been 
represented in different contexts through different means. 
 In Chapter 7, I move onto my empirical data where I analyze the narratives of 
legal professionals as they talk about their profession and law in general and about 
mediation as an emerging area of practice in particular. These narratives allowed me 
to situate mediation within the dynamics, symbols, practices, institutions, rituals and 
principles that are imagined to be characteristic of the existing juridical field by the 
agents of law operating within it. Attending to the narratives of the actors who have 
appeared to be the most vocal ones in the debates around mediation has in turn helped 
me develop an empirical foundation to what can only be called theoretical 
abstractions in the absence of historicity and contextuality. Analysis of these 
narratives allowed me to study the repertoires of meaning and the modes of operation 
that characterize the juridical field as a particular site with its own relationalities and 
dynamics of power that are always connected with the larger web of political and 
social formations at a given time and place in history.  
 For this reason, following the analysis of debates on mediation within a 
Bourdieusian framework in order to understand how the boundaries of the field are 
imagined, in the second part of Chapter 7, I move on to an exploration of the 
implications of these struggles for the legal consciousness of these professionals. This 
exploration is intended to present how these professionals think and talk about society 
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in general and law and legal profession in particular as they engage in the debates on 
mediation. This exploration becomes more relevant when considered in the context of 
the following chapter. In Chapter 8, building upon the determinants of the legal 
consciousness of these professionals, I set out to explore to what extent -if at all- 
Republican trajectories still shape the ways in which these actors imagine the society, 
law and the legal profession. Within this context, I reread the debates on mediation in 
reference to three prominent binary oppositions which are also relevant for an 
understanding of Republican frame of mind: Public/private, formal/informal and 
modern/traditional. In the last Chapter, in addition to the summary of the findings, I 
provide some concluding remarks on what this dissertation set out to explore in the 
first place and what it has managed to accomplish. 
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Chapter 1 
Setting the Context: Understanding Law in Turkey 
 
I. Modernization and Turkey: A Historical Glimpse 
 
 While thinking upon modernization, a simple reminder comes in handy:  “It might 
be worthwhile to remember that what inspired and empowered many of the thinkers, 
writers and activists of the modern era was not the certainties that were later invented 
but the ambivalence and excitement of modernization as it unfolded as a world 
historical process” (Kasaba 1997, 18). Fueled by a series of transformations in a 
variety of spheres, modernization indicated novel structures as well as new ways of 
defining human interactions, needs and expectations. The novelties introduced by 
modernization process in social, economic and political spheres also raised new 
dilemmas and challenges for the humankind. Modernization turned a new page in 
world history that would witness irreversible transformations.  
 Turkey has been a long time adherent of this historical process as well. Beginning 
with the decline of the Ottoman Empire, followed by the founding of the Republic in 
1923 and continuing into contemporary times, modernization has constituted an 
integral part of Turkey’s political, economic and social history. During the Ottoman 
rule, exchanges with the West have taken place in a variety of fields: Imitation of each 
other’s tactics and weapons in warfare, in clothing and diet; the growing resemblance 
through conversion, assimilation and marriage by capture; commercial relations 
allowing European merchants, scholars and others to travel in Ottoman lands (Lewis 
1968); the impact of the converts and the non-Muslims of Ottoman Empire on 
establishing links and communications between the two worlds (Artemel 1988, 
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quoted in Heper 1993) etc. In fact, this historical proximity with the West together 
with the “self-confidence deriving from the fact that, earlier in history (from the first 
part of the sixteenth to the middle of the seventeenth century) they had the upper 
hand” has been interpreted as leading the Turks to “consciously adopt European ways 
in order to arrest their decline and put and end to the conquest of their realms by the 
Europeans” (Heper 1993, 8). This initial look at the West as a way to compensate the 
losses generated mainly by military defeats in the late Ottoman period, would later 
transform itself into a modernist ideology that takes the West as the model civilization 
to be followed. The rest would consist of the perennial history of the pains and gains 
of an interaction that would continue into twenty-first century.  
1.  The Decline 
 During the “rising period” of the Empire (1453-1579), Ottomans considered their 
civilization to be superior to the West and as such it was not taken as an exemplary 
model. During the “decline period” (1699-1792), however, reasons explaining the 
Empire’s loss of power were sought particularly in the military superiority of the 
West. At this stage, the Empire is sketched as being aware of the problems it is faced 
with but not yet associating the solutions with modernization (Tekeli 2002). The 
revival of the existing system was perceived to be the way out of the dire strait. 
Strengthening the military power would serve as the ointment for the scar left by a 
lost battle. However, it was soon to be realized that strengthening the central army 
would in the long run increase expenses leading the Empire to a financial crisis 
(Tekeli 2002). 
 Faced with this new challenge that could not be overcome solely through military 
regeneration, Ottomans set out to figure out what lies beneath this emerging 
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supremacy of the West. Nineteenth century witnessed the sending of Ottoman young 
men to study in Europe and the continuous establishment of embassies in the West 
allowing Ottomans to realize the significance of financial resources and an efficiently 
working taxation system on the military success. With a mainly instrumentalist logic 
of reform, the state administration first introduced changes through economic 
channels with advances in the commercial field. These developments such as 
protection of property and lifting of controls on production remaining from 
preindustrial period were later followed by attempts to create a circle of western 
educated people to establish the social and economic liaisons that is required by this 
new order. Initially through sending male students to Europe and later on through the 
establishment of western modeled education institutions in the Empire, underlining 
thinking matrices of modernity started to diffuse among the administrative cadres of 
the Empire although it was not yet totally spread among the people (Tekeli 2002). 
These developments were accompanied by an increasing institutionalization of 
modernist sentiments leading to a new basis of legitimacy, one that needed to be 
sought in the people rather than the divine. 
 Tanzimat Period of 1839-1876 is a result of this new look at the West as the 
model to be followed. During Tanzimat, while the military, administrative and 
judicial structure of the West was being transferred, its everyday culture also started 
to sweep into the lives of the Ottoman elites. This period is interpreted as an 
“organization of mentality” in the sense that it marks the realization that the 
superiority of the West lies beyond its military power and witnesses the efforts of the 
reformists to capture its underlying mentality (Yavuz 2002, 214). These qualitative 
changes in the interactions with the West also gave way to an increasing divergence 
 13
of demands for political power within the Empire5. These demands were initially 
brought up against the administration rather than the Sultan himself and were bound 
to remain hidden until the First World War broke. The fall of the Empire at the end of 
the war resulting with the emergence of new nation states, witnessed the rise of a new 
line of political thought concerned with determining how much should be taken over 
from the West.6 Hence, modernizing elites of the Empire began to be concerned with 
the problem of westernization without “becoming western”.7 In fact, in the sense that 
                                                 
5 Şerif Mardin’s work provides a historical overview of the changes in the political landscape of the 
late Ottoman period (Mardin 1973). 
6 The debates surrounding this dilemma mainly focused on the necessity of separating Western science, 
technology and industry from Western mentality and Western worldview. Societies like Ottoman, 
Russian, Japanese and Iran -already having a rich historical accumulation- are pictured as always 
having had imagined a “we” that can compete with the West which have led them to see themselves as 
owners of a history that can “translate” any other civilization. Hence, the West was understood not as a 
model civilization but rather as a means to supplement their being (in terms of science, technology and 
industry), as a “compensating ideology” that could allow them to make up for their “historical delay”. 
This selective mentality is shaped by a “demand for otherness” that promises to remain however the 
imagined “we” is constructed. One of the most acclaimed followers of this line of thinking is Ziya 
Gökalp, a leading intellectual of the late Ottoman and early Republican period. Gökalp’s well-known 
distinction between “civilization” and “culture” refers to change without losing one’s sense of self 
(Çiğdem 2002, 68, 69, 73).  
7 The association between modernization and westernization has led to significant debates about the 
extent to which modernity as a project can be separated from the West as a historically unique political, 
social, cultural and economic entity. These debates have generated such theses as “multiple 
modernities” (Eisenstadt 2002), “non-Western modernity” (Göle 2002), “end of history” (Fukuyama 
1992), “clash of civilizations” (Huntington 1996). On the one hand, modernity as a project is seen as a 
product of Enlightenment which constitutes basic sine qua non elements such as trust in human reason, 
autonomous subjectivity, universality etc. It was born in Western Europe and although its claim to 
universality has led to its appropriation in many non-European contexts, the premises of modernity 
remain intact. As such, some of the followers of this approach have insisted that there is only one 
modernity that can only be realized in the West. On the other hand, a different approach to modernity 
in relation to the way it has been experienced in Turkey, gives reference to the debates around the 
failures of modernization process, the demise of its developmentalist ideals and the crisis of the state in 
Turkey which in turn have inspired a sense of pessimism regarding the exhaustion of the global project 
of modernity. In this perspective, the argument is that the failures of Turkish experience indicate not so 
much a failure of the project of modernity but rather the flaws of “social engineering associated with 
modernization-from-above” (Keyder 1997, 38). Another line of thinking, on the other hand, takes 
modernity’s features as a whole but does not negate the possibility of their application in non-Western 
contexts. For instance, in the case of Turkey it has been argued that its modernization has been 
metonymical because “the piece has replaced the whole” (Yavuz 2002, 212). This argument does not 
reject the possibility of being modern in Turkey, but it contends that modernization experience of 
Turkey has been so selective that it has remained at the level of symbols without understanding 
modernity in terms of its principal concepts and principles. In this sense, the argument follows that 
Turkey has not become “modern” or “western”; it has rather become “orientalist” because just as the 
West has identified the Ottoman civilization with the harem and the hammam, Turkish modernization 
has considered playing the piano, wearing a hat, speaking French to be the core elements of western 
civilization. Yet others have claimed that the project of modernity can be carried out in non-Western 
contexts without losing its soul. In the case of Turkey, one comment on the possibility of the 
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it requires a compromise between the “tradition” and the “modern”, this dilemma has 
been at the central of all debates around the project of modernity ever since its 
inception. Tekeli argues that in such a transformative climate, any political movement 
would need to prove that it harbors “the paths to development as well as the ways in 
which cultural identity can be protected” (2002, 30). The kind of compromise to be 
reached between rapid transformations and the protection of identity would in fact 
determine the type of relation to be established with the project of modernity.  
2. The New Nation State 
 The period after the last epoch of Tanzimat towards the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century is characterized by a wave of “radical modernity” (Tekeli 2002, 25).  
In this period, with the cadres of the new Republic (1923) making sure that they are 
seen and felt in every aspect of social life, modernization efforts no longer follows a 
concealed path. At this stage, there is also a shift in expectations from the project of 
modernity. With the Empire already falling apart, it would no longer serve to rescue 
it; rather, as the “founding paradigm” of this new nation state that aspires to be a part 
of the West (Kaliber 2002, 107), it was expected to allow for economic and social 
development (Tekeli 2002). In line with these new expectations, the new Republic 
                                                                                                                                            
realization of modernity warns against building the relationship with it on an East-West antagonism 
since this would inevitably mean a rejection of modernity’s claim to universality (Tekeli 2002). This 
argument realizes the possibility of inheriting modern principles without losing one’s identity. 
However, it is cautious of associating the “modern” with the “west” for its inescapable suggestion of 
the “east” as the other which would mean compromising modernity’s universalist posture. “Multiple 
modernities” and or similar concepts such as Göle’s “non-Western” modernity build upon changing 
experiences and definitions of modernity (against homogeneous, unidirectional sketches of modernity) 
and attempt to understand the project in its various contexts. Some of these approaches reinterpret 
modernity as a multidimensional, culture-bound project (multiple modernities), some assume the 
presence of other new experiences that could transcend the existing readings of modernity (alternative 
modernity), others attempt at moving modernity beyond the center -the West- and try to read it from 
the experience of the “other, the “periphery”; while other approaches try to move non-Western contexts 
into the center of the problematic of modernity rather than trying to analyze them as a “second-hand 
modernity” (non-Western modernity) (Göle 2002).   
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witnessed the modernization efforts of the new Turkish elite, touching upon the 
threads of the society in an unprecedented way.8 From the way they dressed to the 
alphabet they write with, from the music they listen to the way they dance, the people 
were introduced to a foreign set of cultural idioms and symbols that have been taken 
over from the West.9 These reforms are considered to have created an overall “state of 
amnesia” within the population by estranging them from most of their defining 
cultural practices and values (Kadıoğlu 1996). 
 These changes were particularly significant in two aspects. As the reformists 
identified modernization with westernization and hence with embracing the cultural 
values that define Europe as modern; “they were never satisfied with “increasing 
rationality, bureaucratization, and organizational efficiency; they also professed a 
need for social transformation in order to achieve secularization, autonomy for the 
individual, and the equality of men and women” (Keyder 1997, 37). And through 
these transformations in the lives of the people, the idea(l) of catching up with the 
modern civilization, i.e. the West, confirmed itself as a concrete societal project 
(Öztürk 2002). During this period, the elites of the Republic are sketched as focusing 
on their “will to civilization” rather than being engaged with modernist projects solely 
for the protection of state’s unity as was the case in the period of Tanzimat reforms 
(Kadıoğlu 1999, 27). Secondly, these reforms that have been part of a cultural 
                                                 
8 Robert N. Bellah argues that among anthropologists there is a consensus that these secularizing 
reforms had a strong impact in Turkey at the mass level as well as the elite level (1958, quoted in 
Heper 1993, 9). June Starr, based on her ethnographic experience in the western Anatolia, also argues 
that -despite the shared pessimism about the success of the social reforms in anthropological works on 
Turkey during this period- the social revolution of 1920s had in fact reached the rural women in 
Anatolia by 1950s.  Starr argues that despite the relative success of reforms on the lives of “elite urban 
Turkish women”, the rural women have continued to be imagined as “backward, submissive and 
subordinate to male and Islamic controls”; not necessarily because the social revolution failed to reach 
these women but because the “rural women’s struggle for autonomy went unrecognized at this time by 
the press, social researchers, and the villagers themselves due to their failure to form a social 
movement to articulate values concerning their civil rights” (Starr 1989, 499).   
9 Seçil Deren offers a detailed picture of this cultural revolution (Deren 2002). 
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Westernization program10 would also serve to create a homogenous Turkish nation 
that would constitute the new “political community” (Turan 1993, 121).   
 The constitution of this new political community would come about in a top-down 
fashion. This method was seen as necessary in a society that remained “under the 
pressures of conservative powers” (Tunaya 1960, quoted in Deren 2002, 382) and that 
needed the guidance of positive thought to be rescued from the “religious worldview 
based on futile beliefs” (Köker 1990, quoted in Deren 2002, 383). As characteristic of 
all societal changes configured from above, the newly established Republic’s 
aspiration to transform its people was devoid of the people’s demands and desires. 
The reformist ideology imagined the people as “masses” that needed to be guided and 
transformed in line with the objectives of the new Republic.11 In this sense, the 
“modernizing ideology has also had the function of grappling with an already 
important tradition ideology” that was embodied in religion as a “moral prop -
something to lean on, a source of consolation, a patterning of life” (Mardin 2006, 200, 
203). In this context, Mardin argues that the focus of the revolutionaries was “a new 
national identity”; but while trying to achieve this goal, they in fact overlooked the 
complexity of the social structure and the system of values that not only kept it 
together but also provided a sense of meaning in the daily life of the people (2006, 
203).  
                                                 
10 İdris Küçükömer argues that the interaction with the West in societies that are westernizing turns into 
a “cultural revolution” due to the structural-institutional deficiencies of these societies. As long as the 
societal transformation expected from westernization fails to come into being, an ideological, cultural 
and political emphasis on this transformation gains significance. With the deepening of this paradox, 
ideology of westernization gradually becomes the discourse of the ruling elite and loses it 
emancipatory potential (Küçükömer 1989, quoted in Çiğdem 2002, 75). 
11 Education would be one of the most important means to attain these objectives. The new Republic 
would use education to create its enlightened individuals who would in turn be the carriers of its 
modernist aspirations. For this purpose, in the 1920s students would be sent to the West (this time both 
to Europe and to the USA) on state scholarship in order to acquire its “civilization” and bring it back to 
Turkey to spread it through the nation (Öztürk 2002). 
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 Within this context, this ideal of a “homogeneous national identity”12 has been 
conceived almost as a natural element of the sociopolitical reality of the new nation 
which in a way was seen by the elites of the new Republic as a new legitimating 
framework for their transformative politics. Şerif Mardin interprets this top-down 
character of the reform efforts in the context of center-periphery dynamics whereby 
the center -constituted by the state bureaucracy- shapes the periphery (1973). In this 
interpretation, it is possible to detect the implications of the “popular personification 
of the Turkish state as a paternalistic figure, sometimes referred to as “the father 
state” (devlet baba) and other times referred to as a ‘teacher’ or ‘educator’” (Babül 
2008, 8). Within this imagery, the state is equipped with a multiplicity of educational 
functions that are realized through the national schooling system as well as through 
the mobilization of its “enlightened” agents as the carriers of its modernization 
project. This deployment sometimes comes in the form of “making bureaucratic 
appointments, i.e. sending civil servants on duty from the center to provinces all 
around the country” (Babül 2008, 8); while sometimes it appears in the form of 
mobilizing legal professionals as the agents of the new secular laws and legal 
institutions.13 
                                                 
12 Ernest Renan argues that neither race, nor language, religion, geography nor a community of 
interests form the basis of a national unity. The nation, argues Renan, is rather “a soul, a spiritual 
principle”; one that is constituted by “the feeling of sacrifices that one has made in the past” and “of 
those that one is prepared to make in the future”. Reinforced on a continuing basis through what Renan 
calls a “daily plebiscite”, the nation is imagined to be “a large-scale solidarity” that presupposes a 
glorious past and a present-day consent to live together. In 1882 when Renan formulated this 
conception of nation, he considered Turkey to be a typical example of a non-nation given its 
composition of “communities each of which has its own memories and which have almost nothing in 
common” which he considers to be a direct consequence of a “policy of separating nationalities 
according to their religion”. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, which Renan sees to be unfit for a 
national idea, the Republic of Turkey was established upon this very idea of a unified nation proposed 
by Renan. The Republican project of nation building has from its outset presented itself as the product 
of heroic fight against the external and internal enemies given by a courageous and heroic nation with 
“common glories in the past” and “a common will in the present” which according to Renan is the 
“social capital upon which one bases a national idea” (Renan 1882). 
13 Şerif Mardin previously elaborated the emergence of a type of “reformist bureaucrats” in late 
nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. Mardin argues that these bureaucrats, taking the leadership in 
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 While engaging with this project of nation building, the elites of the Republic 
were also trying to draw clear-cut boundaries between the new nation state and the 
Ottoman past. In this period, similar to the dilemmas of the modernizing elites of the 
late Ottoman period, the elites of the new Republic found themselves contemplating 
on the type of relation to be formed with the Ottoman past. As modernization efforts 
in the late Ottoman period were characterized by struggles over preserving the 
Ottoman culture and religion, the political discourse of the new Republic was shaped 
around a “break with the Ottoman past” that was seen as “traditional” and 
“backward”. Ignoring the achievements of Ottoman modernization efforts reinforced 
the marking of the founding of the Republic as the baseline of the new era ahead.14 
 This antagonism of traditional vs. modern has led to a Jacobin attitude15 which 
contended that modernization could come about through clearance of tradition (Yavuz 
                                                                                                                                            
reform, selected as “the earliest nodal point of reform of the modernization of educational institutions 
preparing the military and the civilian bureaucracy”. Following the model of Grandes Ecoles, this 
group of reformist bureaucrats produced a “well-trained, knowledgeable bureaucratic elite guided by a 
view of the ‘interests of the state’” (Mardin 1973, 180). 
14 Çiğdem argues that the relation between the Republic and the heritage of Ottoman thought is limited 
to the defense of “Turkish otherness” thesis which is built upon claiming all that belongs to the “Turk” 
to be “other”, to be “different”. In line with Ziya Gökalp’s thesis cited in Footnote # 6, this approach 
has helped the elites to preserve a constructed sense of “we”: defined as “Ottoman” and “Muslim” in 
late Ottoman modernization efforts and as “Turkish” in the Republican period. Nonetheless, the 
achievements of Ottoman modernization efforts continued to live among the right-wing ideological and 
political formations in the Republic (2002). These formations have in fact transformed the Republic’s 
claim to otherness over being “Turkish” into one that brings back Gökalp’s insistence on preserving the 
local traditions and culture and limiting westernization to a transfer of western science and technology 
(Demirel 2002).  
15 It is argued that Ottoman and Republican reformists alike have found their most direct inspiration in 
the French Revolution. Like the acculturation efforts of the Republicans, the Jacobins also carried out a 
revolution that was to diffuse into every aspect of social life. In this context, they changed the calendar 
into decimal units; renamed the days, months, and holidays; renamed the streets; introduced a new 
form of clothing and even encouraged people to change their names if these had any links to the old 
regime (Kasaba 1997). Şerif Mardin, on the other hand, questions this discourse of similarity and 
points out to a number of serious differences between the two social movements. Building upon 
Tocqueville’s conceptualization of a revolution –including above all social, political and ideological 
elements together with the fundamental element of violence- Mardin argues that if the French 
Revolution is considered as the benchmark of all revolutions, then the Turkish one is not one. In the 
Turkish case, Mardin argues that neither in the context of “the break with the preceding political 
system” nor in the context of a social transformation was there a comparable “systematic violence” 
especially insofar as revolutionary mobs are concerned. Mardin argues that as opposed to the French 
case, in Turkey “there was no systematic disestablishment and banishment of an entire class of the 
ancient regime” (2006, 193).  
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2002) and/or through disregarding or prohibiting traditions on the grounds that they 
constitute an obstacle to modernization (Göle 2002).16 Göle argues that societies 
under the impact of “voluntary authoritarian modernization projects” like Turkey and 
China have experienced this break with the past and the tradition in a much more 
radical fashion than societies that have experienced “colonialist modernization 
projects” like India. While India has embraced its tradition and even transformed it 
into a form of resistance against colonialism, in Turkey a radical denial of the past has 
constituted the foundation of a reformist ideology and a search for “a new life” (2002, 
65). However, the creation of this new nation and the construction of a national 
identity that aspires to be western was also paradoxical. The new Republic was 
established as a result of the struggles against western imperialism, yet the new nation 
was to be constructed within a western model of civilization. This is in fact quite a 
common feature of “Eastern nationalism” where certain features of the local culture 
are rejected because they do not conform to the set of standards established by the 
imitated model of progress; yet they are at the same time praised as distinguishing 
marks of national identity (Chatterjee 1993).  
 Within this context, despite the alleged break with the past, like the reformists of 
the late Ottoman period, the elites of the Republic found themselves facing the 
problem of what to take over from the West without losing identity. Kadıoğlu defines 
this phenomenon in terms of Turkish nationalism embodying characteristics of 
                                                 
16 Similarly Şerif Mardin argues that the cadres of the Republic were not interested at all in 
understanding the differences of the periphery and including them in the political processes. Rather, 
they perceived the cultural diversity of the provinces as an obstacle to modernization which needed to 
be transformed through the construction of a homogeneous and organic nation (Mardin 1990, quoted in 
Kaliber 2002). There are however counter arguments to this reading of the Republican project. Tanel 
Demirel, for instance, argues that it would be a misinterpretation to claim that the Republican project 
was in absolute opposition with traditions. He argues that the elites of the Republic did not anticipate a 
merging with the West at the cost of eradication all that is traditional; rather, they aspired to catch up 
with this civilization by preserving the Turkish civilization. In this respect, what the Kemalist elites in 
fact aspired to do was to get rid of the Islamist elements of tradition because they were interpreted as 
obstacles to modernization (Demirel 2002). 
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Enlightenment as well as Romanticism which translates into accommodating 
“Civilization” and “Culture” respectively. In this sense, she argues that the West is 
both “imitated” in the context of its civilizational model and at the same time 
“criticized” in terms of its moral side which has resulted with a permanent paradox 
(1999, 17). Till this day, Turkey continues to have a paradoxical affair with the West.  
3. Whither the Project of Modernity?17 
 Turkey’s modernization experience has been considered by many to be a solid and 
well functioning example of universalist aspirations of modernity.18 Its unique status 
as a Muslim constitutional democracy19 has been celebrated because of its advocacy 
of a western model of society as well as its efforts for the establishment of such a 
social order. Erik Zürcher for instance argues that the modernization project of 
Turkey has been praised by many because its experience has been highly attractive for 
the majority of the Western public. For the liberals, the establishment of a laicist 
Republic in place of the Sultanate and the Caliphate meant the victory of democratic 
values; while for the Left, the War of Independence was symbolic of success against 
colonialism. Zürcher even argues that the interpretation of the cultural and social 
transformations that Turkey has been experiencing as an acceptance of the superiority 
of the western culture has also been a source of contentment for the West (1992).  
                                                 
17 The subtitle is originally a part of the title of an article by Çağlar Keyder (1997).  
18 Bernard Lewis and David Lerner are among the world-renowned scholars who have acclaimed 
Turkey’s experience (Lewis 1968; Lerner 1958). 
19 It has been argued that “within the constellation of Muslim countries, Turkey occupies a distinct 
place” (Heper 1993, 12). In fact, Andrew Mango argues that right from its birth in Asia Minor, Turkey 
has been seen as Roman by the inhabitants of the older Islamic countries (1988, quoted in Heper 1993, 
12). Being the first among early twentieth century nation building projects, Turkey was also considered 
to be a “genuine revolution in the sense of positing a new ‘projected order’ based on republican 
institutions of popular sovereignty, common citizenship, language and ancestry, against the dynastic 
‘old order’ of the multilingual, multiethnic Umma of Islam” (Öncü 1993, 260). 
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 The second half of the twentieth century, however, witnessed the waning of this 
celebratory tone when the revolution was criticized as a product of an elite-run, 
authoritarian project from above that was not in touch with the popular will. It has 
been argued that Turkish nationalism -which has always been and still is an 
indispensable ideological element of the Republic20- is an extreme example of a 
situation in which “the masses remained silent partners and the modernizing elite did 
not attempt to accommodate popular resentment” (Keyder 1997, 43). Şerif Mardin 
argues that the “fear that Anatolia would be split on primordial group lines ran as a 
strong undercurrent among the architects of Kemalism trying to establish their own 
center” especially in the early days of the Republic but also continued to be a main 
issue of the Kemalist policy until the end of the one party rule (1973, 177). In the 
aftermath of transition to multi-party rule in 1950, the two main lines of Republican 
ideology, nationalism and secularism, were faced with strong opposition. The 
assumption that “ethnic and linguistic differences would eventually disappear and a 
homogeneous community of Turks would form the core of the new state” together 
with the efforts to subordinate “religious affairs to the priorities of the secular 
                                                 
20 Nationalism is one of the founding principles of Kemalism, the other ones being laicism, 
republicanism, populism, statism and reformism. In reference to the secularization efforts of the 
Kemalist project mainly built upon the eradication of the power of Islam upon state and social affairs, 
Özman argues that nationalism and laicism, replacing the Islamic worldview, emerged as new symbols 
of legitimation that were to constitute the building blocks of the cultural transformation (2000). 
Nationalism has also been one of the defining features of Turkey’s constitutional history. In the 
original version of the Republic’s first constitution (1924), Article 2 states that the religion of the state 
is Islam, the official language is Turkish and its capital is Ankara. The Article was later amended in 
1937 to include all the founding principles of Kemalism. The amended Article defined Turkey as a 
“Republican, Nationalist, Populist, Statist, Laicist and Reformist” state. The language and the capital 
city clauses were reserved. Article 2 of the 1961 Constitution, on the other hand, defined the 
characteristics of the Republic as a “national democratic, laicist and social state governed by the rule of 
law, based on human rights and fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble”. Nationalism as a 
principle of the Republic came back in the 1982 Constitution which is still in force today. Article 2 of 
the 1982 Constitution defines the Republic of Turkey as a “a democratic, laicist and social state 
governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and 
justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental 
tenets set forth in the Preamble”. The clause of the 1982 Constitution is the official translation. The 
clauses of the 1924 and the 1961 Constitutions are translated by the author. 
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government” quickly became core issues of political controversy as soon as the 
parliament welcomed the representation of new identities and interests (Kasaba and 
Bozdoğan 2000, 2-6).  
 In brief, there seems to be three main points of discussion when Turkey’s 
modernization journey is assessed. One is the continuing controversy around the 
question of the Ottoman past. In this picture, the past is taken to be symbolic of the 
traditional and backward and as such it is imagined to constitute the number one 
obstacle to what the Republican ideology set out to establish. In this context for 
instance, in 1925, fez- a form of headwear- was abolished in line with efforts to 
change the outlook of the people as part of the creation of the modern Turkish nation. 
What is interesting about this change is that in the nineteenth century fez was 
introduced as a part of efforts of westernization (Kasaba 1997; Koğacıoğlu 2003). 
Hence, what once served for the Ottomans as one of the symbols of “becoming 
western”, was removed from the everyday life of the people on the grounds that it was 
not compatible with the western look of the new nation. This discourse of “break with 
the past” was in fact not limited to the early Republican period. Kasaba argues that as 
late as 1983 elections when the military junta handed over the government to civilian 
administration, president Kenan Evren- the leader of the 1980 coup- warned the 
people against returning to “tried and failed” ideas and encouraged them to follow the 
“new” path opened by the new leaders. This warning against the “old” is seen as an 
extension of this continuing discourse of break with the past which asserted that in 
order to be a part of the modern world, Turkey had to free itself from all the ties 
binding it to the “pre-republican political, economic and social institutions and 
attitudes” (1997, 15).  
 23
 This controversial relation with the “past” on its own has been interpreted as an 
indication of the fact that a discourse of modernity is still pervasive among political 
and social currents defining today’s Turkey. Tekeli argues that a crucial feature of 
contemporary political trends in Turkey today is that they still define their positions 
within the political arena in terms of their assessment of the modernization experience 
rather than their prospective projects (2002). Defining westernization as a “grand 
political project” articulated by the Turkish elites, writing at the beginning of 1990s, 
Öncü also argued that “amidst sharp conflicts over ways and means, there has always 
been the continuity of a profound emotional commitment to the legitimacy of the 
grand project itself” (1993, 258).21 
 Following this idea of the prevalence of modernity, a second point of discussion 
revolves around the idea(l) of “catching up with the West”22 which has been and still 
remains to be a powerful motor force behind Turkey’s modernization experience 
although it has been instrumentalized by different actors for different ends. Within 
this context, İlter Turan argues that one peculiar difference between the Republican 
elites’ idea of modernization and the contemporary projections of the project is that 
modernization is no longer seen as a “consummatory” one whereby the idea of 
becoming a western society is an end in itself. Writing in 1993, Turan argues that the 
                                                 
21 This is despite the fact that particularly since 1980s the changes on a global scale have challenged 
“Turkish elite’s certainty of vision” (Öncü 1993, 258). Öncü argues that for the Turkish elite, this grand 
project was always based upon the European nation state and that in the midst of Europeans searching 
for a common identity beyond the nation state, Turkish elites’ were discovering that “the very basis of 
their claim to Western-ness, of being a member of the family of modern European nation-states” was 
slipping away (1993, 260). 
22 The phrase “catching up” is significant for its explanatory power in context of Turkey’s 
modernization. In several of his speeches, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk makes specific reference to this 
ideal. In a speech he delivered at the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the Republic, he is 
reported to have said: “We will elevate our nation to the level of the most prosperous and most 
civilized nations of the world…We will carry our national culture beyond the highest level of 
contemporary civilization” http://www.ataturkun-hayati.com/10yil-nutku/#more-13(accessed March 5, 
2010). In fact this “catching up” has been interpreted as an “utopia” not in the sense that it has been an 
unattainable “fantasy”; but in the sense that against the deficiencies, insufficiencies of the existing 
model of society, it has been proposed as an “alternative societal structure” (Öztürk 2002, 488).  
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politicians of contemporary Turkey no longer have “desires for comprehensive 
change without specific ends in mind” (1993, 133). 
 The insistent discourse underlying the importance of Turkey being a member of 
the EU and the necessity of taking the required measures for this purpose can be 
interpreted within this context. It is possible to observe that EU membership as a 
specific political end has been employed by actors with different political agendas and 
as such has been explained in reference to different ends. For instance, in its election 
statement, published before the general elections in 2007, AKP (Justice and 
Development Party) -the ruling party of the current government- defined European 
Union accession period as “an integration as well as a reconstruction period that raises 
Turkey’s political, economic, social and legal standards”. Accession is defined as an 
objective that will enable Turkey to approximate universal standards on matters such 
as democracy, fundamental rights and freedoms and the rule of law. AKP’s push for 
EU accession has been explained by some writers in reference to its Islamist origin 
and as such its interest in membership has been interpreted in the context of its desire 
for expansion of religious freedoms under the protection of the EU. The interest of the 
secularists in the process, on the other hand, is explained in terms of protecting the 
western orientation of Turkey through EU membership which is synonymous with 
keeping Islamist tendencies under control.23 
 Within this context, it is possible to observe that rather than a consideration of EU 
membership as an end on its own, the benefits of EU process are increasingly 
evaluated in reference to their contribution to Turkey’s development. Prime Minister 
Erdoğan’s call for rephrasing Copenhagen criteria as “Ankara criteria”, for instance, 
                                                 
23 Ziya Öniş presents a comprehensive overview of different political stances towards EU and their 
changing degree of commitment to Europeanization (Öniş 2009). 
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can be interpreted within this context. By naming the criteria for membership after the 
capital of Turkey, Erdoğan seems to refer to the significance of reform process for 
Turkey’s future and defines progress as an ultimate goal with or without the EU 
prospect (Öniş 2009). At the same time, the process of integration is not considered 
solely in terms of its advantages for Turkey. Turkey’s membership is also approached 
as a significant surplus value for the European world given her dynamism, young 
population, economic power, geopolitical significance, her strategic alliances 
particularly in the Middle East and Caucasus etc. In this sense, Turkey’s acceptance is 
not only evaluated in terms of its contribution to the economic and political well being 
of Europe; but also from a cultural perspective her membership is seen as an 
indication of Europe’s capacity to allow for coexistence of multiple cultures (Öniş 
2006).  
 The last but not least- and certainly not independent of the previous ones- point of 
discussion on Turkey’s modernization experience revolves around the top-down 
character of modernization process. Tekeli argues that between following modernity’s 
faith in human reason -thus allowing the society to change in its own pace- and 
changing the society in light of the knowledge they have acquired, the enlightened 
elites followed the second path despite the fact that this transformative mission would 
always arouse skepticism about the popular support of this project (2002). In fact, 
Şerif Mardin even argues that the “the Turkish War of Independence, which was the 
first stage of the Turkish Revolution, had much support from the lower classes insofar 
as it embodied resistance to a despised invader” (2006, 193). In this sense, it was 
rather in the fight against the invading powers that the people presented a united front; 
not in the cultural and social modernization aspect of the revolution (Mardin 2006, 
194).  
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 This dilemma in fact points to the crucial difference between “modernization-
from-above” and modernization as a “self-generating societal process” (Keyder 1997, 
39). Critiques of the Republican project seem to agree on this point that the project 
has “negated the historical and cultural experience of the people in Turkey” and as 
such it has “undermined the normative order in Ottoman-Turkish society” (Bozdoğan 
and Kasaba 1997, 4). In opposition to those celebrating Turkey’s experience as a 
concrete example of the success of the objectives of modernization in a non-western 
context- and hence of the success of its universalist claims-, these scholars argue that 
the Kemalist path of modernization failed to take into consideration the specific social 
and cultural framework within which it was applied.  
 These three discussion points have mainly centered on the modernization ideals as 
established and carried out by the Republican elites and institutions at the outset of the 
new nation state. Hence, Turkey’s modernization experience has commonly been 
criticized in reference to the gains and the failures of the grand project as it has been 
imagined by the early Republican elites. Given Turkey’s dynamism, a comprehensive 
historical account of this experience would suggest certain lines of divergence from 
the discourses underlying this original political project and from the practices that 
were carried out for the dissemination of the principles of the Republican regime. 
Given the scope of the dissertation, however, it is not possible to provide a full-
fledged historical account of these lines of divergence. Nonetheless, it is still possible 
to take a brief look at the latest developments in contemporary Turkey to have an idea 
of the ways in which principles of the Republican regime may have been reproduced 
within the society.  
 This type of an inquiry into Turkey’s recent sociopolitical history first of all 
necessitates its contextualization within these three points of discussion. These 
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dimensions are valuable for in essence all three of them have implications for the 
ways in which the relation between the state and the society has been imagined in 
Turkey. In this sense, the Republican project needs to be understood as a project of 
state as well as society formation. In the former case, an inquiry into state formation 
as an integral dimension of the modernization project is called for in order to 
understand what kind of a state has been imagined by the Republican elites and if this 
vision can still explain the role of the state in contemporary Turkey. In the latter case, 
on the other hand, modernization efforts of the Republic need to be considered in the 
context of the project’s approach to the people at large. Within this context, in the 
following pages I will first sketch an account of state-society relation in the Ottoman-
Turkish case and then move onto some defining moments in the recent history of 
Turkey for an exploration of the prevalence of this account.   
 As a starting point, Şerif Mardin’s historical account of the state-society relation 
in the Ottoman-Turkish context that is framed within a center-periphery dichotomy is 
highly useful for an exploration of how- if at all- the ways in which this relation have 
been imagined and instituted by the Republican project can still explain the existing 
sociopolitical dynamics in Turkey. In his influential essay “Center-Periphery 
Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?” Mardin proposes the dichotomy of center-
periphery as the main axis for explaining the structure of politics in the history of 
Turkey (1973). Within this context, Mardin argues that in comparison to the multiple 
layers of confrontation between the center and the forces of the periphery in the West 
that were compromised through mediating institutions -and hence the strong civil 
society- in the Ottoman State, only to be followed by the Republic, the central state 
has always held an authoritarian position with respect to the people.  
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 Within this context, the formation of the nation state has commonly been 
explained in terms of its similarities with the strong state tradition of the Ottoman 
Empire. Several historians and political scientists have referred to this continuity 
between the Ottoman state tradition and the modern Republic of Turkey within which 
the strong state has been configured as superior to the weak society (Mardin, 1973; 
Kazancıgil 1981; Heper 2000; Kalaycıoğlu 2002; Keyman 2005; Heper 2006; 
Keyman 2006). In reference to the categorical framework of Berki whereby he 
differentiates the political culture of transcendentalism or statist orientation from 
instrumentalism or societal orientation (Berki 1979, quoted in Heper 2006, 27), Heper 
argues that the state tradition that has been predominant in the Ottoman-Turkish case 
is one of “moderate transcendentalism” (2006, 35). In this type of state formation and 
the political culture that goes along with it, the state is institutionalized around certain 
norms which are either carried out by the public bureaucracy or the political parties.24 
This model of administration is, according to Heper, more symbolic of a continental 
European formation than a US model in the sense of the strong presence of the state in 
the social life. Within this context, Heper resorts to Badie and Birnbaum’s analysis of 
the balance between social and political functions of a state in the context of its role in 
a given society (Badie and Birnbaum 1983, quoted in Heper 2006). In this 
formulation, a culture of conciliation -as it is claimed to exist in the UK for instance- 
whereby disputes are resolved through political measures is seen as a sine qua non 
element of a political tradition of less state presence in social affairs. On the other 
hand, in societies with a political tradition of strong state, as in the case of France, the 
                                                 
24 In cases of extreme transcendentalism, on the other hand, an ideal type of this model would require 
the personification of the state in the administrator. In this type of bureaucratic organization, 
administration is highly personalized and there is no room for institutionalization (Heper 2006).  
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absence of such a culture has resulted with seeking legal solutions to political and 
social problems (Heper 2006). 
 In the Ottoman-Turkish case, the presence of the strong state is depicted in the 
dependency of the periphery upon the center. A constant tension between the center 
and periphery is considered to be characteristic of this type of administrative 
structure. The tension is seen as a consequence of the distance between the center that 
is always suspicious of the intentions of the provinces and the periphery that is always 
prepared to revolt against the center administration (Mardin 1973). The roots of this 
center-periphery cleavage have even been traced back to the formation of the Ottoman 
state by warriors who were opposed by “eclectic popular culture, heterodox religious 
sects and threatening rival principalities” (Heper 2000, 64). Under such circumstances 
and in the absence of intermediary institutions and an entrepreneurial middle class, 
the threat posed by the periphery has been the primary ground for maintaining a 
strong state. Heper argues that although the locus of the state shifted during the 
Ottoman reign from the personal rule of the sultan to the civilian bureaucratic elite 
especially in the Tanzimat period, the preoccupation with the welfare of the state 
continued to shape the Ottoman-Turkish political culture (2000). 
 Within this context, the Republic is also considered to be a follower of this strong 
state tradition in the sense that it has also taken the “maintenance of the state” as the 
primary item on its national agenda. The primacy of the state has become the official 
state discourse that was mobilized through the agency of voluntary ideologues 
(Erozan 2005). During the early Republican period, the center as it was constituted by 
the Republican elites under the roof of CHP (Republican People’s Party)25 -led by 
                                                 
25 The party was first founded under the name Halk Fırkası which translates as People’s Party. A year 
later in 1924, the word “Cumhuriyet” (Republic) was added to the name which was in 1935 purified of 
Ottoman Turkish and got its final version as Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. 
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Mustafa Kemal himself- strived to produce “different and various legitimations of the 
Turkish state and the regime” which usually required silencing the opposition whether 
it appeared in the form of political parties or as social revolts.26 In reference to the 
vitality of such a strong state for the success of modernization project, Erozan argues 
that the Republican elites approached the project in a “teleological” fashion in the 
context of the survival of the state (2005). In this new political agenda, the 
maintenance of the strong state was seen as a sine qua non element of the 
modernization ideal. Within this context, the more the Republican elites realized that 
the regime was not yet firmly established -as was manifested in the growing conflicts 
between the state and civil society that were expressed either as political opposition or 
social rebellions-, the more they further centralized the state and reinforced the reform 
movement.  
 In this sense, this continuity in the state traditions raises doubts about the 
Republican project’s claim to break with the Ottoman past. In the Republican period, 
Heper argues that the new bureaucratic elites have also considered the presence of a 
                                                 
26 The first serious opposition to the CHP in the first Grand National Assembly came from what is 
known as the İkinci Grup (Second Group) which was terminated by Mustafa Kemal due to its potential 
danger for the stability of the Republican regime. The next and potentially more serious opposition in 
the Grand National Assembly was organized in 1924 as a proper political party in the name of 
Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Progressive Republican Party). As opposed to the nationalist 
agenda of the CHP, this opposition party pushed for economic and political liberalism. The 1925 
Kurdish rebellion in eastern Turkey (Sheik Said Rebellion) that called people to arms for restoring 
Islam alerted CHP leaders about the dangers lying ahead. Even though the uprising was suppressed by 
the army and its leaders were executed by the extraordinary judicial powers granted to Independence 
Courts, the unrest caused by the rebellion raised serious suspicion about the intentions of the 
opposition. Hence, soon after the rebellion was suppressed, the Progressive Republican Party was also 
shut down. During this period the passing of Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu (Code of Reinstatement of 
Order/Law on the Maintenance of Order) that called for more serious authoritarian measures against 
opposition in the name of securing the progressive turn of the nation and the future of the state also had 
an immense silencing power upon the opposing voices. Later in 1930, this time Mustafa Kemal himself 
initiated the organization of an opposition party mainly to prevent economic distress from being 
translated into political demands. Hence, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Free Republican Party) was 
established in a controlled fashion for the purpose of enhancing the “quality of policymaking through 
educated debate”. Yet, the party was closed down again with Mustafa Kemal’s order because quite 
unexpectedly, it ended up gaining public support and hence constituting a true challenge to the political 
dominance of the CHP (Erozan 2005). 
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transcendent state as a prerequisite for keeping the new nation together (2006). Within 
this context, the break with the past conundrum can also be considered in reference to 
the particular social imaginary of the Republican elites. This tension between the 
center and the periphery that is claimed to have continued into the Republican period 
of state formation also has implications for the type of society that is imagined by the 
new elites. It has been commonly argued that in the Ottoman and the Republican 
project of modernization alike, society has been imagined as the object of social 
engineering (Mardin 1973; Heper 2000).  
 Within this context, the most radical one of the Republican elites’ measures 
towards the internalization of the principles of the regime by the people was the de 
facto creation of a new nation through various channels of social engineering. In this 
sense, further reforms from above were set in motion for the creation of this new 
nation that was made by the very virtue of “emphasizing their difference from the 
Ottomans along the similar Jacobin lines that the French revolutionaries followed in 
creating the Frenchman” (Kadıoğlu 1996). In this sense, albeit the Republican 
program of “creating an ethnically homogeneous community and turning it into the 
foundation of the new state” was formulated in terms of a break with the past, the fact 
that this program was carried out in a top-down fashion still constituted a continuity 
with the modernization efforts during the Ottoman rule (Kasaba and Bozdoğan 2000, 
2).  
 Today’s Turkey, on the other hand, is sketched as experiencing a shift in terms of 
state-society relations. Fuat Keyman argues that starting with the 1999 earthquake that 
resulted with tens of thousands of casualties, injuries and an immense economic 
burden upon the state and continuing with the 2001 financial crisis and the latest 
controversies around the Ergenekon case in late 2008 and 2009 whereby many high 
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ranked officers, judicial actors, media figures are charged with the accusation of 
overthrowing the government by force27, Turkey has been evolving from a tradition of 
strong state into a democratic state (Keyman 2009). These developments in the last 
decade have proved the incompetence of the allegedly strong state to solve social, 
political and economic problems in a speedy and effective fashion. Similarly, Kasaba 
and Bozdoğan also argue that beginning with the 1999 earthquake Turkey has entered 
a new era of state-society relations. During this new epoch, not only are some of the 
core principles of Kemalism like ethnic homogeneity, laicism and statism challenged; 
but also a new relation between the state and the people seems to be on the verge 
(2000). 
 In this last decade, early Republican elites’ desire to create an ethnically 
homogeneous nation has faced serious challenges from various groups with claims to 
identity and representation. The Kurdish issue and the rising trend of Islamist 
conservatism have emerged as central challenges to the existing political and social 
order. The increasing visibility of such claims and their impact upon the political 
discourse has been interpreted as a testimony to the failure of the allegedly strong 
state to attend to matters of social discontent (Kasaba and Bozdoğan 2000). Given the 
nature of the state-society relation within the strong state tradition, it is difficult to 
think of these moments of incompetence in terms of the state’s failure to fulfill its 
promises with respect to the people. After all, in such a model, the state was never 
formulated in reference to the needs or the claims of the people. In this sense, what 
                                                 
27 For more information on the case in English, please see, 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/home/9430816.asp (accessed March 5, 2010).  
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/yazarDetay.do?haberno=147778 (accessed March 5, 2010).  
http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13040014 (accessed March 5, 2010). 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/197896 (accessed March 5, 2010). 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,603581,00.html (accessed March 5, 2010). 
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these developments seem to display is rather a general discontent with this type of 
administration where the “nation is offended by the state, with a system that views the 
society as a threat, with a bureaucracy that belittles the citizen, with a republic that 
ousts the individual and with a political system that is impotent in the face of these 
adversities” (Yılmaz 1999, quoted in Kasaba and Bozdoğan 2000, 5). 
 All of these latest developments and the alleged transformation in the state-society 
relations seem to pose a challenge to the three main features of the Republican project 
of modernization. The efforts of the new Republic to establish a new state with its 
nation in light of modernist ideals -hence the discourse of break with the past- seem to 
have created serious repercussions in the years to follow its establishment. What the 
new Republic attempted to bury in the pages of history as the traditional and the 
backward ways of administration and social living blossomed as new political claims 
and spaces of social and political struggles in the aftermath of the transition to multi-
party regime in late 1940s and gained a particular momentum following 1980s. It is 
not that the Republican project did not face any opposition in its early days; yet the 
strong state did manage to suppress resistance coming from the periphery. In the 
decades to come, however, especially after the relative democratization of the 
political system with the transition to multi-party rule, the political and social 
visibility of claims for recognition presented larger problems for the legitimacy of the 
state and hence their suppression has been much more controversial if not 
impossible.28 
                                                 
28 For instance, party closures have continued to be quite frequent occurrences in Turkey’s political life 
as late as 2009. With the last party closure case against DTP (Democratic Society Party), the number of 
parties that have been closed down by the Constitutional Court since its establishment in 1961 has 
reached 25. This number increases up to 61 when the political history of Turkey is extended to the 
early days of the Republic.  
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 All in all, the role of religion and ethnic identity has become one of the central 
questions of politics as well as social order during this period and as such has 
constituted a major challenge to the Republican principles of laicism and nationalism 
respectively. In this sense, the Republican project was neither able to create the 
homogeneous nation it imagined; nor was it able to create a society that operates 
within a rational and positivistic frame of mind and action instead of the traditional 
structure mostly identified with “religio-mystical” features (Kadıoğlu 1996). In 
addition, the discourse of break with the past also seems to take a different turn as 
displayed by signs of “reclaiming of heritage”. Kasaba and Bozdoğan argue that 
increasing political and popular interest in Ottoman culture and history by the seculars 
and the Islamists alike attests to a shift in the ideological take on the Ottoman past as 
the backward and the traditional that needs to be discarded. Hence, rather than its 
monolithic denial, the Ottoman past had been awakened for various ends; sometimes 
in reference to Islamic glories, sometimes with respect to its strong Turkic heritage 
and sometimes in the context of its multiethnic and multireligious social structure 
(Kasaba and Bozdoğan 2000). 
 In reference to the ideal of catching up with the West -another major characteristic 
of the modernization project as envisioned by the Republican elites- these new social 
developments have presented yet another challenge. Especially with respect to the 
rising Islamist conservatism in the social, economic and political spheres, it has been 
argued that rather than being the anti-thesis of modern, these forces with Islamist 
backgrounds have managed to blend Islam and modernity (Göle 1991; Kadıoğlu 
1999; Kasaba and Bozdoğan 2000). With increasing urbanization and internal 
migration, what used to be seen as representative of the rural and the backward started 
to challenge the center as it has been imagined by the enlightened elites of the 
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Republic. For instance, Kasaba and Bozdoğan observe how leading actors of Islamist 
politics have been professionals like lawyers, doctors, engineers; and how these actors 
have adopted a cultural outlook that is socially conservative yet flexible towards 
Turkey’s economic and technological integration with global developments (2000). 
At the same time, the Republican ideal of catching up with the West also took a new 
turn with the new Islamist politics especially in the moderate wing of the movement. 
Since 2002 elections, AKP has been considered as a moderate conservative party with 
reformist tendencies which has been explained in the context of its vigorous 
commitment to the implementation of the Copenhagen criteria. In this context, the 
ideal of catching up with the West in the sense of adopting European standards has 
been employed in a rather persistent fashion by a party that has more often than not 
been identified with Islamist tendencies. Although AKP’s enthusiasm about the EU 
seems to have decreased and it has started to employ a political discourse that sees 
membership as a reform opportunity rather than as an end on its own, still this party 
of Islamist roots remains to be the strongest supporter of “catching up with the West” 
through the EU process.  
 In the context of the third characteristic of the modernization process, namely the 
top-bottom nature of the Republican project, the Ottoman-Turkish model of strong 
state vs. weak society also seems to be challenged by the changing role of the state 
that can be observed in its increasing collaboration with the civil society. Within this 
context, in reference to the capacity building projects for the Turkish state as part of 
EU process, Babül argues that another set of relations between the state and the non-
state actors seems to be emerging. In this new type of alliance, Babül presents how 
“the Turkish state, as opposed to its classical position as ‘the reformer’ and ‘the 
educator’ is defined as the one that needs to be reformed and educated” (2008, 10). 
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These novel axes of alliance in turn pose a challenge to the Republican conception of 
the state bureaucrats cum “guardians of Republican values and principles” who 
originally assumed the role of changing the outlook of the state and the society (Babül 
2008, 10).  
 Within this context, the state in contemporary Turkey is not only sketched as 
operating along changing turfs of power with the non-state actors, but its also seems 
to be in search of new grounds of legitimacy beyond the discourse of the all-knowing 
strong state. In this sense, this transformation also challenges the prevalence of a 
strong state tradition in Turkey in the sense of shaking the primacy of the center-
periphery cleavage. Since the elites of the Ottoman as well as the Republican period 
mainly preserved the center along lines of maintaining the primacy of the state and 
legitimized their “self-proclaimed supremacy” based on their knowledge about the 
West, the transformation of the state into the one that needs to be educated also has 
implications for this extended political tradition.29 
 All of these developments seem to suggest a certain shift in the political, social 
and economic outlook of Turkey that can no longer be adequately understood in the 
context of the strong center vs. weak society cleavage.  Not only are the groups that 
have previously been marginalized by the Republican principles of ethnic unity and 
laicism have acquired social visibility as well as political representation, but the 
center has also started to form new alliances with those groups that it did not attempt 
                                                 
29 Heper for instance argues that for the Ottomans the main axis of differentiation between those who 
belonged to the “Ruling Institutions” -such as the palace, civilian bureaucracy and the military- and the 
people was in fact a cultural one. As opposed to the rest of the population, the members of these groups 
were carriers of the “Great Culture” composed of the orthodox teachings of Islam and knowledge of a 
sophisticated language full of Arabic and Persian words. This distance between the elites and the 
people was later on intensified as from nineteenth century on the elites familiarized themselves with 
western culture that was not even tangential to the culture of the people. Similarly, during the 
Republican period, the reformist elites have preserved this cultural distance with the people as they 
have become more and more familiar with the cultural codes of the West (Heper 2000).  
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to integrate. In fact, the success of AKP in the last two general elections has even 
been interpreted as a sign of shifting hegemonic positions over the center, from the 
seculars to the “Muslim democrats” (Öniş 2009, 13).   
 At the same time, the political and cultural elitism of the reformists seems to be 
challenged by the increasing influence of civil society which inevitably has 
repercussions upon the state-society relations in Turkey. The forces of globalization 
are also significant factors influencing these developments not only in the sense of 
challenging the power of the nation state as the world evolves into an interconnected 
system of transnational flows and networks; but also in terms of the impact of this 
interconnectedness upon the creation of a global civil society whereby the demands of 
people on one part of the world are turned into sources of political activism by others 
in different geographies.  In this context, a large part of the public life in Turkey is 
also said to be moving “outside the purview of the Turkish state” (Kasaba and 
Bozdoğan 2000, 19). This development is in turn seen as the most significant blow to 
Kemalist ideology in the sense that its primary response to conflicts within the society 
or opposing voices in the political arena has been the “growing rigidity of the state 
institutions and their expansion to cover all aspects of life” (Kasaba and Bozdoğan 
2000, 19). 
 The achievements of the Kemalist regime especially in terms of economic 
development and the establishment of key institutions of parliamentary democracy 
which have been maintained in one way or another despite periodic military 
interventions are noteworthy especially when compared to countries with similar 
experiences in Latin America, East Asia and Eastern Europe (Öniş 2006). 
Nevertheless, its ideological rigidity that allowed for the survival of the state in the 
early days of the Republic no longer suffices to preserve the social order in 
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contemporary Turkey. In fact, Halil Berktay even claims that the number one obstacle 
to Turkey’s further modernization is precisely Kemalist modernization itself.30 The 
skepticism of CHP -the major opposition party in the Grand National Assembly- 
towards EU membership can be understood against this backdrop. Established by 
Mustafa Kemal for the consolidation of the Republican regime through legitimate 
political action, CHP’s current distance towards EU integration needs to be 
considered against a backdrop of a changing discourse of westernization that is no 
longer identified with the founding party of the Republic.  
 The fact that Turkey’s long yearned European vocation -despite its periodic loss 
of momentum- is currently being carried out by AKP as it appears to be the most 
committed political actor to the project, is symbolic of these shifting positions along 
the modernization continuum.31 Kemalist modernization project’s devotion to 
westernization seems to be taking a different turn in the hands of the AKP 
government with is particular emphasis on expanding religious freedoms and its 
recent initiatives regarding the Kurdish issue which ultimately constitutes a challenge 
to Kemalist principles of laicism and ethnic nationalism precisely through a 
commitment to the European project. At the same time, increasing involvement of 
civil society actors in the EU process also seems to introduce a novel dimension to 
reform process that is considerably different from the elite-based, top-down 
modernization project of the early Republican period. It is not that modernization 
project has lost its appeal in Turkey. It is no longer possible, however, to argue that 
the project retains its original ideological framework as outlined by the Republican 
                                                 
30 This comment was made by Halil Berktay himself at “Academic Freedom and University Autonomy 
in the Balkan, Black Sea and Caspian Regions: Measures & Strategies” meeting co-organized by SAR 
(Scholars At Risk Network), NEAR (Network for Education & Academic Rights) and Istanbul Bilgi 
University Human Rights Law Research Center on October 23-24, 2009. 
31 Öniş provides a comprehensive analysis of AKP’s commitment to EU process (Öniş 2006). 
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elites. The challenges for the strong state tradition and the increasing agency of non-
state actors seem to designate shifting grounds of legitimacy.  
 One of these grounds seems to be law with its gradually increasing presence in 
sociopolitical affairs. Law has been utilized as one of the basic motors of social 
change throughout the Republican project and legal professionals have been 
influential ideologues of the regime. As such, the role of law in the modernization 
history of Turkey is noteworthy. In light of above mentioned observations on the 
changes in the defining characteristics of Turkey’s modernization as outlined by the 
founders of the regime, it is also important to explore the extent to which law still 
remains a significant means for changing the society and legal professionals still 
assume their original roles as pillars of modernization. Within this context, in the 
following pages, I will first provide an account of how law has been imagined as a 
tool of social change and how it has been utilized as such by the reformist elites of the 
Republic. I will then move onto the next Chapter where I will offer an account of the 
historical development of legal profession in Turkey and its missionary role in 
spreading the principles of the Republican regime. I will then explore the political 
nature of the profession in terms of its close relation with the state and analyze the 
validity of this tendency in light of contemporary developments in the legal and 
political fields.  
II. Law and Social Change 
 
 Throughout this modernization experience, law in Turkey has always received a 
particular attention from modernizing elites in the sense that it has been considered 
one of the basic motors of the desired social change (Schur 1968; Livingstone and 
Morison 1990; Starr 1992; Zürcher 1998). Theories of law and social change in fact 
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go back to the nineteenth century European social thinking. Frank Munger argues that 
“specifically the Durkheimian and Weberian strands that gave rise to modernization 
theory which in turn influenced American research on law and social change, focused 
on the function of public institutions in reducing or controlling private conflict that 
arose from the industrialization and bureaucratization of modern society” (Munger 
1990, 219). Law has occupied a specific place within this line of thinking in terms of 
the role it plays in the realization of values characterizing the social order and as such 
reflecting the society and its culture (Friedman 1985). Hence, the interest of 
modernization theories in the power of law as a means through which social change 
can be instigated has a long history. Works looking at this interaction between law 
and social change (Friedmann 1972; Starr 1989; Starr 1994; Mounira 2001) and post-
colonial literature in general- pointing out to the dilemma between the civilizing 
projects of colonial powers and the cultural threads of the colonized society 
(Chatterjee 1986; Merry 2000) - more often than not build their frameworks upon this 
employment of law as a complex means of social change and of political 
empowerment.  
 Similarly in the case of Turkey, importing western legal corpus and institutions 
has been perceived as one of the most effective ways through which the new nation 
can meet its aspiration of catching up with the civilized world. This “borrowing” from 
the West can in fact be seen as a type of “public reform” in the sense that following 
lines of ideology, experts and professionals engage in modernization of law, in most 
cases in the absence of such a demand from the public (Friedman 1977, 160).  In the 
Republican vision, changing the outlook of the society through approximation of the 
existing legal system to its western counterparts would not only open the way to 
deeper substantive changes within the society but it would also prove the resoluteness 
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of this new nation and its state to become a member of the civilized world. Sami 
Selçuk, a former President of Court of Appeals, after referring to the significance of 
the adoption of Swiss Civil Code, explains this situation in the following fashion:  
“...The society will be elevated to a modern level by adopting the laws of a society 
that has reached highest levels of civilization and implementing them in this society 
that has never experienced enlightenment, has never settled down completely, has a 
very low level of literacy and urbanization. But while doing this, law will never 
descend to the level of the society. On the contrary, the society will always be 
elevated to the level of the law. Hence, western law will be used as a revolutionary 
lever to catch western civilization” (Selçuk 2008, 8). The law as such has been 
approached in quite a positivistic framework within which the normative order is 
imagined to be constituted from within the law itself, rather than from constitutive 
elements external to this system of norms.  
 The Republican elites’ efforts to appropriate mainly European law and legal 
institutions were not without a precedent. Significant legal reforms were also carried 
out before the Republic especially during the Tanzimat period (1839-1876). In fact, 
Tanzimat Edict of 1839 -considered to be a turning point in the renovation of the 
state32 and hence the formal beginning of westernization in the Empire- was already 
giving clues regarding the future integration of western legal corpus into the Ottoman 
legal system. The Edict recognized the need for passing new laws for the better 
administration of the state which is interpreted as a legal reform especially in the 
commercial law, criminal code and procedures and court organization (Otacı 2004). 
In line with the Edict, a series of new laws and institutions were introduced along 
lines of secularization during this period: A new criminal code recognizing equality 
                                                 
32 The word Tanzimat means reorganization, reform. 
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between Muslims and non-Muslims (1843); a new commercial code adopted from 
France (1850) together with mixed tribunals for commercial cases in which foreigners 
were involved; a new law allowing foreigners to own land in the empire for the first 
time (1867) and establishment of new secular courts (Nizamiye Courts) to deal with 
cases involving non-Muslims (1869) (Zürcher 1998). In this respect, although Shari’a 
was never nullified, its scope was limited to matters of family law. Following this 
period of reform, the Constitutional documents of 1876 and 1908 were additional 
significant attempts to modernize Ottoman law and legal system.  
 These reforms, however, were rather seen as measures in administrative and 
commercial arenas aimed at establishing the suitable commercial environment for 
western countries, lacking truly observable effects upon the social life of the Empire. 
It is in this sense that Tanzimat is considered to be a period of reorganization of the 
state in line with western models of administration. Legal novelties, during this 
period, were rather attempts to modernize the Ottoman State and as such had 
relatively limited effects upon the people. Although nineteenth century Ottoman life 
witnessed serious changes in social habits, modernization as a state policy has largely 
been interpreted as a vehicle for maintaining the power of the state that has been on 
decline. Reforms of 1920s, on the other hand, were much more drastic “acculturation” 
(Selçuk 2008, 9) efforts directed at changing the whole social and cultural landscape 
of the people in order to help the Republican project reach its goals. In fact, it has 
even been argued that while law has been used primarily as the means to save the 
state in the Ottoman period, for the elites of the new Republic it was adopted as the 
primary instrument of changing the outlook of the nation with the ultimate goal of 
creating a modern society (Otacı 2004). 
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 With this vision of law as the main instrument through which the new Republic 
can situate itself as the modern and the progressive vis-à-vis the allegedly backward 
and static Empire, in light of the ideals of the new regime the whole legal landscape 
went through significant transformations in 1920s and 1930s. Beginning with the 
abolition of the Sultanate in 1922 followed by the abrogation of the Caliphate and the 
Ministry of Islamic Law and Foundations in 1924, Republican elites initiated a phase 
of speedy legal reforms with massive effects upon the social life. In 1924, education 
was unified under a national board which was a crucial step in the creation of a 
monolithic Turkish identity. The first Constitution of the Republic adopted in 1924 
was later amended in 1928 with the removal of the clause on Islam being the official 
religion of the state. Since the role of religion in public life has been one of the 
primary issues on the agenda of the Republican elites, the removal of this clause is 
symbolic of the regime’s desire to secularize social life of the new nation.  
 In addition, significant changes in the legal corpus and structure such as the 
replacement of the Ottoman civil code (Mecelle) based on religion with the new Civil 
Code modeled after the Swiss Civil Code (1926)33, adoption of the Code of 
Obligations and the Commercial Code (1926) and partial adoption of the Italian 
Criminal Code (1926) were also underway following changes in legal institutions like 
the complete replacement of Shari’a courts by new courts modeled after western 
counterparts in 1924.34 The effects of these changes in the legal arena upon the 
accustomed terms of social living were further intensified by a serious of changes that 
                                                 
33 The adoption of the Swiss Civil Code has been an especially controversial moment in the history of 
the secularization of law and the legal system in the Republican period. In reference to the 
controversies around the secularization efforts, Özman argues that against those who supported the idea 
of partial reception, Kemalist cadre insisted on the need to modernize traditions through law which 
resulted with the full reception of the Swiss Civil Code in 1926 (2000). 
34 During Tanzimat, the jurisdiction of Shari’a and its courts was limited to the area of family law. 
Followed by the replacement of Mecelle by the new Civil Code during the Republican period, these 
courts were abolished all together. 
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directly aimed a cultural transformation. In this context, adoption of the Hat Law, 
adoption of international time, calendar and length measurements and adoption of 
new Latin alphabet in the period of 1925 and 1931 all attest to the intensity of 
acculturation efforts of the regime since all these changes had concrete effects upon 
the outlook of the new nation. In the case of the Hat Law, for instance, wearing 
apparel which could be construed as a religious symbol like the fez or the turban was 
forbidden. With regards the Latin alphabet, on the other hand, Feroz Ahmad claims 
that “At a stroke, even the literate people were cut off from their past. Overnight, 
virtually the entire nation was made illiterate” (Ahmad 1993, quoted in Kadıoğlu 
1996). In this sense, these reforms have been interpreted as measures to create “a 
general state of amnesia” among the people or as attempts to construct the national 
imaginary as a “tabula rasa” that would start “‘afresh’ in its efforts to ‘catch up’ with 
the ‘West’” (Kadıoğlu 1996; Koğacıoğlu 2003). 
 Within this context, these measures are seen symbolic of a political project that in 
fact considered the idea of “becoming western” as and end in itself. This “becoming 
western” was not only imagined in relation to a remodeling of the state administration 
in line with Kemalist principles of laicism, republicanism, populism, statism and 
reformism. It was at the same time an ideological reconstruction of the society 
through comprehensive legal reforms that imagined a new type of social living. The 
mobilization of law as the primary means for realizing the type of social 
transformation imagined by the Republican elites can be considered in the context of 
three points of discussion that seem to emerge when Turkey’s modernization 
experience is assessed. The abolition of the legal system, cadres and norms of the 
Ottoman times only to be replaced by a new legal corpus, new legal mechanisms and 
professionals is symbolic of modern Turkey’s alleged break with the past. The fact 
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that these novelties have de facto been created in line with western counterparts 
attests to Turkey’s aspirations of catching up with the West. Last but not least, the fact 
that law has been the primary mechanism used to transform the social and cultural 
fabric of the new nation tells even more about the de facto alienation of the people 
from this modernization process in the sense that law as an institution is already a 
foreign element in people’s lives in terms of the ways in which it is formulated and 
adapted. In this sense, the use of legal reforms to change the outlook of the society 
and hence the introduction of a completely new set of norms for the regulation of 
social life can be interpreted in the context of the top-down character of this 
modernization project.  
 The instrumentalization of law has also constituted a prominent feature of the 
criticisms directed at Republican project of modernization. Within this context, 
emphasis has been placed on the gap between the people and the law as a particular 
offspring of the ways in which the Republican elites have mobilized law in an 
instrumental fashion, only to serve the needs of the new state and to create a political 
community in line with the ideological principles of this new state. In this line of 
thinking, modernity is still imagined to be a promising project especially in terms of 
its Enlightenment ideals of emancipation and individual autonomy as long as the 
people become the main agents of this project. In this context, Keyder, for instance, 
argues that the gap between the modernizing elites and the people emerged as “the 
axis around which the subsequent history of Turkish society was played out” (Keyder 
1997, 45). Thus, with regards the role that law has played in the social imaginary of 
the people in Turkey, the gap between the modernizing elites and the people 
translated into a lack of ownership of the norms that have significant power in the 
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regulation of the terms of social living.35 In a similar fashion, Heper also argues that 
in the Ottoman-Turkish modernization continuum, the “natural rights of man” has 
never been the primary motivation behind political and social change. In this political 
tradition, rights and liberties have not been introduced as a matter on their own, rather 
as instruments for consolidating the type of political change imagined by the reformist 
elites in both cases (Heper 2000, 80). 
 This take on modernization efforts as lacking a genuine interest in establishing a 
rights-based sociopolitical reality is valuable to the extent that it builds upon this gap 
between the people and the modernizing elites especially in the context of mobilizing 
law for imagined social change. Yet, Keyder’s analysis in particular, still suffers from 
a certain degree of Eurocentrism in the sense that he imagines modernization process 
in reference to certain normative ideals that are predominantly western such as 
citizenship, rule of law and civil society. In this context, Keyder seeks to understand 
the failures of the project from within a model of liberal social structure based on 
ownership of rights, a strong civil society and a prevalent rule of law order. 
Nevertheless, this type of an analysis is still significant particularly because it refers to 
a certain discrepancy between theory and reality especially in terms of the attainments 
of the Republic in the legal field and their ownership by the people. In this picture, 
Keyder problematizes the lack of ownership of rights in reference to the familiar 
                                                 
35 In her ethnographic study on the impact of secular law in the lives of rural Muslim women in 1950s 
Western Anatolia, June Starr argues that by this time new ideas on women’s rights had already started 
to reach these rural women. The discourse, within which these ideas were framed, however, was not 
one of “rights” but was an “awareness that the district courts would act on cases concerning women's 
claims and grievances” (1989, 500). Starr observed in 1950s that while the number of women 
parliamentarians was 17 in 1935, this number showed an ever decreasing tendency after Turkey moved 
into two-party system” (1989, 502). In contemporary Turkey, according to the configuration after the 
latest national elections in 2007, the number of women representatives in the Grand National Assembly 
is recorded to be 50 out of a total of 550. This general outlook that has been a recurring trend in the 
course of the Republic can be interpreted against this conceptual deficiency defining the ways in which 
modernization has been projected upon the social imaginaries of the people in Turkey.  
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dichotomy of the authoritarian nation state and the weak civil society and argues that 
the struggle between the state as the “guardian of social change” and the public will 
give way to the realization of the “Enlightenment ideals of emancipation” and 
individual autonomy only if the people are endowed with full citizenship rights not 
only in theory but also in practice (Keyder 1997, 49).36 
 Another line of thinking, on the other hand, problematizes this discrepancy 
between gains of modernization on paper and their reflections in reality in reference 
to a “conceptual deficiency” that Turkey’s modernization seems to suffer from. 
Within this context, it is argued that Turkey’s modernization process has been devoid 
of a conceptual foundation because not only it has appropriated the reason of 
Enlightenment in a dogmatic rather than a critical way; but also by associating 
modernization only with Enlightenment, it has failed to adopt concepts such as human 
rights and civil society that have circulated in Europe at a later period. Thus it is 
claimed to have been experienced at the level of symbols and hardly ever 
apprehended from a conceptual dimension (Yavuz 2002). Similarly, Republican 
policies have been criticized for establishing modern institutions one after another 
without creating the foundation for a “modern ethos” which is claimed to have 
resulted with a project of modernity that is brought from above; rather than a long 
term process of modernization that allows for the establishment of a conceptual and 
normative foundation before the institutional structure (Kadıoğlu 1999).  
 Within this context, experiencing modernization at the semiotic level rather than 
conceptually is claimed to have resulted with a lack of internalization of the 
                                                 
36 Incessant military coups are also considered to have contributed to this lack of ownership by 
reminding people that even the rights that have been granted could be taken back (Keyder 1989, quoted 
in Yavuz 2002). On a similar terrain, Heper also argues that the Republican state and political elites 
carried out reform projects independent of the people as late as the economic revolution project of Özal 
period in 1980s (2000). 
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transformations taking place in the name of modernizing. Şerif Mardin, in this sense, 
criticizes the Republican project for its failure to create meaning in the everyday life 
of the individual. In several of his works, Mardin argues that in the case of Turkey the 
transformation has always been incomplete mainly because the new positivist 
ideology of the reformist Republic has failed to breed new set of values that would 
allow for an ownership of the changes taking place in people’s lives (1977; 2006). In 
this sense, the Republican project has been considered mainly as a “revolution of 
values” in the sense that it mobilized a way of “fastening on values” in a multiplicity 
of polices that directed at the “destruction of social norms” without creating a 
sustainable set of values and integrative mechanisms (Mardin 2006, 203). On a 
similar terrain, tracing back the beginnings of modernization efforts to Tanzimat 
period, Kadıoğlu shows how the “cosmetic modernization” of the elites have become 
a major line of controversy in the debates on whether western civilization model 
could be adopted in a piecemeal fashion or not (1996; 1999). In this sense, legal 
reforms during the early Republican period can be assessed in reference to this 
conceptual deficiency. Within this context, it is argued that while the Hat Law was 
passed as early as 1925 -ensuring that the people of the new nation also “looked” 
modern-, 75 years had to pass before the concept of “human rights” could be 
incorporated into the politico-legal discourse (Yavuz 2002, 215).  
 This mobilization of law is not confined with the early days of the Republic 
either. The EU process that Turkey has been going through has created an impetus of 
change among a diverse universe of actors. In the political realm, this impetus has 
been predominantly shaped by efforts to harmonize national legislation with EU 
standards which translated into significant reforms in the legal sphere. These 
developments which gained a particular momentum after 2004 when negotiations 
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with the EU have officially been initiated are usually defined as the second wave of 
judicial reform in the history of modern Turkey. Within this context, changes in the 
2003 Civil Code in the realm of gender equality like the removal of the clause on the 
man being the head of the household or introducing a system of equal rights and 
benefits regarding domestic relations; or the introduction of new legal institutions like 
victim-offender mediation or probation in the new Criminal Code and Criminal Code 
of Procedure in 2005 are again imagined to carry a significant potential for 
transformation of the society.  
 Nonetheless, the mobilization of law during this period cannot be solely 
interpreted in the context of realizing social change through legal reforms. Recent 
implications of this instrumentalization also seem to point towards a somewhat 
different relationality between law and social change. The immediate past and the 
present of political controversies in Turkey and their frequent reference to law and the 
legal institutions seem to revolve around the implications of resorting to law for the 
resolution of rather complex social and cultural problems and the concerns regarding 
the kind of social change that can come about through this instrumental use of law.37 
Hence, it is not so much the instrumentalization of law for social change but the 
possible change that could come about as a result of using law as the escape route for 
the “resolution” of socially and politically controversial debates that seems to elevate 
                                                 
37 Over a century ago, Tocqueville observed a similar tendency in the American context. In his 
influential work, Democracy in America, he writes that “there is hardly a political question in the 
United States which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one” (1966, 270). Austin Sarat and 
William L.F. Felstiner argue that this is in line with Tocqueville’s general observation on Americans as 
understanding “their social relationships and their social problems through the lenses of law” (Sarat 
and Felstiner 1989, 1663). This observation of Tocqueville has later on been taken up by many scholars 
in relation to arguments regarding the litigious nature of American society and the overwhelming 
presence of law in the life of Americans (Galanter 1983; Friedman 1985; Merry 1990). My argument 
here, however, refers less to a litigation mania in Turkey than to an overall and increasing tendency to 
resort to law and judicial mechanisms for the resolution of what in essence are politico-social 
problems. 
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the tension among various actors operating in the world of politics.38 The transmission 
of political deadlocks to the Constitutional Court like the controversies around the 
presidential election in 2007 followed by the controversies around the results of the 
referendum on electoral reform allowing among other things the election of the 
President by popular vote; the constitutional change package allowing headscarf in 
higher education institutions and the decision of the Constitutional Court overturning 
these constitutional amendments; or the party closure case filed against AKP and the 
Court’s decision to drop charges in 2008;39 followed by the more recent upheaval 
caused by the Ergenekon case, all seem to share a common ground upon which law 
rises as the main instrument of legitimating political stance and action.  
                                                 
38 Metin Heper makes a similar diagnosis on the Ottoman political system. He argues that in the 
Ottoman-Turkish political context, issues that required political or legal solutions were interpreted as 
administrative issues. Based on Mardin’s analysis of the tension between the center and the periphery 
characterized by center’s constant suspicion of the periphery, Heper contends that this ongoing tension 
resulted with the common perception of legal issues as administrative issues (Mardin 1973 and Idem 
1969, quoted in Heper 2006, 40).  My observation of the current situation in Turkey, on the other hand,  
indicates a certain shifting ground of legitimacy to the law in the sense that issues of social and 
political complications are passed on to the judiciary which constitutes an obstacle for ordinary politics 
to follow its course. 
39 For more information on these controversies in English, please see, 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/2007-elections-turkey/article-163039 (accessed March 5, 
2010).  
http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/417160.asp (accessed March 5, 2010).  
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=133847 (accessed March 5, 2010).  
http://bianet.org/english/religion/105126-president-gul-ratifies-headscarves-at-university (accessed 
March 5, 2010).  
http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/Press%20release_TurkeyFeb13.pdf (accessed March 
5, 2010).  
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,HRW,,TUR,4562d8cf2,484cee95c,0.html (accessed March 5, 
2010).  
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/06/world/europe/06turkey.html (accessed March 5, 2010).  
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/turkey/9107525.asp?gid=231&sz=39508 (accessed March 5, 2010).  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7441227.stm (accessed March 5, 2010).  
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=159102 (accessed March 5, 2010).  
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=138009 (accessed March 5, 2010).  
http://bianet.org/english/politics/108704-justice-and-development-party-is-not-closed-but-fined 
(accessed March 5, 2010).  
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=top-court-drops-old-closure-case-against-govt-2009-07-10 
(accessed March 5, 2010).  
http://www.resetdoc.org/EN/Arato-court-akp.php (accessed March 5, 2010).  
http://www.juancole.com/2008/06/arato-turkish-constitutional-crisis-and.html (accessed March 5, 
2010).  
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 Judicial actors also contribute to this instrumentalization by sticking to a discourse 
of independence that allows for the legitimation of law’s operations in the political 
arena to the detriment of the people whose “will” is supposedly represented in the 
Grand National Assembly; while on the other hand the political elite seems to switch 
their basis of legitimacy from the people to the law by referring to the legal system for 
the “resolution” of socially contentious matters. Reference to the independence of the 
judiciary as a quest for legitimacy seems to be serving all: The judiciary, the political 
elites, the media, the non governmental bodies, the transnational actors and even the 
public itself.40 Recent developments in Turkey seem to suggest a picture of law that 
offers the most convenient cradle for almost any political turmoil to mitigate itself and 
simplify its implications on the larger societal platform. In this sense, law with all the 
norms, institutions and practices it embodies seems to be utilized not only as the 
primary mechanism of social change but also as the preferred platform for 
legitimating political maneuvers.  
 As such, whilst the law is busy legitimizing the political or the political is 
increasingly faced with legal intervention, what seems to be perpetuating on a parallel 
channel is the gap between the people and the law. As the instrumentalization of law 
has shifted grounds from one of creating grand social change to one that mainly 
serves to legitimize diverging interests, the distance between the people and the law 
has been preserved. As the modernizing elites of the early Republican period failed to 
take into account the implications of extensive legal reforms upon the cultural thread 
                                                 
40 Organ Gazi Ertekin, a judge and a frequent writer in a daily newspaper in Turkey, argues that all 
parties in Turkey seem to have a consensus on a prevalent judicial tradition which claims that “as long 
as the judiciary is closed to society and politics, a just, impartial and consistent legal practice and 
culture will be established”. With specific reference to the debates around Ergenekon case, Ertekin 
states that not only the judiciary but all those who partake in these debates as part of the general 
political calendar seem to say “don’t meddle with the judiciary” and by doing so, all parties contribute 
to this instrumentalization process whereby the law becomes “a tool for government in the hands of the 
powerful” by distancing itself from any kind of social regulation and control (Ertekin 2009). 
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of the new nation, the leaders of contemporary Turkey have followed a similar 
tendency of failing to bring law down to the people. Hence, in the case of Turkey, to 
this day the role of law in people’s lives and how it is perceived by them still remain 
to be a rather neglected subject matter. It is possible to observe that not only are the 
public authorities distant when it comes to this topic but the interest of researchers, 
academic or otherwise, towards the field is also highly limited.41  
 Referring to the predominance of doctrinal and formalistic analyses of written 
codes that seem to penetrate the “mainstream, academic and activist” discourses alike, 
Koğacıoğlu argues that in Turkey “even critical scholarship and activist writings only 
go as far as exploring the relationship of these codes to the opening of more 
libertarian political spaces and highlighting the problems of these laws in terms of the 
normative criteria established by the ideals of citizenship, human rights, rule of law, 
etc” (Koğacıoğlu 2003, 4). Hence, in Turkey what the Republican elites as well as 
their counterparts in today’s Turkey have so far failed to embrace is the growing 
recognition of law as a living entity, one that also needs to be understood as it is made 
sense of by the people who operate within it. The imposition of predefined definitions 
and objectives to law and its practices as they are imagined by the modernist legal 
                                                 
41 One of these studies on people’s opinions on courts is annual Yaşam Memnuniyeti Araştırması (Life 
Satisfaction Survey) carried out by TUIK (Turkish Statistical Institute). 2008 results of the survey 
reveal that 2% of the people are very satisfied with judicial services, 44% are satisfied and 13% are 
fairly satisfied. Approximately 10% of the respondents stated that they were either not satisfied or not 
satisfied at all with the judicial services whereas a large number of people (31%) stated that they had 
no idea (TUİK 2008).  In 2006-2008, another study was conducted by Istanbul Bilgi University Human 
Rights Law Research Center. Justice Barometer was a nationwide survey on public opinion on courts 
in Turkey (Kalem, Jahic and Elveriş 2008a). Another study carried out by the same institution is a 
courtwatch exercise in courts of Istanbul, constituting observations on a variety of issues such as 
accessibility, security, general physical conditions of courts, delays etc (Kalem, Jahic and Elveriş 
2008b). The work of Dicle Koğacıoğlu is also a significant contribution to the development of the 
literature on law in action in Turkey. In her work where she examines how lay people and legal 
professionals perceive law and how they makes sense of their operations within it as they engage in 
legal activities, Koğacıoğlu offers an account of the reproduction of legal domain as a site with its own 
particularities through the interactions of these professionals and the litigants (2003). Finally, Mithat 
Sancar and Suavi Aydın’s study on the perceptions of the people in Turkey on the judiciary is also one 
of the few works focusing on the ways in which the law is experienced by the people (2009).   
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framework ultimately fails to grasp the complexity of law as a constantly 
(re)produced experience. 
 This indifference towards the existing gap between law in theory and law in books 
as it is played out in the everyday lives of the people is even more consolidated by 
another understudied scope of inquiry: Understanding the ways in which law exists in 
the meanings schemas and modes of operation of the legal professionals. This is in 
congruence with the fact that despite its integral position within the modernization 
project, the legal profession in Turkey has rarely been the subject of sociological 
inquiry. To this day, literature on the profession remains to be limited with historical 
accounts of its emergence and development in the works of historians coupled with 
rather professionally oriented works of legal scholars. While historians seem to focus 
on the Ottoman legal system and offer accounts of how the emergence of the western 
model of legal profession needs to be situated within the structural changes of the 
Tanzimat period and afterwards, legal scholars tend to work on issues that have 
immediate consequences for the profession such as the working conditions, the 
structural inefficiencies of the judicial system, professional ethics, the relation 
between Bars and the state, judicial independence etc. A careful reading of the role 
that legal professionals have played in Turkey’s modernization process and an 
empirical effort to understand to what extent the mission is still alive amongst these 
professionals has so far been overlooked.42 
                                                 
42 There are only a number of exceptions to this tendency. One of these is the work of sociologist Zafer 
Cirhinlioğlu where he sets about for an exploration of the characteristics of the legal profession in 
Turkey through an empirical study amongst lawyers and he portrays these characteristics against a 
backdrop of theoretical approaches of Western scholars to the study of professions. Arguing that 
professional groups are not unique to Western societies, Cirhinlioğlu offers an account of self 
conception of  lawyers through an inquiry of how they evaluate the legal education and the legal 
practice,  how they talk about the relation between their profession and the State, how they imagine 
their own role in the development of the society etc. (1997). The work of Hüseyin Boğaç Erozan on the 
active contribution of law professors of the early Republican era to the consolidation of the regime and 
particularly to producing obedience to the new state is also an important study in this field (2005). 
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 In this sense, the prima facie take on law as the basic motor of social change has 
not only engendered a disinterest in understanding its everyday existence and in 
examining how- if at all- its modes of operation within everyday life bring about the 
desired social change but it has also resulted with an unquestioned realm of legal 
professionalism that has been trapped in its original image as the bearer of modern 
values. In the absence of official as well as academic interest towards a systematic 
analysis of the ways in which law makes sense to these legal professionals -as a 
compilation of norms, as a professional conduct, as a particular social practice etc. - 
the question of to what extent the law as it is imagined by these actors see can still be 
considered in the context of modernist conceptions that have been painted with 
developmentalist aspirations. Such an inquiry becomes all the more necessary given 
judiciary’s increasing involvement in political affairs and as such contributing to the 
continuation of strong state tradition. Within this context, next chapter will be devoted 
to the role of legal professionals in the modernization experience of Turkey and it will 
provide an account of the profession’s relation with the state. This account will in turn 
set the background for an empirical inquiry into the prevalence of modernist 
imaginaries in the legal consciousness of legal professionals as they think and talk 
about the society, the law and the legal profession.  
                                                                                                                                            
Another noteworthy exception is the work of Aylin Özman. In her work on the relationship between 
the State and Bar Associations in Turkey, Özman explores the power of the state upon the 
institutionalization of the profession and the impact of this dominance upon the shaping of a 
professional identity among lawyers (1995). In a later work, Özman looks at the emergence of the legal 
profession in the early Republican period and examines the reidentification of these professionals in 
line with the Republican ideology (2000). Yet, another one is the work of Umut Türem whereby the 
author examines the impact of globalization of law on the legal profession in Turkey and analyzes the 
attitudes displayed by the legal professionals towards this particular phenomenon (2001). Last but not 
least, the work of Dicle Koğacıoğlu again constitutes a noteworthy exception to this general tendency 
to understudy the legal profession in Turkey from an analytical perspective. In her work where she 
looks at citizenship practices as they evolve in and around the legal domain, Koğacıoğlu explores the 
ways in which the interactions between the urban poor and the legal professionals reproduce social 
hierarchies and inequalities on a daily basis (2003).  
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Chapter 2 
Legal Professionals as Pillars of Modernization 
 
 The project of modernization in Turkey, taking law as one of the two main axes of 
social change43, was not confined with importing western legal corpus; it also 
required a new staff of legal professionals who would influence the thoughts and the 
behaviors of the people. Within this context, legal professionals have been endowed 
with a mission to act as agents of the modernization process and to contribute to the 
“education” of the masses. When a new order needs “explanation” for why and how 
its predecessor has lost its legitimacy, this role of the legal professionals has always 
been crucial (Tan 1972, 72). In fact, Tocqueville noted long ago the unique role of 
lawyers in influencing the political and social constitution of any given society, dating 
this power back to Middle Ages when their cooperation was considered to be vital for 
extending the domination of the kings (1966). 
 This role attributed to the legal professional is also in line with the ways in which 
secular thought and social order has been shaped in Europe. The transition from pre-
modern to modern society in Europe has also been realized through the regulations 
passed by the legal professionals (Gözaydın 2002). In the US after the Civil War and 
the growth of corporate enterprises, it is argued that “lawyers assumed the task of 
remolding the legal framework of a predominantly agrarian society to fit, as well as to 
protect and foster, the interests of a burgeoning industrial system” (Murphy, Pritchett 
and Epstein 1961, 122). In the context of the American legal profession, on the other 
hand, despite his overall depiction of the profession as an almost aristocratic 
                                                 
43 June Starr argues that the major instruments to carry out the revolutionary policies in the new 
Republic were secular education and secular court system based on Western European models (1989). 
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formation, Tocqueville still recognized the possibility of lawyers acting as agents of 
revolution recognizing the need to consider this agency in context of an inquiry on 
“whether it is some permanent disposition or an accident which then leads them to 
destroy or change”. Similarly, in the context of the legal profession in France, 
Tocqueville questions the motive behind the political engagement of lawyers during 
the French Revolution; and calls for a discovery of whether this engagement was a 
result of the mastery of the laws or because the lawyers did not participate in the 
making of the laws (1966).  
 This type of a discovery of the reasons behind the active involvement of legal 
professionals in moments of social transformation is also meaningful when studying 
the role that legal professionals have played in Turkey’s experience with 
modernization. Durkheim once noted that only professionals could solve the social 
problems caused by industrialization and could overcome the state of anomie caused 
by social disintegration due to their professional ethics, their capacity to develop their 
own rules and administer their profession (1957). Following this assertion, 
Cirhinlioğlu argues that those experts whose technical knowledge has been crucial for 
industrialization have emerged in different societies at different stages (1997). It is 
therefore significant to historicize the emergence and the development of the legal 
profession in Turkey in order to better grasp the role that these professionals have 
played in the transformation of the society.  
 In the case of Turkey, this line of inquiry immediately calls for the recognition 
that the emergence of this professional group and its mobilization as the main agent of 
the modernization project is a product of the Republican ideology. Özman argues that 
in the Ottoman-Turkish case, the new regime required a new type of socialization 
within a novel universe of social and political imaginaries constituted by positivist, 
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secular and nationalist references rather than religious ones (2000). This in effect 
requires an examination of the mobilization of legal professionals by the Republican 
cadres as carriers of the modernization project in the context of a larger web of 
relationalities between the old cadre and the new cadre of legal professionals, between 
the state and the legal professionals and between the legal professionals and the 
people.   
 Within this context, for the purpose of historicizing and contextualizing the 
developments within the legal profession in Turkey, in the following pages I will first 
offer a brief sketch of the emergence and development of the legal profession in the 
history of Turkey starting with the last decade of the Ottoman Empire. This historical 
overview is significant for it will demonstrate the lines of similarity and divergence 
between the modernization efforts of the late Ottoman period and the new Republic in 
light of the role that legal actors have played in these processes. The fact that the new 
legal cadres of the Republic were mobilized not only as leading actors within the new 
nation state but also as agents of secular law and legal institutions, fighting against the 
representations of backwardness carried on by the legal cadres of the pre-Republican 
period, constitutes the main axis of this divergence during this early period. Building 
upon this historical overview, I will move on to a discussion of the political nature of 
the legal profession in Turkey. This political nature is primarily evident in the de facto 
involvement of Republican legal cadres in the maintenance of the modernization 
project in the early days of the Republic but not limited with this period. This 
discussion is significant for it will set the background for an understanding of the 
historical struggles that have constituted the social and professional imaginaries of the 
legal professionals in Turkey.  
 58
I.  The Emergence and the Development of a Profession 
 
 Even before the birth of the Republic when the Ottoman legal system was opening 
up to foreign elements, the establishment of secular courts for the first time not only 
introduced new mechanisms of dispute resolution within the Empire but it also 
generated a need for a new cadre of professionals who were familiar with the type of 
knowledge and mode of operation that these western model courts required.44 This 
need for a new type of legal profession generated by the legal reforms and the new 
court system would later on shape the restructuring of the legal system during the 
founding of the Republic at the beginning of the twentieth century. In fact, with 
particular reference to the practice of advocacy, it is even argued that a reading of the 
rise and the development of this practice together with the emergence of other 
professions in the course of the Republic allows for a reading of Turkey’s 
modernization project at large (Inanıcı 2008). 
 Even though Tanzimat period witnessed the emergence of new forms of legal 
conduct and the establishment of secular courts following the entry of new legal 
codes, the legal system of the late Ottoman period was still characterized as a dual 
system. This duality was observed in the court system with the new secular courts 
                                                 
44 Following the structural and legislative changes during Tanzimat period, two significant moments 
have marked the institutionalization of the legal profession, especially in reference to the practice of 
advocacy. In 1876, the first text that regulated the profession is called Dersaadet Dava Vekilleri 
Nizamnamesi (Regulation of Attorneyship in Istanbul). This regulation is significant in the sense that it 
regulated for the first time the education of these professionals and established the institutional 
structure of representation by making it a prerequisite for these professionals to be registered with the 
Ministry of Justice. Although the institution is significantly different from the practice of advocacy in 
the sense that it was not organized as an independent profession, that clients were not free to choose 
their own representatives, that the regulation did not include all legal representatives of the period and 
that the representatives did not carry certain rights and duties, these professionals are still considered to 
be the forefathers of lawyers in the modern sense of the term (Inanıcı 2008). In fact this regulation has 
even been interpreted as the “real forerunner” of the independent profession that exists today (Özkent 
1940). The second major moment in the history of institutionalization of the legal profession was the 
1876 establishment of Dava Vekilleri Cemiyeti (Association of Attorneys) which was the first Bar 
Association during the Tanzimat period. 
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accompanying the Shari’a courts as well as in the legal cadres since the traditional 
dispute resolution agents of the Empire were the ones ruling in the secular courts until 
1860s due to the absence of legal practitioners trained in the western legal corpus 
(Cirhinlioğlu 1997). When Shari’a courts were closed down with the founding of the 
new Republic in 1923, however, not only did the former practitioners become useless 
in the new legal system, but an urgent need for a new type of professional legal 
practitioner arose with the unification of the legal system. Alongside the 
secularization and westernization ideals of the new Republic, the new generation of 
legal professionals signified the emergence of a “mission of protecting as well as 
promoting the new legal culture with all its implied meanings of ‘rule of law’” 
together with “the reidentification and socialization of the legal professionals of the 
old regime” (Özman 2000, 165). While on the one hand, new legal cadres were to be 
trained in the new law faculties, the old cadres were to be resocialized within the 
ideals of the new Republic and the principles of the secular legal system. 
 The novel cadre of professionals in the early days of the Republic originally45 
included judges46, prosecutors47, lawyers48 and notaries.49 These professionals were 
                                                 
45 In the last quarter of the twentieth century, new types of divisions within the legal profession arose 
like the Trademark and Patent Attorneyship or the Turkish Competition Authority. The emergence of 
these new areas of legal practice goes hand in hand with the debates around the incorporation and 
specialization tendency within the legal profession. 
46 In the pre-Republican period, kadis used to fulfill the function of judges although the tasks of the two 
were not completely corresponding. In line with the requirements of the Islamic legal tradition which 
was founded upon the idea of total penetration of Shari’a into every aspect of social life, kadis used to 
carry out a wide range of judicial as well as administrative duties. Besides their judicial duties, they 
were also responsible for various tasks such as collection of taxes, the regulation of local security, the 
control of the business in the local markets etc.  In fact, due to this close alliance with the Ottoman 
State, kadis were considered to be the symbols of Islam and the representatives of the state as they were 
the first ones to be appointed to the newly conquered lands (Cirhinlioğlu 1997). 
47 Prosecution did not exist in the Ottoman legal system until the Tanzimat period. This is mainly 
related with the nature of Shari’a law. Islamic law refers to two types of crimes: crimes that concern the 
right of humankind (hakk-ı ademi) and crimes that concern the right of God (hakk Allah). In the first 
category of crimes, the right to file a case belongs to the victim or to her/his beneficiary. Second 
category, on the other hand, includes crimes that impair the benefits of the whole Islamic community 
such as adultery or the consumption of alcohol. The punishment of such offenses does not call for 
anyone’s complaint for they are considered to be crimes against the will of God. Hence, the 
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for a long time educated in two major law faculties, Ankara University and Istanbul 
University.50 Ankara University Law Faculty51 was established in 1925 with the 
particular goal of fulfilling the need of the new Republic for “well educated legal 
professionals who will protect, teach and develop the law of the Republic”.52 The 
Faculty has been perceived as the first and most important institutional step of the 
Republic in the realm of higher education in the sense that it was to establish and 
protect the legal basis of modern Turkey.53 Inaugurated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
                                                                                                                                            
prosecution of these offenses belongs to the head of the State while at the same time it is considered to 
be the duty of every Muslim to report such offenses (Üçok 1946). Hence, within this judicial structure, 
prosecution in the sense of a particular institution responsible for investigation and filing of cases has 
not been established. It was only during the legal reforms of the Tanzimat period in line with the new 
criminal codes that have been imported that prosecution has been established as a separate body within 
the judicial system (Özkorkut 2003). 
48 As previously mentioned, advocacy as a part of the legal system was introduced with the legal 
reforms during the Tanzimat period in the form of legal representatives. Before Tanzimat, however, 
Shari’a rules used to regulate all cases and the fact that these rules were not compiled as codified law 
required a mastery of all religious texts and declarations for a defense or ruling in a case. In cases 
where litigants could not make their day at the court, they resorted to agents who were familiarized 
with these rules and the court proceedings as they have served the kadis for long periods of time. There 
were also local shop-keepers who used to know the kadis through their commercial exchanges and who 
would be preferred by litigants precisely due to their informal networks. Both of these groups of men 
have been considered to be con artists who capitalized on the judicial system and took advantage of the 
people’s needs for material benefits. In this prelegal representation period before Tanzimat, people 
known as arzuhalci, on the other hand, have been recognized as fulfilling a representation task that is 
genuinely similar to the practice of modern day advocacy. In fact, Özkent even argues that it was these 
people, not the legal representatives that emerged at a later period, who in fact constituted the “seeds of 
Turkish advocacy” (1940, 47). These were clerk secretaries/artisans who were acquainted with the 
Islamic law and who used to transmit the petitions of the people to the State in writing. This role of 
arzuhalci was especially significant due to absence of legal representatives in Ottoman courts up until 
the end of eighteenth century (Tan 1972).  
49 In the Ottoman legal system, kadis were doing the tasks of notaries. However, again with the legal 
developments of the Tanzimat period, other civil servants were assigned the task as well. Notary as an 
institution entered the Ottoman legal system in 1878 following the French model (Özkorkut 2003). 
50 A third Law Faculty was established at 9 Eylül University in İzmir only in 1978. Hence, for half a 
century legal professionals of Turkey have been trained either at Istanbul or Ankara Law Faculties.  As 
of 2009, there are 50 law faculties all over Turkey. While twenty-two of these are state schools, the rest 
are private universities. Out of these twenty-eight private schools, three are currently not active and two 
will be accepting students for the first time in 2010. Approximately 5,000 students graduate from these 
faculties per year, with a majority of these graduates becoming lawyers. 
51 The school was first founded as a separate law school under the name of Ankara Adliye Hukuk 
Mektebi. In 1927, its name was changed to Ankara Hukuk Fakültesi (Ankara Law Faculty). It was in 
1946, with the founding of Ankara University, that the Faculty was integrated within this institution 
and renamed as Ankara University Law Faculty (Özman 2000).  
52 http://www.law.ankara.edu.tr/en/?bil=bil_icerik&icerik_id=177 (accessed March 5, 2010). 
53 Erozan argues that the fact that the inauguration ceremony was held in the General Headquarters of 
CHP, the party of the regime, is a symbol of the mission of the school to disseminate the values of the 
Republican regime and to train a generation of legal professionals who will undertake this mission 
(Erozan 2005). 
 61
himself, the Faculty has been considered to be the beginning of the legal reform. In 
his inauguration speech, Atatürk makes it explicit that this inauguration cannot simply 
be seen as an attempt to train “high officials and expert scholars”; it needs to be 
considered in the context of the continuing Turkish Revolution that has “believed in 
the remedy of identifying and strengthening its being and mentality with the new legal 
principals that constitute the foundation of social living”.54 
 The speech delivered by Atatürk is not only significant in the sense that it 
positions the law of the new Republic at the very core of the Revolution which is built 
on the mission of creating a new nation that is unified around the ideal of catching up 
with the “modern civilization”; it is also significant because it also positions legal 
professionals to be educated in this new Law Faculty as the direct opponents of their 
counterparts in the pre-Republican period who mobilized their symbolic capital for 
the sake of preserving the existing order. In this way, the speech demonstrates that the 
relation between the state and the legal profession is not an absolute one; the 
dynamics and the direction of this relation are determined contextually and 
strategically. While the new legal cadres who are to get a secular and positivist legal 
formation in these new schools are considered to be the main agents of modernization, 
the legal cadres of the old regime are the exact representations of all that the 
Republican ideology aims to dispose of.  
 The anti-revolutionary attitude of the pre-Republican legal cadres is in a way 
depicted as the symbol of all conservatism and backwardness that needed to be 
overcome for the Revolution to succeed. In his speech, Atatürk refers to the 
objections raised by these cadres against introduction of the press to the Ottoman 
Empire which is considered to be one of the main symbols of modernization and 
                                                 
54 http://www.law.ankara.edu.tr/UserFiles/File/Ataturkunkonusmasi.pdf (accessed March 5, 2010). 
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mentions how this mentality even resisted the founding of the Grand National 
Assembly on the grounds that it was against the principles of law and science. What is 
more, Atatürk also mentions that this attitude is not unique to the pre-Republican 
period either. In his speech, he shares a personal anecdote regarding the eight times 
election of Lütfü Fikri Bey, a persistent advocate of the Caliphate, as the president of 
Istanbul Bar Association. Atatürk openly states that all of these instances demonstrate 
that “the biggest but the sneakiest enemy of the revolutionaries is the rotten law and 
its irredeemable legal professionals”.55 It was therefore crucial to educate a new 
generation of legal professionals in accordance with the new laws and principles so 
that they can be the constituent forces of the new social order. In his speech, Atatürk 
says that “the fact that the former rules of living and the former laws have been 
replaced by new rules of living and a new law in the Republic of Turkey is a fait 
accompli that will be accepted without any reservations”. The explanation of this fait 
accompli is left to the new generation of legal professionals who are to be educated.  
 Istanbul University Law Faculty, on the other hand, was established in 1933 
although the founding of the university dates back to the last period of nineteenth 
century. First, Mekteb-i Hukuk-i Sultani, established in 1877 and closed down a year 
later; and then, Mekteb-i Hukuk, founded in 1880 with a relatively more western type 
of education, both institutions are considered to be the building blocks of the current 
Law Faculty. In 1900, Darülfünun-u Şahane- the first university- was founded with 
the Mekteb-i Hukuk turned into a faculty under its roof. A decade after the Republic 
was established; in 1933 Darülfünun was abolished and replaced by Istanbul 
University within which the former Mekteb-i Hukuk was turned into the Faculty of 
Law.  
                                                 
55 http://www.law.ankara.edu.tr/UserFiles/File/Ataturkunkonusmasi.pdf (accessed March 5, 2010). 
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 This structural step of replacing Darülfünun with Istanbul University is itself 
considered to be symbolic of regime’s aspiration to align all institutions with the 
ideological outlook of the new Republic. Darülfünun was criticized for its lack of 
commitment to the “republican spirit and ideological mission” and so it was to be 
replaced by a new university that would not only follow the reformist ideals but also 
voluntarily contribute to their dissemination (Erozan 2005, 77-79).56 The introductory 
text on the official website of the Faculty lays emphasis on the presence of western 
scholars in every stage of the transformation from Darülfünun to Istanbul University, 
with particular emphasis on the contribution of western scholars who fled from 
Nazism.57 The objective of the Faculty to achieve western standards is dated back to 
the period after Tanzimat and the current education program is introduced as being 
founded upon the principles of the 1933 Reform which “provides for the conditions to 
make legal education, in light of Atatürk’s principles and reforms, a democratic and 
laicist education that is based on the rule of law”.58 
 While the establishment of law faculties designed to educate the new cadre of 
legal professionals is in line with the principles of the new secular legal system, 
legislative efforts to institutionalize the profession were also underway. Muhamat 
Kanunu (Code of Advocacy), for instance, enacted in 1924 was the first serious piece 
of legislation that regulated the practice of advocacy in the modern Republic. The 
impact of this Code upon the institutionalization of a new type of legal profession was 
further reinforced with the acceptance of the Mehakim-i Şer'iyenin İlgasına ve 
Mehakim Teşkilatına Ait Ahkamı Muaddil Kanun (Code on the Abolishment of 
                                                 
56 In this sense it is argued that Istanbul University Law Faculty was modeled after its Ankara 
counterpart and it was soon after its establishment that the former director of Ankara University Law 
Faculty, Cemil Birsel, was transferred to Istanbul University as the rector (Erozan 2005).  
57 http://www.istanbul.edu.tr/hukuk/tarihce.htm (accessed March 5, 2010). 
58 http://www.istanbul.edu.tr/hukuk/tarihce.htm (accessed March 5, 2010). 
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Shari’a Courts and on the Correction of the Provisions on the Judicature) with which 
Shari’a courts were abolished resulting with the unification of the judicial system.59 
Both of these developments during the early days of the Republic together with the 
establishment of new law faculties and the establishment of a secular court system all 
in all gave way to the organization and regulation of the emerging legal profession in 
line with the founding principles of the new Republic.  
II.  A Creation of the Republic: Political Nature of the Legal 
Profession in Turkey  
 
 As one of the most important agents of the modernization project, especially in 
terms of spreading the ideals of the new Republic to the public at large, one 
particularly defining feature of the legal profession has from the outset been its 
politically charged nature. In fact, the impact of developmentalist aspirations of the 
Republican project has been so prominent in the emergence and the development of 
the legal profession that the “common denominator holding these professionals 
together” has been identified with this mission of “enlightening the people” rather 
than shared professional interests (Türem 2001, 33). With regards this mission, Sami 
Selçuk argues that “the Turkish legal professional does not just generate opinions like 
legal professionals of other countries; because s/he has assumed the task of realizing 
the legal revolution, he is both a mentor who leads the society and an intellectual who 
fights for this cause” (2008, 72). In reference to the significant role of the legal 
professional as one of the main actors delegated with the mission of carrying the 
nation “forward”, given the absence of foundational structures necessary for the 
application of the adopted laws especially in the early days of the Republic, Selçuk 
                                                 
59 Code of Muhamat was accepted on April 3, 1924, while the latter Act was accepted on April 8, 1924. 
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argues that the speed with which the newly adopted laws were implemented in the 
absence of a developed legal profession in the western sense resulted with a 
deterioration in the legal practice. Accordingly, the fact that the new Republic 
established its first law faculty at Ankara University in 1925 proves that the laws 
adopted from the West did not coexist with a class of legal professionals educated 
according to western legal theory and logic (Selçuk 2008).  
 The fact that the Republican project was de facto the creator of a legal profession 
has in effect produced an integral relation with the state and the profession since the 
new Republic not only initiated its development; but it has also mobilized this new 
cadre of professionals for disseminating the values, the practices and the institutional 
procedures of this new state to its people.60 Özman demonstrates that the efforts of the 
Republican elite to mold the new profession in line with the principles and ideals of 
the new nation state could be observed in the legislation about the profession, in the 
establishment of the new law schools and the secularization of legal education and 
also in the statements of the Republican leaders (2000). Law faculties have been 
considered to be particularly active in producing ideological actors of the regime. 
Erozan argues that during the early Republican period (1923-1945), law faculties have 
been endowed with a state mission and hence become “the loci for educating regime 
guardians” (2005, 13). In this sense, in addition to their “ideological mobilization” 
law professors have also become active agents in making people “internalize the new 
state structure and regime principles” (Erozan 2005, 14). 
                                                 
60 Türem argues that this type of a mutually beneficial relationship between the state and the legal 
profession has in fact been a common element of the nation state building in the West. Yet, the fact that 
the state itself was the sole carrier of the modernization project and as such it was the raison d’être of 
the legal profession in the context of modern Turkey, has resulted with the development of an unequal 
relationship between the state and the legal profession (2001). 
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 Alongside the inherent political nature of the profession stemming from its 
missionary character, the legislative developments regarding the profession also 
contributed to its further politicization through strengthening its dependency on the 
state. The 1924 Muhamat Kanunu (Code of Advocacy), for instance, is mostly praised 
for it introduced lawyer and bar association as new terms in the judicial lexicon. Yet, 
the Code is also noteworthy for it demonstrates the strong state interference in the 
regulation of the profession given that the Code required the approval of prospective 
lawyers by the Ministry of Justice before they can register at the Bar Association 
(Inanıcı 2008). In addition, the institutionalization of the new profession with this 
Code was carried out hand in hand with the dissolution of the legal cadres of the old 
regime who were not only considered to be incompatible with the principles of the 
new Republic but also constituted a threat to the consolidation of the new ideology. 
The provisions of this Code outlining the conditions for disqualification included 
betrayal of the nation alongside betrayal of the profession. In this sense, considering 
the betrayal of the nation as a reason for disqualification from the profession, 
Muhamat Kanunu was used as an effective means in the dissolution of unwanted 
elements within the new organization of the profession on the grounds that they 
constituted a threat to the regime.61 
 Despite its will to clear the new profession from all ideological elements of the 
old regime, the success of this Code in achieving a complete dissolution remained to 
be questionable. Even after these collective dismissals at Istanbul Bar Association, 
Lütfü Fikri Bey- a strong opponent of the Republic- was elected as the president with 
the majority of the votes. This suspicion led to even stronger measures in terms of 
                                                 
61 Özman states that these dissolution efforts resulted with the dismissal of 374 lawyers out of a total of 
805 lawyers registered at Istanbul Bar during the period (2000, 173). 
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state interference resulting with the replacement of the Code with the 1938 Avukatlık 
Kanunu (Code of Advocacy) which organized legal practice from scratch with an 
even deeper statist mentality. The extent of this interference is represented in the ways 
in which the new Code regulated certain areas like the prohibition of lawyers from 
defending people who have been involved in activities of political reaction and/or 
who have acted against the “national conscience and unity” or like the provision of 
dismissal from the profession for lawyers who have undertaken such cases (Inanıcı 
2008, 167). Within this context, these regulations during the early days of the 
Republic are interpreted as efforts to create a new identity and new organizational 
structure for the legal profession compatible with the principles of the new regime, 
rather than as direct requirements of the new judicial system (Akyürek 1957, quoted 
in Özman 2000). The ideological dimension of these efforts appear to have made a 
stronger impact on the direction of these developments; thus contributing to the 
political nature of the profession as it has come about and developed in modern 
Turkey.  
 Under such circumstances, an almost organic alliance between the state and the 
legal profession has been established where the state is imagined to be the raison 
d’être of the legal profession. The strong state intervention in the regulation of the 
profession seems to wane with the 1969 Avukatlık Kanunu (Code of Advocacy) that 
removed the clause on the intervention of the state in the organization of the 
profession. In the sense that this new Code of Advocacy allowed lawyers to organize 
around professional principles under the Union of Turkish Bar Associations, it is 
considered to be one of the defining points in the history of the profession. Inanıcı 
defines this moment as a turning point in the history of the practice since Tanzimat 
period and argues that this development is representative of the transformation of 
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advocacy from a practice established around guild-like principles into a modern 
practice organized around professional principles (2008). 
 Despite the removal of the clause allowing state intervention in the regulation of 
the profession, however, political engagement has been an integral feature of the 
profession given the active state involvement in its emergence and its molding within 
the ideological elements of the Republic. Within this context, starting with the early 
Republican period, the profession has been through several moments of engaged 
political activism. In the aftermath of transition to multi-party democracy with the 
increase in popular demands, legal professionals held on in an even stronger fashion 
to the founding principles- nationalism and secularism in particular- of the Republic. 
Armed with extensive powers granted to the judiciary with respect to the executive 
and the legislation by the 1961 Constitution and with the empowering changes of the 
1969 Code of Advocacy, in the following periods- particularly marked by the social 
and political upheavals caused by two coup d’états and a coup by memorandum62- the 
profession has again been an active participant in the consolidation of the nationalist 
and developmentalist ideology of the Republic embodied within a Kemalist paradigm.  
 This close alliance with the state in the sense of defending the interests of the 
regime is in this way considered to be the strongest determinant of how legal 
professionals have seen themselves and defined their social roles within the society 
during this period. Hence, what seems to be particularly discernible in the relation 
between the profession and the state is the commitment of legal cadres to the 
Republican regime. Within this context, a dominant nationalist ideology with a 
particular emphasis on the protection of the regime is considered to be influential in 
                                                 
62 Unlike the 1960 and 1980 coups, during this intervention, the military did not resume power directly. 
Following the political turmoil of the period, especially in response to the rising Islamist movements, 
the military sent an ultimatum to the government leading to the election of a new one approved and 
dictated by the armed forces.   
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the self-definition of legal profession particularly up until 1980s. In the sense that the 
state has been the raison d’être of the profession, until this period this relation 
between the state and the profession has been explained as an “asymmetrical” one 
(Türem 2001, 36). This definition, however, is claimed to fail to grasp the nature of 
legal professionals’ political engagement in the period after 1980s (Türem 2001). In 
the period following 1980s, the profession characterized by its ideological vehemence 
seems to develop a rather controversial relation with the state. While the state’s 
presence in judicial affairs can still be observed63, it is also possible to observe an 
increasing discontent among legal professionals regarding this asymmetrical relation. 
Hence, the ideologues of the Republic who have been mobilized by state elites for 
disseminating the principles of Kemalist regime seem to have developed a new 
relation with the state that can no longer be adequately understood along a strong state 
vs. weak profession axis.   
 This paradoxical relation with the state has been explained by some analysts in the 
context of the profession’s approach to legal globalization as a threat for national 
sovereignty on the one hand -hence a threat to the founding principles of the regime- 
and as a potential instrument for preventing state’s involvement in matters relating to 
legal profession on the other hand. Within this context, Türem’s data display how the 
general resistance among legal professionals against the globalization of law is more 
often than not shaped around ideological commitments rather than professional 
interests. In this sense, Türem finds out that autonomy from the state emerges as a 
                                                 
63 The presence of a military judge in the State Security Courts established in 1982 for the purpose of 
trying offenses against the unity of the State with its nation and the principles of the Republic is a clear 
example of state’s intervention in judicial affairs during this period.  Similarly extra powers that the 
1982 Constitution granted to the executive over judiciary in general and the Bar Associations in 
particular are considered to be symbolic of this prevailing influence. Cirhinlioğlu’s study displays that 
a vast majority of lawyers believe that 1982 Constitution has affected the profession in a negative way 
mainly due to extra powers granted to the executive that have created a more dependent profession 
which fails to perform judicial tasks properly (1997). 
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much less prominent concern for the legal professionals and hence globalization of 
law is less assessed in terms of its potential for allowing independence than in terms 
of its potential threat for national sovereignty.  
 Under these circumstances, Türem argues that the self-definition of these 
professionals is rather ambiguous mainly due to their encounters with global forces 
and their impact upon the profession and the prevalence of their ideological 
commitments in their assessments of the globalization of law. In this sense, the 
profession seems to confront an identity crisis. It can no longer hold on to its 
politically charged mission given “strong questioning of the modernization project of 
the Republican elite, rise of economic thinking and heavy repressions on organizing 
politically” in the post-1980 period; yet it has not managed to find “new codes of 
professionalism” that can offer new axes of self-definition (Türem 2001, 98). The 
challenges posed by new trends in advocacy particularly observed in the impact of 
neoliberal structures upon professional organization also contributed to this 
ambivalence in self-definition of the profession. Within this context, Türem predicts 
that albeit the fact that as interest groups Bar Associations have quite often expressed 
their concerns regarding the strong state authority over the profession, a sociological 
study of the legal profession at large would most probably manifest a correspondence 
between the “founding ideology of the state and the general ideology of the legal 
professionals” (2001, 38). He nevertheless argues that despite this occasional 
reference to traditional missionary identity of the profession shaped around nationalist 
and developmentalist principles, in the post 1980s it is not possible to claim that the 
profession has managed to create a new “common ground for professional 
consciousness” in place of the political bond that used to define them as a profession.  
 71
 Cirhinlioğlu, on the other hand, presents the same paradoxical relation between 
the state and the profession but focuses on the prevalence of developmentalist ideals 
of the regime in the legal consciousness of legal professionals. His study on the legal 
profession in Turkey suggests that on the one hand there exists a shared discontent 
among lawyers regarding the state’s authority upon the profession. Lawyers explain 
the unfavorable relation between the state and the profession in terms of some 
constitutional provisions that consolidate the centrality of the state, incapacity of civil 
servants to satisfy the administrative demands of lawyers, failure of state bureaucrats 
to abide by the rules that have been laid down by the state and the failure of lawyers 
to stand united against the interventions of the state (Cirhinlioğlu 1997). On the other 
hand, lawyers still define themselves and their mission in reference to a 
developmentalist discourse that grants a significant social role to the legal 
professionals as ideologues of the Republic and hence the state.  
 Cirhinlioğlu’s work displays how the profession is still predominantly committed 
to the mission cut out for them by the Republic. They still see themselves as the 
pioneers of social development that can be achieved if their educational advantage 
and their professional proximity to the people can be mobilized in an effective way. 
Within this context, their continuing interest in sociopolitical affairs is reflected in 
their conviction that legal professionals are the enlightened sections of the population 
and as such they can take the lead in improving the social, political and economic 
conditions of the society by mobilizing their cultural superiority for the education of 
the people (Cirhinlioğlu 1997). This social role also has implications for the personal 
histories of these professionals. Research attests to the middle or lower middle class 
composition of legal professionals, with predominantly working class or small 
business backgrounds and families of low education levels (Tan 1972; Cirhinlioğlu 
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1997; Sancar and Atılgan 2009). Hence, the profession not only allows these people 
to undertake a mission of developing the society but it also allows them economic as 
well as symbolic capital for social mobility (Koğacıoğlu 2003). 
 Within this context, given the shifting grounds of alliance between the state and 
the profession, it is necessary to question whether political inclination is still a 
prominent feature of the legal profession in contemporary Turkey. Above mentioned 
works on legal profession seem to suggest the validity of Republican ideological 
framework for the self-definition of professionals vis-à-vis the people and the state. 
Even in the context of Türem’s argument regarding the ambiguity in the self-
definition of these professionals, it is still suggested that Republican frameworks 
remain to be meaningful reference points for the legal consciousness of these 
professionals although they are challenged by the changing relations in the world 
order. In this sense, a commitment to the missionary role of the profession as outlined 
by the regime is still considered to be one of the defining characteristics of this 
profession.  
 What is ultimately revealing about the relation between the state and the 
profession is the claimed prevalence of this commitment despite observations on how 
the state has in fact become a more controversial entity for the profession. While for 
the Republican elites and the legal profession of the regime the state and its ideology 
was directly identified with the Republic and the modernization project, the changes 
in the alliance between the state and the profession with less impact on the prevalence 
of the Republican framework for the legal consciousness of these professionals seem 
to suggest that organic association is no longer imagined. In this sense, legal 
professionals seem to have developed a certain distance with the state that has not 
necessarily brought about an estrangement to Republican values and principles. The 
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discontent among lawyers regarding bureaucratic obstacles to performing their 
judicial tasks, their frequent criticism of constitutional provisions allowing extensive 
executive powers over the judiciary, the influence of neo-liberal waves upon the 
organization of the profession all seem to designate a split in the close alliance 
between the profession and the state. Nevertheless, these challenging moments seem 
to have had a relatively less obvious effect upon the ideological posture of the legal 
professionals that is mainly constituted around a commitment to the Republican 
project.  
 In this sense, albeit in the immediate aftermath of 1980 coup a certain degree of 
depoliticization can be observed within the profession given the challenges to 
modernization project posed by increasing political pluralism and populist politics, 
the authoritarian restrictions upon the profession and the increasing influence of 
market principles, in contemporary Turkey it is hard to claim that legal profession is 
stripped off its political inclinations in the context of their commitment to the 
Republican project. In addition, recent debates on the politicization of the judiciary 
once again attest to an increasing tendency among legal professionals to be engaged 
in the world of politics. This time, the politicization of the legal profession, however, 
seems to go beyond exceptional moments of social and political turmoil that used to 
define legal professionals’ political interventions up until 1980s to rather periodic 
interventions in ordinary politics. In this sense, recent engagements of the judiciary in 
political affairs seem to display an increasing tension between the domains of 
ordinary politics and judicial operations. A speech delivered by President of 
YARSAV (Union of Judges and Prosecutors) on the political dimension of ongoing 
Ergenekon case and the following comment of the Minister of Justice on how 
YARSAV is acting like a political party and hence overstepping the limits of judicial 
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action is a recent example of this tension between two domains. Similarly incessant 
investigations on writers, journalists and academics based on alleged violation of 
Article 301 of Criminal Code64 or the “Protect the Judiciary and Your Country” 
march of 47 Bar Associations upon allegations regarding the illegal listening of 
judicial actors also display a profession of high political inclination.  
 Within this context, these latest developments can be read as public displays of 
the legal profession’s continuing commitment to its original mission of guarding the 
Republic. Various recent instances of the judiciary’s battles with the current 
government on issues of political and social significance demonstrate a rising 
sentiment among the actors of the juridical field- in particular among the 
practitioners- regarding the “contamination” of law with politics which is more often 
than not imagined to pose a threat to the Republican regime. The higher judicial 
institutions such as the Court of Appeals or the Council of State have been 
particularly active in these struggles. Statements delivered by the presidents of the 
Court of Appeals on controversial judicial investigations like the Ergenekon case have 
become a commonly observed phenomenon. Similarly, the Constitutional Court has 
quite often been the target of serious criticisms regarding its controversial decisions 
on presidential elections, headscarf regulations in higher education institutions or its 
general tendency to close down political parties the last one being DTP (Democratic 
Society Party) which was the only Kurdish party in the Grand National Assembly.  
 The Council of State, on the other hand, has become particularly notorious for its 
tendency to revoke administrative regulations. In the last two years, the Council has 
                                                 
64 The highly contested Article considers public denigration of Turkishness, the Republic, the Grand 
National Assembly, the Government of the Republic of Turkey, the judicial institutions of the State, the 
military or security forces as serious offenses that calls for imprisonment between six months and three 
years. The Article has been a controversial item on the agenda of national as well as international law 
and politics given its inhibitive effects upon freedom of thought and speech.   
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reportedly decided in favor of the government in only 4 out of 55 applications (Zaman 
Online, February 16, 2010). Some of these rulings are claimed to be beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Council as in the case where it revoked the regulation proposing the 
closing down of municipalities with a population of 2,000 on the grounds that the 
regulation was “unconstitutional”. One of the most controversial decisions of the 
Council of State has been its double reversal of the Higher Education Council’s 
regulations regarding the system of coefficients applied in the university admission 
exam.  
 The system of coefficients was initially introduced by the Higher Education 
Council in 1999, in the aftermath of what is commonly referred to as the “postmodern 
coup” when the coalition government presided by the Islamist based Welfare Party 
was dissolved after a meeting of the National Security Council in February 1997. The 
coefficients system introduced lower coefficients for students of vocational schools     
-including those of imam hatip schools which are religious vocational schools- in the 
university admission exam which in effect meant these students would have less 
chance of getting into faculties of their choice. Following the postmodern coup 
against rising Islamist sentiments, the system was seen as an attempt to keep 
graduates of religious schools out of universities.  
 The system has been criticized by many for inhibiting equal opportunities in 
education. In fact, immediately after its introduction in 1999, cases against the system 
filed by students were revoked by the Council of State on the grounds that the Higher 
Education Council was the responsible organ for deciding on the selection criteria and 
procedures in higher education. In July 2009, however, the Higher Education Council 
this time wanted to eliminate the system all together and proposed a regulation for a 
system of equal coefficients for graduates of all types of high schools. This in effect 
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meant that graduates of imam hatip schools could take the exam under equal 
conditions with students from other schools and get into faculties of their choice. 
Upon the application of Istanbul Bar Association, another highly active judicial 
institution in political and social matters, the Council of State this time revoked the 
regulation on the grounds that it would be a violation of the principle of equality and 
the rule of law and at the same time damage the integrity of the education system 
(Today’s Zaman, February 9, 2010). Upon the revoking of the regulation, instead of 
abolishing the system all together, the Higher Education Council attempted to 
decrease the gap between coefficients applied to students of regular high schools and 
vocational schools. This attempt was also overruled by the Court.  
 As the coefficient system was a precaution against the rising Islamism in the 
society in the first place, Higher Education Council’s attempt to eliminate the 
coefficient system all together or at least to decrease the gap between the coefficients 
applied to students of regular high schools and those in vocational schools has been 
read as an attack against the laicist Republic. Elimination of the system has been 
interpreted as a way to offer students of religious schools equal opportunities in 
applying to a faculty of their choice which would ultimately lead to the invasion of 
diverse professional spheres by these religiously oriented minds. On the other hand, 
the decision of the Council of State has also attracted serious criticisms coming from a 
variety of groups. Students and civil society groups have reacted to the annulment as 
an authoritarian practice that prevents equality in education, while some legal 
professionals have claimed that the decision lacks a legal foundation especially given 
that in 1999 the on the same matter the Council refused to decide on the grounds that 
it was not authorized to rule. Representatives of the business world, on the other hand, 
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have complained about the implications of this decision upon the lack of qualified 
labor force in industrial sector.  
 All of these recent developments seem to suggest the prevailing political 
inclination of the legal profession. This political engagement is further intensified 
with the fact that the law is quite often employed as a legitimating force in the field of 
politics. While on the one hand, politicians resort to law for the resolution of 
controversial social and political issues, legal professionals and judicial institutions 
seem to be actively involved in shaping the direction of ordinary politics. This active 
involvement more often than not has implications for the type of society that is 
imagined by legal professionals and the ways in which they imagine their role within 
this society. In this sense, the two fundamental principles of the Republic, laicism and 
nationalism, remain to be determining elements of the legal consciousness of these 
professionals and constitute the main reference points of their political engagement. 
The preceding examples from Turkey’s immediate political history reveal that in the 
face of the challenges imagined to be posed against the modern, laicist and unified 
society of the Republic, the judiciary sticks to its original mission as the guardian of 
the regime. 
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Chapter 3 
Theory: Possibilities and Limits 
 
I. Prevalence of Law: A Miracle? 
 
 In one way or another law sustains itself as a powerful force in people’s lives in 
modern society. It does regulate our relations, our interactions and our behaviors. 
With the increasing complexity and uncertainty of modern times, demands placed on 
law seem to be on the rise (Abel 1995). Even despite common allusion to 
dissatisfaction with it and to the average rating of courts (NCSC 1999; The North 
Carolina Court System 2003; SCS 2004), law continues to be a powerful feature in 
the life of the modern individual.65 This prevalence can be questioned from at least 
two aspects: How this prevalence is sustained over spans of time, changing 
circumstances and differing expectations and how it speaks to the discourse of 
autonomy that the formalists commonly resort to when they study law. Both of these 
issues can be tackled from a variety of perspectives depending on the analytical 
framework, the theoretical stance and the methodological choices of the researcher. 
                                                 
65 In a recent nationwide survey on people’s experiences with and opinions on the courts in Turkey, it 
was found out that although the participants’ overall evaluations of courts were rather negative (in most 
of the questions on the performance of and satisfaction with the courts, the number of those who made 
positive evaluations usually did not exceed 50% of all participants), more than half of them still stated 
that they would not hesitate to take their disputes to courts. There may be a number of explanations for 
this choice. It might be that people see the courts as their last resort for disputes that have not been able 
to be resolved otherwise or it may be the lack of alternative mechanisms for settling disputes or it may 
also be the result of a more general belief in the power of law. Although the available data do not 
suggest how people explain this situation, it is still possible to argue that law continues to occupy an 
important role in people’s lives. The insistence on taking disputes to courts despite a general 
dissatisfaction with their services requires a certain abandoning of the direction of the conflict by the 
people by “accepting entry into the juridical field” as Bourdieu suggests. This abandonment at some 
level symbolizes an acceptance of the regulatory role in people’s lives which in turn can be read as a 
sign of legitimacy of law in the eyes of people, regardless of what is attributed to that legitimacy 
(Kalem, Jahic and Elveriş 2008a). 
 79
 The former issue, for instance, can be considered in relation to the legitimate use 
of force in the hands of the state explaining the eternal question of compliance with 
the law (Weber 1978); it can be approached from a systems perspective whereby law 
is analyzed as a primarily “facilitative” system that reproduces itself by providing a 
predictable environment for normative expectations to be stabilized and generalized 
(Luhmann 1995, 2004); it can be analyzed in reference to an “internal attitude” that 
allows people to imagine their own relation with law in terms of shared obligations 
(Hart 1961); or it can be framed within social-psychological theories of legitimacy 
(Tyler 2006) etc. The list can be expanded.  
 The latter issue of the impact of law’s prevalence upon its presumed autonomy 
might be taken up in reference to the autonomy of law as discipline (Posner 1987; 
Galanter and Edwards 1997; Baron 1999). The formalist claims on law’s absolute 
autonomy from the influence of other domains of social life would exemplify another 
strand of work in this area. This traditional positivist line of thinking that asserts law’s 
autonomy from politics, ethics, religion and other spheres of social life finds its 
optimum formulation in Hans Kelsen’s “pure theory of law” which frees law even 
from the idea of justice (Kelsen 1961). Among these studies interested in the 
autonomy of law from other social orders, the relation of law to morality also seems 
to have aroused particular attention (Hart 1963). Yet another line of inquiry on this 
question of autonomy has focused on the capacity of legal training to produce a 
“special (and presumably superior way of seeing things)” which in turn allows for the 
development of law as an autonomous field (Brewer 1996, quoted in Alexander 1996, 
57). The list, again, is not complete. 
 The question of the prevalence of law and how this prevalence can be considered 
in reference to law’s autonomy also constitutes the background of another line of 
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inquiry that looks into law as a particular type of social reality (Bourdieu 1987). In 
this line of study, the construction of this social reality called law -as with any other 
type of social reality- is considered to be inherently related with an act of meaning 
making (Merry 1990a, 1990b). Within this context, law is taken to be one of the 
“many possible set of meanings” that allow people to make sense of their decisions, 
acts and interactions. In this sense, the formulation of law as a particular type of social 
reality that is experienced in different ways by different people calls for an 
exploration of law from the perspectives of actors. When the questions of the 
prevalence and the autonomy of law are analyzed in the context of a particular social 
reality that is always in the process of being constructed, not only is the dichotomy of 
structure and agency overcome but also the question of the prevalence and the 
autonomy of law can be situated within an empirical framework.  
II. Studying Law from Within: Legal Consciousness   
 
 The significance of actors’ perceptions of law was first recognized along with the 
increasing dissatisfaction with structural research. With grand theorizing losing its 
appeal, the 1970s turn towards antistructuralism also affected law and society research 
as socio-legal scholarship started to voice its concerns regarding the limitations of 
institutional/structural/macro research. While some pointed out to the “weaknesses in 
the conceptualization, the theory as well as poor methodology” of this kind of 
research (Munger 1990, 222); some argued that such research characterizing the 
mainstream has been trapped in the assumptions of legal ideology, and thus reflects 
the “pull of the policy audience” to the exclusion of perspectives which favor 
assumptions that do not accord with the official view of the legal system" (Sarat and 
Silbey 1988). A move from “structural models to theories of law as an ideology and 
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most recently to law as an element of consciousness and experience” was observed 
among studies in law and society (Seron and Munger 1996, 187).  
 In parallel, an increasing interest towards looking at law from the actors’ 
perspective was observed among scholars and researchers. Opinions and experiences 
of the people with regard to law have come to be perceived as the real outcomes of 
law, its processes and legal institutions. This shift in emphasis of law and society 
research did not necessarily make the study of formal institutions of law obsolete, but 
rather advocated an understanding of these institutions from the perspectives of the 
social actors using them (Engel 1980; Mather and Yngvesson 1980-1981; Bennett and 
Feldman 1981; Merry and Silbey 1984; Merry 1994; Munger 1998; Silbey 2007).66 
As such, increasing interest on cultural, situational and biographical circumstances 
that affect meaning shifted the emphasis of research from official definitions to 
constructions of meanings through the experiences of the actors (Munger 1998). 
Within these studies that look at law in terms of how its is made sense of, how it is 
experienced, how it is practiced etc., law is neither what natural law tradition 
imagines it to be –“existing apart from social relations”- nor is it solely approached as 
a product of  “groups of powerful law ‘makers’” (Ewick and Silbey 1998, 19). 
 This take on the meanings and understandings as constitutive of different social 
realities has brought about a distinctive line of inquiry of legal consciousness 
(Yngvesson 1988; Merry 1990a, 1990b; Sarat 1990; Ewick and Silbey 1998; Nielsen 
2000). Works on legal consciousness are considered to be following footsteps of 
earlier works in law and society tradition that focused on areas such as “legal needs, 
                                                 
66 The initial reactions to the field’s emphasis on legal centralism, its focus on institutions rather than 
discourse etc. were also criticized for their extreme skepticism. It was argued that this prevented “the 
field’s development of “alternative visions to conservative accounts of society; it undermined the 
field’s ability to promote desirable social change”. These criticisms were replied with the assertion of 
postmodernist scholars that this turn in the field does not focus on discourse to the detriment of 
institutions; rather they see institutions “in a new light” (McCann 1992, quoted in Munger 1998, 38).   
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legal culture, dispute processing and legal ideology” (Engel 1998, 111). Law was 
clearly failing to do what it promised to do under its liberal mask; its contribution to 
the reproduction of systemic inequalities was no longer going unnoticed and legal 
realists were providing tons of evidence against its claims to impartiality, universality 
and equality. In these circumstances, a growing interest in law as a particular type of 
social reality, one that manages to maintain itself as a powerful institution as well as a 
symbolic universe of action and meaning, called forth the necessity to look at the 
ways in which this social reality is reproduced to create a meaningful universe of 
social practices within which the relations with the law are “patterned, stabilized and 
objectified” (Silbey 2008). A concern for an understanding of “what law does and 
how it works” was coupled together with a need to know “how ‘we the people’ might 
be contributing to the law’s systemic effects, as well as to its ineffectiveness” (Silbey 
2005, 326). Legal consciousness emerged as a novel way of looking at this 
relationship between law and those who are subject to its order as active participants 
in the construction of this order and its prevalence as a powerful institution in their 
lives.  
 The literature on legal consciousness concentrates on the meaning schemas and 
perceptions that circulate in the everyday exchanges of ordinary people with the law 
and legal institutions. Consciousness is defined as “the way people conceive of the 
natural and normal way of doing things, their habitual patterns of talk and action, and 
their commonsense understandings of the world” in Merry’s work (1990a, 5); as a 
“research concept, by contrast to attitudes emphasizes commonalities in thinking that 
grow out of the broader structures and relationships in which people are embedded” in 
Sarat’s (1990, quoted in Engel 1998, 112); as a term used to describe “participation in 
the process of constructing legality” in Ewick and Silbey’s formulation of the concept 
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(1998, 45); or as “all the ideas about the nature, function and operation of law held by 
anyone in a society at a given time” (Trubek 1984, 592). Underlining all these studies 
is an attempt to understand legal consciousness as an effect of surrounding social 
relations as a result of which the concept attains its ever dynamic, multi faceted and 
highly context bound character. Legal consciousness is portrayed as the embodiment 
of the changing ways in which social actors relate to law in their daily lives. It is in 
this sense an empirical tool that allows for the exploration of how -and not why- law 
reproduces its “institutional power across wide spans of time, space and variable 
performance” as Susan Silbey puts it (2008).  
 Although researchers are far from agreeing on the ways in which legal 
consciousness can be interpreted, analyzed and explained, the take on legal 
consciousness as an “analytical construct that refers to the meanings and 
understandings of law that circulate in social relationships” seems to constitute the 
common reference point amongst these approaches (Silbey 2008). In this sense, the 
concept has mainly been deployed to understand how law reproduces its institutional 
power particularly in the meaning schemas and perceptions of ordinary people as they 
interact with legal rules and institutions. As such, within this literature, the legal 
consciousness of professionals operating within the formal world of law, i.e. judges, 
lawyers, prosecutors etc., has been a rather neglected dimension. How professionals 
think and talk about law and how their understandings and the meanings they attach to 
it contribute to the reproduction of systemic structures has been understudied.67 
 My take on legal consciousness as an analytical tool to understand the meanings 
and perceptions of law has a different universe of actors, i.e. legal professionals. 
                                                 
67 Works like Sarat & Felstiner’s and Yngvesson’s can be considered as important exceptions to this 
general trend (Sarat and Felstiner 1988; Yngvesson 1988). 
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Within this overall framework that allows law to be studied from the perspectives of 
the actors, in this dissertation I focus on the legal consciousness of legal professionals 
as it comes about in the ways that these actors think and talk about law. This is at the 
same time an attempt to challenge a common assumption of this scholarship regarding 
the “homogeneity and stability of the legal consciousness of legal professionals” as 
they are imagined to be “in the business of disseminating rather standard notions of 
law” (Koğacıoğlu 2003, 83). Within this context, I argue that if the concept of legal 
consciousness emerged out of a dissatisfaction with the main assumptions of liberal 
legalism, if it emerged as a fresh look at the creative space between the law in the 
books and law in action, if it is an analytical tool to understand different experiences 
of law and how these relate to larger schemas of cultural repertoires, political 
struggles, social inequalities, then it would also be interesting to see how the concept 
can be used to understand how law and the relation with it is imagined among the 
legal professionals. I believe that looking at the ways in which these professionals talk 
and think about law, what kinds of meanings they attach to the institution, how they 
see their own positions within this symbolic space can offer us new insights when 
thinking upon the main question that legal consciousness scholarship derived from in 
the first place: How does law sustain its institutional authority?  
 This type of a study necessitates an inquiry that goes beyond a mere acceptance of 
meaning schemas and perceptions of legal professionals as shaped from within formal 
institutional structures like legal education, training and practice (Koğacıoğlu 2003). 
Not only does this entrap our sociological imagination within structural limits, but it 
also impedes attempts to apprehend the lines of divergence and convergence between 
these schemas, it blurs an analysis of the forces that shape these schemas and it strips 
these schemas off their historicity and contextuality. For one thing, the term legal 
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professional itself is not without its problems when it is situated within a particular 
context that is different from the one it usually refers to, that of the western liberal 
democratic contexts. What is meant and understood by “legal professional”, who is 
imagined to belong to such a group, what kind of qualifications these professionals 
are imagined to have etc. need to be raised in order to avoid a holistic perspective on 
the term.  
 For instance, Richard Abel argues that Americans tend to identify the term with 
“private practitioners” while most civil law countries the situation is different because 
there are many more judges, prosecutors and other civil servants than “lawyers in 
private practice”. Within this context, Abel argues that the relatively limited role 
played by private practitioners in other legal systems calls for an understanding of the 
profession from a historical and cultural perspective (1990). Hence, the analytical 
capacity of the term “legal professional” can only be realized if it is contextually 
positioned and defined. From a similar point of view, Edwin Schur cites Geoffrey 
Hazard on how the “the term ‘lawyer refers less to a social function than to a type of 
training, a type which in fact is shared by people doing a bewildering variety of 
tasks”. Within this context, it is argued that a thorough understanding of legal work 
necessitates the recognition that with respect to any important legal problem “there is 
a long, rich and demanding intellectual culture” (Schur 1968, 163). 
 Within this context, in my interviews, I have used the term “hukukçu” which 
literally translates into “man of the law” which I believe is more in line with the 
particularities of the development of the legal culture in Turkey.68 In my interviews, I 
have observed that the ways in which this profession has been imagined by those 
                                                 
68 In order to prevent a lingustic confusion and to allow for an easier reading of the text, in the 
dissertation I have used the term “legal professional” in parts when I meant “hukukçu”. 
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practicing it suggest significant diversities with the ways in which it has been 
imagined in the United States. Since the use of the term legal consciousness originally 
calls for an exploration of the meaning making processes of people as they interact 
with law, this exploration at the same time allows for an observation of how these 
meanings are situated vis-à-vis other axes of meaning making deployed by these 
actors. In her work on the reproduction of systemic inequalities within law’s everyday 
operations in Turkey, Koğacıoğlu demonstrates how in the narratives of legal 
professionals law emerges “in relation to other notions such as state, nation, education 
and development” (2003, 83). She observes that when these professionals think and 
talk about law they always situate these views in context of other set of discourses 
such as “education, politics and modernization” (Koğacıoğlu 2003, 10). 
 In this sense, through an account of the legal consciousness of legal professionals, 
Koğacıoğlu demonstrates how the relative autonomy of law is constructed in relation 
to other notions that contribute to the ways in which these professionals imagine law 
and their relation to it. On a parallel terrain, my interviews also suggest certain 
detectable axes of meaning making deployed by legal professionals when they talk 
about mediation and its relation to their notions of law and the legal profession. The 
narratives of these professionals are almost always developed in reference to a certain 
type of social imaginary. This imaginary is one that situates mediation not only in 
relation to the existing legal norms and institutions but also to a particular vision of 
society and the imagined role of the law and the legal professional within that society. 
In this context, an exploration of the legal consciousness of legal professionals 
through a study of how they think and talk about mediation and how they relate to this 
emerging practice as a legal professional also allows for a study of the underlying sets 
of meanings.  
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 The concept of legal consciousness, however, is helpful for such an exploration as 
far as the meanings attached to law are concerned. An attempt to understand how the 
relative autonomy of law is constructed by the legal professionals also requires an 
understanding of the objective relations of power and mechanisms of reproduction 
that operate in the construction of this autonomy. Bourdieu’s conceptualization of the 
field as a site of struggle that is composed of objective relations of power emerges as 
a useful heuristic tool for such an exploration in the context of its emphasis on 
practice.  
IV. Juridical Field  
 
 In Bourdieu’s works, one is constantly faced with the challenge of the common 
sense assumptions. His theory of practice is an extremely useful tool to deconstruct 
the main assumption of human communication -that a shared meaning schema exists 
between the one who says and the one who listens- or for that matter between the 
reader and the writer. This is also the inspiration behind the increasing interest in legal 
consciousness. There too the assumption that a certain understanding of law or a 
certain hegemonic picture of law- which in the case of liberal legal ideology is painted 
with principles of equality, access to justice, impartiality etc- is equally diffused 
among those who operate within the world of law in their daily routines is contested. 
The idea of giving legal professionals a voice first in explaining how they see their 
vocation and how they define it and then in expressing the meanings they attach to 
law and their own perceptions of this institutional force in their lives is in this sense 
compatible with Bourdieu’s efforts to look beyond the given and the observable to see 
how they are in fact formed and sustained.  
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 At the same time, Bourdieu’s sociology and his theory of practice in particular 
allows for the realization of the power of a relational mode of thinking that sees 
practice as a common product of the mutual interaction between the field and the 
habitus. In this conceptualization, Bourdieu refrains from reducing social conduct to 
the confinements of “structure” without being trapped in a philosophy of 
consciousness that grants the agent full power to determine his own actions.  
 In understanding social life as the product of our habitual ways of thinking, 
understanding and acting through which we get to transform the social around us and 
are at the same time transformed, Bourdieu resorts to the concept of the field which is 
an area of “structured and socially patterned activity or practice” (Terdiman 1987, 
805).  Positions within any given field are “objectively defined, in their existence and 
in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their 
present and potential situation (situs) in the structure of the distribution of species of 
power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are 
at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relations to other positions 
(domination, subordination, homology, etc.)” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 97). 
 In this conceptualization, the field is a site of struggle; it is a site of competition 
for control over the monopoly of the means through which the kind of authority 
particular to each field is gained and sustained.  The social world then is explained in 
the context of “struggles of groups of people fighting for greater and greater share in 
the special kind of capital in each social field” (Pokol 2003). However, as it is an 
attempt to define all existing fields in the social universe under shared characteristics; 
it is also an attempt to rehistoricize each and every one of these fields by identifying 
them through their own case specific attributes that distinguish them from other fields. 
In this sense, fields are “historically constituted areas of activity with their specific 
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institutions and their own laws of functioning” (Bourdieu 1990a, 87). Thus, albeit the 
social universe is composed of fields, these fields are autonomous to the extent that 
they are characterized by the practices of the agents who are committed to the idea of 
the field yet play different parts in the struggle for power within that field.  
In this sense, Bourdieu deals with law as an autonomous field which has its 
own relationships, modes of operation, technical expertise and competitive struggles 
(Bourdieu 1987). The relative autonomy of this field is always in the making 
depending on the types of external forces that challenge its modes of conduct and 
meaning. It is in this sense not statically relative, with given, predefined axes of 
resistance. Bourdieu states that “to think in terms of field is to think relationally” as 
such it is “the locus of relations of force- and not only of meaning- and of the 
struggles aimed at transforming it, and therefore of endless change” (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992, 96, 103). In this sense, in the field of law as in any other field, the 
values, practices, types of capital that constitute its autonomy from other social 
universes are always constituted in relation to the types of pressure posed by the 
outside world. 
 Within this context, Bourdieu talks about the internal organization of what he 
calls the juridical field. This internal organization is defined vis-à-vis the particular 
body of internal protocols, typical behaviors and values that define this specific field. 
He argues that “the social practices of law are in fact the product of the functioning of 
a ‘field’ whose specific logic is determined by two factors: on the one hand, by the 
specific power relations which give it its structure and which order the competitive 
struggles (or more precisely, the conflicts over competence) that occur within it; and 
on the other hand, by the internal logic of juridical functioning which constantly 
constraints the range of possible actions and, thereby, limits the realm of specifically 
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juridical solutions” (Bourdieu 1987, 816). Writing against the formalistic approach 
that grants a limitless autonomy to law and the instrumentalist approach that relegates 
law to a simple tool of the existing social power relations, Bourdieu tries to 
understand the “specific social universe in which law is produced and in which it 
exercises its power” (1987, 815).  
 In this formulation, entry into the juridical field is considered to be synonymous 
with agreeing to solve any given conflict through legal means and hence granting the 
legal professionals the right to solve the existing conflict with reference to their own 
acquired dispositions. This indicates a twofold procedure: On the one hand, a 
particular operation of naming institutes certain behaviors as legally (un)acceptable 
and hence the legal professionals draw the boundaries of their field; and, on the other 
hand, by appealing to the services of a legal professional and the mechanisms of law 
in general, individuals recognize this way of resolving conflict as legitimate and 
hence solidify the boundaries between themselves and those who are equipped with 
the social capital necessary for legal construction. There is no doubt that law 
possesses a specific efficacy-particularly as a result of codification-; nevertheless, this 
efficacy is exercised only to the extent that the law is socially recognized.69 This 
claim behind the legitimacy of the decision taken within this field and its 
simultaneous acceptance as legitimate by those outside the field is an extension of the 
universalizing attitude of the legal professionals. Bourdieu argues that “law is the 
quintessential form of the symbolic power of naming that creates the thing named, 
and creates the social groups in particular” (1987, 838).  
 This take on law as a particular social reality the construction of which depends 
on the types of legal consciousness and the modes of operation, practices and 
                                                 
69 This aspect of social recognition connotes Weber’s interest in what makes a rule socially valid. 
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struggles that are specific to this symbolic space is also meaningful for understanding 
the (re)production of law’s prevalence and autonomy. Bourdieu argues that there is a 
common confusion between the symbolic structure called law and the social system 
that produces it. Instead, he states that distinguishing this “symbolic order (law) from 
the order of objective relations between actors and institutions in competition with 
each other for control of the right to determine the law” would allow us to realize that 
the autonomy granted to law by the formalists is not an absolute one (Bourdieu 1987, 
816). To the extent that law has its own unique relation with the exercise of power in 
other social realms, it can never be immune to the determining effects of other social 
fields; yet, this interaction should not be perceived as a loss of autonomy on behalf of 
law. In his conceptualization, the maintenance of the autonomy of the field is only 
possible through a continuous resistance on behalf of the actors of the field against the 
effects of the other social realms. This is to say that as the juridical field, like all other 
fields, is a site of competition for monopoly of the right to determine the law, it is 
necessary to recognize this confrontation within the field in order to “take account 
both of the relative autonomy of the law and of the properly symbolic effect of 
‘miscognition’70 that results from the illusion of the law’s absolute autonomy in 
relation to external pressures” (Bourdieu 1987, 817). 
 Bourdieu argues that it is the specific traits ascribed to the professionals within 
this field that allows their actions to be perceived as legitimate by those who remain 
outside the scope of this specialization. As such, professionals occupying different 
hierarchical positions within the field in correspondence with their technical expertise 
                                                 
70 Miscognition here refers to an ‘induced misunderstanding” through which, Bourdieu argues, power 
relations come to be perceived not as they are but in a form that renders them legitimate in the eyes of 
those subject to the power. This idea of domination through internal means/through internalization is 
common to Bourdieu’s work where he claims for the contribution of the dominated to the system of 
domination (Bourdieu 1987). 
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also deviate themselves from those outside the juridical field by these various 
positions that allow them to have a say in the determining, functioning and practicing 
of law. Hence, “the professionals create the need for their own services by redefining 
problems expressed in ordinary language as legal problems, translating them into the 
language of the law and proposing a prospective evaluation of the chances for success 
of different strategies”. And “those who tacitly abandon the direction of their conflict 
themselves by accepting entry into the juridical field (giving up, for example, the 
resort to force, or to an unofficial arbitrator, or the direct effort to find an amicable 
solution) are reduced to the status of client.” (Bourdieu 1987, 834).   
 The concept of the juridical field as developed by Bourdieu is analytically useful 
for this dissertation in several respects. As stated, the main objective of this work is to 
look into the ways in which the boundaries of the juridical field are imagined by the 
legal professionals as they position themselves in the debates on mediation. Within 
this context, I interpret the controversies around mediation as signifiers of the 
competitive struggles within the juridical field in Turkey for the right to determine the 
law. These struggles around questions like what kinds of disputes can go to 
mediation, how the process of mediation can be carried out or who should be allowed 
to participate in this practice are in turn reflexive of how the boundaries of the 
juridical field are imagined by those operating within it. In this sense, the 
neutralization effect of law, for instance, appears to be a common denominator in the 
legal consciousness of these professionals. This effect is imagined in relation to the 
power of form as well as the internal logic of the field. As such, the fact that 
mediation is being introduced as a formal mechanism in the framework of a Draft 
Law as well as the fact that its practice is commonly explained in reference to the 
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recognized types of symbolic capital within the juridical field have both been 
explained in reference to law’s neutralization effect.  
 This effect is in turn important for an understanding of the ways in which the legal 
consciousness of these professionals is shaped in the context of how they imagine the 
society, the law and its role in the field of dispute resolution. In this sense, the debates 
around the form and the types of symbolic capital that is imagined to characterize the 
juridical field are not only reflexive of the power struggles within the field. 
Neutralization effect of law has almost always been explained in reference to legal 
professionals’ assessments on the existing social structure, the legal culture and the 
political situation in Turkey. In this context, the fact that these debates have almost 
always been accompanied with these actors’ social imaginaries and political 
assessments attests to Bourdieu’s observation on the ways in which these struggles are 
almost always determined in relation to the larger universe of power. Hence, the ways 
in which legal professionals think and talk about the practice of mediation and how 
they situate this practice within the operations of the juridical field seem to be affected 
by the ways in which these professionals imagine the society, the law and the legal 
profession. Establishing this connection with the larger universe of power is 
significant for contextualizing Bourdieu’s theoretical framework that is predominantly 
-but not exclusively- based on his observations of the French juridical field. In this 
sense, the previous inquiry into the history of the legal profession and its relation with 
the Republic is important for contextualizing the struggles within the juridical field. 
As the representations of mediation and the narratives demonstrate, these struggles are 
not independent of the larger debates on the role of law and the legal profession in 
Turkey’s social and political structure and they almost always have implications for 
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the ways in which legal professionals make sense of these debates in reference to 
Republican ideals and modernist sentiments. 
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Chapter 4 
Methodology 
 
 Given that mediation in civil disputes is a relatively novel matter of discussion in 
Turkey, the actors who operate in this area constitute a relatively distinct group. I 
started identifying these actors first by an extensive internet search. I searched for all 
the sites that included the words mediation, mediation draft law, mediation in civil 
disputes, alternative dispute resolution and alike. Upon the completion of this search, 
I categorized the data sources in five main groups: News and commentaries on 
mediation; statements and press releases of particular institutions; blogs and forums 
that cover debates on mediation and alternative dispute resolution; scholarly work on 
mediation and alternative dispute resolution (online articles and published work) and 
the various conferences, seminars and meetings on the subject. These categories 
allowed me to demarcate three distinct units of analysis: Actors, textual sources and 
ongoing floors of discussion. Each of these units required a different methodological 
tool for gathering more detailed data and for further analysis. I used semi-structured 
in-depth interviews for a detailed examination of actors’ perspectives, discourse 
analysis technique for an understanding of different types of texts and nonparticipant 
observation method for following the ongoing debates that revolve around mediation. 
I. Interviews  
1. Pre-interview Process 
 After this initial introduction, I scanned all the sources to outline the main actors 
active in mediation. By active, I mean those actors who make statements on the issue, 
who write and publish, who offer courses and trainings on alternative dispute 
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resolution and mediation, who carry out projects on the subject, who organize 
meetings, seminars, i.e. actors who in one way or another operate within mediation. 
This was a more or less a complete list with approximately 50 actors. Although this 
list is mainly composed of individual actors, some of these actors were also operating 
within certain institutional boundaries and hence they also provided information on 
institutional positions towards the matter. In this sense, the analyses of the interviews 
together with the data provided by the discourse analysis and nonparticipant 
observation method allowed me to identify certain institutional positions on mediation 
as well. 
 This initial search, however, has given me the impression that individual actors 
are relatively more salient than institutional ones. Even in cases where there have 
been explicit institutional positions, a number of individuals in these institutions seem 
to be particularly vocal on the issue. I interpreted this observation as a consequence of 
the fact that mediation is a newly emerging practice and hence it does not yet have its 
own institutional structures, its operational framework, its established rules and 
regulations etc. For this reason, I have decided to outline the number of active actors 
in mediation on an individual basis. This individual focus also seemed more 
appropriate for an exploration of the legal consciousness of these actors in the sense 
that such individual positions allowed for an understanding of the ways in which 
actors think and talk about mediation and its relation to law as they define it. At the 
same time, a particular focus on individual actors in the interviews also allowed me to 
follow the ways in which actors strategically position themselves within mediation 
and the legal profession in general. 
 On the other hand, this emphasis on individual actors, in no way undermines the 
significance of outlining certain struggles observable along institutional axes. My 
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initial search on mediation for an outline of actors made it explicit that there are also 
certain identifiable institutional positions towards the Draft Law in particular and 
mediation practice in general. Within this context, I also conducted a discourse 
analysis of institutional statements that further contributed to an exploration of 
institutional positions towards the issue. At the same time, in order to make the 
connections between actors more observable (to spot for instance who belong to more 
than one institution etc.), I developed a map of all the actors which helped me sketch 
out how these actors relate to one another. Having this information about the 
institutional networks between the actors before the interviews also allowed me to 
develop my questions accordingly. In this way, I could inquire about the affiliation of 
these actors with the institutions they are related to and get more information about 
the works they do in different institutions. This visual mapping also allowed me to 
organize my interviews for I could see how many interviews I need to do from which 
institutions and where I need to be traveling for these interviews.  
 For almost all interviews, I contacted respondents first via e-mail, giving them 
brief information about my study and asking them if they would agree to be 
interviewed. This was also important in terms of documenting my interview process 
for I could go back and see how I approached the respondents, how many exchanges I 
made with different people, what these exchanges were composed of etc. In some 
cases where I had previous acquaintance with the respondents, I either asked them 
face-to-face during random encounters or I reached them by phone and scheduled a 
meeting. In the interviews conducted outside Istanbul, I usually had a fixed time 
frame for the interviews (like a specific week in a specific month) and asked the 
respondents if they would be available during those days and when would be the best 
time for them. I believe that giving the respondents a fixed yet flexible calendar for 
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the potential meetings made the arrangements easier for me as well as the 
respondents. Being lawyers in practice, judges, academics, bureaucrats and 
administrators in various institutions, these people usually had considerably tight 
work schedules. Hence, it would not be practical to leave the interview dates totally 
open since this flexibility could lead to a perpetual postponement of the meetings. At 
the same time, it would also be an impractical and highly costly arrangement for me 
since I would need to travel to different cities at unpredictable times at the request of 
the respondents. For those people I interviewed in Istanbul, I arranged meetings at the 
convenience of the respondents. I tried to schedule interviews at least ten days ahead 
of time so that I could give the respondents enough time to make room in their 
schedules for the interview. I always confirmed the interview day and time right 
before my meetings with the respondents. 
 At the end, I ended up interviewing twenty-five of these actors. I did not interview 
the full list due to a number of reasons: Some of these potential respondents were on 
duty outside Turkey during the time I was at the field, one respondent passed away 
recently, one respondent rejected my request due to her work load, two of them were 
already retired, some I was not able to locate while some others I did manage to locate 
but could not get a chance to interview due to their workload. This last group of 
respondents was usually composed of judges of Court of Appeals and although I had 
to wait for extensive periods usually outside their doors, I could not get a chance to 
interview any of these judges. At the end, I also left out some of the planned 
interviews because I believed that the data I have collected from the twenty-five 
respondents already provided me enough information on my main issues of concern. 
Since my work does not have representation claims, I have decided to put an end to 
my interview phase at the end of twenty-five interviews.  
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2. Selection of Respondents  
 Overall, I interviewed a total of twenty-five actors in the spring and summer of 
2009 (March 2009- August 2009).  Most of these respondents were located in Ankara 
(16) and Istanbul (6) but I also had to travel to Izmir once, the third largest city 
located on the western coast of Turkey, to conduct three interviews. While some of 
these respondents were academics some where members of Bar Associations or other 
types of professional organizations such as Union of Turkish Bar Associations or 
Union of Turkish Notaries while some others were bureaucrats of the Ministry of 
Justice. Table 1 shows the institutional affiliation and the location of the respondents. 
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Table 1. Institutional affiliation and the location of the respondents 
 
Interview No. Institution/Affiliation  City  
1 University Istanbul 
2 Professional Organization Ankara
3 Professional Organization Ankara
4 Professional Organization Ankara
5 Professional Organization Ankara
6 University Ankara
7 Professional Organization Ankara
8 Professional Organization Ankara
9 University Izmir
10 Professional Organization Izmir
11 Professional Organization Izmir
12 University Istanbul 
13 University Istanbul
14 Ministry Ankara
15 Professional Organization Ankara
16 University Ankara
17 Ministry Ankara
18 University Ankara
19 Professional Organization Istanbul
20 Ministry Ankara
21 Professional Organization Ankara
22 Professional Organization Ankara
23 Professional Organization Ankara
24 University Istanbul
25 Professional Organization Istanbul
 
 Actors in mediation are quite detectable and not large in number. Yet, there has 
still been a need for sample selection from within the existing universe of actors. 
Interviewing all these actors could involve the risk of losing focus in the dissertation 
since this methodological choice would bring about a heavy load of data that could be 
interpreted on multiple axes given the actors’ different stakes in mediation. Moreover, 
I also believed that the information collected from the complete universe could also 
prove to be rather abundant in the context of this dissertation since my particular 
interest lies in the debates and struggles around an emerging area of practice which 
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mainly evolve around a contested legislation. Within this context, I decided to choose 
my respondents in reference to two main criteria: Their participation in the ongoing 
debates around mediation as an emerging institution and their participation in the 
constitution of the legislation on mediation.  
 In line with first criterion, I decided to include all those individual actors whom I 
observed to be the most vocal ones on the debates around mediation and who actively 
participated in the debates by attending events like seminars, trainings, press releases, 
by releasing commentaries on the Draft Law etc.71 In some cases, these individuals 
were also holders of high ranked positions72 in institutions and in that sense their 
opinions on mediation seemed to be rather emblematic of their affiliated institutions’ 
positions towards the matter. Hence, interviewing these individuals was also 
beneficial in terms of getting information on institutional positions towards mediation.  
In accordance with the second criterion, on the other hand, I decided to interview the 
members of the Commission on the Draft Law on Mediation in Civil Disputes. The 
Commission preparing the Draft Law consists of twenty-five individuals of various 
professions and positions in different institutions some being academics, some 
bureaucrats of the Ministry of while some are members of professional organizations. 
Given that the members of the Commission are the main actors outlining the formal 
framework within which the practice of mediation will take place, I decided to 
                                                 
71 I believe that I have rightly determined these most vocal actors based on the frequency of their 
appearance on the internet search. This, of course, does not negate the possibility that someone who 
could be considered vocal on the subject matter was left out of this sample. Nevertheless, my initial 
search accompanied by other channels of data gathering (discourse analysis of various texts, 
observation at seminars and meetings , the names frequently mentioned during interviews) allows me 
to claim that the sample used here is as close to a complete list of vocal actors as it can get. Of course, 
this is the list prepared according to my definition of vocal and active. It does not exhaust the 
possibility of the inclusion of other respondents over other criteria.    
72 I refrain from giving examples of these positions due to reasons of anonymity and the confidentiality 
pact between myself as the researcher and my respondents. Since this universe is relatively small with 
quite marked boundaries, the actors who operate within it are easily recognizable. Therefore, any 
reference to the specific positions of the actors would carry the risk of violating principles of 
anonymity and confidentiality. 
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interview all of these members. In the end again to due to a number of reasons, I 
ended up interviewing twelve of these commission members.  
 Nevertheless, the particular inclusion of members into the interview process is 
also meaningful in the sense that the nature of commission activities in general allow 
for the coming together of a multiplicity of actors selected on the basis of professional 
diversity (members of professional associations, academics, bureaucrats etc). Yet, this 
composition does not necessarily suggest a convergence of opinions between the 
members of different institutions operating within the same professional group (for 
instance academics from different universities); nor, does it suggest a uniformity 
among the members of the same institution (for instance the judges from the Court of 
Appeals). As the workings of the Commission takes place on a variety of axes along 
professional and institutional lines, I decided that interviewing these actors would 
allow me to see all of these axes that play a role in the constitution of the Draft Law 
which in turn constitutes the focal point of the debates around mediation. Table 2 
shows the breakdown of the members of the Commission. 
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Table 2. Members of the Commission of the Law on Mediation in Civil Disputes 
 
Groups Number of 
members in 
each group 
Academics 
Galatasaray University Faculty of Law 1 
Ankara University Faculty of Law 2 
Bilkent University Faculty of Law 1 
Yeditepe University Faculty of Law 1 
Dokuz Eylül University Faculty of Law 1 
Gazi University Faculty of Law 1 
Koç University Faculty of Law 1 
Total 8 
Bureaucrats 
Ministry of Justice 6 
Ministry of Environment and Forestry 1 
Total 7 
Judges 
Court of Appeals  3 
Lower Court (family court) 1 
Total 4 
Members of professional organizations  
Union of Turkish Bar Associations 1 
Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey 1 
Union of Turkish Notaries 1 
The Banks Association of Turkey 1 
Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association  2 
Total 6 
TOTAL (of all members) 25 
 
3. The Ones Left Out 
 Some actors operating in this newly emerging space yet not included in this 
dissertation, are also relevant not because they are necessarily active participants of 
the ongoing debates but because they operate within this space through their 
educational services. These are universities offering different training programs or 
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courses on mediation. These institutions were originally included in the sample 
because of their contribution to the development of a body of professional knowledge 
on mediation. Moreover, by contributing to the growth of interested actors in this 
emerging practice these institutions were also considered to be partaking in the 
creation of a certain market share for the practice of mediation. Within this context, 
initially respondents from these institutions were planned to be selected among 
individuals of administrative positions rather than academic ones. With this choice, I 
wanted to understand the interest in mediation as a particular market that seems to be 
developing especially among lawyers and what kind of opportunities these institutions 
foresee by competing within this market. As my dissertation proceeded, however, I 
decided to leave this inquiry for a future work, one that can be developed in light of 
the establishment of the practice of mediation.  
 Academics, on the other hand, constituted another group of possible respondents, 
who were in the end left out as a group but not on individual basis. This group 
included individuals who work on mediation either by writing on the issue, teaching 
courses on mediation and/or partaking in the ongoing debates on the subject matter by 
presenting at various events or by being involved in training programs. As I 
proceeded with my field work, I included only those who were members of the 
Commission. However, my take on academics as a group of active producers of 
intellectual knowledge on alternative dispute resolution theory and on mediation in 
particular allowed me to include these individuals within my dissertation through their 
scholarly works on mediation if not as respondents.  
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 Lawyers in certain law firms that offer services that are usually considered within 
the larger Alternative Dispute Resolution framework such as arbitration services73 and 
other private enterprises and individuals that offer mediation services like peer 
mediation, family mediation, school mediation etc. can also be considered to be 
operating within mediation. I have left both of these groups outside my sample mainly 
because for the purposes of dissertation I have decided to leave out actors who are 
engaged in the practice side of the institution. At the time of this dissertation, 
mediation was still being deliberated as a draft law, hence it was not yet recognized as 
an official area of practice, whose rules and activities are outlined by the law. The law 
firms, although they included mediation in their practice areas, mainly operated in the 
field of alternative dispute resolution in general and international commercial 
arbitration in particular; and the independent mediators were offering services that 
concentrated on mediation as a peaceful method of conflict resolution in diverse areas 
of social life. Given that my main interest is around the emergence and the formation 
of mediation, I have decided not to include these actors who operate within the larger 
universe of alternative disputes resolution and whose participation, for that matter, in 
the debates and struggles around the formation of mediation as a particular area of 
practice were rather marginal.  
 In the long run, upon a continuing observation of the debates around mediation, of 
the type of practice that will be established if the Draft Law is passed, of the new 
possible axes of contestation around the practice, it will be possible to broaden the 
scope of inquiry into understanding other struggles that go into the development of 
this area of practice. Possible lines of further and more detailed inquiry could involve 
                                                 
73 There are serious conceptual debates on whether arbitration can be considered an alternative dispute 
resolution method or not. 
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issues such as analysis of the developments along the lines of hard law vs. soft law 
debates, the real life consequences of judicial reform efforts, the relevance of these 
debates for the future practice of mediation and the observance of their compatibility 
etc. For the moment, I choose to limit my inquiry about mediation to understanding 
what is happening at the moment of its emergence as a particularly contested area of 
practice.  
4. Interview Process 
 The interviews on average lasted ninety-eight minutes, the shortest being forty-
nine minutes and the longest being one hundred and sixty-six minutes. In twenty of 
the twenty-five interviews, the respondents gave me permission to record the 
interview while the rest only allowed me to take notes. In each case, however, before 
starting the interview, I gave the respondents brief information about my study and 
assured them that the information collected would in no way be used outside scientific 
purposes and their names and institutions would never be revealed. I told my 
respondents that institution names would have to be used in order to outline a map of 
actors operating within mediation but that these would always be general references 
and hence would not reveal any information on individual interviews. I also asked 
those respondents who gave permission for recording to sign the interview protocol 
for reasons of accountability and for the protection of the rights of my respondents.  
 I decided to conduct my interviews in an in-depth semi-structured fashion because 
I believed that this would be in line with the overall design of my work in the sense 
that I was trying to outline the legal consciousness of legal professionals as they were 
talking about mediation. Since my objective was to understand how these actors think 
and talk about mediation, I tried to refrain from a closed structure as much as possible 
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so that I could in fact discover how these actors define mediation, what role they 
ascribe to it within the existing legal practice, how they imagine its relation to law etc. 
In my first six interviews, I categorized my questions under two main headings: 
General questions on law, the legal system, the legal profession, the legal education 
etc. and specific questions on mediation. Regarding the first category, I found these 
questions to be relevant for my dissertation because they could help me understand 
how these actors make sense of law which in turn could allow me to situate these 
perceptions vis-à-vis their perceptions of mediation. However, as I proceeded I 
realized that some of these questions -like the ones about actors’ definitions of law, 
how they see its role in the society, what they believe people expect from law, why 
they think people obey the law etc.- would in fact be more appropriately addressed as 
parts of the second category of questions. Questions on mediation already gave clues 
as to what law means for these actors, so it was only a matter of further inquiry in the 
context of these questions.  
 Regarding my first six interviews as exploratory, I developed the rest of my 
interviews in light of what I have observed and learned during this initial phase. 
Within this context, in the following interviews I decided to limit my inquiry to 
particular questions on mediation and further dwell on the issue of meanings attached 
to law as the interviews created the opportunities to do so. I realized that in this way, I 
was able to direct the attention of my respondents to mediation in particular and hence 
get a more detailed account of the particularities of this emerging practice as imagined 
by the respondents. In the end, my interview protocol included the following 
questions:  
1. What does alternative dispute resolution mean to you? 
2. What does mediation mean to you?   
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3. What is the relation between mediation and law? How do you situate it within 
the existing legal system? 
4. How did we start talking about mediation? How did this all come about?  
5. Who are the actors in the debates? Who are the interested parties? How and 
why did they become interested?  
6. How would you explain your interest in mediation? How and why did you 
become interested? 
7. Turkey has a longer history of alternative dispute resolution. How do you 
compare the current controversies around mediation with the debates around 
other mechanisms of ADR? 
8. What are the grounds of controversies? What are the most common matters of 
debate? 
9. What do you think about the Draft Law on Mediation in Civil Disputes? 
10.  What do you think of the legal education in Turkey? 
11. What are your opinions on the legal profession in Turkey? How do you assess 
its developments, how do you see its future? 
12. What does it take to be a “hukukçu”? What kind of a relation does s/he have 
with the society?  
13. Did you choose this profession voluntarily?  Is there anything else you would 
rather be? 
14. Do you believe that Turkey has been experiencing a “judicial reform” lately? 
What do you think about the latest legal developments? 
15. How do you see the impact of transnational actors upon these developments? 
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 These questions constitute the skeleton of the interviews but it was almost never 
the case that I managed to ask all of them or that the interview was limited with these 
questions. First of all, in all the interviews, these questions were joined by questions 
on the educational and occupational past and present of the respondents. In addition, 
when appropriate, I joined these questions with the omitted questions regarding the 
respondents’ perceptions of law. Upon observing that in some instances my 
respondents were confused or they had a hard time responding to these “big” 
questions like what law means to them, how they define justice etc., occasionally I 
felt the need to explain why I was asking these questions that have occupied the 
minds of legal theorists and the philosophers since the beginning of time. I explained 
to the respondents that I believe when someone is engaged in a practice, one develops 
a sort of occupational hazard that causes her/him to overlook and/or to fail to 
contemplate upon the features that are considered to be definitive for that practice. In 
the practice of law, this could emerge as a tendency to stop thinking about questions 
of law and justice. In fact, in some of these instances after the interviews the 
respondents told me that they found the interview quite helpful for they had a chance 
to think about issues that they have not been able to for a longtime. I believe that 
giving the respondents a chance to talk about such issues that they have failed to give 
“systematic attention” to, had a valuable contribution to the development of the 
interview as a “research partnership” (Weiss 1994, 122). 
 In addition, addressing such questions in an open manner, without assuming a 
pregiven consensus on what concepts and practices mean, is also meaningful in the 
context of an exploration of legal consciousness. By turning to the actors’ own 
perceptions of their practices and of the concepts that are claimed to define this 
practice, I aim to look for the “situated meanings” rather than assuming an 
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“objectively meaningful” and shared universe of concepts and practices (Emerson 
1981, 353). For this reason, instead of assuming that law means what the books claim 
it to be or justice has the same connotation for all respondents or that they all refer to 
the same person when they talk about a legal professional, I rather asked the 
respondents to provide their own definitions of concepts and practices that they are 
routinely engaged in.74 
 In the interviews with the commission members, I also addressed specific 
questions regarding the workings of the Commission, how its members are selected, 
how the respondent explains his own inclusion and contribution in the Commission 
etc.75 Aside from these additional questions for the members of the Commission, in 
almost all of the interviews skeleton questions were also joined by spontaneous ones 
some of which were addressed to get a more detailed sense of the respondent’s 
opinions on rather technical issues like the clauses of the Draft Law, the qualities of a 
mediator etc. while some were rather contextual questions with political, social, 
cultural and economic undertones. Questions regarding the political culture in Turkey, 
the compatibility of mediation with the social structure of Turkey, European Union 
membership and comments on the activities of the current government, the general 
lack of knowledge on legal matters shared by the legal professionals and the public 
are some of the lines of further inquiry that have emerged during the interviews.  
 These questions were not always asked in the order outlined either. In many 
instances during the interviews, respondents commented on certain issues without 
                                                 
74 I do not want to suggest that the definitions or the perceptions of these actors are shaped independent 
of or necessarily different from those shared, commonly accepted ones. After all, not only would such a 
claim of clear demarcation be a misreading of my methodological choice (of asking questions in an 
open manner), but it would also be a sociological impossibility. It would also not be compatible with 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice and his relational take on concepts of the field and habitus which are 
essential for this work. I do want to suggest, however, that an exploration of these situated meanings 
can in fact allow for an inquiry into the shared universe of these actors. 
75 All commission members that I could interview were male. The Commission only had two female 
members one of which rejected my request due to work load while the other was already retired. 
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being asked about them. And in some others, the interview atmosphere did not allow 
questions to be asked in an orderly fashion, to be asked in detail or to be asked at all. 
Some of these instances included times when the respondent was inclined to give 
short answers and hence did not quite allow me to ask for further explanation; or 
when the respondent was in a rush to end the interview because of some other 
arrangement which I did not know about; or when other people were asked to join the 
interview by the respondent and hence the flow of the interview was interrupted etc. 
In all of these and other similar instances, I tried to maintain the core of the interview 
and get as much information as possible without being insistent. 
 I transcribed all the interviews and translated the excerpts used in the dissertation 
myself due to concerns of confidentiality. I believe that sharing the information that 
my respondents have exchanged with me during the interviews with anyone other 
than myself would be an infringement of our confidentiality pact.76 Later, I analyzed 
these texts using NVivo software. Since the interviews were conducted in a semi-
structured fashion, the answers to questions could be found in a scattered fashion 
within the text. Thus, I sometimes coded a sentence, sometimes a paragraph and 
sometimes a number of these at the same time as relevant data for my analysis.  Some 
of my codings were pregiven as they included direct and clear answers to some of the 
questions but some were rather “grounded”77 as I found them to be analytically 
meaningful categories while I was transcribing and coding the interviews.  
                                                 
76 I am here referring to the commercial activity of paying total outsiders for the transcription of 
research materials. Research assistants or any similar type of collaboration that would involve other 
people informed about the project and who would be easily accountable for any violation of 
confidentiality are not the targets of this criticism. 
77 I borrow the term “grounded” from Glaser and Strauss (Glaser and Strauss 1967). 
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5. Notes on the Interviews 
 At the beginning of the interviews, I introduced myself as a sociologist working in 
the field of law and society but I also mentioned that I am a lecturer at a law faculty. 
This allowed me the capacity to play on a dual position in the face of the respondents. 
As a lecturer at a law faculty, they could communicate freely with me assuming a 
minimum shared terminology as well as a smack of knowledge on legal 
developments; yet as a sociologist, who lacked their foundational depth and their 
competence over technical information, I offered them the space to practice their 
competence upon me. Within this relationship, I felt the freedom to ask the 
respondents quite openly questions like what the Draft Law covers, what a certain 
article means, how a legal procedure works etc. which constituted me as the 
sociologist lacking the necessary technical competence that the legal profession 
generates.  
 In this sense, I actually epitomized what most of these legal professionals wanted 
to exclude from the practice of mediation: “the one who knows some law but not 
enough”. In this relationship, I was a lecturer at a law faculty who is equipped -at least 
partly- with the symbolic capital necessary to survive in the field of law given my 
academic and professional background and my familiarity with the language of law; 
and at the same time I was a sociologist who is not in complete possession of the 
“written and unwritten laws of the field” (Bourdieu 1987, 831). Hence, the interviews 
themselves offered me the opportunity to observe how I, as the sociologist, could be 
(re)constituted as the outsider to law and the legal profession upon whom these actors 
could practice their professional “protectionism” by providing me with technical 
information on legal codes, by asking me if I am informed about a certain legal norm, 
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by referring to a certain legal logic that could only be gained through a proper legal 
education etc. 
 This situation can be interpreted within the general context of “interviewing 
relationship” defined by Weiss. Weiss argues that there are multiple ways of defining 
this relationship, one of which is the case of the researcher taking the role of the 
“respectful student, awaiting instruction” (1994, 66). In this relationship, the 
researcher does not reveal her knowledge on the matter and instead tries to make her 
respondent feel that she is “ready to admire their knowledge”. In yet another type of 
relationship, Weiss describes how some interviewers are “willing to act as 
antagonists”, ready to confront the respondents with the information they already have 
or by repeating some of the conflicting statements that the respondent makes during 
the interviews and asking the respondent to comment on them.  
 In my experience, I felt a little bit of both. When I positioned myself as the 
sociologist, I had some resemblance to the awaiting student; yet when I talked as the 
lecturer at law faculty, I sometimes found myself discussing loop holes in legislation, 
asking the respondents their opinions on alternative approaches towards issues like 
court performance, judicial services etc. In fact, at the beginning of my interview 
process, I realized that due to my experience in action research in the field of law, I 
could become too much of an antagonist from time to time. Although during these 
interviews, I did not face any of the indications of an ineffective relationship which 
Weiss defines as “discomfort, antagonism or boredom” on behalf of the respondent, I 
still felt the need to contemplate on my interviewing performance. In order to preserve 
my objectivity as a researcher, at the end of the first six interviews I put the process 
on hold for about a month, went over my interviews, detected the parts where I 
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believed I interfered too much and continued my interviews with this self induced 
admonition in mind.   
 Another way to consider this dual positioning would be to interpret it in light of 
the question of control in interviews. Weiss suggests that an interviewer should never 
fight for control in an interview because in its ideal form it should proceed as 
“collaboration” (1994, 78). Yet, I believe there’s more to the issue of control than 
what this suggestion can cover, dynamics of power emerging during the interviews 
being one. Power is not a one-sided issue; it operates on multiple layers of shifting 
positions. Researchers are quite often warned against the risks of power display upon 
their respondents that can emerge out of struggles for control of the interview. These 
warnings have become an element of academic curiosity especially in the context of 
the debates around informed consent (Thorne 1980; Wax 1980; Emerson 1981). U.S. 
federal regulations on the use of human subjects in research are claimed to be 
instituted because “some groups of subjects lack power relative to researchers and 
hence have less capacity to freely choose to participate” (Thorne 1980, 293). This has 
mainly been considered in context of disadvantaged, dependent, subordinated and/or 
vulnerable groups. In reference to these “relatively powerless groups”, informed 
consent has been considered as way to give these groups “a sense of countervailing 
powers in research situations where they may feel coerced” (Thorne 1980, 294). 
 Yet, the controversies around informed consent question this take on power as a 
unilateral exercise. Aside from their inability to realize the multiplicity of roles 
emerging during a field research and the multiple axes of relationships formed 
between the researcher and the subjects, the controversies around the issue of 
informed consent have also been criticized for their one dimensional conception of 
power. Emerson, referring particularly to the use of informed consent in fieldwork, 
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points out to the drawbacks of such imagery of unilateral power exercised upon the 
subject in the context of the subject’s further disempowerment. 
In most field situations, the researcher neither possesses great power as perceived 
by those studied, nor exercises unilateral control over the setting, conduct, or 
interactional contours of the research encounter (Cassell, 1980). Informed consent 
then becomes not only formalistic, but also patronizing (M. Wax 1977; Klockars, 
1977), assuming “ignorant, powerless, innocent subjects who become the victims 
of the sly maneuvers of crafty professors (Wax 1977, quoted in Emerson 1981, 
373). 
 
 My respondents could hardly be defined as “powerless” from a sociological stand 
point and this is in fact one of the reasons why as a group they did not allow for the 
use of more engaged methods like participant observation.78 In this sense, the problem 
of patronizing the subjects as raised by Emerson was almost never present. Despite 
the fact that my relationship with the respondents did not develop in the context of a 
field research, I believe that the interviews still allowed for shifting grounds and 
references of power to emerge. This was especially true for my positioning as a 
sociologist and a lecturer at a law faculty. The changing turfs of power between me 
and the respondents mainly occurred at those moments where I was constituted either 
as a sociologist or as a lecturer. In this sense, I find Emerson’s depiction of the 
researcher as an actor within relations of power rather than its sole possessor to be 
useful for understanding the changing axes of power that have emerged in my 
interviews. 
II. Discourse Analysis  
 
 My initial internet search on the subject of mediation also provided numerous 
textual materials that needed further analysis for a thorough understanding of the 
                                                 
78 This issue of the inconvenience of direct participation observation in field research among the 
“powerful” has been tackled by many scholars. Emerson offers a brief summary of these assessments 
(Emerson 1981).   
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debates around its emergence. For this reason, while conducting the interviews I also 
carried out a discourse analysis of the available texts on mediation. My preliminary 
search provided different types of textual materials on mediation. I categorized these 
materials under three main headings: News clips available on the internet; press 
releases and statements of institutions on mediation in general and the Draft Law in 
particular and blogs and forums covering debates on mediation. Aside from these 
three main categories, there were also two supplementary groups of textual materials 
that contributed to an understanding of the ways in which this practice was being 
imagined in the juridical field. These were the legislative texts directly and indirectly 
related to mediation and the articles, books and reports on the subject matter. 
 Legislation on mediation includes the Draft Law as well as other relevant laws 
and regulations that allowed me to see different areas of mediation in a larger 
legislative framework.79 In addition, the articles, books and reports on mediation-
published and unpublished- also helped me contextualize mediation in a larger body 
of knowledge. These materials allowed me to better contextualize the debates and 
struggles around mediation within a particularly intellectual framework. These texts  
-both the legislative and the intellectual ones- were not analyzed but rather used as 
reference sources. Nevertheless, they did contribute significantly to my understanding 
of the debates and the struggles around mediation. Reading these scholarly works on 
mediation was also significant from a theoretical dimension. These materials that are 
mainly the products of theoreticians operating within the juridical field are also 
constitutive of the “legal corpus” that Bourdieu refers to. In this sense, reading of 
                                                 
79 Some of these relevant pieces of legislation are the Civil Procedure Code, Family Law, 
Administrative Law, Consumer Law, Tax Law, Sports Law and Code of Advocacy. 
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these materials also allowed me to explore how and by whom mediation is being 
constituted as a particular body of knowledge and unique type of practice.  
1. Archival Media (News) Search  
 For this part of my analysis, I collected the news clips that have appeared as a 
result of my initial internet search.80 These clips cover the period of 2006-2009 with 
the first piece appearing on September 23, 2006. As of April 30, 2009, the last news 
clip that I have included in my analysis was dated February 28, 2009.81 After 
collecting all these news, I compiled them together and saved them as a single text in 
a chronological order which allowed me to follow the course of debates around 
mediation and detect the particular periods when mediation appeared as a newsworthy 
item for the written press. This in turn allowed me to look into these periods when 
mediation was considered to be an important subject matter for the news to better 
historicize the debates around the Draft Law.  
2. Institutional Statements and Press Releases 
 As for the second part of my discourse analysis, I have scanned the data from my 
initial internet search looking in particular for the statements and press releases of 
                                                 
80 I have only included news that has appeared online. These include articles from written press as well 
as pieces from online news sites. In this research, I have not looked at the coverage of the issue by 
visual media organs. 
81 Although I have limited my analysis to this period, I still continued to check for new pieces that 
might have appeared after February 2009. After this date most of the news that I have searched for 
online were about the Mediation Congress on December 8, 2009, jointly organized by Konya Chamber 
of Commerce and L’accadémia Areté which is an Italy based conflict resolution organization that also 
has a contact office in Turkey. This congress has been advertised as the first mediation congress in 
Turkey in so far as it has been organized by mediators from Turkey as opposed to other similar events 
where the invitation of foreign guest speakers or experts has been a common tradition. Another piece of 
news that was posted on an online news site was again related to a conference on mediation that took 
place in March 2009 organized as part of the Technical Assistance for Better Access to Justice project. 
Another noteworthy representation during this period seems to be the news after the releasing of 
Judicial Reform Strategy by the Ministry of Justice in late August 2009. Since Draft Law on Mediation 
in Civil Disputes is one of the items on the Strategy, there has been occasional coverage of the issue 
within comments on the Strategy. 
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institutions that have appeared to be vocal actors during this period of 2006-2009. 
This search has resulted with an extensive database of official institutional responses 
to the Draft Law. This database is predominantly composed of the reactions of the 
Union of Turkish Bar Associations and the statements launched by individual Bar 
Associations. Some of these pieces are institutional statements that are released to the 
public as the official views of the institutions on the subject matter; while some are 
opinions of actors of influential positions within these institutions like the presidents 
or general secretaries. These opinions of the latter kind have more often than not been 
expressed in various occasions such as the meetings of presidents of Bar Associations 
or seminars of various types or in the form of pieces published in diverse newspapers. 
In the case of the Bar Associations, these pieces sometimes take the form of collective 
declarations while sometimes they appear as statements released by local Bar 
Associations. The analysis of these pieces revealed diverse actors with diverse 
concerns, frames of opposition and means of action with respect to the Draft Law. 
This overview enabled me to better observe the main lines of debate and to outline the 
institutional actors who have been active in these debates.  
3. Blogs and Forums  
 For this part of my analysis, I have first sorted out the blogs and forums from 
within my initial internet search that have revealed any type of information on the 
existing debates around mediation. In the end, I have analyzed data from twelve 
different sites with various discussion spaces, sometimes in the form of a forum, 
sometimes as a blog, sometimes in the shape of a group in facebook. While nine of 
these are professional sites such as the ones created by lawyers or a forum within the 
website of a professional organization like the Union of Turkish Bar Associations, the 
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rest of them are sites of public sharing such as facebook, yahoo groups and alike.  Out 
of the nine professional sites, three of them are sites on mediation whereas the rest are 
sites that focus on general legal issues. After sorting out all these sites, I have scanned 
the discussion areas within them -sometimes entering into all topics- and analyzed the 
relevant debates in terms of the issues that have come up in the questions and the 
comments.82 This study has enabled me to gain a deeper understanding of the kinds of 
problems and concerns that the Draft Law and the institution of mediation in general 
seem to raise for actors operating within the world of law.  
III. Nonparticipant Observation 
  
 Finally, I was also a nonparticipant observer in two international conferences on 
mediation. Both of the conferences I attended were organized under an EC sponsored 
project called Technical Assistance to Better Access to Justice in Turkey.83 The first 
conference was organized on February 13, 2009, in Istanbul while the second one was 
organized a month later in March 13, 2009, in Ankara. While the first conference was 
organized under the general title of “Better Access to Justice in Turkey” and mainly 
focused on legal aid and ADR as issues of access to justice, the latter one focused 
primarily on the subject of mediation as its title “Civil and Commercial Mediation in 
Turkey” suggests.  
 My participation in these sites has allowed me to observe different actors as they 
exchange their opinions and concerns on mediation. This method was particularly 
beneficial for it gave me the opportunity to observe how and in what context the 
                                                 
82 The last date of my data collection is July 2009. After this date although I did follow ongoing 
debates, I did not include these in my analysis. 
83 The project was implemented by an international consortium led by ADR Center in Rome, Italy. 
Technical Assistance for Better Access to Justice- Turkey (‘BAJ’)- EuropeAid/123555/D/SER/TR.  
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issues outlined in the programs of these conferences were approached by various 
actors and what kinds of controversies emerged out of the debates between these 
actors. In a way, sitting at these conferences allowed me to observe the actors of these 
debates as they bring out matters of concern from their own perspectives and engage 
in heated discussions about what mediation will bring to the existing legal system, 
how it will adapt and contribute to its workings and how all of these efforts can be 
evaluated in light of the larger sociopolitical dynamics of the society. 
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Chapter 5 
A General Look at Alternative Dispute Resolution and the 
Emergence of Mediation in Turkey  
 
 In this chapter, I offer a general overview of the emergence and development of 
the theory and the practice of Alternative Dispute Resolution, looking at how this 
movement has established itself as a more or less global phenomenon as well as its 
particular presence within the legal system in Turkey. Since ADR is not the main 
concern of this dissertation and in reference to mediation I am mostly interested in 
understanding the struggles and hierarchies that emerge in the debates around this 
field, the chapter is not intended to offer a detailed elaboration of the theoretical and 
practical features of ADR in general or mediation in particular. Nevertheless, I believe 
that presenting a rather general history of the emergence and the development of the 
ADR movement and acquainting the reader with the specific ways and timelines of 
the repercussions of this movement in Turkey is still significant for a better 
understanding of the institutional context within which mediation has been situated. 
I.  Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Look at Theory and Practice 
 
 Courts have more often than not been portrayed as fundamental mechanisms of 
dispute resolution regardless of the type of legal system they function in. This 
depiction of courts as the primary channels through which social conflicts turned into 
matters of legal relevance are resolved is at the same time symbolic of the monopoly 
of the state over disputes. This monopoly can in turn be assessed against a general 
background of the principle of sovereignty. The state’s claimed monopoly over the 
right to resolve disputes through its official judicial mechanisms is in this sense an 
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extension of its sovereign power. This holds true especially for developmentalist 
nation state models where the law of the state is seen as the “foundational symbol of 
national sovereignty” (Koğacıoğlu 2007). In this formulation, judicial power that is 
exercised through judgments and penalties that can possibly include acts of physical 
constraint and violence is imagined to be symbolic of a certain “sovereign vision of 
the state” where the state alone is the holder of the “monopoly of legitimized 
symbolic violence” (Bourdieu 1987, 838). 
 This sovereignty is claimed in two ways. With respect to the people in terms of 
concentrating the power to decide on judicial matters in the hands of the ultimate 
sovereign, the state; also as a declaration of independence with respect to external 
pressures whereby through its national legislation and judicial institutions, the state 
establishes itself as the primary authority of social control and regulation. In this 
sense, the concentration of the power to regulate and control social relations as well as 
the ownership of the right to resolve disputes in a single entity can be interpreted as an 
affirmation of the sovereign power of the state. Within this context, in matters of 
criminal justice, the state establishes itself as the sovereign holding the power to 
punish those who fail to abide by the rules of social living; while in the context of 
civil disputes via its judicial bodies the state acts as the primary negotiator between 
parties.  
 This conception of law as the ultimate representation of legitimate force in the 
hands of the state is useful for understanding the authority and control exercised by 
legal institutions in modern society. Nevertheless, the explanatory power of such a 
conception fails to satisfy the need to understand the power of extralegal formations 
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that present social alternatives to state’s monopoly over disputes.84 In this sense, this 
take on law and the legal institutions as reflections of the power of the state upon the 
regulation of social conflicts fails to account for the prevalence and the effects of 
other forms of dispute resolution that regulate social relations. Within this context, 
Sally Engle Merry, for instance, refers to the multiple strategies of disputing and the 
choices that social actors make between “alternative modes of dispute settlement” as 
they go about their daily lives (1979, 891). In this picture, resorting to courts for the 
resolution of disputes is presented as only one of the alternatives that are available to 
social actors as they deal with their disputes (Cartwright et al. 1974). Informal modes 
of dealing with disputes such as gossip, scandal, violence and especially avoidance of 
the conflict in the social setting that Merry has studied, present themselves as 
recognized ways of dispute settlement by the people of the community. Within this 
context, the choice of the way in which the dispute will be handled and whether it will 
include a formal resolution is depicted as a consciously employed strategy by social 
actors.85 
 On a parallel terrain, this depiction of law as the representation of the sovereignty 
of the state in terms of its monopoly over the right to resolve disputes also fails to 
account for the developments especially in the second half of the twentieth century 
characterized by phenomena like the globalization of law and the emergence of 
transnational forms of legislation and judicial institutionalization. On the one hand, 
these developments have challenged the authority of the nation state upon internal 
                                                 
84 It is important to note here that a rather encompassing definition of law as all those mechanisms of 
social control and conflict resolution; one that sees law, legal authority and legal institutions beyond 
simple adjudication mechanism is also possible. In this depiction, favored by Evans-Pritchard in his 
work on the Nuer, the institutionalization of law is not limited to pure adjudication; rather, it is 
imagined to be operating on a much larger social level, as long as “there is machinery for settling 
disputes and a moral obligation to conclude them sooner or later” (Evans-Pritchard 1940, quoted in 
Abel 1974, 223). 
85 William Felstiner also touches upon this issue in his study on the social conditions under which 
different forms of dispute processing are likely to occur (Felstiner 1974). 
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disputes due to for instance new forms of legal remedies beyond national jurisdictions 
such as the right of individual petition to the European Court of Human Rights. On 
the other hand, these novel phenomena have also required states to acknowledge the 
presence of cross border disputes which call for alternative means of resolution 
beyond national jurisdictions as in the case of international commercial arbitration 
which is institutionalized in bodies such as the International Chamber of Commerce, 
American Arbitration Association and London Court of International Arbitration etc.  
 In addition, while the emphasis on law as the ultimate symbol of the sovereign 
state may result with an underestimation of the power of other modes of social control 
and mechanisms of dispute resolution and a failure to account for the effects of the 
globalization of legal norms and institutions upon this claimed sovereignty; at the 
same time, it carries the risk of sacrificing the concept of dispute for the concept of 
law.86 When the concept of dispute is placed at the center of a social scientific 
exploration of the role of law in social relations, then the possibility of seeing 
alternative machineries of regulation and settlement presents itself. Within such 
formulation, the formal legal mechanisms of the state authority -courts being the most 
important ones- become only one amongst a multiplicity of mechanisms that offer a 
wide array of methods and procedures with which disputes can be handled.  
 In addition, when the concept of dispute is taken as the main unit of exploration, it 
also opens up new ways of thinking upon how it can be ended. In this sense, literature 
offers alternative terms other than “resolution” to accompany the concept of dispute 
                                                 
86 Richard Abel, for instance, suggests the displacement of law from “the center of our conceptual 
focus as we attempt to build social theory” and instead offers the concept of dispute -albeit not as 
equivalent for law- in the context of some sort of a “narrowing of vision”. Abel contends that the 
concept of dispute has the capacity to have a “content that is both unambiguous and generally 
acceptable” which in turn can allow it to be more applicable across societies than any definition of law 
can imagine to be. In addition, he justifies this choice of emphasis on disputes amongst many other 
alternative “behavioral patterns which we denominate as legal” such as social control, social 
engineering etc. in terms of the general social scientific interest in law predominantly being an interest 
in the study of disputes (Abel 1974, 224, 225). 
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such as “processing”, “management” and “outcome” (Cartwright et al. 1974; Merry 
1979; Abel 1974 respectively). In this context, the conceptual choice of “dispute” 
over “law” in the study of the multiple ways in which social conflicts are handled in 
society also allows for recognition of the differences between representations of 
conflicting relations. Miller & Sarat for instance, carefully distinguish the concept of 
dispute from grievance and claim in order to understand the genesis of this concept 
that is usually considered to be given. They define grievance as “an individual's belief 
that he or she (or a group or organization) is entitled to a resource which someone else 
may grant or deny”. In this sense, to the extent that grievances are perceptions, 
whether they will be turned into conflicts that require further action is a choice on 
behalf of the subject experiencing this grievance. If the choice is made in the direction 
of asking the party perceived to be the cause of the grievance to take responsibility, 
then a claim is said to be registered. A dispute, on the other hand, is said to exist 
“when a claim based on a grievance is rejected either in whole or in part” (Miller and 
Sarat 1980, 527).  
 This type of a conceptual clarity is important for at least two reasons. First, the 
recognition of alternative mechanisms of dealing with disputes within the social order 
allows for a questioning of the claimed monopoly of the state over these disputes. 
Secondly, and perhaps dialectically, it allows for an exploration of the ways in which 
the formalization of such methods through the establishment of ADR mechanisms in 
fact reinstitutionalizes the monopoly of the state. The birth of ADR in theory and 
practice, in this context, as a novel way to approach the issue of dispute resolution 
cannot be considered independent of the political will to regulate the existing conflicts 
within the society.  
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1.  Birth of ADR  
 The birth of the concept of Alternative Dispute Resolution can be situated within 
this framework. The failure of formal judicial mechanisms to serve the legal needs 
and demands of the people in an efficient and timely fashion has been considered to 
be the primary push factor behind the development of alternative mechanisms to deal 
with disputes. In this sense, the idea has been to develop novel methods of dispute 
resolution that can be presented as alternatives to the judicial service of the courts, if 
not to the judicial function of the state. The fact that these novel mechanisms have 
been organized under some sort of a regulatory schema either controlled by the state 
or by other interested parties such as NGOs or Bars -hence their institutionalization-, 
attests to their quasi formal nature. Not judicial mechanisms proper, these alternatives 
are not the nonformal means of dispute resolution that grow out of the particular 
cultural dynamics of each social order either.87 Albeit the fact that they are more often 
than not inspired by nonformal mechanisms of dispute resolution existing within 
social relations such as third party involvement in settlement of disputes or as in the 
case of informal ways of conciliation and negotiation, the recognized methods listed 
under the title of ADR more often than not refer to some degree of formalism that is 
itself recognized officially by the primary actor of social control, the state. In this 
                                                 
87 One particular difference between traditional methods of dispute resolution and ADR mechanisms is 
the natural emergence of traditional methods within the particularities of each cultural setting as 
opposed to the ADR mechanisms which are products of conscious planning and political strategies 
(Ceylan 2009). It is also important to note here that a pure disintegration of available methods of 
dealing with disputes- formal and nonformal alike- would be a sociological impossibility given their 
strong interdependence. In acknowledgement of this fact, Cartwright, Galanter and Kidder argue that 
“there are multiple systems of normative ordering in society and that official agencies and norms do 
not necessarily stand in a relation of hierarchic control over the unofficial”. In this context, they refer to 
how the authors of Law & Society Journal’s issue on Litigation and Dispute Processing “posit multiple, 
overlapping and sometimes competing sets of norms and institutions with sufficient mutual influence 
that their functioning can- not be understood by studying them in isolation” (Cartwright et al. 1974, 2). 
From a similar point of departure, Mather attempts to integrate findings of longitudinal studies of 
courts with data from works on dispute processing in order to present the ways in which these 
seemingly different lines of studies can in fact complement each other (Mather 1990). 
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sense, although these mechanisms have rather flexible ways of operating with fewer 
rules and limitations, they still function according to some logic of formality depicted 
in acts of book keeping, supervision, training, quality assessment which overall 
require an institutional framework.88 
 In addition to these formal characteristics, alternatives as they are, these 
mechanisms still in one way or another have an affiliation with the formal legal 
system in the sense that they are concerned with those disputes that are potential court 
materials yet are not taken up to courts for a variety of reasons. The assessment of the 
emergence of the movement of ADR against the backdrop of a rising trend of access 
to justice is, for instance, an indicator of this affiliation between these novel 
mechanisms and the disappointment with institutions of formal law (Cappelletti 
1993). Building upon the struggles of legal realism against the formal, rationalistic 
and rather theoretical conceptions of law, the interest in access to justice has largely 
been a response to the failure of liberal law to fulfill its promises of fair treatment and 
equality for all. In this sense, access to justice movement became especially powerful 
and contentious during the period in the aftermath of the social conflicts 
characterizing 1960s especially in the US which is also the period that the concept of 
ADR was born.  
 Following the legalization of increasing number of diverse disputes arising from 
the social and political turmoil of 1960s, litigation as the classical method of formal 
dispute resolution was in a dire strait. In this period, not only was there an increase in 
the number of disputes coming to courts in the US -hence the capacity of the judicial 
                                                 
88 One line of opinion follows that ADR mechanisms offer alternative methods to classical judicial 
procedures delivered by the courts as well as to other nonformal ways of solving disputes within the 
society. In this sense, ADR is imagined to be serving like a bridge between the rigidity of adversarial 
legal mechanisms controlled by the state and the flexibility of the traditional methods of dispute 
resolution (Ceylan 2009). 
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system to handle this litigation explosion was questioned- but there was also an 
increase in the diversity of disputes resulting mainly from the new life styles, new 
identities, new moralities that the general social and political atmosphere of this 
period allowed to flourish. The increase in the transformation of social conflicts into 
legal disputes in this atmosphere is also interpreted in terms of the expansion of the 
areas of legal intervention. Robert Kagan, for instance, expresses his concern for the 
growth of law in terms of the failure of socio-legal scholars to keep up with the pace 
with which “law becomes more ambitious”, “more dense, more complex, more 
politically-charged, and most importantly, more changeable” as well as with the 
lateral and vertical spread of law across the globe. In light of such circumstances, 
Kagan asserts that the powerful law-generating factors like the more intense economic 
competition, rapid technological change, increasing environmental stress and greater 
geographical mobility lead to the erosion of older forms of social control and 
undermine “the old-boy networks that managed conflict in socially homogeneous, 
stratified communities” (1995, 140-141). While on the one hand, these developments 
lead to greater demands placed on law and its proliferation in the society; at the same 
time they bring out questions on the capacity of law and existing legal institutions to 
cope with the challenges of expansion in scope and density.   
 Within this context, influenced by an overall concern for access to justice, the idea 
of ADR was developed as a particular consequence of a political philosophy that was 
characterized by the objective of increasing the accessibility of judicial institutions as 
well as other effective measures of dispute resolution for all (Özbek 2009). In this 
sense, the development of ADR was not seen as a necessarily novel invention given 
that such alternatives have always existed in societies. Yet, the reasons for resorting to 
such mechanisms are considered to be the extensions of a new political philosophy 
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that is primarily concerned with removing the obstacles that people face while trying 
to have access to justice (Özbek 2009). Within this context, the institutionalization of 
these new modes of dispute resolution as a result of a specific political philosophy can 
be interpreted as attempts on behalf of the state apparatus to re-establish its monopoly 
over disputes.  
2.  The Context 
 The concept of Alternative Dispute Resolution is in this sense more often than not 
considered to be an Anglo-Saxon invention. First born in the US, due to the 
similarities in the legal systems ADR is claimed to have successfully penetrated into 
other Anglo-Saxon contexts like Australia and the UK. National Conference on the 
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, aka Pound 
Conference, organized in 1976 by American Bar Association is considered to be the 
major force behind the spread of ADR mechanisms in the US (Moffitt 2006).89 In this 
conference, not only was the use of arbitration and mediation further encouraged, but 
also the development of new mechanisms such as multi-court house programs and 
neighborhood justice centers was on the agenda. By 1990, the process of developing a 
federal legislative framework of ADR was already underway, initially with the 
adoption of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act by the Congress which 
anticipated the use of methods such as negotiation, mediation, mini trial and 
arbitration in the resolution of administrative disputes, and later on with the adoption 
of ADR Act of 1998 by which each federal court was given the authority to establish 
its own ADR program (Goldberg et al. 1999, quoted in Özbek 2009).  
                                                 
89 This is despite the historical presence of commercial arbitration and the existence of professional 
mediators as early as 1940s particularly in matters of work conflicts. 
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 The prevalence of ADR in the US is also manifested in the growing professional 
interest in dispute resolution. American Bar Association Section on Dispute 
Resolution established in 1993, for instance, is considered to be “one of ABA's newest 
and fastest growing Sections with over 19,000 members already”.90 The Section not 
only works to generate information and awareness on ADR and to accommodate 
dispute resolution processes within current legal procedures, but it is also active in 
creating an educational platform for ADR through programs such as Multi-Door 
Dispute Resolution Courthouse Centers Project. The Section is also engaged in 
accommodating ADR within legal education through the activities of its Committee 
on Law Schools which include events like competitions and colloquiums as well as 
cooperation with the law faculties for course offerings and exchange of syllabi. 
According to the 2003 Directory of Law School Dispute Resolution Courses and 
Programs, there are 887 such courses and programs offered by 184 ABA approved 
law schools in the US which attests to the growing professional interest in ADR.91 
 Similarly, in the UK, which is considered to be the second most successful applier 
of alternative mechanisms, on top of the century long history of arbitration and the 
existence of mediation in neighborhood, commercial and family disputes, the 
publishing of Access to Justice Final Report by Lord Woolf in 1996 is considered to 
be a significant turning point in the ADR history of the country (Özbek 2009). The 
report outlined the main defects in the present system of civil justice and suggested a 
“new landscape” where “litigation will be avoided whenever possible” (Access to 
Justice Final Report 1996). Upon the suggestions of the Woolf Report, with the 
overriding objective of “enabling the courts to deal with cases justly”, 1998 Civil 
                                                 
90 http://www.abanet.org/dispute/aboutsec.html (accessed March 5, 2010).  
91 http://www.abanet.org/dispute/directory.html (accessed March 5, 2010). 
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Procedure Rule gave the courts full responsibility for the management of cases which 
included “encouraging the parties to use an alternative dispute resolution procedure if 
the court considers that appropriate and facilitating the use of such procedure”.92 
 In fact, in 1996 ADR was integrated into the policy of the New Labour when, in 
the foreword of a book presenting the government’s proposals on law reform, Tony 
Blair, while accusing the Conservatives for cutting down legal aid coverage, 
advocated the use of ADR instead of promising to grant more money to legal aid 
budget (Abel 2003). The ADR system in the UK is argued to be further strengthened 
by developments like the 1996 Family Law Act providing legal aid for mediation in 
family disputes; the 1999 Access to Justice Act that allowed for the costs of mediation 
to be fully met through legal aid and the 2000 changes in the legal aid system that 
extended this public spending to areas other than family law.  
 In civil law traditions, however, the development of ADR has been delayed with 
respect to the Anglo-Saxon world. One reason for this delayed emergence is 
explained in terms of the different approaches to law in the Common Law and Civil 
Law traditions. Ceylan argues that the fact that ADR first emerged in the US and was 
later on adopted by other similar legal systems is a consequence of the Anglo-Saxon 
emphasis on practice and pragmatic solutions to judicial issues as opposed to the 
rather theoretical framework within which law and legislation is situated in Civil Law 
systems.93 In this sense, this instrumental take on law in the Anglo-Saxon world has 
                                                 
92 Civil Procedure Rules, http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules_fin/contents/parts/part01.htm 
(accessed March 5, 2010). 
93 Weber also acknowledged this difference in his conceptualization of law as a “craft” and law as a 
“science”. He argues that the former type of legal thought is mainly represented by the English method 
of “having law taught by the lawyers”. This type of legal training, according to Weber, produced a 
formalistic treatment of the law that prevented “systematic and comprehensive treatment of the whole 
body of the law”. At the same time, the product of such legal thought was also a type of legal practice 
“that did not aim at all at a rational system but rather at a practically useful scheme of contracts and 
actions, oriented towards the interests of clients in typically recurring situations”. In the latter 
possibility, however, law is taught in special schools “where the emphasis is placed on legal theory and 
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been interpreted as the main motor force behind the development of such practical 
solutions as ADR to the problem of judicial inefficiency; whereas mainly due the 
formalist nature of the Civil Law tradition reactions to similar inefficiencies have 
been much slower to develop (Ceylan 2009). In this respect, Ceylan argues that the 
emphasis on practice rather than theory in the US legal thinking can be explained in 
terms of the prominence of the search for justice over conceptual concerns which in 
turn has allowed for the creation of a structural setting within which alternative 
mechanisms to the judicial procedures can be developed (2009). 
 Nevertheless, the Civil Law world also seems to be accelerating the steps taken 
towards integrating alternative mechanisms into their judicial systems.94 One decisive 
step has been the 1999 European Council Meeting in Tampere. Under the heading of 
“Better Access to Justice in Europe”, the final report of the meeting calls the Member 
States to create alternative, extrajudicial procedures for approaching the objective of 
the European Council “to develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and 
justice”.95 Following this meeting, in 2002 the European Commission launched a 
Green Paper on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Civil and Commercial Law with 
the purpose of “taking stock of the current situation and launching broad consultations 
on the measures to be taken”.96 The Paper explains the current situation of ADR in 
                                                                                                                                            
‘science’, that is, where legal phenomena are given rational and systematic treatment (Weber 1978, 
784-792).   
94 In case of Germany, for instance, it is argued that in late 1990s interest in mediation moved beyond 
academic borders and received serious attention during litigation reform discussions. These 
developments are seen as an indication of German mediation movement to be “repositioning itself from 
the academic into the practitioner focused political arena” (Alexander 2001, 3). In the French context, 
ADR is claimed to have a presence since the French Revolution when conciliation was considered to 
be the ideal method for dispute resolution. Although the use of mandatory conciliation declined in the 
early twentieth century, since the second half of 1990s, the method seems to be promoted again albeit 
mostly in an optional framework (Gaillard and Edelstein 2000-2001).  
95 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm (accessed March 5, 2010).  
96 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2002/com2002_0196en01.pdf (accessed March 5, 
2010). 
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Member states and proposes strategies and policies that need to be developed for 
increasing the applicability and the efficiency of these mechanisms.  
 Last but not least, a significant development at the European level has been the 
passing of Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 
Europe on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters.97 The 
Directive qualifies the principle of access to justice as fundamental and considers 
access to extrajudicial mechanisms as equally integral elements of this principle as 
judicial mechanisms. Referring to the particular capacity of mediation to offer cost 
effective and quick extrajudicial resolution, the Directive promotes the use of 
mediation in cross border disputes in civil and commercial matters, emphasizing the 
need to introduce legislative frameworks to ensure the predictability of mediation 
process for the parties. Member States are obligated to put into force the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with the clauses of the 
Directive before May 21, 2011. 
3.  Defining ADR 
 A rather flexible definition of ADR would refer to all procedures -outside judicial 
ones- where the parties of a dispute come to a mutual agreement as a result of a 
process that they voluntarily join and whereby, with the help of a third party, they get 
the opportunity to express their needs and demands from each other. The sine qua non 
elements of such a process would be good faith, informed consent, active participation 
of the parties, mutual agreement and confidentiality. Nevertheless, by definition such 
flexibility would ultimately allow for the inclusion of all existing mechanisms of 
                                                 
97 Directive 2008/52/EC, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:136:0003:0008:EN:PDF (accessed March 5, 
2010).  
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dispute resolution that remain outside the jurisdiction of the state which in turn would 
blur all possible lines of differentiation between ADR mechanisms and all other 
“methods, practices and techniques” of dispute resolution within the social order 
(Ceylan 2009, 171).  
 This confusion around the definition of ADR manifests itself through two main 
lines of controversy in the ADR literature.98 The first one problematizes the word 
“alternative”, mainly questioning what these methods are being alternative to 
(Lieberman and Henry 1986; Twining 1993). The second line of controversy, on the 
other hand, revolves around the types of methods that can actually be called ADR. In 
this latter category of debates, the boundaries of ADR are imagined to be determined 
in accordance with the characteristics of the final decision, i.e. if it is based on the 
mutual agreement of the parties or if it is delivered by a third party.  
 The former line of controversy is mainly concerned with the position of these 
mechanisms vis-à-vis the formal judicial system. Within this context, the question 
becomes whether these mechanisms are established as alternatives to the judicial 
power of the state which in turn raises concerns about the displacement and/or 
transfer of this particular state function. Such an understanding of the concept is 
criticized from a variety of positions: The danger of leaving courts and legal 
professionals outside mechanisms of dispute resolution; jeopardizing the relationship 
between the state and individuals as a result of challenging state’s authority over 
disputes; the possibility of ADR mechanisms operating side by side with formal 
                                                 
98 The confusion around defining ADR can also be explained in reference to its conceptual deficiency 
manifested by its over emphasis on practice. Ceylan argues that since the raison d’etre of the whole 
movement is resolving the deadlocks of the formal legal system and seeking for solutions to the 
practical needs of the system, ADR movement is similar to other currents focusing on practice in the 
absence of a clear conceptual basis. Ceylan interprets this situation in relation to the fact that ADR 
practices preceded their reasoning (Ceylan 2009). 
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judicial bodies; a postmodern denial of the political organization of the nation state 
manifested in the principle of less law etc (Özbek 2009). 
 In line with these criticisms, it is even argued that ADR mechanisms can only 
succeed in the sense of serving the needs of the public as long as they operate 
alongside a formal judicial mechanism since they are not intended to compete with 
the judiciary. This necessity is explained in terms of the differences in the objectives 
of the services provided through ADR and the courts. ADR is depicted as closer to 
providing “acceptable” solutions for the parties rather than serving “justice” which is 
considered to be the primary task of courts (Özbek 2009, 140). Within this approach, 
from an ideological perspective, ADR is not seen as a revolutionary step that has the 
potential or the objective of overthrowing or replacing the existing judicial institutions 
of the state. Defining ADR’s potential for existence only within the structures of the 
liberal law system, this line of thinking rejects granting ADR an ideological position 
in strict opposition to the ideology of liberal law (Ceylan 2009). 
 In addition, it is also claimed that ADR mechanisms would fail to provide the 
judicial security that courts allow for based on their constitutional foundation. The 
presumption of equality between the parties of a dispute which is characteristic of 
ADR finds a complete opposite in judicial procedures where the protection of the 
weaker party is considered to be an integral feature of protection of basic rights and 
freedoms (Özbek 2009). On a different terrain, the word has also been criticized for 
its implicit suggestion of formal judicial mechanisms as the primary mechanisms of 
dispute resolution and hence defining nonformal methods that exist within the social 
structure only as alternatives to these formal mechanisms. These concerns are at the 
same time coupled with suggestions to replace the term alternative with other terms 
like amicable, appropriate or preferred (Özbek 2009, 129, italics original).  
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 The latter issue, on the other hand, revolves around the question of what ADR is 
comprised of. Although the literature on ADR, with a particular reference to the 
multiplicity of such practices in the US, refers to a wide spectrum of mechanisms, 
arbitration, negotiation and mediation appear to be the most common practices.99 The 
debates on ADR methods mostly problematize the inclusion of arbitration as an 
alternative mechanism primarily due to its resemblance to the formal judicial 
mechanism as an adjudicative process. The presence of an arbitration judge deciding 
on the case and the fact that this decision is binding for the parties raises doubts about 
the compatibility of arbitration as an ADR mechanism. On the other hand, features of 
arbitration such as the freedom of the parties to decide on the judge, on the procedures 
to be used, on the setting of the process all are claimed to attest to the alternative 
nature of arbitration.  
 Mediation, however, is rather undisputedly recognized as an ADR mechanism. 
Theoretically, this rather common acceptance can be considered in terms of the nature 
of the process. Mediation is commonly defined as a multi-stage process where a 
neutral and impartial third party, referred to as the mediator, facilitates the dialogue 
between the parties of a dispute without directing them to certain solutions or 
deciding on their behalf. The key to a mediation process is usually described as the 
voluntary, active and equal participation of the parties in the process as well as the 
decision. Within this context, the position of the mediator as the well informed third 
party who facilitates the dialogue between the disputing parties in an impartial and 
nondirective fashion is considered to be one of the defining features of this process. 
                                                 
99 Some of these other methods can be listed as practices like bargaining, conciliation, neighborhood 
justice centers, fact-finding, ombudsman, small claims courts, multi-door courthouse programs, mini 
trial, summary jury trial, settlement conference etc. 
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 Mediation is also praised for its particular contribution to the continuation of the 
relationship between the disputing parties. In this sense, its original use in the 
resolution of workplace disputes is explanatory of its potential to resume the damaged 
relationship between the parties. In fact, the use of mediation in addressing the 
conflicts arising out of collective labor agreements, between the worker and the 
employer, has been considered as an effective way to allow both parties to maintain 
their ongoing relationship. This effectiveness has more often than not been explained 
in terms of the “win-win” nature of the mediation process as opposed to adjudicative 
mechanisms such as courts or arbitration whereby the delivering of a final decision is 
synonymous with one of the parties “losing” their case. In mediation, however, the 
active and voluntary involvement of the parties in the process as well as the 
agreement allows for a situation- at least in theory- whereby everybody gets what they 
want out of the process.100 
II.  The Birth of Mediation in Turkey: Context and Process  
 
 Mediation is certainly not the first ADR item on Turkey’s agenda. There is, for 
instance, a long history of national arbitration in Turkey starting with the 1927 dated 
Civil Code of Procedure which is still in effect today and has specific articles on the 
use of arbitration in civil disputes that are not matters of public interest. Despite the 
controversies within the literature on whether arbitration can be considered as an 
alternative dispute resolution, the existence of arbitration is still noteworthy with 
regards the historical development of alternative measures in the sense of the 
transference of legal disputes to another source of authority than the formal judicial 
                                                 
100 This praised feature of mediation can also be interpreted in the context of “criticisms directed at 
legal professionals and legal processes as unnecessarily intensifying the hostility between disputants” 
(Miller and Sarat 1980, 526). 
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mechanisms. In 2001, Turkey also passed International Arbitration Law which 
allows for the resolution of disputes stemming from international commercial 
relations outside national jurisdictions. As another common mechanism of ADR, the 
institution of victim-offender mediation has also been introduced in the new Criminal 
Code and Criminal Code of Procedure in 2005.  
 Besides these institutions offering alternative resolutions, there are also a number 
of other mechanisms covered by a variety of legislative texts such as the provisions 
in Family Law, Administrative Law, Consumer Law, Tax Law, Sports Law and Code 
of Advocacy or other similar methods employed in the resolution of disputes arising 
out of labor agreements, insurance contracts, stock exchange transactions etc. 
Nevertheless, the legislative measures taken for introducing mediation in civil 
disputes as a separate institution and the debates around this institution are relatively 
novel phenomena that need to be contextualized within a framework of merging 
international and national developments.  
1. International Context 
 The international developments in the field of ADR that have been influential in 
the emergence of mediation in civil disputes in Turkey are primarily the steps taken at 
the European level. Since late 1990s, European Union member states have grown an 
interest in the expansion of ADR mechanisms for the resolution of disputes that 
regularly go to courts. In line with this interest, significant policies have been 
developed at the legislative as well as the practical level. Within this context, the 
beginnings of a systematic approach to the issue of alternative mechanisms at the 
European level can be traced back to the adoption of the "Communication on the out-
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of-court settlement of consumer disputes" by the European Commission in 1998.101 
This Communication -a part of series of Community initiatives in the field of 
consumer access to justice- was intended to encourage and facilitate the settlement of 
consumer conflicts at an earlier stage, allowing access to justice through “simple, 
swift, effective and inexpensive redress channels”. The document outlines the 
establishment of out-of-court procedures as one of the three possible ways of 
improving access to justice for consumers. As a way that aims to remove disputes out 
of the traditional framework of judicial settlement, these procedures are defined as 
ways to settle disputes “through the active intervention of a third party who proposes 
or imposes a solution”.  
 Recognizing the structural and procedural diversity of the existing schemas of 
out-of court settlements for consumer disputes in Europe, the Communication not 
only recommended certain minimum guarantees to be provided by responsible bodies 
in each member state but it also anticipated an increase in disputes arising from cross 
border consumption. For this reason, the Communication also pointed out to the 
necessity of establishing central contact points in each state which would then be 
linked through the creation of a European Extra-Judicial Network that will allow the 
consumers to approach a single contact point in their national systems and regulate 
the channeling of the cross border disputes to the relevant bodies in the country of the 
supplier.102 This Network (EEJ-Net) was established in 2001 as a one-year project and 
was later on in 2005 turned into European Consumer Centres Network (ECC-Net).103 
                                                 
101 http://aei.pitt.edu/1179/01/consumer_justice_gp_follow_COM_1998_198.pdf (accessed March 5, 
2010). 
102 http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/policy/developments/acce_just/acce_just07_workdoc_en.pdf 
(accessed March 5, 2010). 
103 http://www.euroconsumatori.org/16853.html (accessed March 5, 2010). For more information on 
ECC-NET, please see http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/ecc_network/factsheet-ECC-Net_en.pdf 
(accessed March 5, 2010). 
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 European Council has also been an interested party in the development of ADR at 
the European level. During the Council’s 1999 special meeting in Tampere on “the 
creation of an area of freedom, security and justice in the European Union”, member 
states were invited to take the necessary steps in the development of ADR 
mechanisms in line with access to justice principles. Under the heading “Better 
Access to Justice in Europe”, alongside suggestions on enhancing legal aid systems, 
increasing level of information on judicial systems and establishing minimum 
standards for crime victims, the conclusions of the meeting also called for the creation 
of extra-judicial procedures in member states.104 Following Tampere, in 2002, the 
European Commission launched a Green Paper on Alternative Dispute Resolution in 
Civil and Commercial Law on the current state of ADR in Member states and 
proposing policies for increasing the applicability and the efficiency of these 
mechanisms.105 The passing of Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and 
the Council of Europe on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters 
has also been a significant reference point for the developments around mediation in 
Turkey.106 Given Turkey’s status as a candidate country, this Directive has been 
particularly influential on the legislative steps taken in the direction of introducing 
mediation in civil disputes.  
 Alongside the developments at the EU level, the 2002 UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Conciliation has also been an important international 
reference point for the mediation works in Turkey. The Model Law was prepared with 
the conviction that the establishment of a model legislation on methods for settling 
                                                 
104 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm#b (accessed March 5, 2010).  
105 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2002/com2002_0196en01.pdf (accessed March 5, 
2010). 
106 Directive 2008/52/EC, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:136:0003:0008:EN:PDF (accessed March 5, 
2010). 
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disputes in which parties request a third person for assistance would “contribute to the 
development of harmonious international economic relations”.107 Within this context, 
the Model Law is designed to provide “uniform rules in respect of the conciliation 
process to encourage the use of conciliation and ensure greater predictability and 
certainty in its use”.108 Table 3 presents a chronological order of developments in the 
field of ADR. 
                                                 
107 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/538/98/PDF/N0253898.pdf?OpenElement 
(accessed March 5, 2010). 
108 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2002Model_conciliation.html 
(accessed March 5, 2010).  
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Table 3. Timeline of significant developments in ADR field at the European and UN 
level  
 
DATE ACTIVITY INSTITUTION CONTENT 
 
1998 
 
Communication on 
the out-of-court 
settlement of 
consumer disputes 
 
European Commission  
 
Setting the foundation for 
the European Extra-
Judicial Network (EEJ- 
Net) 
 
1999 
 
European Council 
Meeting in Tampere 
 
European Commission 
Inviting to Member 
States to take relevant 
steps in the field of ADR 
in context of “access to 
justice”  
 
 
2001 
 
European Extra-
Judicial Network 
(EEJ- Net) 
 
European Commission 
Establishing a network of 
national bodies for the 
extrajudicial settlement 
of disputes in order to 
resolve cross-border 
consumer disputes. 
 
2002 
 
Green Paper on 
Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in Civil 
and Commercial 
Law 
 
European Commission  
Setting the principles of 
mediation; developing 
strategies and policies at 
the European level  
 
 
2002 
 
UNCITRAL Model 
Law on 
International 
Commercial 
Conciliation 
 
UNCITRAL  
Developing uniform laws 
on mediation among 
members of United 
Nations  
 
2008 
 
Directive 
2008/52/EC 
 
European Parliament 
and the Council of 
Europe 
Promoting the use of 
mediation in cross-border 
disputes in civil and 
commercial matters; 
calling for the 
development of 
legislative frameworks; 
obligating Member 
States to force necessary 
laws, regulations and 
administrative measures  
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 These developments have not been overlooked by policy makers in Turkey given 
its status as a European Union candidate country. In fact, UNCITRAL Model Law, 
Directive 2008/52/EC, the Green Book, together with particular national legislative 
texts such as the Austrian Federal Act on Mediation in Civil Law Matters, Baden-
Württemberg Mediation Law, Bavarian Mediation Law, Hungarian Mediation Law as 
well as similar legislation from countries recently accepted to membership such as 
Bulgaria and Slovakia are claimed to have constituted the foundation of the 
preparation of the Draft Law on Mediation in Civil Disputes in Turkey.109
 Following the speedy penetration of ADR methods in the Member States, 
particularly since 2005 policies on the enhancement of the functioning of judicial 
mechanisms in Turkey have included out-of-court settlement methods as potential 
solutions to the problems generated by the increasing workload of the courts, 
insufficient number of judicial personnel, delays in courts proceedings and case 
processing, low level of confidence of the people in the judicial system etc. These 
problems have in fact been a common feature of government programs, judicial year 
inauguration speeches annually delivered by Presidents of Court of Appeals, judicial 
reform reports of the Ministry of Justice and other periodic assessments on the 
judicial system made by influential judicial persona, NGOs and academic actors 
especially in the last decade.110 Reports prepared by the European Commission on the 
                                                 
109 The General Reasoning of Draft Law on Mediation in Civil Disputes. 
http://www.kgm.adalet.gov.tr/tbmmkom/arabuluculuk.pdf (accessed March 5, 2010).  
110 For an overview of such assessments, please see 60th Government Program, 
http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/ 2006-2007 Judicial Year Inauguration Speech, 
http://www.yargitay.gov.tr/tarihce_aak/baskankonusma2006.pdf; 2004-2005 Judicial Year 
Inauguration Speech, http://www.yargitay.gov.tr/tarihce_aak/acilis2005.htm; 2003-2004 Judicial Year 
Inauguration Speech, http://www.yargitay.gov.tr/tarihce_aak/0304.html; 2002-2003 Judicial Year 
Inauguration Speech http://www.yargitay.gov.tr/tarihce_aak/2003.html; 2001-2002 Judicial Year 
Inauguration Speech http://www.yargitay.gov.tr/tarihce_aak/2002konusma.html; Ministry of Justice 
Judicial Reform Strategy,  http://www.sgb.adalet.gov.tr/yrs.html (all accessed March 5, 2010); Selçuk 
2008; and Kalem, Jahic and Elveriş 2008. 
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workings of the judicial system in Turkey as well as the Progress Reports on the 
developments in Turkey regarding accession negotiations also touch upon these issues 
(Björnberg and Richmond 2003; van Delden 2008; Turkey 2007 Progress Report; 
Turkey 2009 Progress Report). Hence, the changes in the direction of considering 
alternative mechanisms as plausible solutions to the problems of the judicial system in 
Turkey can be interpreted against a backdrop of increasing European engagement in 
such alternatives and Turkey’s interest in becoming a part of this world. 
2. National Context 
 Mediation in civil disputes is currently the subject matter of a Draft Law which     
is -as of March 2010- still on the agenda of the Justice Committee within the Grand 
National Assembly waiting to be passed amongst a number of other and quite 
significant laws such as the new Commercial Code, new Code of Obligations and the 
new Civil Code of Procedure. While originally provisions on the establishment of 
such a mechanism were planned to be included in the new Civil Code of Procedure, it 
was later on developed as a separate Draft Law. One of the topics on the agenda of the 
Commission working on the Civil Code of Procedure was the regulation of areas that 
have a direct or indirect relevance with adjudication. Mediation in this sense was 
considered to be an extreme example of such areas since it is not a mechanism where 
a decision is rendered on behalf of the parties.111 For this reason, it was decided that 
first the work on the regulations concerning civil procedure would be finished and 
then the regulations of such matters as mediation that remain outside the scope of 
formal adjudication would later on be tackled.  
                                                 
111 Interview # 9. 
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 Upon a number of exchanges with experts on the issue both from Turkey and 
abroad, the Commission decided to design mediation as a separate institution under a 
separate law. The reasons for this decision are twofold. First, its regulation in the 
context of adjudicative rules would lead to a misperception of the institution as a 
direct feature of adjudication; and second, designing the institution under a separate 
regulation would allow for more flexibility compatible with the nature of 
mediation.112 As a result, Draft Law on Mediation in Civil Disputes was designed as a 
separate regulation by a new Commission that was formed particularly for this task by 
the Ministry of Justice in 2007.113 The Commission had twenty-five members -some 
members were already on the Commission preparing the Civil Code of Procedure- 
composed of Ministry officials, academics, representatives from professional 
associations as well as practicing judges of lower courts and the Court of Appeals. 
The members of this Commission had study visits to Germany, Austria, the 
Netherlands and accumulated information on the ways in which mediation has been 
institutionalized and practiced in these contexts. They have also visited the UN 
                                                 
112 Interview # 9. 
113 In Turkey, upon the initial emergence of a political will, laws that concern the society in general, i.e. 
laws that are passed by the Ministry of Justice, are first discussed within a commission particularly 
designed for this purpose by the Ministry of Justice. The commission then prepares a draft version of 
the law in question and submits it to the Minister of Justice. The common practice is that the Ministry 
only checks the draft for technical details and does not interfere with the contents. The process than 
continues with the sending of the draft to the Prime Ministry whereby all the draft laws coming from 
various ministries are assessed in terms of their overall compatibility with the legislative framework. At 
the same time, the draft is also shared with the public mainly composed of universities, professional 
organizations, practitioners, NGOs and other relevant institutions. Upon receiving the comments of the 
public, the commission reassesses the draft and sends the final version once again to the Ministry and 
from then on it is submitted to the Prime Ministry. The later stage in the law making process is the 
sending of the draft to the Grand National Assembly where the draft is officially registered as a draft 
law. At the Grand National Assembly, drafts are evaluated by one or more specialized committees. A 
foundational law, unless it concerns other areas, is usually deliberated by the Justice Committee within 
the Assembly. In the case of the Draft Law on Mediation in Civil Disputes, for instance, the draft was 
first assessed by two secondary committees and then passed on to the Justice Committee which is the 
primary committee evaluating the drafts. After its evaluation at these committees, the draft is then sent 
to the General Assembly of the Grand National Assembly where it is decided whether or not the draft 
should be enacted.   
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Commissions in Vienna working on arbitration and mediation issues for an 
exploration of their legislative and practical works in the field. 
 In the process of preparing the Draft Law, aside from these studies an ADR 
training program was also organized in the framework of a judicial reform program- 
Judicial Reform for Improving Governance in Turkey- jointly run by the World Bank 
Institute and Istanbul Bilgi University in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice of 
Turkey and the EU between October-December 2004. The World Bank Institute has 
been a concerned party in the execution of judicial reform movements in Turkey and 
it has mainly designed this program to “advance the process of judicial reform in 
Turkey” through an integrated and participatory process (Dañino 2004). The program 
comprised of six modules on certain aspects of judicial reform which were designed 
as meetings with national and international experts on the covered issues. One of 
these modules concentrated on access to justice in relation to alternative dispute 
resolution in the context of the potential of such services to improve the “ability of a 
legal system to offer and deliver justice”. At the end of the program, an Action Plan 
was developed as a guide for follow up activities on issues that have been covered in 
the modules. In addition, realizing the interest in ADR during this distance learning 
program, after its completion the organizers decided to develop a specific training on 
various mediation mechanisms in the world which was organized as a video 
conference of presentations by experts from the US and Europe.   
 Aside from the World Bank program, an EC sponsored project called Technical 
Assistance to Better Access to Justice in Turkey carried out by a consortium of 
international institutions has also been a crucial step in the development of mediation 
in Turkey. In the period 2007-2009, a number of activities have been carried out for 
the outlined purpose of strengthening the rule of law in Turkey in line with EU 
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standards. Under the ADR component of the project these activities included 
trainings for lawyers, organization of international conferences and awareness raising 
regarding mediation. During the same period, the Ministry of Justice has also been 
engaged in a project on improving the practices of victim-offender mediation in 
Turkey. The project has been sponsored by United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) with the objective of “establishing the principle of restorative justice, 
developing victim offender mediation practices and contributing to the effectiveness 
of the criminal justice system in Turkey”.114 The project was composed of activities 
such as sending surveys to prosecutors, judges, Bar Associations and universities 
regarding their opinions on victim-offender mediation; organization of workshops, 
seminar, trainings and study visits; and the preparation of a report on the state of the 
institution in Turkey regarding the obstacles, the possibilities and the problems with 
its application.  
 In addition, the Ministry of Justice has also carried out a project on mediation in 
cooperation with the British Embassy in Turkey and Conflict Management 
International UK between 2008 and December 2009. The project entitled 
Strengthening the Administrative Capacity of Ministry of Justice Concerning the 
Functioning of Mediation in Turkey had as its main objective to improve the capacity 
of the Ministry of Justice on matters of mediation in order to make the institution 
function effectively. The stated purpose of the project made explicit reference to the 
EU process and the necessity to align the legislation and the practices in Turkey with 
EU standards. The project was composed of activities such as training of five trainers 
at mediation institutions and other relevant bodies in the UK;  developing a database 
                                                 
114 Adalet Bakanlığı Projeleri Hakkında Bilgi Notu (Information Note on the Projects of Ministry of 
Justice), June 2009.   
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of various documents for the Ministry of Justice to benefit from other countries’ 
experiences with mediation; an awareness raising study tour to the UK for ten 
members of the Justice Committee of the Grand National Assembly; evaluation of 
the content of the Draft Law and recommendations for further reforms; organization 
of seminars and workshops for different target groups and the publication of the 
results of an international symposium on mediation.115 
 All together, these projects attest to an accelerated cooperation between the local 
authorities and international institutions in particular with the EU. The cooperation 
seems to be on the rise particularly since December 2004 which is the date of the 
European Council Presidency Summit where opening negotiations with Turkey was 
deliberated in principle.116 Accession negotiations were de facto initiated in October 
2005 with the adoption of Negotiation Framework by the Council of European 
Union. The Screening Process on the thirty-three Chapters that were to be negotiated 
was finalized in October 2006. Such projects are interpreted as essential features of 
this accession process as the EU in general provides financial support to activities 
that will enhance the political and social situation in candidate countries. This 
support more often than comes in the shape of financing locally initiated projects that 
will contribute to the meeting of membership criteria.117 
 In case of judicial matters for instance, the Ministry of Justice in Turkey has been 
going through a phase of incessant project development since 2004. Even though 
when compared to then candidate countries such a Romania and Bulgaria Turkey is 
depicted as a poor user of the financial means allocated by the EU, the Ministry of 
                                                 
115 The information I give here regarding the project is based on the documents that I have received 
from the British Embassy Ankara Project Office upon request.  
116 http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=300&l=2 (accessed March 5, 2010). 
117 Adalet Bakanlığı Projeleri Hakkında Bilgi Notu (Information Note on the Projects of Ministry of 
Justice), June 2009.   
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Justice claims to be one of the most efficient users of these resources.118 For instance, 
in the period of 2004-2006 the Ministry reports to have used 5% of the financial 
resources allocated to Turkey on its own. Since 2004, the Ministry of Justice has 
participated in twenty-five projects that have been supported by EU and other 
international institutions.119  
 This cooperation of the Ministry with EU bodies has been on the rise particularly 
in the aftermath of the explanatory screening for Chapter 23 (Judiciary and 
Fundamental Rights) of accession negotiations in September 2006.120 Since 2006, the 
Ministry of Justice has been engaged in several projects for the purpose of “satisfying 
the contents of Judiciary and Fundamental Rights Chapter and the Political 
Criteria”.121 In addition to the mentioned projects, one other project on mediation 
proposed by the Ministry of Justice for 2009 has been postponed to 2010 since the 
Draft Law is yet not passed. This project was previously approved by the EU on the 
condition that Draft Law is enacted by May 4, 2009.122 
 Overall, this period of accelerated cooperation in terms of project developing can 
be interpreted as one of increasing international interest in Turkey’s judicial system 
                                                 
118 In the period of 2004-2006, it is reported that while a transfer of 2.400 million Euros have been 
made to Romania and a total of 1.600 million to Bulgaria, Turkey has received only 1.050 million 
Euros. Adalet Bakanlığı Projeleri Hakkında Bilgi Notu (Information Note on the Projects of Ministry 
of Justice), June 2009.   
119 Out of these projects, twelve of them are reported to be complete in a June 2009 report of the 
Ministry of Justice. Eleven of these projects were funded by EU institutions while one was funded by 
UNDP. Thirteen projects are still in process as of June 2009, many of which are planned to be 
complete by December 2009. Eight of these continuing projects are funded by the EU and five are 
funded by institutions such as MATRA, SIDA, TAIEX, UNDP, UN, British Embassy and World Bank 
Institute. In addition, the Ministry also has projects that have been approved but not initiated as of June 
2009. Out of five such prospective projects, two will be funded by the EU.  Adalet Bakanlığı Projeleri 
Hakkında Bilgi Notu (Information Note on the Projects of Ministry of Justice), June 2009. 
120 As of December 2009, the Draft Screening Reports of the Chapter are waiting to be approved by the 
Council of European Union. 
121 Adalet Bakanlığı Projeleri Hakkında Bilgi Notu (Information Note on the Projects of Ministry of 
Justice), June 2009.   
122 One of my respondents explained this situation in reference to a principle of the EU which suggests 
that if the realization of a project depends upon the passing of a relevant legislation, then the project 
will be carried out following the enactment of the relevant law. The respondent explained the rationale 
of this principle in the context of preventing the misuse of the taxes of the citizens of EU Member 
States which are allocated for such projects in candidate countries 
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at large. The performance of the judiciary and the assessment of the quality, 
effectiveness and the accessibility of judicial services have for instance constituted a 
common feature of Progress Reports on Turkey annually prepared by the European 
Commission since 1998.123 These reports give updated information on the legislative 
developments and the availability of the necessary infrastructure for their application. 
The delays in the judicial proceedings, the heavy workload of the courts, and the 
insufficient number of judicial personnel have been reported to be significant 
problems for the efficient functioning of the judicial system in Turkey as early as 
1998 and have continued to be crucial items on EU’s agenda while assessing 
Turkey’s progress.  
 In 2007, it was reported that despite the fact that the newly established Strategy 
Development Presidency under the Ministry of Justice has started working on 
assessing the future needs of the courts, there was still no National Reform Strategy 
on the judiciary. In line with these criticisms, since 2007 the Ministry of Justice has 
been working on a Judicial Reform Strategy. The preparation process of the Strategy 
has taken off following the screening meetings of Chapter 23 (Judiciary and 
Fundamental Rights) of accession negotiations completed on October 13, 2006, and 
the unofficial screening report of the Chapter delivered to the Ministry of Justice in 
August 2007. Upon the opinions delivered by experts from the European 
                                                 
123 In addition to the Progress Reports, since 2003 reports of advisory visits prepared by independent 
experts appointed by the European Commission are also noteworthy in the sense that these reports are 
specifically prepared for assessing the judicial system in Turkey and the developments in this field. 
Reports of advisory visits in 2003 and 2005 give a detailed overview of the state of the judicial system 
in Turkey with particular focus on the position of judges, public prosecutors and lawyers. It is also 
noteworthy that the development of ADR mechanisms is recommended as one of the ways to reduce 
the excessive workload of the courts (Björnberg and Richmond 2003). Another significant report is a 
2008 joint expert report titled “Effectiveness of the Judicial System” on the results of needs assessment 
visits in courthouses in Turkey. This report is also important for the significance it devotes to ADR 
mechanisms for at the very beginning of the report the author suggests studying the possibility of 
further developing these mechanisms in order to increase the effectiveness of the judicial system from 
outside the system (van Delden 2008).   
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Commission on Turkey’s requirement to prepare a national strategy for judicial 
reform, a commission was established in January 2008 with the participation of 
various units in the Ministry and started working in coordination with General 
Secretariat for EU Affairs for the preparation of the Strategy.  
 In line with the contributions of experts from the European Commission, in April 
2008 a preliminary draft of the Strategy was released on the website of the Ministry 
to be shared with stakeholders and the public. The preliminary draft was first 
discussed with senior judges and prosecutors of various courts across the country, 
senior officials from the Ministry and later on with representatives from the Union of 
Turkish Bar Associations. In November 2008, the preliminary draft was sent to High 
Council of Judges and Prosecutors, the Constitutional Court, the Court of Appeals, 
the Council of State, Military Court of Appeals, High Administrative Military Court, 
Ministry of the National Defense, the Union of Turkish Bar Associations, the Union 
of Turkish Notaries, Bars and Law Faculties for written opinion. Upon the releasing 
of these opinions on the website of the Ministry, the draft was revised and shared 
with the representatives of the European Commission in July 2009.  
 The final draft of Judicial Reform Strategy, approved by the government in 
August 2009, is comprised of headings such as strengthening the independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary, increasing professionalization, increasing efficiency and 
effectiveness, management of judicial system, enhancing confidence in the judiciary, 
facilitating access to justice, improving the penitentiary system and ensuring 
effective implementation of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.124 
Supplemented by an Action Plan for its implementation, the Strategy also lists further 
legislative and practical measures that need to be taken for harmonization with EU 
                                                 
124 http://www.sgb.adalet.gov.tr/yrs/Judicial%20Reform%20Strategy.pdf (accessed March 5, 2010). 
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legislation and considers the Draft Law on Mediation in Civil Disputes to be one of 
these requirements in the framework of the judicial reform. This development has 
also been praised by the EU in the 2009 Progress Report in terms of the “consultative 
process followed before its approval but also of its content that broadly provides for 
the right direction for reforms (Turkey Progress Report 2009). 
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Chapter 6 
Representations of Mediation in Turkey 
 
 
 In this Chapter, I am engaged in a discourse analysis of the ways in which 
mediation has been represented in different channels in the period of 2006-2009. 
These analyses are intended to provide a larger framework within which the narratives 
in the following chapter can be situated. These representations of mediation in the 
news, in the institutional statements and in blogs and forums allow for a 
contextualization of the narratives of respondents within an overall stream of debates 
on mediation. At the same time, these representations also provide a sketch of the 
general institutional positions within the mediation debates. Particularly the section on 
institutional statements presents the differences in the positions assumed by various 
professional organizations, and it allows for an account of the ways in which 
institutions and their representatives approach the positions of actors on opposite side 
of the debates. As such, from within a Bourdieusian framework these representations 
also allow for an observation of the competitive struggles within the juridical field.  
 In this sense, these representations have allowed me to follow the debates around 
mediation which in turn helped me develop my interview questions. Since the primary 
objective of this dissertation is to look at the ways in which the juridical field in 
Turkey is constituted through an analysis of the debates around mediation as a 
controversial subject for the actors operating in the world of law, looking at various 
channels through which these controversies have been expressed is relevant for an 
understanding of the struggles within this field. In this sense, these analyses are also 
intended to develop a comprehensive sketch of the legal consciousness of legal 
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professionals in Turkey insofar as the debates around mediation are concerned. At the 
same time, the institutional struggles within the juridical field are also reflexive of the 
overall political and social conjuncture and as such are always framed -albeit in 
varying degrees- in reference to these external developments. Hence, the debates 
among various professional institutions on mediation in general and the Draft Law in 
particular are also reflexive of the ways in which these institutions approach key 
issues such as the current political atmosphere in Turkey, the state of the defining 
values of the Republic, the cultural traits of the society, the relation between the 
judiciary and politics and the impact of global forces upon the political, judicial, 
social and economic development of Turkey.  
 
I. Archival Media (News) Search  
 
 The news covering mediation dates back to September 2006. This coverage, 
however, is highly limited. My search yielded two pieces of news from the year 2006. 
The first of these pieces is significant not only because it is the very first piece of 
news about the subject matter but also because coming from the Minister of Justice of 
the time, it is also reflexive of the context within which mediation was first introduced 
to the press. In the words of the Minister, mediation was situated within the larger 
context of problems of the judiciary in Turkey. In his speech, the Minister stated that 
they could no longer resolve disputes with traditional judicial proceedings and 
therefore they were strongly considering alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 
Speaking at a seminar of the International Association of Lawyers, the Minister stated 
that in parallel with the societal changes and developments, conflicts have become 
much more complicated and this resulted with an increasing number of disputes 
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ending up in the courts, increasing the workload of the judiciary (Memurlar.Net, 
September 23, 2006). Referring to low levels of confidence among the people towards 
the judicial system mainly stemming from the lengthy judicial proceedings, the 
Minister claimed that it has become impossible to eliminate the increasing workload 
with classical judicial procedures and therefore alternative methods have presented 
themselves as a necessity.125 
 The second news clip is dated December 2006, three months after the statement of 
the Minister of Justice. In this piece, referring to the work of the Ministry of Justice 
on alternative mechanisms, the courthouse reporter of a daily newspaper announced 
that work has been initiated for a transition into a period of mediators who will be 
serving as “modern kadis” in the justice system (Radikal, December 16, 2006). The 
piece further refers to areas in civil law that can be taken to mediation such as 
divorce, collection of debt, equitable distribution, rent and conflicts between 
neighbors. This piece of news is important in the sense that in a way it signals the 
possible lines of controversy that are to evolve around mediation in the years that 
follow. My overall inquiry demonstrates that the analogy of kadi justice which was a 
part of the Ottoman legal system and the issue of which disputes will be eligible for 
mediation continues to be significant determinants in the debates around mediation as 
late as 2009.  
 In the following year, press coverage of mediation seems to have increased 
although not dramatically. With ten news clips that I have been able to detect, in 2007 
                                                 
125 It is important to note here that in his speech, the Minister also stated that the work on alternative 
dispute resolution methods has been partly completed and that they were planning to submit the Draft 
Law on Mediation in Civil Disputes to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey until the end of 
October. The Draft Law was submitted to the Grand National Assembly in June 2008 and as of 
December 2009 it is still on the agenda of the Justice Committee within the Assembly. For further 
information on the process that the Draft Law has been through, please see Chapter 5.  
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mediation still remains to be a rather unrecognized subject matter for the press. 
Nevertheless, despite the quantitative rarity of the news, an overview of these clips 
reveals a relative contextual depth. Except for the very first clip during this period 
which presents some preliminary information on the content of the Draft Law, all the 
rest of the clips appear after the announcement of the Programme of the 60th 
Government presided by the current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and 
approved by the President on August 29, 2007, after the July 2007 early general 
elections.126 Immediately after the announcement of the Programme, among its other 
aspects, mediation in civil disputes seems to have attracted the attention of the media. 
Aside from pieces that offer relatively more information on the content of the Draft 
Law when compared to the year 2006, this year can also be marked as the period 
when concerns around the Draft Law started to become a matter of public debate.  
 During this period, one significant development seems to be the reaction of 
Istanbul Bar Association127 to the Draft Law. On September 19, 2007, Istanbul Bar 
Association published a statement on its website, announcing its opposition against 
the Draft Law and declaring its own opinions and suggestions about the text.128 
Starting with this statement, all the news clips during the year 2007 seem to 
concentrate on the reactions of lawyers to the Draft Law, with a particular focus on 
the reactions of Istanbul Bar Association. These clips concentrate on lawyers’ distress 
about a possible invasion of their field of practice together with an underestimation of 
the whole legal education by allowing graduates of other faculties to become 
                                                 
126 This is Erdoğan’s second term of office as the Prime Minister and the second term of AKP as the 
ruling party in the Grand National Assembly. After the authorization of the new government by 
President Abdullah Gül, Prime Minister Erdoğan announced the programme on August 31, 2007. 
127 With 23,884 registered lawyers (as of December 31, 2008) Istanbul Bar Association is the largest 
one among seventy-four Bar Associations in Turkey. Istanbul Bar Association is also reportedly the 
second largest Bar Association in the world. 
128 http://www.istanbulbarosu.org.tr/Detail.asp?CatID=1&SubCatID=2&ID=2906 (accessed March 5, 
2010). 
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mediators as long as they get the necessary training.  While some of these pieces -in 
the name of emphasizing the vitality of a proper legal education for engaging in 
“dispute resolution”- include particularly pejorative references to these “other 
faculties”129, some others refer to these developments as the “assassination of law” or 
as the “illegalization of law”. Some, on the other hand, identify these developments as 
attempts to create new jobs. These news, once again, foreshadow the possible lines of 
controversy that are to emerge in the future debates around mediation such as 
concerns about the creation of a new profession, eradication of the established legal 
doctrine and traditions, emergence of multiple jurisdictions and displacement of 
courts with informal control mechanisms.  
 When we come to 2008, the definitive date appears to be June 03, 2008, when the 
Draft Law was submitted to the Presidency of Grand National Assembly of Turkey to 
be evaluated first by the specific committees130 and finally by the General Assembly. 
Of the ten pieces of news that I have detected during the year of 2008, four of them 
date back to this exact date. All of these pieces cover the same general information 
about what the Draft Law will be comprised of: Training of the mediators, the 
supervision of mediation services, the registration of mediators, the fees of the 
services, the rights and responsibilities of the mediators, the preparation of the 
mediation agreement, the terms of its enforcement, the secrecy of mediation process 
etc. One important piece during this period is an article published in one of the most 
                                                 
129 In one particular piece, for instance, there was a pejorative undertone to the way in which other 
faculties were mentioned. The piece stated that with this draft law, someone who has been trained in 
fishing and aquaculture or a graduate of veterinary school, for instance, will be able to become a 
mediator and act almost like a judge in the resolution of vital conflicts between parties 
(Haberkulesi.com, 2 October, 2007). 
130 In this case, the Draft Law was sent to Justice Committee, Plan and Budget Committee as well as 
the European Union Harmonization Committee. As of August 2009, the Draft Law was passed only in 
the European Union Harmonization Committee on February 10, 2009. For more information about the 
committees and the General Assembly, please see 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/english/about_tgna.htm#COMMITTEES (accessed March 5, 2010).  
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conservative newspapers in Turkey in terms of its hardly changing and deep-rooted 
columnist cadre; its solid ideological stance as a Kemalist, pro-Republican, anti-
American, laicist media organ, and its devoted reader populace mainly comprised of 
military, diplomatic and academic circles (Tunç 2009, 123). The writer -a practicing 
lawyer who also holds a position in UTBA- fiercely warns against the possibility of 
mafia organizations, religious norms, tribal laws and alike entering into the existing 
judicial proceedings via mediation (Dinç 2008).  
 The rest of the news clips published this year have different dates but they also 
mainly focus on what the new Draft Law will bring. Two of these pieces, on the other 
hand, cover different issues. One of these pieces is about a book on mediation that has 
been written by a Chief Inspector in the Police Force. The other piece, on the other 
hand, is a journal article cited by a popular daily newspaper. Compared to the rest of 
the news during this period, the article offers a much deeper portrait of mediation both 
in terms of what the Draft Law entails and what the proposed institution will bring to 
the existing legal practice as well as to the societal habits. The article familiarizes the 
reader with mediation-like practices that have already started to surface in the lives of 
people such as online mediation services, or a TV program called “I do not want to 
get a divorce” that broadcasts the judicial process based on real cases whereby a real-
life lawyer acts as the judge who mediates between parties or school mediation 
practices whereby conflicts between students are resolved via student mediators 
which results in less number of cases going to the school’s disciplinary committee.131 
 Since the first coverage of mediation by the press in 2006, year 2009 has by far 
been the year with the most extensive press coverage of the issue. I have compiled 
                                                 
131 http://www.analitikbakis.com/haber/20081025/Mahkemelerde-surunmeye-Son.php (accessed March 
5, 2010). 
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eighty-five news clips from 2009 that have in one way or another touched upon 
mediation. Some of these news are a replica of previously published pieces mainly 
covering general information about what the Draft Law proposes; yet with a different, 
a new constitutive date in the history of mediation. One of the defining moments of 
this period is the acceptance of the Draft Law in the European Union Harmonization 
Committee of the Grand National Assembly.132 On January 28, 2009, a press release 
was issued on the official website of the Grand National Assembly about the 
acceptance of the Draft Law by the Committee. In 2009, the majority of the news on 
mediation revolves around this development. These pieces referring to the decision of 
the Committee almost always cover the heated debates during the assessment of the 
Draft Law. These debates during the deliberation session of the Committee are in fact 
almost like a preview of the controversies that mediation in general and the Draft Law 
in particular have aroused in the political and legal circles in Turkey.133 
 At the same time, a glaze over these debates in the European Union 
Harmonization Committee also provides an opportunity to make sense of the macro 
political culture in Turkey. The debates have clearly delineated sides, the members of 
opposition parties within the Grand National Assembly -particularly the members of 
the main opposition party (Republican People’s Party)- versus the members of the 
ruling party. Although parliamentarians from the ruling party have also raised their 
concerns, these are not only small in number but also content wise they are rather 
                                                 
132 European Union Harmonization Committee is one of the specialized committees in the Grand 
National Assembly. It was established in 2003 for the purpose of harmonizing national legislation with 
acquis communautaire. It is also one of the secondary committees that evaluate the Draft Law in the 
Grand National Assembly. Being a secondary committee, it is only responsible for assessing the overall 
text without going into a detailed evaluation of its particular clauses and its decision is not binding in 
the last instance. Nevertheless, the fact that the Draft Law has been accepted by one of the committees 
has more often than not considered as a crucial step for its legislative progress. For more information 
on the European Union Harmonization Committee, please see 
HHhttp://www.tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/abuyum/index_eng.htm (accessed March 5, 2010). 
133 Via the Right to Information Law, I have acquired a copy of the minutes of these proceedings from 
the Grand National Assembly. 
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comments on the inefficiency of the existing infrastructure for mediation to work in 
an effective fashion and/or on the overall necessity of creating a culture of 
conciliation within the society which cannot be achieved solely through legislative 
steps. 
 Reaction of the opposition, on the other hand, comes in many shapes: Labeling 
the Draft Law as an attempt to privatize law; as a threat against the independence of 
the judiciary; as an ill-prepared law that can prevent access to justice; as a step 
towards a dual legal system; as a way to reinforce the existing inequalities in the 
society; as an attempt to create a new profession that can cause distress among legal 
professionals etc. At this point, another popular feature of politics that seem to be on 
the rise in the last couple of years once again presents itself in the following words of 
one deputy from the main opposition party: “If the draft becomes a law, we will go to 
the Constitutional Court for its annulment. If you wish, you can go to Brussels and 
complain about us once again. When you cannot insure the independence of the 
courts, of the judges, how will you insure the independence of mediators?” (Zaman 
Online, January 28, 2009). The attitude that can be observed here is the elevating 
tendency among political circles to take matters up to the Constitutional Court. That 
this statement is made right in the middle of a session of legislative assessment is 
crucial here. After all, the whole point of such meetings is precisely to create an 
environment for political deliberation whereby the representatives in the parliament 
can openly discuss the piece of legislation in their hands and come to a shared 
decision about its fate. The fact that even during the relatively early phase of a series 
of debates concerning a piece of legislation, the idea of going to the Constitutional 
Court for an annulment emerges as a possible safety net, needs to be considered 
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against the general backdrop of the role that law has come to play in politics of 
contemporary Turkey.  
 After this initial coverage of the decision of the European Union Harmonization 
Committee, the news during this period seem to move towards a more critical 
direction with increasing number of pieces on the reactions of legal professionals and 
various professional organizations towards the Draft Law. In line with these 
developments, another significant date during this period seems to be February 04, 
2009, when the Union of Turkish Bar Associations released a statement on its website 
about its position towards the Draft Law.134 Immediately after the press release, there 
seems to be extensive media coverage on the points raised by the Union. While some 
of these clips give direct reference to the view of the Union, others cover the positions 
of various Bar Associations towards the Draft Law or the opinions of various groups 
within the Bar Associations on the issue.   
 Another development that can be observed during the same period is the 
increasing coverage of the issue by columnists. During this period, especially after the 
press release of the Union, a number of columnists in various newspapers seem to 
deal with mediation, more often than not in a highly critical fashion. In one piece, the 
columnist cites a representative from a women’s NGO on the possibility of opening 
the way for the application of Shari’a rules in disputes (Vatan, February 1, 2009); 
whereas in another one the author writes about how this Draft Law is designed to 
overthrow the legal system by opening the way for multiple jurisdictions and the 
privatization of law. This latter article continues its bash against mediation by citing 
all the drawbacks of the Draft Law as listed in Istanbul Bar Association’s statement 
against mediation: It will lead to a restriction of our rights of independence, the state 
                                                 
134 http://www.barobirlik.org.tr/calisma/haberler/tbb/090204_kamuoyu.aspx (accessed March 5, 2010). 
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will give up its function to provide justice, foreign firms and mediation bureaus and 
all other types of extralegal formations will replace the national judicial institutions 
etc. (Aydın 2009). The author sees all of these developments as the “reawakening of 
the Ottoman”. Another columnist, on the other hand, after giving an overview of the 
developments, defines these developments as another dimension of carelessness on 
behalf of an administration that has in his words “surrendered”. The author associates 
this carelessness with the success of capitalist-imperialist system in convincing the 
society that the system will not change. Referring to a general state of atrophy of 
social sensibilities, he defines these developments as new apparatuses of “ideological 
aggression” that can manipulate the society in any direction (Abacıoğlu 2009). 
 Representations during this period also include occasional statements delivered 
especially by Istanbul Bar Association mainly concentrating on the drawbacks of 
mediation and interviews with people like a well known, active lawyer in mediation 
debates or a parliamentarian who is a member of the Justice Committee within the 
Grand National Assembly. All these instances of active involvement with the issue as 
they have been covered by the press have not been left unacknowledged by the 
institutional authorities. Towards the end of February 2009, a statement delivered by 
the Minister of Justice of the time takes its place amongst the news pieces. Referring 
to the opposition of Bar Associations and other parties to the Draft Law, the Minister 
states that all of these opinions will be taken into consideration during the assessment 
of the Draft Law in the Justice Committee which is the primary committee that 
assesses the Draft Law. In response to claims regarding the reemergence of kadi 
justice, the Minister frames the issue as a matter of EU harmonization and states that 
mediation is not an institution created by the Ministry of Justice and that it exists as a 
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way to decrease the workload of the judiciary in many countries including the EU 
members (8Sütun, February 16, 2009).  
 This statement is in fact coherent with the very first statement that has been 
included in this collection of news made by the previous Minister of Justice.135 The 
previous Minister, like his colleague, also framed the necessity for mediation within 
an overall problem of judicial deadlock due to the increasing workload of the courts. 
What is noteworthy in this discursive continuity is the invariance of the ways in which 
the government legitimizes its legislative step. In the course of almost four years, 
despite the increasing intensity of reactions to the Draft Law, the government has not 
changed its rationale for incorporating the institution of mediation into the existing 
judicial system. In both statements, the workload of the judiciary and the reference to 
EU requirements remain to be the common defining elements of reasoning behind this 
legislative attempt. In this sense, debates around mediation reveal that while the 
political authority legitimizes its actions in the context of a westernization ideal, 
actors of the juridical field more often than not interpret these developments as attacks 
against the independence of the judiciary, against the judicial function of the 
sovereign state and as an invasion of their field by extralegal measures and practices.  
 Other responses to the reactions accompany the statement of the Minister of 
Justice during this period. The Head of the Justice Committee, for instance, refers to 
mediation as a brand new model of the right to legal remedies where the disputes are 
resolved without the interference of the state (Haber7, February 16, 2009). In 
response to claims regarding kadi justice system, he states that this claim is unfounded 
and that a “societal retrogress” of this kind is out of question. Alongside the Minister 
                                                 
135 The former Minister of Justice, Cemil Çiçek, served between November 18, 2002, and May 08, 
2007. The term of office of the latter Minister, Mehmet Ali Şahin, lasted between August 29, 2007, and 
May 01, 2009.  
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and the Head of the Justice Committee, legal theoreticians who have been actively 
involved in the drafting of the law have also evaluated these comments as products of 
a serious lack of information on the subject matter (8Sütun, February 16, 2009).  
 An overall assessment of the news during the period of 2006-2009, demonstrates 
a general tendency to cover the issue from a predominantly technical, informative 
perspective. The majority of the news during this period is pieces that give 
preliminary information on the system that will be in effect if the Draft Law is passed 
by the Grand National Assembly. The references to concerns about mediation such as 
the possible return of the kadi system, the emergence of multiple jurisdictions and/or 
the privatization of law are not only relatively low in frequency but a careful look at 
these references also reveal a concentration of these comments by a few number of 
actors and institutions. One such actively involved institution is Istanbul Bar 
Association either in terms of releasing official statements on mediation, or releasing 
statements of certain groups within the Bar Association or as independent comments 
coming from its various members. Union of Turkish Bar Associations appears as 
another, yet relatively less vocal institution in this period. In addition, the news that 
have been covered during this period also highlight the main opposition party CHP as 
an important stakeholder since a number of representatives of the party appear to have 
made strong statements on the Draft Law during the covered period. In this sense, the 
news coverage of the issue not only gives clues about the possible controversial 
matters that are to shape the debates around mediation but it also allows for a sketch 
of the interested actors. Both of these dimensions -controversial matters and interested 
parties- are further specified in the following analyses of particular institutional 
statements and opinions that circulate at online discussion sites. 
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II. Institutional Statements and Press Releases  
 
 One of the major official statements regarding the Draft Law during this period 
has been released by the Union of Turkish Bar Associations on February 4, 2009.136 
The statement outlines two main reasons behind their reservations for alternative 
dispute resolution methods in general: The fact that people who are not legal 
professionals will also be able to become mediators and the possibility of the 
emergence of multiple jurisdictions. Pointing out to a common experience among 
continental legal systems regarding the slow development of alternative methods -as 
opposed to the widespread use of these methods in the Anglo-Saxon world-, the 
Union underlines the significance of anticipating a similarly gradual development of 
mediation in Turkey. Within this context, the Union does not oppose mediation all 
together; neither does it totally dismiss the Draft Law. On the contrary, the statement 
expresses the need to raise awareness about mediation especially among legal 
professionals by underlining the point that mediation is in fact not a replacement of 
the judiciary and that it might in fact contribute to a more efficient judicial system by 
preventing many cases from going to courts. 
 Nevertheless, the Union does not fully support the Draft Law either. The main 
lines of concern as covered by the statement revolve around the possibility of people 
who are not legal professionals becoming mediators as suggested by the Draft Law. 
The Union explicitly opposes this suggestion and argues that mediation should be 
designed as a service that can only be provided by graduates of law faculties, by 
lawyers, by the Bar Associations or by the Union which will ultimately require 
changing the current Draft Law altogether. This change is anticipated to go hand in 
                                                 
136 http://www.barobirlik.org.tr/calisma/haberler/arabuluculuk/huak_tasari_tbb.pdf (accessed March 5, 
2010). 
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hand with the delegation of the regulatory powers of the Ministry of Justice to the 
Union. Again from a similar perspective, the Union also objects to the required exam 
at the end of mediation training as proposed by the Draft Law. This exam will be 
required for all potential mediators including lawyers and given that there is no bar 
exam in Turkey, this clause is seen as the reflection of a mentality which suggests that 
“anybody who graduates from a law faculty can become a lawyer but not a 
mediator”.137 This, in effect, is interpreted as creating a profession that is considered 
to be superior to advocacy.  
 Aside from this official statement, various other statements coming from actors 
occupying different positions within the Union also seem to concentrate on similar 
concerns. One such statement is an earlier speech delivered by the President of the 
Union at a meeting of the presidents of Bar Associations on March 15-16, 2008.138 In 
addition to expressing the concerns outlined in the official declaration of the Union, 
the President also calls attention to the need to specify the disputes that can go to 
mediation in an explicit fashion. In reference to the drawbacks of creating a new 
profession that can be practiced by anybody who is a graduate of a four year higher 
education institute yet endowed with powers that can only be granted to lawyers, the 
President argues that the most significant criticisms on this issue have emerged as 
reactions to the press releases of the government. Referring to a new period of “justice 
without courts” and mentioning the possibility of getting the opinions of “trustworthy 
and competent people” during this period, these press releases of the government are 
                                                 
137 http://www.barobirlik.org.tr/calisma/haberler/arabuluculuk/huak_tasari_tbb.pdf (accessed March 5, 
2010). 
138 http://www.barobirlik.org.tr/tbb/baskan/konusmalar/080315_bursa.aspx (accessed March 5, 2010).  
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considered to be evoking the possibility of endangering the law of the laicist Republic 
as well as setting the ground for multiple jurisdictions.139 
 The second major actor that has taken a solid institutional position towards the 
Draft Law is Istanbul Bar Association. The Bar Association differs from the Union 
both in terms of the seriousness of its attacks against the Draft Law and also in terms 
of its overall opposing attitude towards mediation as a practice. In its declaration 
against the Draft Law released on September 19, 2007, it is reported that following 
the launching of the Draft Law by the government the Association has carried out a 
number of studies on this issue.140 Aside from these studies, the declaration gives 
reference to a number of other enterprises undertaken by the Bar Association 
regarding this issue. Inviting the Head of the Commission that prepared the Draft Law 
to the meeting at the end of which the official declaration has been accepted by the 
Executive Committee of the Bar Association or the visit that the representatives of the 
Bar Association made to this Commission together with the petitions and 
announcements in the press released by particular groups within the Association are 
all cited as instances of active involvement in this issue. The declaration is reported to 
have been prepared as a product of all these steps. The fact that the declaration has 
been shared with a number of institutions such as the Grand National Assembly of 
Turkey, the Presidency, the Ministry of Justice, other Bar Associations and the press 
is presented as an indication of the seriousness of Istanbul Bar’s take on this matter.  
 Following this initial introduction, the official declaration presents a detailed 
overview of the particular clauses of the Draft Law. The declaration is organized 
under two main headings. The first category of opinions is built around the primary 
                                                 
139 Hhttp://www.barobirlik.org.tr/tbb/baskan/konusmalar/080315_bursa.aspx (accessed March 5, 2010).  
140 http://www.istanbulbarosu.org.tr/Detail.asp?CatID=1&SubCatID=2&ID=2906 (accessed March 5, 
2010). 
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suggestion that calls for the withdrawal of the Draft Law due to its normative 
principals. One of these principals is the reregulation of an area that essentially 
belongs to the field of advocacy by opening it up to other professions. The fact that 
mediation will be used in civil disputes, that it will contribute to decreasing the 
workload of the judiciary and to increasing the efficiency of judicial proceedings, that 
mediation agreement will qualify as a verdict and that the drafting of such a law is 
seen as a step in access to justice altogether demonstrate that this work is primarily a 
part of judicial practice. That this institution has a judicial quality to it makes it all the 
more dangerous for people who lack the notion of law, who are not graduates of law 
schools, who are not practicing legal professionals to become mediators. Another 
problem, on the other hand, is defined as the creation of a new profession with its own 
registry and tariff. The fact that the members of this new profession will be required 
to use the title of “mediator” and that as a professional group they will not be subject 
to the restrictions faced by lawyers is imagined to create an unfair competition within 
the juridical field. In this sense, the Draft Law is seen as contributing to a further 
limitation in the operations of lawyers that has already been invaded by practices like 
Trademark and Patent Attorneyship or the attempts to transfer certain matters of 
litigation to notaries. 
 The second category of opinions in the declaration, on the other hand, is designed 
as an alternative to the first category in case it would be impossible to withdraw the 
Draft Law because it has already been “pledged”141 in the Government Programme. 
These opinions are therefore in the form of more detailed suggestions for change in 
the Draft Law. These suggestions include the prerequisite of legal education for 
mediators, clarification of the disputes that will go to mediation, the necessity of legal 
                                                 
141 Quotation original. http://www.istanbulbarosu.org.tr/Detail.asp?CatID=1&SubCatID=2&ID=2906 
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professionals’ contribution to the preparation of the mediation agreement -both as 
mediators as well as representatives of the parties-, the clarification of the 
requirements for education institutions that will be offering mediation training and the 
active involvement of the Bar Associations in the supervision of these proficiency 
requirements. Overall, with its contextual elaborateness and the extensity of its 
audience, this declaration appears to be a testimony of the prominent role played by 
Istanbul Bar Association during the entire course of debates around mediation.  
 The official declaration constitutes only one dimension of the reaction of Istanbul 
Bar Association. Aside from this statement, there are other representations of 
positions towards the issue. These representations sometimes come in the shape of 
commentaries of the Presidents of the Association, sometimes in the shape of a 
petition against mediation, sometimes in the shape of a column in a newspaper and 
sometimes as declarations or statements released by various groups within the 
Association. Although the way that this opposition is framed shows variance, all of 
these diverse representations share the common feature of being in strong opposition 
to the Draft Law and mediation in general. 
 There are two such presidential commentaries on mediation during this period due 
to the change of office. In his commentary on the issue released three months after the 
institutional declaration in December 2007, the President of Istanbul Bar 
Association142, referring to the mediation process, argues that “under this type of a 
pressure there will be people who will be forced to go to mediation by gangs” so that 
the judicial verdict that they cannot achieve through regular judicial mechanisms will 
be made possible via mediation (NTVMSNBC, December 12, 2007). The President 
refers to the already existing forms of such organizations like religious sects that force 
                                                 
142 Kazım Kolcuoğlu served as the President for a period of six years from 2002 until 2008. 
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people to mediate according to religious principles and argues that this type of a 
regulation will lead to multiple jurisdictions by legalizing these forms of dispute 
resolution. In the commentary of the latter President143, on the other hand, released 
two years later on February 05, 2009, opposition is framed in the context of a breach 
of national sovereignty as it is seen as an attack against the unity of the judicial 
system that is the product of popular will. Sovereignty is also considered to be 
threatened by the possibility of international mediation firms or illegal formations to 
replace the judicial institutions if this draft is to become a law. Mainly attacking the 
current government for being engaged in obsolete enterprises such as this Draft Law 
rather than trying to solve the immediate problems of the judiciary, the President 
announces to the public that in line with its historical power and responsibility, 
Istanbul Bar Association will bring forth “effective action options” in case the Draft 
Law is not withdrawn.144 
 In another instance, opposition comes in different forms as various groups within 
the Association present their own takes on the issue.145 In the case of Genç Avukatlar 
Birliği (Young Lawyers Association), for instance, opposition is made public in the 
form of a petition against “the legalization of illegality under the name of mediators” 
launched in September 2007.146 A year later, Avukat Hakları Merkezi (The Center of 
Rights of Lawyers) within Istanbul Bar Association, released a statement against 
mediation and invited all lawyers to be wary of and resist all these attacks against 
their profession. In their statement, the Center argues that mediation is the enemy of 
                                                 
143 Muammer Aydın took over the Presidency in October 2008 after Kazım Kolcuoğlu. Both Kolcuoğlu 
and Aydın are members of the same group within the Bar. 
144 http://www.istanbulbarosu.org.tr/Detail.asp?CatID=1&SubCatID=1&ID=3893 (accessed March 5, 
2010). 
145 http://www.istanbulbarosu.org.tr/Document.asp?DocumentIndex=baro/tarihce.htm (accessed March 
5, 2010). 
146 http://www.istanbulbarosu.org.tr/Detail.asp?CatID=1&SubCatID=1&ID=2907 (accessed March 5, 
2010). 
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advocacy and questions the intention of all legal institutions that not only remain 
silent in the face of these developments but also sometimes -as in the case of Ankara 
Bar Association where a Center for Alternative Dispute Resolution has been 
established- actively contribute to the institutionalization of this practice.147 Katılımcı 
Avukatlar (Participatory Lawyers), another group within Istanbul Bar Association, 
reflects their opposing position in their election programme for the 2008 Bar 
elections.148 Their candidate for presidency argues that the way to solve the problem 
of reaching a fair, speedy and efficient judicial decision is not to introduce mediation 
as an alternative mechanism but to bring it alongside an overall judicial reform.149 In 
yet another instance, at the beginning of 2009, opposition takes the form of an open 
call to all legal institutions, the Union of Turkish Bar Associations and all the Bar 
Associations to join these “effective actions” against the Draft Law.150 
 Last but not least, opposition against the Draft Law and mediation comes in the 
form of a press release launched by an independent association working on various 
judicial matters.151 On the Day of Lawyers on April 05, 2009, Çağdaş Hukukçular 
Derneği (Association of Modern Lawyers) released a statement touching upon general 
issues like the independence of the judiciary, fair trial, right to defense which they see 
as integral principals of the fight for democracy and freedom.152 The Association 
frames these issues as outcomes of a general hegemony of the capitalist system upon 
                                                 
147 http://www.arabulucu.com/blog/?p=626 (accessed March 5, 2010). 
148 Bar elections are held every two years. Different groups within the Bar can nominate their own 
candidates for presidency. These groups not only have different approaches to certain professional 
issues but they are also divided along political and ideological lines as well. For instance, the 
presidency has been held for the last four terms (2002-2010) by Önce İlke Çağdaş Avukatlar Grubu 
which has been known as a nationalist group. 
149 http://www.katilimciavukatlar.org/files/Kav_secim_programi_08092008-v11.doc (accessed March 
5, 2010). 
150 http://ayrintilihaber.com/news_detail.php?id=32058 (accessed March 5, 2010). 
151 http://www.cagdashukukculardernegi.org/tuzugumuz/tuzugumuz/ (accessed March 5, 2010). 
152http://www.cagdashukukculardernegi.org/basin_bultenleri/basin_bultenleri/avukatlar_gunu_basin_ac
iklamasi_09.html (accessed March 5, 2010). 
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the judiciary within which judicial organs are used as instruments in the economic and 
political relations of interest. This capitalization of law leads to the privatization of the 
judiciary and the reconstruction of the legal profession in accordance with the needs 
of the neoliberal process.153 The Draft Law is interpreted as the depiction of the 
hegemony of free market procedures in the legal profession which is equivalent to the 
privatization of the judiciary. This transformation in the legal profession is claimed to 
be pioneered by the Union of Turkish Bar Associations and Ankara Bar Association 
which can be observed in their supportive approach towards the Draft Law.  
 Another influential actor during this period appears to be Ankara Bar Association. 
When compared with Istanbul Bar Association, the position of Ankara appears to be 
quite moderate. Not only does the Association not oppose mediation all together, but 
it is also an active participant in its constitution as an institution. Ankara Bar 
Association is known to be the first and the only Bar that has established a Center for 
Alternative Dispute Resolution within its structure in 2004. It is also the only Bar that 
has participated as a cobeneficiary in an EU project titled Technical Assistance for 
Better Access to Justice- Turkey which had an ADR component that focused on 
“making ADR more applicable in the justice system, strengthening the functioning of 
the judiciary, and increasing public awareness of the issue”.154 
 In his opening speech at the third mediation training that has been organized as a 
part of this project in 2009155, the President of Ankara Bar Association, after 
presenting a general overview of the prevalence of conflict in the course of human 
                                                 
153http://www.cagdashukukculardernegi.org/basin_bultenleri/basin_bultenleri/avukatlar_gunu_basin_ac
iklamasi_09.html (accessed March 5, 2010). 
154 Technical Assistance for Better Access to Justice- Turkey. EuropeAid/123555/D/SER/TR. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/comparl/juri/hearings/20071004/depalo4_en.pdf (accessed March 5, 
2010). 
155 This training took place in Istanbul on February 13-15, 2009. The two previous trainings were 
organized in Ankara and Mersin on October 25-27, 2008, and December 19-21, 2008 respectively. 
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history, refers to the win/lose nature of mechanisms that have been developed to solve 
these disputes. Mechanisms like mediation are cited as alternatives developed in order 
to overcome the enduring state of enmity caused by this win/lose nature and to 
establish social peace. The President also adds that these mechanisms have a long 
history of application especially in the Anglo-Saxon world -but not limited to it- and 
that they are not foreign methods to the judicial system in Turkey either. Within this 
context, given the global developments on this issue and the fact that the legislative 
framework in Turkey already carries elements of this kind, the President expresses his 
astonishment with the “noise” created around the Draft Law. He argues that the 
“almost paranoid” scenarios, press ads, announcements regarding the Draft Law can 
only be explained in terms of a general cultural tendency that is based on looking at 
everything from our own ideological windows, taking sides, labeling those who do 
not agree with us, turning every matter into a crisis and enjoying all of these. He 
makes it explicit that Ankara Bar Association -although it has its own reservations 
about the Draft Law- is not against alternative dispute resolution methods and 
mediation because they define their style more as “following and adopting to the 
global developments”. 
 In a later speech delivered on March 13, 2009, at another conference organized in 
the context of the same project, the President again makes similar comments 
regarding their position on alternative mechanisms in general and mediation in 
particular. Giving reference to the widespread use of alternative methods on a global 
scale and the involvement of legal professionals in the development and the operation 
of such mechanisms, he tries to make sense of the opposition raised by lawyers and 
Bar Associations in Turkey.  In his speech, the President frequently reminds the 
audience of the ideal of the Republic -once foreseen by Atatürk- to reach western 
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standards, to keep up with the developments in the western world. In this context, he 
argues that the reason why lawyers in Turkey fiercely oppose these mechanisms 
cannot be because they are more concerned about the welfare of their society than 
their western counterparts or that they are more “intelligent”. The real reason 
according to the President lies in “our” general tendency to “make noise”, to “take 
sides” rather than talking to each other, discussing our issues, doing research in 
matters of importance. 
 Based on his personal acquaintance with most of the lawyers within Ankara Bar 
Association who are against the institution, the President states that these people 
oppose mediation due to their lack of knowledge because they have prematurely 
formed opinions on the issue. Within this context, he also condemns the attitudes of 
these professionals who always put forth the argument that since “Turkey is no 
Denmark”, since “it is not the Netherlands” the extension of the scope of rights and 
freedoms in Turkey and hence the development of mediation would not follow the 
same path. He interprets this line of thinking as an extension of an elitist attitude that 
sees “Kemalism as its own monopoly”, that does not “trust its own people”, that sees 
the people as masses that need to be “disciplined”. At this point, the President asks if 
the reason why Atatürk adopted the Civil Code in 1926 was because Turkey was 
similar to Switzerland or the reason why it has been applied successfully in the last 83 
years is because the people have not fully internalized this Code. Within this context, 
in his speech, the President asks everybody to work together until the point is reached 
where “we” share the same “principle”, the same “character”, and the same “spirit” 
with the western world on matters of democracy, rights and freedoms. 
 What is noteworthy about these statements is the gradual increase in the intensity 
of the tone. In an earlier speech delivered at a mediation training coorganized by 
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Ankara and Mersin Bar Associations in December 2008, the President makes no 
reference to the opposition raised by various circles, to the implications of these 
attitudes or to the relation between these developments and the westernization ideal of 
the Republic.156 This speech appears to be a purely informative one on the 
development and the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in the world 
and on the technical details of the mediation process in comparison to the classical 
judicial process. At the end of his speech, the President states that their main concerns 
about the Draft Law revolve around the issue of people who are not legal 
professionals becoming mediators and argues that mediation training should only be 
given by the Union and the local Bar Associations. Aside from these criticisms, the 
statement neither refers to any other concerns or to the opposing positions towards 
mediation nor does it frame the issue within an overall modernization ideal. This is 
despite the fact that by this time, influential institutional statements such as the 
declaration of Istanbul Bar Association against the Draft Law, the commentary of the 
former President of Istanbul Bar Association and the petition launched by Young 
Lawyers Association were already in the open. In the following speech delivered by 
the President, on the other hand, it is possible to observe a firm reactionary tone 
towards the increasing opposition. This gradual increase in the intensity of the tone of 
the speeches delivered by the President can be read as the increasing involvement of 
Ankara Bar Association in the publicly observable debates around mediation. 
 Aside from these main institutions that have appeared to be the most vocal and 
active ones during this period, other Bar Associations have also participated in the 
development of the debates around mediation. The responses of these institutions 
sometimes had a collective nature as in the case of a final declaration at the end of a 
                                                 
156 Mediation training organized in Mersin on 19-21 December 2008. 
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meeting of Presidents of Bar Associations for instance. At the end of this meeting that 
took place on October 5-6, 2007, a declaration was signed by a total of fourteen Bar 
Associations. The declaration covered three main issues one of which was the Draft 
Law. Regarding the drawbacks of this Draft Law, the declaration states that mediation 
as an institution fails to comply with the constitutional provision on the administration 
of justice by independent courts and the provision of this service by those 
professionals endowed with the required authority. At the same time, by granting 
“judicial powers” to those who are not legal professionals and by failing to foresee 
control mechanisms over the decisions of these people, the Draft Law is seen as 
impairing the confidence in judicial institutions. The fact that mediators will be 
subject to pressures will further damage the principle of equality before the law and 
lead to the creation of multiple jurisdictions. Based on these and other similar 
concerns, these Bar Associations demand the withdrawal of the Draft Law and call for 
studies to resolve the problems of the judiciary within the system itself.  
 In another collective enterprise, the Presidents of Bar Associations and the 
Administrative Board of the Union of Turkish Bar Associations released a public 
statement at the end of a meeting in March 2008. The statement focuses on the 
relation between legislative, executive and judiciary and claims that recent 
developments in Turkey suggest a shift from a model of “pluralist democracy” to a 
“democracy of the majority”. In this atmosphere, it is claimed that the legislative has 
aligned with the executive and as such no longer carries out its supervisory functions. 
In this void, the judiciary has stepped in and assumed this monitoring role of the 
legislative by correcting mistakes and preventing the majority from becoming an 
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uncontrolled power”.157 Within this context, these two branches are pictured as having 
united against the judiciary and as such their members are not executing judicial 
decisions that are not compatible with their interests, are openly criticizing the 
judiciary and act and talk in ways that can impair the prestige of the judiciary, 
diminish its power and turn it into an open target.158 Within this context, among other 
issues, the statement also refers to mediation as a problematic area. Eighteen Bar 
Associations, including Ankara and Istanbul, together with the Union, declare their 
opposition against the Draft Law based on their concerns with the vagueness of the 
disputes eligible for mediation, the possibility of people who are not professionals to 
become mediators, the coordination of the institution by the Ministry of Justice and 
the exam requirement at the end of mediation training that is also applicable to the 
lawyers etc.  
 Again in February 2009, another collective declaration against mediation was 
signed and delivered by fourteen Bar Associations and the Union of Turkish Bar 
Associations. One last enterprise of this kind is the March 2009 public statement 
announced at the end of the meeting of Presidents of Bar Associations in the Black 
Sea Region with the Administrative Board of the Union of Turkish Bar 
Associations.159 This declaration signed by twelve Bar Associations as well as the 
Administrative Board of the Union, again covers similar concerns like people who are 
not legal professionals becoming mediators, the dependence of the institution on the 
Ministry of Justice, the exam requirement for lawyers who want to become mediators 
etc.  
                                                 
157 http://www.bursabarosu.org.tr/haberler.php?kimlik=122 (accessed March 5, 2010).  
158 http://www.bursabarosu.org.tr/haberler.php?kimlik=122 (accessed March 5, 2010).  
159 http://www.barobirlik.org.tr/calisma/haberler/tbb/090308_kamuoyu_barolar.aspx (accessed March 
5, 2010).  
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 Aside from these collective statements, there have also been individual 
declarations of local Bar Associations during this period. In my research, I have 
spotted fifteen statements of this kind. Some of these are official declarations released 
on behalf of the Bar Association while some are statements of the Presidents. The 
common feature of all these statements is their insistence on lawyers or at the 
minimum the graduates of law schools to become mediators. As professional 
organizations, Bar Associations unite in their opposition against people who have not 
received a formal legal education, who lack the notion of law and who are not integral 
features of the judicial system to be engaged in such a practice that they consider to be 
judicial in essence. These statements are again composed of familiar concerns like the 
possibility of the emergence of multiple jurisdictions, the privatization of law, the 
replacement of the judicial system and the delegation of the state’s judicial authority, 
the authority of the Ministry of Justice over the institution, the vagueness of the 
category of disputes eligible for mediation, the exam requirement for lawyers who 
want to become mediators, the emergence of a new profession and the limitation of 
lawyers’ field of practice.  
 All of these institutional statements are delivered by professional associations of 
lawyers. Hence, it is important to recognize the active role that lawyers as a 
professional group play in the debates around mediation. This predominance can be 
interpreted in terms of the relative autonomy enjoyed by these professionals with 
respect to other actors of the juridical field like the judges and the prosecutors. The 
fact that judges and prosecutors do not have a professional organization that protects 
their interests further contributes to their relative silence on the issue. On the other 
hand, legal theoreticians -another significant group operating within the juridical 
field- are rather holders of individual positions towards the issue. These possible 
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explanations for the particular predominance of lawyers in these debates make more 
sense when they are interpreted against a backdrop of the boundaries of the juridical 
field. As these boundaries are always imagined in the context of the struggle for 
power within the juridical field, the fact that lawyers’ professional organizations are 
the most active and vocal groups in debates around mediation can be read as symbolic 
of these struggles within the field. Since mediation is in particular imagined to be an 
invasion of the practice of advocacy, the fact that lawyers as a professional group are 
much more engaged in these debates can be understood in the context of a perceived 
threat against the power of this group within the juridical field which is above all 
constituted by their capacity to create the need for their services.  
 In addition, the institutional statements also reveal that these professional 
concerns are not on their own enough to explain different positions in the debates. As 
various professional organizations are engaged in the debates around mediation, 
certain institutional positions that are seriously antagonistic become easily detectable. 
In fact, in the context of the possibility of people who are not legal professionals 
becoming mediators, all institutions seem to protest this clause of the Draft Law. 
However, an overview of these positions reveals that rather than differences in their 
professional aspirations, what seem to situate these institutions on opposite corners 
are the ways in which they imagine the compatibility of mediation with the cultural 
structure and the existing political situation in Turkey. Hence, while opponents of the 
Draft Law frame their reactions in the context of their concerns for the emergence of 
multiple jurisdictions, the invasion of the legal domain by extralegal forces or for the 
privatization of law; adherents of the practice approach it as a necessity of the global 
order and a way for Turkey to catch up with these developments. In this sense, rather 
than recognizable differences along professional lines, the institutional positions 
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display different ways in which the practice of mediation is imagined in relation to the 
society, the law and the legal profession.  
III. Blogs and Forums  
 
 The debates that can be observed in online discussion spaces during this period 
are not different from the ones covered in the news or the institutional statements. 
Akin to the ones that have emerged in the analysis of news pieces and institutional 
declarations, blogs and forums also seem to be composed of debates on how 
mediation is a judicial practice in essence, how this means the reemergence of Shari’a 
law and institutions, how mediation will allow for the legitimation of feudal structures 
and sectarian relations through the work of certified state officials and how this 
enterprise is an indication of ulterior political and social motives etc. Other similar 
comments were also raised in the context of the possible interpretations of this Draft 
Law as an attempt to delegate judicial powers, as an attack on the legal profession or 
as the privatization of law etc. 
 In almost all of these debates, the main line of controversy seems to emerge 
around the possibility of people lacking a proper legal formation becoming mediators. 
In these online discussion arenas, practicing lawyers or students of law usually engage 
in debates on why mediation needs to be practiced by legal professionals. While some 
fiercely reject the idea of people lacking a formal legal training and professional 
experience becoming mediators and hence push for the complete rejection of the Draft 
Law and the institution, others seem to suggest that rather than opposing the practice 
all together lawyers should even be more engaged than ever in order to appropriate 
the institution which will be -in the long run- left to legal professionals anyway. In 
this sense, while commentators seem to agree on the point that legal professionals are 
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the most compatible group for the practice of mediation, they seem to disagree on 
how legal professionals are to become a part of this process. While some argue that 
unless legal professionals are the authorized group to carry out mediation practice the 
Draft Law should be rejected all together; others seem to believe that it is better to 
allow for the “natural selection” process to follow its own pace which ultimately will 
bring about the ownership of the practice by legal professionals.  
 One piece from an online forum, for instance, holds a strongly anti-mediation 
attitude which is more often than not reflected in an overall anti-AKP undertone. The 
writer of the comment- a lawyer of Istanbul Bar- expresses his concerns with the 
Draft Law as a medium for creating a model of multiple jurisdictions which he argues 
is what some circles in fact long for. According to the writer, the possibility of the 
reemergence of the kadi system, the incompatibility of the mediation institution with 
the societal structure and state tradition of Turkey, the existence of similar 
mechanisms within the present legal system all seem to designate an ulterior motive 
behind this Draft Law, i.e. “the eradication of the Turkish Civil Code which is the 
basis of the laicist conception of law in Turkey which in turn sets the foundation of 
the Turkish legal revolution”. 
 In such comments, opposition seems to be formed around issues that are beyond 
professional struggles like concerns around the demise of the modern legal system of 
the Republic of Turkey. In the preceding example, for instance, the crucial function 
attributed to law as a means to popularize the terms of modern living in general and 
the particular role attributed to the Turkish Civil Code as the main instrument through 
which a laicist life style can be established in Turkey is depicted as being at risk. In 
others, the judiciary is imagined to be the latest target of a “civil coup” that will turn 
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the laicist, democratic, rule of law state into an Islamist Republic and mediation is 
imagined to be one of the ways in which this transition can be institutionalized.  
 On the other hand, a group of legal actors have also emphasized the advantage of 
lawyers becoming mediators given their educational and professional proximity with 
dispute resolution. These actors, however, have approached the emergence of this new 
institution from a rather strategic point of view in the sense that instead of opposing 
the institution of all together, these actors asked their fellow professionals to join them 
in getting to know the institution better so that lawyers can be the primary actors in 
the actual practice. In response to comments on how mediation is an enemy of 
advocacy and how this Draft Law will mean the demolition of a whole profession, 
these actors first explain the necessity of this institution in reference to global 
developments and as such claim that rather than opposing an institution that will in 
one way or another become a part of the legal structure in Turkey, legal professionals 
should instead try to appropriate this practice within their fields of operation.  
 In this sense, these comments focused on how mediation is a globally recognized 
practice that is spreading to different legal systems and how it is a particularly 
significant item in the context of Turkey’s EU process. As such, the institution has 
been considered as an item of state policy in the context of Turkey’s aspirations to 
become a member state and as such to be a recognized partner in the league of 
developed nations. Within this context, these actors have invited legal professionals to 
realize the increasing significance of this practice and approach it as an addition to 
their “professional portfolio”. This suggestion has also been justified in the context of 
the legacy of legal change from above.  
 In this sense, in response to comments on the incompatibility of mediation with 
the social structure in Turkey given that people do not trust each other, that they are 
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more concerned about complaining than resolving their disputes and that they are 
more inclined to prolong the dispute, it has also been suggested that the emergence of 
this institution can in fact be approached as an opportunity in the sense of legal 
professionals playing an active role in its establishment. One commentator, for 
instance, considered this opportunity against the backdrop of the top-down legacy of 
legal change in Turkey and argued that if legal professionals stop opposing the 
institution at face value and instead try to learn about it, improve themselves 
accordingly and hence “volunteer” to be the main carriers of this practice, they might 
in fact be prepared about what the Draft Law and through it the institution will bring 
into the existing legal practice in Turkey.  
V. Notes on Observations 
 
 In the course of my data gathering, I have also been a non-participant observer in 
two conferences related to mediation. These conferences were organized under an EC 
sponsored project called Technical Assistance to Better Access to Justice in Turkey. 
The project that lasted between September 2007 and April 2009 outlined its objective 
as “to strengthen the rule of law in Turkey and provide all citizens’ access to justice in 
line with EU acquis standards”.160 In line with this overall objective, the project had 
three main components: Legal aid, ADR and IT. The ADR component which 
constitutes the main interest of this dissertation was composed of public awareness 
activities on mediation, trainings for lawyers, international symposia on ADR, study 
                                                 
160 Cited from a project template distributed at the seminars. 
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visit to the Netherlands by the beneficiaries161 and a nationwide survey assessing the 
success of the project.  
 During my observations, I paid particular attention to the issues brought up by 
various actors and how these issues have been encountered by the speakers as well as 
the general audience. During the first conference, I was yet at an exploratory stage in 
my dissertation and although I was contemplating on including mediation in my work, 
it was not yet the central focus of my research. At this stage, I was mainly interested 
in understanding how law and its institutional authority is reproduced in the meaning 
schemas and practices of legal professionals as they get to move in and around the 
legal domain. During this conference, however, I was struck by the intensity of the 
debates around mediation and the complexity of the larger world of meanings and 
practices within which these debates were framed.  
 One of the speakers at this first conference, for instance, began her opening 
speech with a word of gratitude to Atatürk. With a portrait of Atatürk in the 
background, she expressed her gratitude to him for “making it possible” for her to be 
there. The fact that the speaker did not explain why she believes that Atatürk is the 
reason behind her presence and why she feels compelled to begin her speech with a 
word of gratitude is symbolic of the taken-for-grantedness of a shared social 
imaginary, one that is painted with the heroic image of Atatürk and on his behalf the 
Republic as the foundation of a secular and modern Turkish national identity. It is this 
identity that the speaker refers to in a subtle manner and expects it to be recognized by 
the audience who is assumed to be operating within the same social imaginary. This 
opening speech on its own is representative of the complexity of the larger universe of 
                                                 
161 The beneficiaries of the project in Turkey included the Ministry of Justice as the leading beneficiary 
and the Union of Turkish Bar Associations and Ankara Bar Association as cobeneficiaries. 
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meanings within which social actors operate and as such proves the relevance of an 
inquiry into the legal consciousness of these professionals. 
 Another issue that emerged during this conference was the importance of a 
professional discipline for the practice of mediation to be accepted by the people at 
large. The speaker who focused on this particular issue affiliated this discipline with 
being a member of the legal profession and argued that mediation should be practiced 
by these professionals for the institution to be trusted by the people. With regards the 
close affinity between mediation and the legal profession, the speaker stated that as 
members of this profession they feel that they are responsible for the establishment of 
this institution on solid grounds. This issue was brought up by other participants in 
reference to a general concern regarding the possibility of people who are not 
graduates of law schools becoming mediators. In fact, as other representations of 
mediation have also displayed, this issue appears to be one of the most crucial 
defining axes of the debates around mediation. In this conference too, the issue was 
wrapped around concerns about the creation of a superior, a more selective profession 
than advocacy -given the exam requirement for mediators- and about transferring 
what are in essence legal disputes into the hands of those who lack the necessary 
knowledge and expertise given that the training for mediators includes only limited 
hours of basic legal training. Within this context, introduction of mediation was also 
considered as an attempt to create a new market that will allow these people lacking 
the necessary legal training and skills to engage in judicial activities. 
 During this conference, I have also observed that there are serious debates 
amongst members of the legal profession on how the Draft Law should be interpreted 
from a legal perspective. In one of the panels, participants were given the opportunity 
to address their questions on the Draft Law to a an “expert”- a professor of law- who 
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was a member of the Commission that prepared the Draft Law and as such directly 
contributed to the process of outlining the legal framework of mediation. In the panel, 
the commission member was quite often faced with comments on the how different 
clauses of the Draft Law could be interpreted in different ways. What was most 
interesting about observing these debates was that the answers given by the 
commission member almost never seemed to satisfy the listeners who addressed the 
questions. The whole panel took place as a pretense question and answer session 
where in fact what was taking place was a latent struggle between “holders of 
different types of juridical capital” (Bourdieu 1987, 823).  
 My observations made me believe that these interpretive struggles cannot be 
approached purely as differences in technical evaluations of the text. Bourdieu argues 
that the interpretation of legal texts is always “aimed at a particular object and is 
designed to determine the practical effects” (1987, 818). In this case, the particular 
moment of struggle between the law professor and the practicing lawyers during the 
panel can in fact be considered against the background of professional concerns that 
are most of the time raised by practicing lawyers since mediators are imagined to be 
entering into their field of practice. Theoreticians, in this sense, are less likely to raise 
professional concerns since the foreseen entry of the mediators into the juridical field 
is less likely to have a practical effect on their space of activity and mode of operation 
within the field.  
 One last issue that came up during this conference was concerned with the 
compatibility of such an institution with the existing societal structure in Turkey. 
Concerns regarding the possibility of mediation reinforcing the existing relations of 
power within the society were brought up mainly in reference to the possibility of 
people without a formal legal education becoming mediators as suggested by the 
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Draft Law. Points raised about these concerns were framed within general 
sociological observations by lawyers regarding the absence of a culture of conciliation 
in Turkey. In these observations, the public at large is usually portrayed as poorly 
educated, with insufficient economic means and lacking rights consciousness. When 
considered against a backdrop of Turkey’s modernization experience and the role 
attributed to the legal professionals, this portrayal is in line with the self-image of 
these professionals as the enlightened actors within the society who are charged with 
a mission of developing and educating the people (Cirhinlioğlu 1997; Türem 2001; 
Koğacıoğlu 2003). This role is further affirmed by a common conviction among 
lawyers that they can contribute to the economic, social and political development of 
Turkey primarily by assuming a leading role within the society (Cirhinlioğlu 1997).  
 The second conference that I attended as a nonparticipant observer, on the other 
hand, was organized particularly around the subject of mediation and in this sense it 
offered me even more opportunities to observe legal professionals as they talk about 
mediation. In one of the opening speeches of this conference, the speaker started his 
speech again with a reference to Atatürk. After citing maxims on law and dispute 
resolution, the speaker explained his reason for citing these maxims of western 
intellectuals in order to point out to the fact that mediation is a common practice in the 
West which is the destination put forth by the “great Atatürk”. This initial framing of 
the subject is again symbolic of a certain set of meaning that is presumed to be shared 
by the participants of the conference. 
 The fact that the speaker continued his speech with a comparison of the negative 
attitudes towards mediation among legal professionals in Turkey and those in the 
western countries based on an assessment of the differences between debate cultures, 
further reinforces the impact of this initial reference point. During his speech, the 
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speaker continued to frame his arguments within this framework. At some point he 
argued that those professionals opposing mediation did in fact know nothing about 
mediation, while at another point he accused them of monopolizing Kemalism. 
Instead of these unproductive approaches, the speaker advised his fellow 
professionals to be active participants in the development of mediation in Turkey by 
emphasizing the necessity of mediators being law graduates and Bar Associations and 
accredited law faculties being the sole providers of trainings on mediation. This 
suggestion was again framed within the context of “catching up with the West” as the 
speaker asked his fellow professionals to give up redundant fights that lead to further 
polarization and unite under the goal of “working until we fully establish the 
democracy and human rights mentality of the western world that we have constantly 
bumped into over the last 200-300 years”.  
 Another prominent point during this conference was again related to the absence 
of a culture of conciliation within the society. One of the speakers, addressing mainly 
the foreign participants, mentioned the “uniqueness” of the relation that people living 
in this society have with the law in the sense that they see courts as vengeance 
mechanisms. The difficulty also stems from the “submissive” character of the people 
which brings about unequal relations of power between the parties of the disputes. 
Within this context, not only are the people in Turkey imagined to be lacking rights 
consciousness; but they are also portrayed as subjects of unequal relations of 
subordination that may lead to unwilling participations in certain peacemaking 
practices. The speaker was nevertheless hopeful and expressed the need to realize that 
in order to create a democratic, social state under the rule of law, first “we” have to 
abandon such imprisoning values that prevent the creation of a truly safer and more 
peaceful society.  
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 In reference to the spreading of global values and the creation of legal 
mechanisms to actualize these values across borders, the speaker also addressed the 
need to be active participants in these developments not because the EU asks us to do 
but for the sake of “our own people”. This argument is in line with Türem’s 
observation regarding the attitudes of legal professionals in Turkey towards the 
globalization of law. Türem argues that although there are differences in the attitudes 
of traditional legal professionals and globally oriented corporate lawyers towards this 
phenomenon, there is still a recognizable tendency shared by the two groups to justify 
their opinions in reference to the “well being of the Turkish society and public at 
large” (2001, 91). In this justification, improvements in the field of human rights, for 
instance, seem to make sense to these professionals as long as they are actualized for 
the sake of “our people” and “our nation”; rather than as impositions of foreign bodies 
such as the EU (Türem 2001, 104).  
 Within these expanding relations with the global order, legal professionals are 
imagined to play a leading role in terms of improving themselves in line with the 
requirements of these expanding networks and the spread of global values. The legal 
professional, according to the speaker, also assumes a significant role in the 
transformation of the state into a modern entity that is more than an ordinary 
“administrative mechanism”. This depiction of the legal professional as the 
responsible party for modernizing the state might again be considered in the context 
of a strategic and contextual determination of the direction of the relationship between 
the state and the legal profession. Within this context, the state is no longer imagined 
to be the raison d’être of the profession that has initiated its emergence as well as its 
development; rather, there seems to be a reversal in the way in which this relationship 
is imagined.  
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 This narrative suggests the possibility of such a reversal whereby the legal 
profession is rather imagined to be the modernizing and progressive engine behind the 
state which -in the absence of such a strong and influential legal profession- is a mere 
instrument of administration. In this narrative, the legal professional is not only 
portrayed as the active agent in the creation of a culture of conciliation and a more 
peaceful society; but is also depicted as the major force behind the state’s interaction 
with and adoption to the global order. In this sense, legal professionals are again 
imagined to be the leading actors within the society; although this time they are not 
only guiding the people but they are also reforming the state in the direction of 
becoming a more globally oriented entity.  
 Yet another notable speech at this conference was delivered by a professor of law 
who was also a member of the commission that prepared the Draft Law. After 
explaining the procedure they have followed while preparing the Draft Law, the 
speaker mainly shared his astonishment with the reactions towards the Law especially 
with regards the general lack of knowledge on the subject matter. In response to the 
concerns about Shari’a law coming back or about the emergence of a legal system 
based on multiple jurisdictions, the speaker addressed his concerns about the quality 
of these debates that are tagged with “political labels”. This resistance based upon 
political polarizations rather than on informed opinion was, for instance, reflected in 
comments on mediation that were framed in the context of a general opposition 
against  “any type of imperialism, fascism, domination, mediation”. The speaker 
argues that other comments on how mediation is in fact a tool for money laundering 
or how this practice in effect means that courts declare their incapacity to deal with 
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disputes are in fact all political statements rather than informed debates around the 
advantages and disadvantages of a new institution.162 
 Overall, my presence at these two events has allowed me to observe legal 
professionals as they engage in debates on mediation: How they frame their opinions, 
what kind of reactions these opinions receive from the rest of the audience etc. In this 
sense, these observations also gave me the chance to see the ways in which actors 
operating in the juridical field frame their opinions and positions on mediation and 
how they negotiate these with other actors. At the same time, I also had the 
opportunity to observe in more depth the actors that I have selected for my interviews 
and to establish contacts with other actors who were not included in my original list 
but who nevertheless appeared to be active during the debates. Observing these actors 
in the very process of meaning making and position taking in turn allowed me to 
situate these processes in the larger framework of the competitive struggles within the 
juridical field for the right to control what this emerging practice will be composed of. 
These struggles will be discussed in further detail in the next two chapters where I 
will be examining the implications of these debates for an account of the legal 
consciousness of these professionals and its compatibility with the Republican image 
of the legal profession. 
                                                 
162 This approach that interprets mediation as a declaration of state’s incapacity to provide justice has 
come up during the interviews. One respondent, for instance, argued that this was an attempt to 
institutionalize what exists in traditions as a recognized alternative to the judiciary and as such 
interpreted these efforts as the declaration of state’s helplessness, its incapacity to solve disputes. 
Interview # 25 
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Chapter 7 
What do Legal Professionals Talk About? 
Implications of Mediation Debates for Legal Consciousness  
 
 The narratives of legal professionals designate some recognizable sets of meaning 
around which attitudes towards mediation in general and the Draft Law in particular 
are formed. These sets are derived from respondents’ comments to questions about 
the particular debates around mediation, how they position themselves within these 
debates, how they see opinions of actors on opposite corners, how mediation can be 
situated within the existing legal framework and how they assess the compatibility of 
mediation with the existing social structure etc. These responses have almost always 
been coupled with respondents’ comments on law in general and on the legal system 
in particular, in the context of the ways in which they frame their own relation with 
and expectations from law and their perceptions of the legal profession.  
 At the same time, these narratives also allowed for an exploration of how the 
boundaries of the juridical field are imagined in the meaning schemas and practices of 
the actors operating within this field. In their work on the analysis of international 
commercial arbitration as a field, Dezalay and Garth point out to the significance of 
studying this question of boundaries in order to see “how a given domain is regulated 
and how institutions develop and change”. Following Bourdieu, they argue that this is 
a relatively general problem in the study of symbolic institutions like law but a 
particularly apparent one in matters that are newly emerging and as such devoid of 
established institutional forms (Dezalay and Garth 1996, 15). In this sense, mediation 
-at least as a formal practice regulated by law- is a newly emerging institution in 
 193
Turkey. At this point, it is not possible to talk about experts operating in this space or 
to observe practices that are recognized as characteristics of this institution. There are 
no established structures, accepted modes of operation, unique protocols that would 
make this space a field in Bourdieusian sense of the term. In this sense, the fact that 
the legal text on mediation is yet a Draft Law that is waiting to be passed by the 
Grand National Assembly or that there are limited number of institutional formations 
that directly concentrate on the subject of mediation make it difficult from a 
sociological perspective to talk about the field of mediation on its own.163 My 
preliminary observations on the debates around this emerging institutional form 
together with my occasional encounters with legal professionals before and during the 
data collection period have nevertheless made me believe that what mediation can in 
fact allow for an empirical analysis is not so much an exploration of whether it is 
emerging as a new field on its own or not but rather how it relates to the existing 
juridical field.  
 Within this context, I have quite often observed that struggles around mediation 
are rather reflections of the struggles within the juridical field. As legal professionals 
engage in debates around mediation, more often than not they frame their opinions in 
reference to the existing legal system, the role of law and legal professionals in the 
resolution of disputes. For instance, the analysis of representations of mediation in 
various channels has presented a certain professional imaginary that sees the practice 
of mediation as a judicial practice in essence. Within this context, the delegation of 
                                                 
163 For instance, Ankara Bar Association is the only Bar in Turkey with an Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Center which was established in 2004. In 2007, Alternative Dispute Resolution Association 
was also established in Ankara the members of which are usually also members of the Center. Aside 
from these organizations by lawyers, there are also a couple of independent organizations providing 
mediation services particularly in the field of education, business, commercial and family disputes. In 
addition, a number of educational institutions have launched mediation training programs some of 
which are prepared in accordance with the requirements of the Draft Law. These formations, however, 
remain to be quite few in number and only marginally accepted mainly due to the strong presence of 
highly critical voices raised among legal professionals against these enterprises. 
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“judicial powers” to people who are not trained in law constitutes one of the most 
prominent concerns for professional associations. This concern is expressed in terms 
of a violation of constitutional provisions on the administration of justice by 
independent courts -hence the concern for privatization of the judiciary- as well as an 
attack against the legal profession as mediators will primarily be working in their field 
of operation. The institutional statements in particular designate a common concern 
for the confiscation of judicial operations by people who are not legal professionals.  
 As such, rather than designating the emergence of a new field, mediation appears 
to be emerging as a controversial matter for the boundaries of the existing juridical 
field. Under these circumstances, although it is not possible -at least not yet- to talk 
about mediation as a field on its own, akin to the representations of mediation, the 
narratives also designate certain imagined challenges to the boundaries of the juridical 
field. In this sense, issues such as the kind of expertise that is imagined for mediation 
-what kind  of a symbolic capital is envisioned in order to be operating within this 
space-, the actors who are considered to be stakeholders in this emerging space- what 
will be the axes of competition for the right to determine what mediation will be 
about-, the type of relation that is to be constituted between mediation and the existing 
juridical field and the compatibility of mediation with the social structure all seem to 
indicate the types of struggles and axes of competition that make up the juridical field.  
 Within this context, in the following pages I will first present the main axes of 
contestation around the Draft Law that have emerged in the narratives of legal 
professionals. These axes of contestation are also developed in reference to the 
previous analysis on the representations of mediation. As such they are also reflexive 
of the main points of contestation that have emerged in the media, in institutional 
statements, in online discussion spaces and during the two conferences on mediation. 
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Within this context, there seems to be three primary issues that the debates seem to 
focus on in particular: What is to be mediated, what is to happen at the end of 
mediation process and who is to mediate. These issues respectively refer to 
controversies around the scope of mediation as outlined by the Draft Law, the 
agreement to be signed at the end of mediation process and the qualifications of 
mediators. These contestations will be situated in the context of Bourdieu’s overall 
theoretical framework with a particular reference to the concept of the juridical field 
and its relative autonomy which is imagined to be constituted by the practices of the 
agents who compete for the right to determine law. In this sense, the struggles of legal 
professionals over the definition of the disputes, the process of mediation and the 
technical competence of mediators will be understood in the context of the internal 
logic of the field that contributes to the sustenance of its relative autonomy. 
 Following this presentation of the major axes of contestation and their reading 
from within a Bourdieusian framework, I will move on to a discussion of these 
internal debates as signifiers of relations of power that constitute the other dimension 
in the making and the maintenance of the relative autonomy of the juridical field. 
Bourdieu’s emphasis on the difference between the “symbolic structure called law 
and the social system that produces it” is a key analytical issue here. This is a 
distinction between the symbolic order of norms and doctrines and the order of 
objective relations between actors and institutions for the monopoly of the right to 
control law. This distinction allows for an exploration of the “power of form” which 
has a tendency to codify and formalize, on the one hand, and the “totality of objective 
relations between the juridical field and the field of power” on the other (Bourdieu 
1987, 841).  
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 In the context of mediation debates, the first dimension of this distinction allows 
for recognition of the specific power relations within the juridical field as constituted 
by the struggles around the issue of which disputes will be formalized, what kinds of 
effects this formalization will have and who will be responsible for this formalization. 
The second dimension of the distinction, on the other hand, allows for a consideration 
of these relations in the context of “the exercise of power in other social realms” 
(Bourdieu 1987, 807). As such, while the legal universe is imagined to be operating 
within a logic of its own that is shaped by “tradition, education, and the daily 
experience of legal custom and professional usage”, it is at the same time closely tied 
to other fields of power through a relation of “intense resistance to the influence of 
competing forms of social practice or professional conduct” (Bourdieu 1987, 808). 
Hence, the contestations around the Draft Law are not only relevant for an 
understanding of the struggles for determining the form of law; but they are also 
meaningful in the context of mediation as a competing form of professional conduct 
around which specific axes of resistance are observed in the juridical field. 
 Within this context, the axes of resistance to this competing practice seem to be 
reflexive of financial interests, political inclinations, ideological positions and social 
imaginaries of legal professionals (Bourdieu 1987). As such, in the second part of this 
Chapter, I will explore how these debates can be construed in the context of the larger 
universe of social relations that are constitutive of the ways in which these 
professionals imagine the society, the law and their profession. In this sense, this 
second part will be an inquiry into the legal consciousness of these professionals 
through an exploration of the implications of debates around mediation. 
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I. Debates around the Draft Law 
 
 Legal professionals who emerge as the vocal and active ones in these debates 
around mediation and in the development of the Draft Law are considered to be the 
main actors in the construction of a particular type of relationality between mediation 
as an emerging mode of practice and the existing juridical field. The reasons given by 
these actors of why they want or do not want to be a part of this world, whom they see 
as fit to operate within this world, how they describe the disputes that are eligible for 
mediation as well the kind(s) of symbolic capital they refer to when they picture the 
relevant actors allow for an understanding of the “process of construction of 
mediation” while at the same time allowing for a rethinking of the process of the 
(re)construction of the autonomy of the juridical field (Dezalay and Garth 1996, 10). 
Within this context, data from the interviews designate certain shifting boundaries 
between the juridical field and mediation as legal professionals comment on particular 
features of the Draft Law.  
1.  Scope of Mediation 
 One of the controversial issues in the debates concerns Article 1 of the Draft Law 
where mediation’s scope of application is described. The Article goes as such: “This 
law will be practiced in the context of civil disputes arising from matters or 
procedures on which parties can freely agree upon, including the disputes that involve 
a foreign element”164 It is not so much the general context of the Article referring to 
matters under the jurisdiction of civil law but the disputes that the parties can “freely 
agree upon” that emerges as a matter of interpretational controversy among legal 
                                                 
164 The foreign element may refer to a dispute between a national company and a foreign one as well as 
a dispute between a Turkish national and a foreign first person. 
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professionals. While trying to understand participants’ interpretations of this Article, I 
asked them quite openly if they believe that this is a clear, understandable clause from 
a legal perspective. Responses indicate a disagreement among legal professionals 
about what these disputes may include. While some argue that this is an evident 
clause from a legal perspective, that anyone trained in law would understand what 
such issues would include; others claim that the disputes that will go to mediation 
needs to be clearly listed.  
 In these responses, there seems to emerge two primary dimensions of 
contestation. The first dimension revolves around the clarity of the Article from a 
legal perspective whereas the second one that extends from the first one is more about 
the implications of this clarity- or the lack of it thereof- upon the public order and 
personal disposition cleavage that is suggested by the phrase of “freely agree upon”. 
In the former, narratives either suggest that the disputes “parties can freely agree 
upon” are categorically clear and comprehensible from a legal perspective or not. This 
second interpretation regarding the ambiguity of disputes suggested by the Article 
leads into the latter dimension of contestation that questions the necessity of listing 
these disputes in order to elucidate what is implied by the Article and hence 
narrowing the scope of its interpretation.  
 In the first dimension of the controversy, those narratives that suggest the 
categorical clarity of these disputes usually situate this suggestion in the context of 
technical competence. In this approach, legal professionals who are trained in law are 
imagined to possess the required technical capacity to interpret what is implied by the 
word of law. Mainly arguing that the clause is clear and comprehensible to a legal 
professional who is in command of the existing body of law, these respondents 
commonly refer to the relevant clauses on the concept of “freely agree upon” in 
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various codes. As such, the assumption is that a legal professional whose command of 
the legal corpus is strong enough would not face any difficulty in interpreting the 
Article. The other side of the clarity issue, on the other hand, suggests a lack of 
precision in these disputes which leads to the more controversial second dimension of 
these debates that focuses on the question of whether these disputes should be 
specified or not.  
 This question of listing the disputes has more often than not been handled in 
relation to a foreseen distinction between matters of public interest and matters that 
parties can “freely agree upon”. This distinction appears to be imagined by both sides 
of the debate. Those who believe that these disputes need not be listed as well as those 
who claim that these disputes should be specified in a detailed fashion seem to refer to 
this distinction. The former group of respondents explains the lack of clarity in the 
Article in relation to the dynamism of the concept of “public order”. For instance, one 
respondent stated that outlining these disputes would be against the nature of the 
concept of public order which is a dynamic concept that is time and context bound.  
The concept of public order refers to an order of rules that preserves 
the main structure and interests of a society.  This concept is 
dynamic; it changes according to time and place. If you list the 
disputes, the concept would lose this dynamism. For instance, was it 
possible think of mediation in criminal cases twenty years ago? Even 
there, the concept of public order is softened. Development and 
change made this a necessity... Administrative law and arbitration 
could not be imagined side by side. But public order is not 
static...These cannot be listed by its nature. They should be open to 
interpretation. Public order is used as a framework concept.165 
 
 Another respondent also explained why he opposed the idea of listing these 
disputes in reference to the dynamism of the concept of public order. In this narrative, 
as a changing concept that is time and context bound, public order is considered to be 
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“one of the most important problems that law has not been able to resolve”.166 In this 
context, the respondent gives the example of adultery that used to be a crime 
according to the Criminal Code and as such was considered to be an act of “heavy 
violation of the public order”. The fact that today adultery is only included in the legal 
system as a ground for divorce and not as a criminal act attests to the changing nature 
of the concept of public order. Under such circumstances, an attempt to specify these 
disputes is considered to be against the “nature” of the concept that needs to evolve in 
line with changing social dynamics.167 
 Those narratives that emphasized the vagueness of the Article but argued in favor 
of their listing, on the other hand, justified their quest for enumeration in reference to 
the complexity of these disputes from a legal perspective. Responses usually indicated 
the drawbacks of leaving this clause open ended and referred to possible 
misinterpretations of the clause that are likely to occur if people without a formal 
legal training can also become mediators as suggested by the Draft Law. Hence, aside 
from the complexity of these disputes from a technical perspective, the possibility of 
people without a formal legal education becoming mediators was also raised as a 
supplementary justification for enumeration.  
They need to be listed, yes. Because there may be problems there. 
There are conflicts that are so intricate that there may be problems. 
For instance who will decide on issues that parties can freely agree 
upon? Mediators? Mediators who are not legal professionals? So for 
instance an art teacher, an expert of psychology, an architect, an 
engineer, how will they decide which disputes?168 
 
 These struggles that go into deciding which disputes will be eligible for mediation 
can in fact be analyzed from within the specific logic of the juridical field as a “social 
space organized around the conversion of direct conflict between directly concerned 
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parties into juridically regulated debate between professionals acting by proxy” 
(Bourdieu 1987, 831). The controversies around the question of “which disputes” can 
be interpreted as struggles among the actors within the juridical field for determining 
the borders of this conversion. It is in this sense reflexive of the competition among 
legal professionals for the right to determine what the law and through the law the 
state will be able to control and regulate and what will be left to the “will” of those 
who lack the means and the capital to operate within this field. Within this context, 
the line between public interest and personal disposition emerges as a possible border 
line demarcating what is allocated to the control of the state and what is left to the will 
of the parties.  
In fact this is what the cliché of having the right to freely agree upon 
is about. I mean, if the party agrees to it, then what is it to the state? 
What is a state, how can it determine what I want on something that I 
can personally decide upon, something that reflects my free will?169 
 
 In this sense, the transformation of social conflicts into juridical cases, in fact 
allows for an observation of the forces that contribute to the sustenance of law’s 
relative autonomy. While on the one hand, the public-private divide is (re)constituted 
around the struggles within the juridical field to define what law will regulate and 
how; on the other hand, this reconstitution from within the juridical field allows for a 
manipulation of legal aspirations by legal professionals which contributes to the 
sustenance of the division between these professionals and the lay people. Bourdieu 
argues that this borderline between groups of actors -legal professionals on the one 
hand and lay people on the other- is in fact “essential to a power relation upon which 
two systems of presuppositions, two systems of expressive intention -two world-
views- are grounded” (1987, 828). In the struggle for maintaining this division lies the 
de facto construction of the relative autonomy of the juridical field and hence the 
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constitution of a particular reality which in this case is shaped around the decision of 
what can be considered to be a matter of public interest and what can be left to the 
decision of the parties. If law is “the quintessential form of the symbolic power of 
naming that creates the things named”, then in this case it is the creator of the public 
interest through which not only does it reaffirm its institutional autonomy but also 
confirms its authority over the management of disputes within the social order.  
 Overall, when these debates around the scope of mediation are situated in context 
of Bourdieu’s observations of the juridical field, four main issues seem to be relevant 
for analytical consideration. First is the process of naming through which disputes that 
will be eligible for mediation are defined. In this sense, debates around which disputes 
can be left to the decision of parties and which disputes are matters of public interest 
are reflexive of this process of naming. Hence, this process on its own contributes to 
the relative autonomy of the juridical field by accepting certain acts as legally 
governable while leaving others outside the borders of legal regulation. At the same 
time struggles around the operation of naming is also symbolic of law’s work of 
codification and formalization which is constitutive of law’s efficacy. In Bourdieu’s 
approach towards the juridical field, this efficacy is always considered in relation to 
the social recognition of law. The formalization of disputes that are eligible for 
mediation allows legal professionals to create a space for intervention which 
contributes to “increasing the need for their own services and products” (Bourdieu 
1987, 836). This creation of the need for the services of legal professionals in turn 
generates the grounds for law’s social recognition which according to Bourdieu is an 
essential feature of its efficacy. Juridical formalization and rationalization, according 
to Bourdieu, creates “a social division between lay people and professionals”, the 
result of which is a system of juridical norms that seems independent of power 
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relations and as such socially recognized as the official mechanism of dispute 
resolution (1987, 817). 
 As a third issue, these struggles among the actors of the juridical field at the same 
time contribute to the maintenance of the relative autonomy of the field by 
transforming “prejuridical interests into legal cases” (Bourdieu 1987, 834). In debates 
around the scope of mediation, the question is also one of which disputes will remain 
as prejuridical interests and which will be regulated through a process of 
formalization and codification. Here, technical qualifications of legal professionals 
are imagined to be the required symbolic capital that is operational for recognizing 
which disputes are related to public order and which can be left to the will of the 
parties. Hence, the last issue that emerges during these debates concerns the type of 
symbolic capital that “guarantees the mastery of the juridical resources required by 
the field’s own logic” (Bourdieu 1987, 834). In these struggles around the types of 
disputes that can go to mediation, technical competence which is mainly explained in 
terms of legal education and experience in legal operations emerges as a key symbolic 
capital. As such, the “competition for control of access to the legal resources inherited 
from the past” not only contributes to establishing a social division between legal 
professionals and lay people but it also allows for the control of entry into the 
juridical field (Bourdieu 1987, 817). 
2.  Mediation Agreement 
 Another controversy revolves around Article 18 of the Draft Law. The second part 
of the Article states that if an agreement is reached at the end of mediation, parties can 
take this agreement to a Court of Enforcement -the jurisdiction of which will be 
determined in accordance with the dispute in question- and they can ask for an 
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execution by this court. It is further stated that an agreement that includes this 
declaration would qualify as a verdict. The controversies around this clause have 
usually been framed within an extremely positivistic framework that was also 
indicative of the space for interpretation that codified law allows for. During the 
conferences I have attended, I have observed serious debates around the formal legal 
implications of this clause that showed significant divergences amongst members of 
the legal profession. 
 The key technical issue here was what the word “qualify” implies from a legal 
perspective. In this sense, controversies on this clause revolved around whether such 
an agreement would be res judicata (final judgment) or not. As such, this feature of 
the agreement was assessed in reference to the authority of the court since it is the 
only officially recognized mechanism that can rule a final decision. Within this 
context, the fact that res judicata is a principle of the formal court proceeding is 
considered to be symbolic of state’s monopoly of judicial power.170 One respondent, 
for instance, fiercely rejected an interpretation of this clause as a final judgment on 
the grounds that what the word “qualify” implies is precisely this fine line between a 
decision that can be enforced and the final judgment of a court. While the former has 
enforceability like the decisions reached at the end of procedures like mediation or 
arbitration or a notarial deed would have, the latter is strictly a feature of official 
adjudication.171 On the other hand, legal professionals who were concerned about the 
implications of this clause as a final judgment also framed their responses in reference 
to the judicial power of the state. While the former group of responses suggested the 
impossibility of such an interpretation given that adjudication is strictly a state activity 
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and as such its transfer was unimaginable from a legal perspective, the latter group of 
responses manifested a certain distress about the possibility of dispossessing the state 
of its judicial authority. 
 Different interpretations of this clause also reveal another cleavage among legal 
professionals regarding the legal quality of the agreement to be signed at the end of 
the process. Building upon the controversies around the meaning of “qualifying as a 
verdict”, legal professionals are also engaged in a debate on whether a document that 
qualifies as a verdict is in essence a legal document or not. The fact that for the 
agreement to qualify as a verdict, it needs to be submitted to a Court of Enforcement 
for a declaration of enforceability is usually interpreted as an indication of its legal 
quality. However, what seems to be the dividing line between legal professionals’ 
approach to this issue is whether people who are not trained in the word of law can be 
involved in the preparation of this agreement that can in the end -upon the request of 
the parties and the assessment of the Court- qualify as a verdict and as such become a 
legally binding document.  
 While some respondents framed their opposition to the possibility of people 
without a formal legal training becoming mediators in reference to the legal quality of 
the agreement; others argued that the fact that the Draft Law stipulates judicial review 
for the enforceability of the agreement is on its own a safety net for preventing 
possible judicial errors. One opposing respondent for instance, emphasized the legal 
quality of a document that is presented to the Court and argued that such a document 
needs to be prepared by legal professionals only. This response was framed with a 
tone of astonishment regarding the resistance against the regulation of this institution 
by people trained in law.  
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There is an interesting resistance against the preparation of this 
document by legal professionals. We have to balance benefits here. 
We have to consider the difference between the benefits of legal 
professionals preparing the document and not preparing it. I mean, if 
there is already a legal document at stake, we won’t lose much if it is 
prepared by a legal professional. I am trying to understand the other 
side; I mean what can we lose? I think we will not lose anything. But 
what will be our benefit if someone who is not a legal professional 
prepares it?172 
 
 In response to such claims, one respondent argued that the fact that the document 
will need Court’s assessment for it to qualify as a verdict -and hence acquire legal 
quality- is enough of a measure against the possibility of legal errors. Here, both the 
fact that in the preparation of the agreement there is an officially trained mediator 
whose competence has been certified by the state and the final submission of the 
document to the judicial mechanism for enforcement are interpreted as legal 
guarantees in the process of mediation. In this sense, two main controversies seem to 
be emerging around the legal quality of the agreement. First controversy revolves 
around the “professional qualifications that guarantee the mastery of the juridical 
resources required by the field’s own logic” (Bourdieu 1987, 834). Legal 
professionals who are imagined to possess such qualifications -formal legal training 
being the most significant one- are considered to possess the necessary symbolic 
capital to operate in this field. The second controversy, on the other hand, again 
recognizes the legal quality of the document but does not share the view that 
professional qualifications are necessary for the preparation of the agreement on the 
grounds that the document will ultimately need a court’s assessment in order to be 
enforced.  
 Within this context, both lines of interpretation ultimately seem to consider 
mediation process and agreement against a backdrop of legal guarantees which is 
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reflexive of an imagined relation between mediation and the existing legal system. In 
this sense, a common explanation for including such a clause in the Draft Law has 
been framed in the context of the “encouraging” quality of legal guarantees. Within 
this context, the clause was seen as a necessary measure for creating a sense of trust 
towards mediation by accommodating it within the established judicial mechanism. In 
this interpretation, the law and its mechanisms are assumed to bear that quality of 
trustworthiness which would contribute to the acceptance of this new institution by 
the people as a legally regulated and supervised mechanism of dispute resolution. 
Hence, although there are evident differences between legal professionals regarding 
the legal quality of the agreement and the ways in which it should be prepared, there 
seems to be a more or less shared conviction on the power of formal law and its 
recognized mechanisms in the field of dispute resolution.  
 Even in skeptical responses regarding the legal quality of the agreement, a relation 
between mediation and the existing legal system -albeit a rather marginal one- has 
still been imagined in the sense that it deals with disputes. In these narratives, this 
relation has emerged in the form of questioning the necessity of this clause that allows 
judicial review of the agreement. These comments were usually framed in reference 
to the nature of mediation as a voluntary process that is facilitated by a neutral third 
party and that is primarily concerned with establishing a dialogue between the parties. 
In this sense, mediation’s primary advantage over the adversarial nature of official 
judicial proceedings has usually been described in terms of its contribution to the 
communication between the parties which is crucial for the durability of their 
relationship. Nevertheless, although these respondents claimed that mediation 
primarily has to do with human communication and as such it does not require legal 
regulation, they still made sense of the shadow of formal law over this institution that 
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is claimed to have existed since the beginning of humanity. Law, in these narratives, 
has been imagined as a way to “institutionalize” and to “spread” this practice due to 
its recognized capacity to establish a feeling of trust among the people that is not 
limited to personal relations.  
 In this sense, even those professionals who did not consider mediation agreement 
as a legal document could still explain the final opportunity of judicial review by the 
Court of Enforcement as a positive, encouraging feature of the process. In this sense, 
through the “juridical labor of formalizing and systematizing”, a certain belief in the 
“neutrality and the autonomy of the law” is imagined to be created among the people 
(Bourdieu 1987, 844). In particular, respondents who claimed that mediation 
agreement is essentially a legal document and as such needs to be prepared by people 
who are in command of the legal corpus, more often than not explained this necessity 
in terms of the quality of impartiality that is imagined to be embodied by 
professionals operating within this world. This belief in the neutrality and autonomy 
of law is in effect considered to be the most crucial factor for the social recognition of 
law as a “particular mode of managing disputes” (van Krieken 2003, 13).  
 As it will be further elaborated in the following pages, this conviction that can be 
understood in the context of Bourdieu’s concept of “neutralization effect” seems to be 
a prominent feature of the legal consciousness of actors operating within this field. 
Bourdieu argues that the rhetoric of autonomy and neutrality is the basis of a “real 
autonomy of thought and practice”; it is the “expression of the whole operation of the 
juridical field and, in particular, of the work of rationalization to which the system of 
juridical norms is continually subordinated” (1987, 820). This rhetoric has been 
present for centuries and it is constitutive of the universalizing attitude of legal 
professionals which “unifies the body of those who live by the production and sale of 
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legal goods and services” despite their “competition for the same professional assets” 
(Bourdieu 1987, 820-821). Hence, aside from a mastery of the “canon of texts and 
modes of thinking, of expression, and of action in which such a canon is reproduced 
and which reproduce it”, this attitude that produces the neutralization effect of law is a 
prerequisite for entry into the juridical field (Bourdieu 1987, 820). 
 These debates within the profession regarding the interpretation of the Article also 
need to be considered in terms of the “practical effects” that different interpretations 
of the text are imagined to produce. In the previously given example of the encounter 
between the professor and the practitioners, for instance, these effects were defined in 
professional terms since mediation is less likely to have an effect on the theoretician’s 
mode and scope of activity and hence the professor’s interpretation of the text was 
relatively less framed in terms of professional interests. From a Bourdieusian 
framework, these exchanges bring to mind his argument that “the form of the juridical 
corpus itself, notably its degree of formalization and normalization, seems very 
dependent on the relative strength of ‘theoretician’ and ‘practitioners,’ of law 
professors and judges, of exegetes and legal specialists, within the power structure of 
the field at a particular point in time, and upon their respective abilities to impose 
their vision of the law and of its interpretation”.173 In this sense, this struggle between 
the two “authorized interpreters” of law -the professor and the practitioners- in the 
course of this panel is reflexive of an internal competition within the juridical field 
which is in effect constitutive of moments of power struggles between “holders of 
                                                 
173 In this context, Bourdieu argues that the systematic differences between national traditions -between 
the Anglo-American tradition and the Romano-Germanic one for instance- can in fact be explained in 
reference to the differences in the relative power of various groups to impose their visions of law. In 
this sense, while in the former tradition the jurisprudential law emphasizes the work of practitioners, in 
the Romano-Germanic tradition the dominance of doctrine and hence the power of theoreticians seems 
to be more recognized (Bourdieu 1987). 
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different types of juridical capital who are committed to very divergent interests and 
world-views in their particular work of interpretation” (Bourdieu 1987, 823).  
 In fact, later on I had the chance to interview both of these actors and when I 
asked about the debates on the difference between what it means to “qualify as a 
verdict” and a final judgment, the professor openly stated that this “generalization” 
was a typical practitioner behavior in the sense that practitioners usually confuse 
concepts and insist on their interpretations.174 Bourdieu argues that this “structural 
hostility” between the theoretician and the practitioner where the former is “dedicated 
to pure doctrinal construction” against the latter who is “concerned only with the 
realm of its application” is in fact “at the origin of a permanent symbolic struggle in 
which different definitions of legal work as the authorized interpretation of canonical 
texts confront each other” (1987, 821). In this context, the moment of confrontation 
between the theoretician -whose engagement in mediation is also shaped by his role 
as a member of the Commission that prepared the Draft Law- and the practitioner can 
be read as an instance of these permanent symbolic struggles between different 
authorized interpreters of the law. 
 Such moments are constitutive of the hierarchic composition of the field which is 
determined and redetermined depending on the respective abilities of the actors to 
impose their visions of what law should look like and how it should be interpreted. 
These moments are not constitutive in an absolute sense, they are always determined 
relationally depending on the shifting power struggles between the actors at a given 
time and space within the field. In this sense, this particular moment of contestation 
between the professor and the practitioner does not rule out the possibility of 
interpretive differences among practitioners or any other group within the juridical 
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field for that matter. Within this context, different positions in the debates around 
mediation are only strategically determined and as such reflexive of the changing turfs 
of power and shifting grounds of alliance within the juridical field. 
3.  Mediators 
 Last but not least, Article 20 of the draft law emerges as a fiercely debated issue 
among legal professionals. The Article outlines the requirements for registering to the 
Registry of Mediators as follows: Being a citizen of the Republic of Turkey, being 
legally capable, being a graduate of a four year higher education institute, having no 
criminal record except for negligent offences, having completed mediation training 
and succeeding in the written and applied exam given by the Ministry of Justice. The 
most controversial feature of this Article seems to be the provision allowing graduates 
of any four year higher education institute to become mediators which in effect means 
that mediators do not have to have a legal background.  
 This item has also been contested by legal professionals in the context of previous 
debates on the scope of mediation and the agreement to be signed at the end of the 
process. In debates around the scope of the practice, for instance, the issue of people 
without formal legal training becoming mediators has been problematized in reference 
to the necessary technical competence that one is expected to possess to partake in the 
formal practice of dispute resolution. The controversies on whether disputes that can 
go to mediation should be listed or not have more often than not been shaped around 
the significance of legal formation as a required symbolic capital for the interpretation 
of which disputes concern public interest and which can be left to the decision of the 
parties. In the debates around the mediation agreement, on the other hand, the issue of 
people lacking legal formation and technical competence becoming mediators has 
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been raised either in the context of the legal quality of mediation agreement or within 
a general legal guarantees framework that is provided by the opportunity to take the 
agreement to a Court of Enforcement.  
 Legal professionals also have quite diverse opinions on the compatibility of 
mediation practice with legal profession in general and with advocacy in particular. 
Some professionals argued that given their occupational tendency to take sides 
lawyers are not fit for mediation at all; while some believed that given their legal 
knowledge and professional experience with dispute resolution only legal 
professionals should be able to become mediators. The former group of respondents 
believed that given the adversarial nature of the practice of advocacy and their 
educational backgrounds, lawyers in particular would be inclined to search for who is 
right in a given dispute which is against the nature of mediation practice. In these 
narratives, the practice of advocacy has been framed in terms of a discourse of rights 
whereas mediation is considered to be an activity of “reestablishing social or 
economic peace” among the parties.175 As such, in these descriptions advocacy and 
mediation have been situated in opposition to each other in terms of their objectives 
and procedures. Lawyers are imagined to possess a dispositional tendency to solve the 
dispute in a way that is to the advantage of the party that they represent, rather than 
being facilitators between parties with different stakes in a given dispute. Here, aside 
from the nature of the practice of advocacy, legal education is also considered to be a 
significant factor that would inhibit lawyers from internalizing the type of symbolic 
capital that characterizes the practice of mediation. Narratives that strongly oppose the 
idea of people who are not legal professionals becoming mediators, on the other hand, 
argue that it is precisely the qualities of the practice of advocacy and the attainments 
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of legal education that will make legal professionals in general and lawyers in 
particular the most suitable group for mediation.  
 In both groups of narratives, impartiality emerges as a key symbolic capital to 
operate in the field of mediation. Both groups of respondents emphasize the 
importance of impartiality in the practice of mediation. Nevertheless, while 
respondents who believe that lawyers are not suitable for becoming mediators 
explained this incompatibility in terms of their tendency to take sides due to their 
educational formation and the nature of the practice of advocacy -hence their 
incapacity to be impartial-, respondents on the opposite side argued that it is precisely 
the attainments of legal education and experience in the field of advocacy that 
contribute to the impartiality of lawyers which makes them the best candidates for 
mediation. In this sense, the former group of respondents is skeptical of legal 
professionals’ capacity to convert their “mental space” in line with the requirements 
of the field that they are entering. One respondent, for instance, explained this 
incapacity in reference to legal professionals’ “conservative frame of mind”. 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus “as an acquired system of generative schemes” is quite 
useful to understand this embodiment that the respondent explains as a conservative 
frame of mind (1990b). In this sense, these habits that the respondent refers to are 
imagined to be “inscribed at the deepest level of the habitus” (Bourdieu 1987, 830). 
It is hard to leave your habits. They sink into you. We have been told 
at an international conference that something similar has been 
experienced in France. They started with a regulation that allowed 
retired judges to be particularly effective in the process but they told 
us that this caused them ten years because of that deep seated point of 
view.  As I said, in terms of a justice feeling, instead of holding on to 
a house that is worth TL 100, it might make sense to get TL 110 for 
it. However, when we take concepts out of positive law we are faced 
with a different material here. I mean not selling that house, keeping 
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the family residence might be more important than the cash that the 
person will have.176 
 
 These narratives have almost always been coupled with imagined qualities of 
mediators such as being a good listener, impartiality, command of negotiation 
techniques, patience, the ability to empathize, not being aggressive, knowing the 
society they live in and having good social relations with people in general. In the 
context of these general qualities, lawyers who are skeptical of their compatibility 
with mediation have not only described themselves and their fellow legal 
professionals as lacking the universally accepted qualities of mediators, but they have 
also expressed the difficulty of “switching between different hats” of side taking and 
decision making on the one hand and standing at an equal distance and facilitating on 
the other hand. Hence, even if lawyers possessed some of these qualities, they still 
would have a hard time going back and forth between advocacy and mediation in the 
sense that lawyers are primarily inclined to come to a decision about a particular case 
rather than letting the parties decide on their own.  
 This is again related to Bourdieu’s observations on the implications of this mental 
conversion for the boundaries of the field. Bourdieu argues that through this 
conversion, the juridical field establishes a borderline between actors who are 
“qualified to participate in the game” and those who fail to accomplish this 
conversion and hence are not competent enough to operate in this space (1987, 828). 
Similarly, in these narratives -at least in reference to the imagined symbolic capital- 
mediation emerges as a potentially autonomous field in the legal consciousness of 
some professionals. The entry to this field is defined in terms of a mental conversion 
that will require lawyers to leave their hats of advocacy and internalize the valued 
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traits of mediation practice, impartiality being the most important one. Several 
respondents made statements on how they would probably have to give up advocacy 
if they were to become mediators, how the trainings that have participated in have 
been given by lawyers who ultimately had to leave the practice of advocacy in order 
to practice mediation and how this seems to be the general trend in the practices 
around the world.  
 This imagined difficulty of switching between hats is also related to the fact that 
in these narratives mediation is almost never imagined as a profession on its own. 
This also holds true for those who oppose the idea of lawyers becoming mediators and 
imagine mediation as a potentially autonomous field in the sense of requiring a 
different type of symbolic capital. As such, although occasionally it has been 
imagined as a separate field in terms of its unique symbolic capital, given the 
imagined relation between the practice and the juridical field and the emphasis on the 
significance of legal guarantees mediation is hardly ever imagined as a profession on 
its own. Thus, mediation is rather defined as a “hobby”, as a “pursuit”, as a “side job”, 
as a “supplement to advocacy” or as an “alternative route”. In this sense, mediation 
was almost never imagined as a replacement of the legal profession. This was 
sometimes expressed in terms of its different nature and purpose; while sometimes it 
was explained in terms of the relatively low numbers of mediation practices across the 
globe. Comments on the low numbers of mediation practices around the globe were 
usually situated in reference to the continuing eminence of advocacy even in countries 
where mediation has been employed successfully for quite a long time. Interestingly, 
while some respondents explained their skepticism regarding the emergence of 
mediation as a solo profession in the context of cross border references, some 
respondents have framed their narratives in reference to local observations. Here, as it 
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will be developed in the coming pages, the existing social structure is seen as an 
impediment to the development of mediation as a profession on its own. This social 
skepticism is more often than not framed in reference to the absence of a culture of 
conciliation in Turkey. In this sense, law and legal professionals -again in terms of the 
recognized symbolic capital- are imagined to be the primary agents of dispute 
resolution.  
 On the other hand, respondents who argued that lawyers in particular and legal 
professionals in general would be the most competent actors to carry out mediation 
practice also underlined the significance of impartiality as a recognized symbolic 
capital, but framed it as a unique asset that can only be attained through years of 
serious legal training and practical experience in the field of law. In these narratives, 
lawyers emerged as the primary group of professionals in possession of this required 
symbolic capital and as such they were imagined to have a dispositional superiority 
over other professional groups due to the nature of their training and practice. One 
respondent, for instance, openly listed professions like “art teacher”, “architect”, 
“engineer” or “economist” and claimed that these professionals would not be able to 
“remain impartial” during mediation process since they would not have internalized 
the “notion of law” and as such would not be sharing the same habitus with actors of 
the juridical field.177 
 A pejorative tone can be detected in these narratives which can also be observed 
in some legal professionals’ approach to the issue of additional qualities that lawyers 
might need to possess in order to become mediators. One respondent for instance 
explained how he finally came to define a mediator as a “legal professional with 
                                                 
177 Interview # 19. Such references also existed in representations of mediation in the media. Please see 
Footnote # 129. 
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psychology training”.178 Here, knowledge of psychology is not imagined in terms of 
proper psychology education, but rather as learning the fundamentals of the practice 
since mediators are also imagined to be acting like therapists.179 In such narratives, 
the symbolic capital defining other fields of practice -like being a good listener as a 
therapist- seems to be easily transferable to the juridical field and as such is imagined 
to be easily attainable through special trainings; whereas the different types of 
symbolic capital that seem to be possessed by the actors of the juridical field are 
imagined to be attainable solely by legal professionals. Within this context, the 
transferability of symbolic capitals between different fields seems to be imagined in 
unequal terms. While the mental conversion required to operate in the juridical field is 
imagined to be an impossible undertaking for those who are not accustomed to the 
“learned yet deep structures of behavior within the juridical field”, a similar 
undertaking in the field of psychology is imagined to be quite feasible by acquiring 
some fundamental qualities (Terdiman 1987, 807).  
 This imagined superiority of the profession is also expressed in debates around the 
exam requirement for mediators.180 Article 20 of the Draft Law suggests that in order 
to become a registered mediator, after the training candidates will have to pass a 
qualifying exam that is given by the Ministry of Justice. This clause has been 
seriously contested by some respondents in the context of the absence of such an 
exam requirement for practicing advocacy. The fact that anyone who graduates from a 
                                                 
178 Interview # 23 
179 Interview # 18, Interview # 21 
180 This superiority discourse connotes Tocqueville’s observations on the American legal profession. 
He argues that this “notion of superiority” among legal professionals is derived from their “study and 
specialized knowledge of the law” which also ensures them a “rank apart in the society”. This notion is 
continuously reaffirmed through their practice as “they are masters of a necessary and not widely 
understood science; they serve as arbiters between the citizens; and the habit of directing the blind 
passions of the litigants toward the objective gives them a certain scorn for the judgment of the crowd”. 
In this sense, Tocqueville explains this notion of superiority in relation to legal professionals being the 
“strongest barriers against the faults of democracy” (1966, 263,264). 
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law faculty and completes his year long internship can start practicing advocacy has 
not only been assessed in terms of its implications for the quality of the practice in 
Turkey, but it has also been considered in the context of the proposed measures for 
guaranteeing the quality of mediation practice. One respondent, for instance, 
expressed the irony of these regulations in the sense that while the practice of 
advocacy does not require a qualifying exam, lawyers who can automatically become 
practitioners are required to take an additional exam in order to become mediators.181 
The respondent questioned the logic behind this regulation that requires lawyers to 
pass an exam in order to become a mediator given that “legal education is imagined to 
be so great that it does not require such measures”.182 Similarly other narratives 
revealed similar concerns regarding the motive behind this requirement such as the 
comment of one respondent on how the status that is being created proposes 
mediation as a profession that is more important than advocacy as it has higher 
standards of entry.  
 Impartiality has also been explained in reference to a “mechanical” state of mind 
that is again imagined to be a shared feature of the habitus of these professionals.  As 
“juridical formalization introduces into social relations a clarity and predictability”, 
the habitus of legal professionals is also imagined to possess a mechanical quality that 
is imagined to contribute to their recognized social power (Bourdieu 1987, 849). In 
this type of imagining, legal profession is attributed a particular social function of 
preventing inequalities and instances of injustice that these inequalities produce 
within the society. Formal rational law and legal professionals who have inscribed the 
tenets of this rationality in the sense of being stripped off value judgments and 
                                                 
181 These criticisms have been raised particularly in reference to the practice of advocacy since judges 
and prosecutors are already required to take an exam before they can start their practice. 
182 This statement was made in an explicitly sarcastic tone. Interview # 2 
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remaining impartial are considered to be the primary impediments to the possibility of 
reinforcing existing inequalities in the society through mediation practice.183 This 
mechanical quality of legal professionals is at the same time imagined to be 
preventive against the possible diffusion of various cultural alliances into mediation 
process. In this context, mediators who do not share the same habitus with legal 
professionals are imagined to be easily taken with such alliances which would 
jeopardize their impartiality.  
I mean there is hemşehricilik184, woman side with woman, man will 
take the side of the man, everything is possible with us. Trabzon185 
people will side with others from Trabzon, Black Sea people will 
take sides with Black Sea people, easterners will side with easterners. 
I mean this happens unfortunately. It is not enough to take a person, 
make him a mediator, tell him to be impartial and to apply everything 
properly. Generations need to pass. There needs to be cultural 
development. That person needs to reach that level of consciousness. 
How are you supposed to make this possible through limited hours of 
training? You can’t. I mean these mediators need to be people who 
have seen conflicts, lived the law, received a legal education, gained 
a certain experience; people who have acquired all these aspects and 
the philosophy behind it.186 
 
 On a similar terrain, impartiality also emerges as a fundamental concern in the 
context of the imagined effects of state’s involvement in the regulation of the practice 
given that both the Directorate of Mediation187 and the Mediation Board188 will be 
                                                 
183 Koğacıoğlu skillfully demonstrates how the formal and the informal are woven into the daily 
operations of the law and how this enmeshing is in fact internalized by lay people and legal 
professionals alike. She argues that although “procedural regulations as well as the socio-legal 
scholarship presume a very formal and impersonal operation”, her research among the urban poor in 
Istanbul shows “the patterned nature of the informal and personal elements found in mixed form with 
formal and impersonal problem solving mechanisms”(Koğacıoğlu 2003, 55). In this sense, as opposed 
to legal professionals’ claims regarding the healing power of the formal and the embodiment of this 
power by actors operating within the juridical field, Koğacıoğlu presents how these processes within 
which the formal is enmeshed with the informal in fact contribute to the daily reproduction of 
inequalities in the realm of law (2003). 
184 A particular form of cultural, social and economic alliance established among people of same 
hometown origins. 
185 A city on the northeastern region of Turkey. 
186 Interview # 19 
187 The Directorate will primarily be responsible for carrying out all the services related with mediation 
which includes keeping the registry of mediators, publishing on mediation, promoting the institution, 
keeping statistics on mediation practices around the country, deciding on the eligibility of education 
institutions for offering mediation trainings, keeping records of mediation documents, preparing the 
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established within the Ministry of Justice. The fact the Ministry is an executive organ 
and that in this sense it is seen as an extension of the political will makes this clause a 
potential threat to the independence and hence the impartiality of mediators. The 
involvement of the State especially in the certification and the supervision of the 
mediators are in this sense interpreted as an opportunity for political battles to diffuse 
into mediation.  
Why is the state involved?...I mean how does this happen. They 
establish a huge body. A director in the General Directorate of Civil 
Affairs of the Ministry of Justice is spared for this job. He decides 
who will get to be mediators. He would not make me a mediator for 
instance. This ruling party would not make me a mediator. Of course 
I do not want such a thing either but I mean they would not make me! 
Who would they make? A graduate of imam hatip school or a High 
Institute of Islam189; they would make them mediators...Why does the 
state interfere? If I am going to come to an agreement with someone, 
I will go to court. Courts are independent, mediators are not. They 
are affiliated with the Ministry of Justice...I am against solving this 
matter within the state, within the government. I mean, how can it 
happen? Mediators can organize on their own; they can acquire a 
quality on their own. And they can be tested in practice, become 
efficient, they can sanctify themselves to the society...Otherwise 
everyone in Turkey wants to come from top to bottom; everyone 
wants to get somewhere with the power of the state...This is why I 
oppose.190 
 
 In this respect, legal guarantees that can be provided through the regulation of 
mediation by professional organizations are considered to be vital for the 
establishment and the acceptance of this institution. Hence, instead of state organs, 
Bar Associations and the Union of Turkish Bar Associations are imagined to be the 
most competent actors that can undertake such a regulatory function.  Aside from its 
                                                                                                                                            
annual minimum wage tariff for mediators and collecting the registry and annual subscription fees of 
mediators. 
188 Mediation Board will primarily be responsible for establishing the fundamental principles and the 
codes of conduct of mediation, determining the standards of the trainings and the qualifying exam, 
setting the rules for the supervision of the practice, deciding on the annulment of training licenses of 
education institutions as well as canceling the registry of a mediator. 
189 The institute was established in 1959 as a higher education institute under the Ministry of National 
Education. In 1982, the Institute was transformed into Faculty of Theology within Marmara University 
in Istanbul. 
190 Interview # 10 
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imagined authority in the field of dispute resolution, the fact that the legal profession 
already has a working infrastructure with its established rules, procedures, ethical 
codes and mechanisms of supervision is also considered to be a priceless advantage of 
this group of professionals over many other groups of professionals who might 
become mediators if the Draft Law is passed without any changes. As such, these 
institutions are imagined to embody the necessary rules and mechanisms that can 
compensate the deficiencies associated with mediation and in particular prevent the 
imposition of the law of the powerful upon the powerless.191 Here again, in terms of 
infrastructural competence, the legal profession is imagined to present a superior 
image vis-à-vis other professions.  
Here again we believe that Bar Associations are a guarantee. Besides, 
we have even prepared the codes of conduct for mediators in our 
country and we can even pass them if required. But even in the absence 
of these codes, lawyers are subject to certain professional codes. I mean 
I always give this example, no offense to our veterinarian friends, but 
veterinarians may be affiliated with a chamber but the rules of that 
chamber would not satisfy anything about mediation because of its 
nature. But the professional codes of advocacy, the codes of Bar 
Associations can be expanded to cover the problems associated with 
mediation. Hence, even if we do not establish its codes of conduct at 
all, Bar Associations would still be the guarantee for lawyers to abide 
by these professional codes.192 
 
 Aside from impartiality, trust also emerges as a significant quality that needs to be 
possessed by potential mediators. Here again, there seems to be a shared conviction 
among legal professionals about this quality being a defining symbolic capital of the 
juridical field which has implications for the relation between legal professionals and 
the people. Institutional statements on the Draft Law also touched upon this issue in 
the context of concerns on granting “judicial powers” to those who are not legal 
professionals and as such impairing the confidence in judicial institutions. Trust here 
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is imagined to be achieved by the formal rational law, the legal system and the legal 
profession. The law is imagined to create a sense of trust among the people through 
juridical formalization which is considered to be significant for “the ability of law to 
obtain and sustain general social consent because it is taken as a sign of law’s 
impartiality and neutrality” (Terdiman 1987, 810).193 In the context of mediation, this 
trust is imagined to be created through codifying the rules, regulations and processes 
of this practice as a separate legal text which in effect carries an image of 
predictability, consistency and impersonality and as such creates what Bourdieu calls 
the “neutralization effect”. One of the respondents explained this effect and its 
relation to feelings of trust in the context of the significance of codification and legal 
regulation for mediation to be socially accepted.  
The reason for legal regulation is to make it more institutional, to 
make it more widespread. This also has to do with trust. Not personal 
trust. People may trust me, but how many? Ten persons, hundred 
persons? But when we think as a society, if this is subject to certain 
rules then when a person called a mediator emerges, people will 
know that person is subject to a particular training, particular rules, 
has an idea about what he should and should not do like for instance 
he will be impartial, he will treat both parties equally, he will not 
establish any separate relation with one of the parties without 
informing the other side etc. I mean this is some sort of a guarantee. 
This guarantee will enable a speedy progress on behalf of this 
institution.194 
 
 The legal system, on the other hand, is imagined to contribute to this sense of trust 
through its established procedures and mechanisms which in the case of mediation 
provides legal guarantees by offering the option of taking the agreement to a Court of 
Enforcement. Courts, in this sense, are more often than not imagined to be institutions 
that still arouse a feeling of trust among the people.195 Judicial review, in this sense, is 
                                                 
193 Here Bourdieu’s analysis connotes Weber’s discussion of formal rationality (Terdiman 1987, 809).   
194 Interview # 23 
195 Interestingly, a survey carried out by one of the groups within Istanbul Bar Association 
demonstrates that judiciary ranks third among the institutions that are trusted by lawyers of Istanbul. 
The military is the most trusted institution by lawyers.  
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imagined to be an encouraging factor for the institution to win people’s trust and 
hence to be recognized as a legitimate and effective method of dispute resolution. 
Even in cases where respondents were skeptical about the level of confidence in 
judicial mechanisms, from a comparative institutional perspective and particularly 
with respect to mediation, courts have nevertheless been depicted as institutions that 
enjoy a certain degree of trust.  
 Impartiality and impersonality again appear to be fundamental sources of this 
imagined trust towards the legal system. One respondent, for instance claimed that 
“no matter how bad the judge is, he is still a guarantee; no matter how inefficient the 
court is, it is still a guarantee in the eye of the citizen”.196 This claim was 
supplemented by statements on how the one on the bench is not the judge as a person, 
but the person who represents the justice of the state and its application. In quite a 
Weberian perspective, the fact that judge A might begin a case and judge B may be 
the one who closes it is considered to be symbolic of the impersonal character of the 
formal legal system. In comparison, mediators are imagined to operate as individual 
persons who do not have a social responsibility and function since mediation is not 
considered a public service. In addition, the fact that mediation is being promoted as a 
“market” in the sense that certain institutions have already started offering mediation 
trainings in the absence of an official legal framework has also been considered as an 
additional factor contributing to the relative lack of trust towards this new institution. 
Judicial mechanisms, on the other hand, are imagined to be operating without 
“commercial concerns” as they are constructed as public services and as such have 
gained the trust of the people. 
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 In this sense, the whole process of mediation is seen as the “personalization” of 
the practice of dispute resolution. In the interviews, one of the respondents even 
claimed that through mediation disputes are being “abducted” from the judiciary.197 In 
institutional statements and online discussion sites similar comments were also made 
on the “privatization of the judiciary” or the “confiscation of judicial operations by 
people who are not legal professionals”. In this sense, the image of trust that the 
judiciary has created within the society is imagined to constitute a threat to the 
interests of some people and as such certain recent attacks against the judiciary are 
seen as deliberate political maneuvers to impair this prevailing image.198 This issue 
has also been brought up in institutional statements where Bar Associations 
collectively declared that the legislative and the executive have joined powers in 
efforts to defame the judiciary.199 In such narratives the judiciary is often identified as 
the symbol of state’s sovereignty since it is responsible for applying the national law 
and the judicial power of that state is exercised by national courts in the name of the 
people. As such attacks against this judicial power are seen as attacks against the 
sovereignty of the state and the nation.200 
Law is the unique sphere of every nation, every state. And judicial 
power is exercised in the name of the people by officials with special 
authorities. When judges deliver a judgment, everybody has to stand 
up in accordance with Article 231/4 of the Criminal Code of 
Procedure. Why? Because at the beginning of the judicial decision, it 
is written that judges decide on behalf of the people. Now, you are 
saying that instead of people who decide on behalf of the nation, you 
will bring in people who will decide as a result of 250 hours or 150 
hours of training. I mean then we have thrown away our state’s 
                                                 
197 Interview # 11 
198 Interview # 11 
199 http://www.bursabarosu.org.tr/haberler.php?kimlik=122 (accessed march 5, 2010). 
200 Similar comments have been made by Bar Associations as well. For instance, Istanbul Bar 
Association opposed mediation in the context of state giving up its function to provide justice, as a 
breach of judicial independence and the replacement of national judicial institutions by extralegal 
forms of dispute resolution or by the spread of foreign mediation firms. 
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sovereignty, academic education, our judicial system that is founded 
upon centuries long experience.201 
 
 In parallel with these explanations in reference to formal rational law and the legal 
system, the issue of trust has also been brought up in relation to legal profession. 
Almost all respondents -those who insist that mediators should be legal professionals 
as well as those who believe that other professionals can also become mediators- 
seem to agree that trust is a key symbolic capital of mediators. A significant issue that 
has been brought up in these narratives is related to people’s attitudes towards holders 
of different types of juridical capital, in particular towards judges and lawyers. 
Judges, in this respect, have more often than not been portrayed as the embodiment of 
trust towards the judiciary; whereas the image of advocacy has from time to time been 
painted with concerns regarding the lack of trust towards the practice. In the context 
of mediation, this rather positive image of judges has been explained in reference to 
the prevailing role of courts in the lives of the people; whereas the lack of trust 
towards advocacy has been raised as concerns regarding people without a legal 
education becoming mediators given that even people with such formation are not 
perceived to be trustworthy.  
 Last but not least, during these narratives on the significance of trust for mediation 
to be accepted there have been occasional references to a general lack of trust within 
the society, between people and between the people and state institutions. These 
comments have generally explained the lack of trust towards the judiciary or the 
skepticism regarding the potential success of mediation in Turkey in reference to an 
overall “culture of distrust”. Such comments have almost always been supplemented 
with general sociocultural and political assessments on the ways in which people 
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handle their disputes, the role of law and official judicial mechanisms in the resolution 
of these disputes, the relation between the people and the state, the social functions of 
legal professionals etc. One respondent even claimed that there exists a lack trust 
towards the future among the people in Turkey which cannot be observed in western 
societies given their welfare state tradition that allows them to be prepared about what 
the future may bring. In Turkey, on the other hand, in the absence of such long term 
guarantees for a quality life, people are imagined to be operating on a daily basis.  
In Europe people trust the future. That might be a condition created 
by the welfare state. They believe that even if they do not have 
money they will not starve to death; they will not die because of a 
disease; they can still send their kids to school. These are very 
important guarantees. Our society does not have such guarantees. If 
you do not have money, you cannot send your kid to school, you can 
die of a disease, you cannot go to a hospital, you cannot be treated 
like a human being at a hospital. If I do not retire, I cannot have 
social security; if my kid does not look after me or cannot afford to 
look after me, I am done! The first thing on our minds because we do 
not know what tomorrow holds is to find a place to live, to guarantee 
our lives with the first job we have. This hunger and lack of trust in 
the future push people into doing wrong and into feelings of 
anxiety.202 
 
 Within this context, mainly in reference to the significance of mediation creating a 
sense of trust among the people, a number of narratives suggested a general cultural 
tendency of not trusting each other among people in Turkey. This cultural feature has 
more often than not been related to the absence of a culture of conciliation which is 
imagined to be built upon trust between people. As such, lack of trust was not 
imagined to be unique to people’s attitudes towards mediation, towards courts or 
towards the judicial system. It was depicted as an overarching phenomenon that can 
be observed in different aspects of the social order. The respondent cited above, for 
instance, explained the prevalence of this cultural behavior in the context of a general 
“syndrome of distrust” that can be observed towards administration as much as the 
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courts, towards imams as much as teachers.203 Several respondents even justified this 
lack of trust on the grounds that people in Turkey are usually inclined to deceive each 
other. People are imagined to be after each other’s money and as such there is a 
general suspicion of other people’s intentions. Similar comments have also been 
raised in online debates where people in Turkey have been portrayed as skeptical of 
each others’ honesty as opposed to European societies where it is presumed that 
everyone is honest. These narratives suggest that in such a social environment, it is 
even more crucial for a new institution to establish itself on solid grounds and arouse 
the kind of trust necessary for its acceptance by a population that is already imagined 
to be skeptical of each other’s motives and actions. 
II. Implications of Debates: Understanding Legal Consciousness 
 
 Following this presentation of the major axes of contestation and their reading 
from within a Bourdieusian framework, I move on to a discussion of these internal 
debates as signifiers of relations of power that constitute the other dimension in the 
making and the maintenance of the relative autonomy of the juridical field. Following 
Bourdieu, I take the practice, the meaning, the institutionalization and the autonomy 
of law to be an effect of social relations. Within this context, in this section I will be 
engaged in an analysis of the implications of these debates around mediation on the 
larger universe of social relations. This is also in line with my choice of studying 
mediation. I have previously explained this choice in terms of the implications of this 
emerging practice for the scope of legal regulation and the imagined role of legal 
professionals in this regulation. In this sense, I argued that since disputes that are 
eligible for mediation exist on the margins of formal law, the debates around them 
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almost always have implications for the type of society that exists in the legal 
consciousness of legal professionals and for the imagined role of law and legal 
profession within this society. Within this context, debates on mediation can be 
framed in the context of legal professionals’ perceptions of the society, the law and of 
the legal profession. In this sense, the following section will provide an account of the 
legal consciousness of these professionals.  
1. Imagining Society 
 In debates around mediation, legal professionals have quite often framed their 
opinions in the context of their general observations on the social relations between 
people in this society. Mainly due to the proximity of their practice to the dynamics of 
everyday life, legal professionals in general and lawyers in particular quite often 
engage in sociological assessments regarding the ways in which people behave in this 
society, the kinds of alliances they form, the ways in which they resolve their 
conflicts, their cultural characteristics or the axes of social inequalities they 
experience. In these narratives, the existing social structure in Turkey has quite often 
come up as a determining factor in the compatibility and feasibility of mediation for 
the people of this geography. In this sense regarding the type of society that is 
imagined by legal professionals, two themes in particular are detectable in the legal 
consciousness of these actors: Culture of conciliation and the feudal structure of 
society.  
 
i. Culture of Conciliation  
 
 When talking about the compatibility of mediation with the existing social 
structure, legal professionals quite often refer to traditional methods of dispute 
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resolution within the society. The practice of mediation, in the sense of an external 
third party being involved in the resolution of a dispute, is depicted as a prominent 
feature of cultural habits. Practices such as making peace through the help of elderly 
members of the family, consulting a sect leader or a respected member of the 
community for the resolution of the dispute or the involvement of other neighbors in 
reconciling two disputing neighbors are all explained as traditional examples of 
mediation that constitute an integral part of social relations. As such, mediation is not 
considered a foreign element in people’s cultural modes of resolving their disputes.  
 The existence of such traditional mechanisms within the society, however, has not 
been taken at face value by legal professionals. Some respondents explained this 
cultural fact as a positive feature in the context of people’s familiarity with such 
mechanisms and hence the relative easiness with which they can adapt to this new 
practice of mediation. In such positive approaches, however, these mechanisms are 
usually described in the context of a distant memory of the way that social relations 
used to be in the past. This nostalgia for a closely knit community where people used 
to solve their problems in a peaceful fashion, without harming their social relations or 
damaging their cultural ties, is usually followed by an observation on the erosion of 
social values in the contemporary society.  
We grew up and the world has changed. Our world views have 
changed. Because society has changed. Moral judgments have 
changed. In the past, honesty used to be a significant virtue, but 
today, in fact once honest people were even seen as fools. You might 
remember, not long ago, at the beginning of 1980s or 1990s honest 
people were depicted as fools. When this is the case, the idea is not to 
resolve disputes in an honest way; people rather think how they can 
prolong the dispute, how they can put the other party into trouble, 
how they can bankrupt and still live a good life. A person who is 
bankrupt can easily come up and say that he is bankrupt... As we 
know it, a person who goes bankrupt should not have anything left 
but in Turkey the man’s life standards do not change at all! These 
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reflect the erosion in our social value judgments. In a society with 
such erosion, dispute resolution will come to a deadlock.204 
 
 
 In such narratives, values like honesty, keeping your word, paying your debts on 
time that are attached a particular social significance are considered to be on the verge 
of extinction within the society. Within this context, in these narratives the 
compatibility of mediation with the existing social structure has more often than not 
been framed in reference to the absence or the waning of a certain culture of 
conciliation within the society. Legal professionals who believe that such a culture 
exists among local practices have nevertheless argued that it has almost become 
extinct in the contemporary society due to larger changes in the social and economic 
relations between people. One respondent, for instance, argued that factors like 
speedy urbanization, corruption in economic relations, weakening of social control all 
have contributed to the decay in previous networks and cultural modes of dispute 
resolution.205 
 In these narratives, from a rather Durkheimian perspective it is argued that as 
people leave their places of origin mostly due to economic pursuit or political unrest, 
they have difficulty in establishing new mechanisms of social control which in turn 
causes a breakdown in the system of values and norms that used to define their social 
relations. In such new social configurations, mediators are imagined to perform this 
function of solving conflicts and reestablishing peace between the parties. One 
respondent, for instance, argued that a culture of conciliation is a part of the social 
history of these people and that even though they seem to have become temporarily 
more conflict oriented due to economic, political or ideological unrests in the last 
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years, this does not mean that such a culture does not exist in their “genes”.206 As 
such, mediation is seen as an opportunity that can contribute to the reawakening of 
this culture which used to be a part of the cultural thread of the people. Hence it is not 
so much the ineffectiveness of traditional methods of dispute resolution in addressing 
the needs of the people; but rather their diminishing significance and practicality and 
as such decreasing feasibility in contemporary society that necessitates the use of 
alternative mechanisms like mediation. In this sense, between traditional methods of 
dispute resolution that are imagined to have lost their feasibility and official legal 
procedures that are not only adversarial in nature but also costly and lengthy, 
mediation is imagined to provide a middle ground that resembles local practices but 
also formally regulated, systematized and legally guaranteed.  
 Within this context, in such narratives, law and its regulation of disputes is 
recognized as only one of the ways in which people deal with their problems 
stemming from social relations. Its authority, however, is quite often ascribed a 
particular significance due to its binding power and its systematic nature that allows it 
to approach disputes in a neutral and predictable fashion. The fact that mediation is 
being introduced as a formally regulated field of practice within a codified 
institutional structure that has its particular rules, regulations and supervisory 
mechanisms is in this sense interpreted as a legal guarantee for people which is 
imagined to be an encouraging factor for the parties of a dispute.  
 Within this framework, mediation has also been imagined as a way to either 
regenerate this waning culture of conciliation or to create it from scratch. In this 
sense, codification of the practice hence its formalization within the legal framework 
is not on its own considered as an adequate measure for the establishment of the 
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practice and its acceptance by the people either. Together with the encouraging effects 
of formalization, a culture also needs to be created which ultimately necessitates a 
long term process of awareness raising and education. The respondent that 
emphasized the significance of late urbanization, for instance, explained this delay in 
terms of the prevalence of a nomadic culture in the history of Turkey which is 
imagined to have prevented the establishment of constitutive cultural codes within the 
society. European nations, in comparison, are described as having retained their 
fundamental values even during times of great social transformations mostly through 
products of popular culture.   
Detective novels, for instance, first emerged in England during the 
Industrial Revolution. Why? Because with the revolution, people’s 
beliefs started to decay. I mean the Church and religion is weakening. 
But instead of them you need to find something else to control the 
society. This may be conscious or unconscious. What does emerge? 
Be careful, the guilty is arrested at the end of most of those novels. 
Les Misérables is the most beautiful example. There, the French 
Revolution is taking place, other things are happening but a detective 
is after a thief who stole a piece of bread and the message at the end 
is this: Yes, no matter what you do, the system is after you. Now, we 
are only recently experiencing this, this is quite normal. With 
mediation a culture of conciliation needs to develop. If you only 
think in terms of the Draft Law, it is risky. You cannot explain it at 
schools, you cannot apply it in work environments, you cannot 
expand it to other areas. Then it will only be a utopia and you will 
have to be satisfied with the idea of a nice piece of legislation.207 
 
 In such narratives, degeneration in social values and bonds is also associated with 
a certain social consciousness that is imagined to be a vital element in transforming 
the practices, values and institutions within a society. In this sense, the waning or the 
absence of a culture of conciliation is more often than not explained in reference to 
the necessity of establishing this culture through education. Since previous social 
bonds, relations of trust and cultural networks are no longer imagined to be effective 
in solving disputes and the judicial mechanisms are also claimed to be even more 
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damaging to existing social bonds, a culture of tolerance, leniency, understanding and 
trust needs to be created among the people which is imagined to be possible through a 
process of life long education and consciousness raising that starts from early 
childhood.208 Such a process is considered to be necessary for the internationalization 
of fundamental values and cultural practices that define a society which, in the case of 
mediation, would mean the “creation” of a culture of conciliation and hence 
contributing to the acceptance and the utilization of this institution by the people.   
 The absence of a social consciousness among the people and the compatibility of 
mediation with such a social structure have also been considered against a backdrop 
of a certain conservatism that is imagined to be characteristic of the ways in which 
people of this society approach new institutions. In such narratives, mediation like any 
other new institution is imagined to have been approached in a skeptical fashion 
which is considered to be a product of the lack of consciousness in the society. One 
respondent, for instance, argued that even in the field of agriculture, people have a 
hard time leaving their traditional methods that have been passed through generations 
and as such are resistant to changing their practices in light of the new technical 
information provided by engineers. This conservatism and lack of vision is again 
imagined to be curable above all through education which is considered to be the 
primary asset of developed societies.209 
 Overall, in these narratives that acknowledge the presence of traditional methods 
of dispute resolution within the society, it is possible to detect a developmentalist 
discourse. Responses on how traditional modes of dispute resolution are no longer 
feasible due to social transformations, how a culture of conciliation is either waning 
                                                 
208 Interview # 13, Interview # 15, Interview # 19 
209 Interview # 15 
 234
or not absent at all to due a degeneration in the value system of the society, how such 
a culture can be reconstructed through educating the people and raising their 
consciousness can all be interpreted against a backdrop of a developmentalist vision 
that seems to prevail in the legal consciousness of these professionals. The fact that 
these responses have quite frequently compared the existing sociocultural structure in 
Turkey with the situation in European countries also reinforces this developmentalist 
approach in these narratives.  
 What appears as a subtext in these narratives that approach traditional 
mechanisms in a relatively positive way becomes an observable, dominant discourse 
in the responses of those professionals who talk about these mechanisms in a 
pejorative fashion. In these narratives, the presence of traditional modes of dispute 
resolution within the society has been associated with a relatively low penetration of 
formal law and legal mechanisms into social relations; and as such it has been 
explained as an indication of low development, low education, low modernization and 
cultural backwardness. Similar to the previous group of narratives that emphasized the 
significance of including mediation within the formal legal system in the sense of 
regulating already existing practices of dispute resolution within a system of codified 
rules and systematized procedures, narratives that were explicitly framed in a 
developmentalist framework also underlined the significance of legal guarantees for 
mediation to be applicable.210 
 These narratives have usually referred to a clash between traditions and modern 
values and institutions that have been created by the Republic. While some blamed 
the Republican project of legal modernization for ignoring the traditional modes of 
living and dispute resolution which in the long run has created a tension between the 
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remnants of these traditions and the modern legal system211, others explained the 
current tension in reference to the danger of law making with external pressures like 
the ones from the EU. One respondent, for instance, reacted to the ways in which new 
laws and accompanying institutions are being introduced without taking the traditions 
of this society into consideration. The respondent approached the whole EU process 
as one of establishing western hegemony and as such considered Turkey’s adaptation 
to European cultural values to be a quite difficult endeavor. In this context, he argued 
that traditions need to be cleared all together for the people in this society to adopt 
new legislations and practices.   
 In other narratives, respondents who claimed a culture of conciliation is absent 
among the people of this society, there was again frequent reference to the 
significance of creating such a culture for mediation to be applicable. While some 
argued that mediation could only be a possibility in Turkey if a culture of conciliation 
and a culture of “living lawfully” were to arise, other responses referred to a specific 
lack of communication between people in Turkey which hinders the development of a 
culture of conciliation. Similar to previous narratives, the responses of those actors 
who believed that a culture of conciliation does not exist in Turkey have also quite 
often been framed in comparison to the social structure, the level of consciousness 
and the cultural characteristics of western societies. One respondent gave the example 
of a TV show in Germany where he observed how even in the midst of heated debates 
people preserve a certain level of respect, without attacking the other personally; 
whereas another respondent claimed in cultures such as Turkey where even a person 
who kills someone claims that he is right, a culture of conciliation is an impossibility. 
In other instances a number of respondents referred to traffic feuds in Turkey where 
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drivers almost never give way to each other and quite often come to the point of 
strangling one another; whereas others gave the example of people’s inability to form 
a line in Turkey which is seen as a cultural habit of European people.  
 All of these narratives associated mediation with a prerequisite of a culture of 
conciliation that can exist among people who respect each other, who are educated, 
who are ready to make sacrifices, who are individuals and as such stripped off 
collective identities, who listen to, communicate with and trust each other, who have 
high degrees of social consciousness and who have internalized democratic values. 
All of these sociocultural assets are more often than not explained in reference to a 
certain level of development that Turkey has not yet managed to reach. More often 
than not   -even in the case of responses that approached the presence of traditional 
mechanisms in a relatively positive fashion- the narratives paint a picture of a society 
that is imagined to be lacking a culture of conciliation. This social deficiency is in 
turn interpreted as an obstacle -if not an impossibility- for the establishment and the 
acceptance of mediation in Turkey.  
 
ii. Feudal Structure of Society 
 
 Another prominent theme that can be detected in the narratives regarding the ways 
in which legal professionals seem to be imagining the society has to do with the 
existing inequalities which are more often than not explained in the context of the 
prevalence of feudal institutions and patriarchal relations. In the former, the 
prevalence of feudal institutions like aşirets212, sheiks and large landownership in 
eastern parts of Turkey and the role of these in shaping economic, political and social 
relations in the area as well as in big urban centers are considered to be the root 
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causes of many of the inequalities existing within the social order.213 In the context of 
mediation, narratives suggest a concern for the diffusion of these unequal relations of 
power between the tribe leaders, the sheiks, the landowners and the people into the 
process, especially if people who are not trained in law are to become mediators. In 
the context of patriarchal relations and its relation to mediation, on the other hand, 
respondents quite often referred to the possibility of gender inequalities being 
reproduced through this process especially in the shadow of sectarian affinities.  
 In both cases, regarding the penetration of feudal structures into the mediation 
process as well as the reproduction of patriarchal relations through this process, 
concerns raised by respondents have more often than not been framed in the context 
of the voluntary nature of mediation practice. Given that both in theory and practice 
mediation is imagined to differ from judicial proceedings mostly due to its emphasis 
on the voluntary participation of the parties, the question of how this voluntariness 
can be guaranteed becomes an important challenge. 
 In the context of feudal institutions, respondents have referred to the possibility of 
people agreeing to go to mediation because they have been forced by a higher 
authority exercised by an aşiret leader or by some other recognized holder of power 
within local traditions. In such narratives, the penetration of feudal ties, feudal 
relations and feudal structures into mediation process has been imagined as a 
possibility both in the context of parties who might consider these collective identities 
as determinants of their self definition -hence the possibility of parties themselves 
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landscape. As such, these feudal institutions and traditional bonds are no longer considered unique 
sociocultural characteristics of the east. They have become a prominent feature of urban life as well. A 
detailed review of internal displacement can be found in the “Coming to terms with Forced Migration: 
Post-Displacement Restitution of Citizenship Rights in Turkey” report of TESEV (2007).  
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being affected by these ties-; and also in the context of mediators either themselves 
coming from such feudal backgrounds and hence sharing the same social habitus with 
the parties or not being able to recognize or ignoring the effects of such unequal 
relations upon the voluntariness of the process.  
 In both contexts, legal training and experience in the field of formal dispute 
resolution have been considered as the primary capital that can prevent the penetration 
of such feudal structures into the mediation process. One respondent, for instance, 
argued that if mediators are not required to have a legal formation, each aşiret or sect 
or any other power group214 could raise their own mediators and take their disputes to 
them. In such situations, these extralegal formations could be legitimized through a 
formally regulated institution of the state. Here, it is not so much the state 
involvement in the reproduction of such traditional ties -as several respondents also 
noted how the state is de facto involved in the perpetuation of this social structure- but 
rather the fact that through mediation this involvement will acquire an official 
character is what seems to be the main dilemma.215 
 Concerns around the possibility of gender inequalities being reproduced through 
mediation, on the other hand, were framed in the context of the possibility of women 
being forced by their husbands, fathers or other male members of the family into the 
process. One respondent, for instance, argued that given the low level of education of 
the people, if for instance the scope of mediation were to be expanded in the future to 
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215 One respondent, for instance, explained how the state has always been involved in the maintenance 
of these feudal structures. He argued that the leading party as well as the opposition party and other 
parties -be them ultra nationalist or Kurdish parties- all “feed on” this feudal structure by choosing their 
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which included the alternative of nominating “regular people” instead of those who are carriers of 
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include matters of Family Law, then “no woman in the southeast will divorce, give 
custody of her children, hand over her property or give up alimony with her own 
will”.216  In such narratives, women are depicted as already holding an inferior 
position within the society in terms of economic means and social freedoms and as 
such their voluntariness in mediation process emerges as a highly questionable issue.  
If a girl in Şanlıurfa, in Viranşehir, in Suruç217 marries someone and 
then breaks up. When separating, the court does not know the parties 
because the judge is appointed there for three years. Then what 
happens if the girl who sees the judge as the shelter goes to a 
mediator and then the village imam comes and also gets training? 
That is easy. We give everyone a driver’s license, you know! We 
have even given driver’s license to the blind in this country! That is 
easy. And then the aşiret leader will come, then the village guard will 
come and say ‘What is this girl? You came from your father’s house 
and set your eyes on people’s land? Are you going to create blood 
feud? Sign here!’ Who will be the guarantee? Who will be the 
guarantee? They need to tell me this. They say that these things will 
not happen, that we are making these up, that we are hallucinating. 
Let’s hope so! Let us be the one who is hallucinating. Or is it others 
who are hallucinating in this country?218 
 
 In these narratives, the formal practice of mediation is imagined to create the 
ground for the recognition and hence the legitimation of extralegal forms of dispute 
resolution and the traditional structures within which they are practiced. Hence, the 
fact that mediation will be an officially recognized practice with rules, regulations and 
codes of conduct is considered to be problematic particularly in the context of people 
without a legal formation becoming mediators. In this sense, the main concern 
revolves around the possibility that the formalization of mediation could lead to the 
legitimation of extralegal practices into the world of law in the hands of people who 
lack the necessary symbolic capital to operate within the world of law.   
 Other narratives, on the other hand, problematized these concerns around 
formalization in the context of the power of such extralegal mechanisms in the dispute 
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resolution practices of the people. In this sense, some respondents recognized the 
presence of feudal structures within the society and their existing authority upon 
personal will which in turn is a strong factor in determining the ways in which 
disputes are resolved. However, they interpreted this sociocultural phenomenon as a 
recognized alternative to formal law and its mechanisms. In this sense, these 
respondents questioned why -given the prevalence and the authority of such 
alternative laws- people who mobilize such channels for the resolution of their 
disputes would come to mediation in the first place. In the case of gender inequalities, 
for instance, one respondent claimed that if a man wants to force his wife into doing 
something, then he could do it in any way that he wanted. This narrative was framed 
particularly in the context of the types of disputes that can go to mediation. The 
respondent argued that since these are disputes that the parties can freely agree upon, 
as in the case of a transfer of a property for instance, the man could easily take his 
wife to a notary, get her to sign the papers and usurp her property.219 
 On a similar terrain, in the context of gender inequalities, some respondents 
remarked on concerns regarding the power of sectarian affinities upon people’s 
decisions and argued that the possibility of such affinities affecting social and 
economic relations between people already exists within the society. As such, people 
are imagined to be operating within such affinities without needing the intermediacy 
of official institutions such as mediation. One respondent, for instance, commented on 
how people seem to be worried about the reemergence of Shari’a principles. In this 
context, he argued that if by these principles people refer to practices such as 
marrying four women, cutting a thief’s hand off for stealing or stoning in cases of 
adultery, these are matters of public interest and as such would not be eligible for 
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mediation anyway. However, even in cases such as the ones related to inheritance 
law, for instance, where Shari’a would bring to mind unequal distribution of shares, 
mediation would not pose an obstacle in the sense that such an inequality is easily 
realizable in the existing system of social and legal norms. 
If people were to do this now, if the woman was to say ‘I will take 
one share, let my brother take two shares of what is inherited from 
our father’, who could prevent this from happening in the current 
order of things? If the two parties agree and prepare an inheritance 
contract, a contract for distribution of shares, there is no obstacle to it 
anyway.220 
  
 In response to concerns regarding the reintroduction of Shari’a rules, one 
particularly interesting narrative approached this issue in the context of how a 
formally outlined and regulated practice of mediation would in fact not be a desired 
mechanism by those who are imagined to be proponents of a religious order. Rather 
than seeing mediation as a possible legitimation mechanism for these irrational values 
and practices, the respondent instead focused on the threat posed by mediation for the 
Islamist population who are imagined to be operating within sectarian structures. In 
this sense, faced with a group of mediators “who are trained in a rational fashion, who 
have received a scientific education, who operate under pressures enforced by the law 
like the pressure of supervision or the pressure of keeping record”, the respondent 
claimed that the traditional mediation mechanisms of sectarian relations would in fact 
lose prestige.221 
 Concerns raised on the formalization of extralegal mechanisms were also 
problematized in the context of the positive effects of such formalization. Within this 
framework, in some narratives again the presence and the power of feudal 
mechanisms, sectarian affiliations and gender inequalities were recognized; but rather 
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than expressing the potential threats of these sociocultural traits for the mediation 
process, these narratives instead concentrated on how mediation -given its formal 
rational framework- could in fact be employed strategically as a potential 
countercheck for these structures. In relation to gender inequalities, for instance, this 
potential was framed in reference to the possibility of empowering women through 
mediation. One respondent explained this potential in the context traditional 
mediation mechanisms where women cannot really go against the recognized 
authority of those traditional mediators. Within this context, the fact that mediation 
will be a formal practice with codified rules, established procedures and systematized 
means of control is rather imagined to be a possible antidote of the inequalities that 
are reproduced within the local, the static, the conventional, the traditional.  
People already mediate. But they cannot in fact. Our cultural level, 
our education is very low. And also when people go to these elderly 
people, it gets worse. They harm young people, people who want to 
open their eyes to the world. They impair their mental health, they 
break a marriage that can work. So, such a mediation that is done 
clumsily, hastily, abruptly already exists in our lives. And above all 
decisions are made in these mediations that exist in our business 
relations, in marriages and they are always forced mediations... 
Within these, women are already oppressed. They are already 
oppressed...Now why should that woman be all cringed in front of 
that elderly person? For one thing, here it is a voluntary environment, 
an agreement is trying to be reached within the framework of legal 
provisions and the physical equality of the parties is just as much 
protected as the their right to equal speech. And this is exactly what a 
mediator does. Then, in this environment the woman is already 
protected, why are we scared? Consequently, the woman will be 
empowered here.222 
 
 Within this context, formalization emerges as a significant axis of controversy in 
the debates on mediation. While some legal professionals raised their concerns 
regarding the legitimation of extralegal modes of dispute resolution and hence the 
sociocultural structure within which they are practiced through a formally recognized 
process of mediation; others remarked on how such a process could in fact be a 
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possible empowerment mechanism for those who are socially disadvantaged. In all 
these narratives -in the ones concerned about formalization as well as the ones who 
consider formalization to be an advantage in the face of recognized sociocultural 
practices- education and development came up as significant discourses that have 
been employed to explain the persistence of such feudal structures and patriarchal 
relations within the society. In this sense, the low level of education of the people in 
general has usually been associated with low levels of development in the society 
which is defined by a lack of rights consciousness among other things.  
 One respondent, for instance, explained the low level of education and 
development in the society in reference to the necessity of mediators having a legal 
formation. He argued that if “we are not yet at the stage where we will be collectively 
opposing these traditional mechanisms” -that is to say if these mechanisms are still 
legitimized and used by some of the people- in that case it is vital for legal 
professionals to be a part of this emerging institution. In this context, he gave the 
example of a sheik who is famous for reconciling people in the southeast of Turkey. 
Reciting an anecdote from his encounter with the President of the Bar Association of 
this city, the respondent explained how this local mediator is even praised by the 
governor and consulted by the state in instances of conflict between aşirets. 
Reportedly, this leader approaches the issue of crimes of honor223 in the following 
way:  If a woman runs away with a man, it is wrong to kill her; the pair needs to be 
joined in matrimony. If the man is married and the woman is single, the man needs to 
be killed and the woman needs to be taken back to her family. If both are married, 
both need to be killed. If the woman is married and the man is single, again both need 
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2003-2007 more than 1.100 women have been victims of honor crimes all over Turkey (Republic of 
Turkey Prime Ministry Human Rights Presidency 2007). 
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to be killed. Here, the respondent claimed in a humorous way that the methods of this 
local mediator can even be considered affirmative action in the sense that when the 
woman is single it is only the man who is killed and he explained this situation in 
terms of a mentality that sees women as inferior, as easily deceivable, easily seducible 
by men. In this sense, the respondent argued that if decisions like the ones that could 
be rendered by this man are still seen as acceptable by the people and even 
appreciated for it is protective of woman, in that case legal guarantees that are 
provided by codified law and executed by legal professionals are an absolute 
necessity in the practice of mediation.224 
 In this narrative, the respondent argued that if we were to change this existing 
background and imagine a different type of social structure and a different cultural 
pattern, then such regulatory measures would not be necessary. On a similar terrain, 
another respondent for instance argued that this is a society where men are powerful 
and women are exchanged like commodities. In this cultural structure where “the man 
takes the woman, his wife, leaves her with her family, says take your child, do 
whatever you want with your daughter and next day he brings in someone else”, the 
respondent argued that there is nothing that a mediator can do. In developed countries, 
however, mediation is imagined to be a commonly used, quite feasible and highly 
effective practice by the respondent.225 Hence, in the context of mediation, the 
guarantees provided by formal rational law and applied by legal professionals are only 
imagined to be necessary in the case of a sociocultural structure that is highly 
patriarchal, hierarchical, undereducated and underdeveloped as is the case in Turkey. 
In this sense, regarding its relation to society, law is imagined to be a safety net 
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particularly in a cultural context where it has failed to become the dominant feature of 
the normative order given the prevalence of traditional values and practices in the 
ways in which people resolve their disputes.  
2. Imagining Law  
 The type of social imaginary that emerges in the narratives of legal professionals 
as they think and talk about mediation practice seems to be related to the ways in 
which these professionals imagine law and its role within the society. In the narratives 
of legal professionals as well as other representations of mediation, two main 
discourses seem to characterize the ways in which these actors think and talk about 
law in Turkey. One of these discourses is legal culture as actors quite often refer to a 
certain culture of law that is imagined to determine the ways in which people resort to 
law and how they perform in this world. Social change through law constitutes the 
second discourse that determines how law is imagined in the legal consciousness of 
these professionals.  
 
i. Legal Culture 
 
 Issues that have been raised by respondents regarding the compatibility of 
mediation with the social structure of Turkey have quite often been situated in the 
context of a certain type of legal culture that is imagined to exist among the people. 
This culture has been explained in reference to two main issues: Expectations from 
law and the legal system and the role of formal rational law in the resolution of 
disputes within the society.  
 An inquiry into how legal professionals think and talk about people’s expectations 
from formal law and its mechanisms points out to a recurring theme among the 
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narratives. The conviction that people’s primary expectation from courts is the 
satisfaction of their demands or the fulfillment of their wishes emerges as a strong 
determinant of how legal professionals imagine the relation between the people and 
the law. In this context, expectations from law and the formal legal mechanisms have 
been defined in the context of people’s ultimate desire to prove that they are right. 
These expectations are usually depicted as unrealistic ones that overestimate the 
power of courts in terms of serving the needs of the people.226 
In Turkey people expect law to realize their expectations. Whatever 
their expectations are, they want these to be realized through law. For 
instance, this is what they expect: Very educated. Educated in 
America. A friend of mine who carries out commercial activities in 
Ankara years ago gave me an instruction to collect his debt. This was 
the instruction: Go and confiscate everything from head to toe. I said, 
wait a minute, I cannot do that; I can only confiscate the amount that 
he owes you. No, he said. Get whatever you can. I asked why? He 
said: He hurt me so I want to do the same to him. I said no; I am not 
your pawn. If you want to hurt him, do so. I will also defend you in 
criminal court I said!227 
 In this narrative as in many other instances during the interviews, the desire to “be 
proven right” has also been coupled with discourses on how people want to hurt the 
other party not only through legal sanctions but also by the mere act of taking him to 
court and “making him suffer” through the judicial process that has always been 
depicted as an unpleasant, emotionally consuming, costly and lengthy experience. 
Such expectations in turn further cast doubt on the compatibility of mediation with the 
existing legal culture in Turkey. As previously mentioned, mediation is imagined to 
offer an environment for the conciliation of the parties rather than proving who is 
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facts brought before it”. As such they argue that “many litigants thus come to the civil court with a 
model of justice that better fits the criminal system” (O’Barr and Conley 1988, 159). 
227 Interview # 2 
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right in a dispute. In this sense, since people are imagined to resort to official legal 
mechanisms in order to prove that they are right, in order to win their case, in order to 
get back at the other party with the support of the state behind them,228 the gains that 
they could achieve by going to mediation are imagined to be relatively less 
satisfactory. One respondent, for instance, explained this in reference to the failure of 
victim offender mediation practice in Turkey that has been introduced in 2005 but has 
been applied only marginally. The respondent argued that in a society where people 
never admit that they are at fault, where no matter what they have done they always 
try to prove that they are right, such mechanisms are bound to fail.229        
 Within this context, one of the defining characteristics of this legal culture seems 
to be a “sense of entitlement” that allows people to take their matters to courts. This 
sense of entitlement that is associated with taking disputes to official mechanisms of 
formal law, however, is rarely explained in reference to a discourse of rights 
consciousness.230 On the contrary, it is usually depicted as an indication of an absence 
of such consciousness in the sense that these entitlements are more often than not 
imagined to have been developed on unrealistic grounds. It is in this sense rather 
imagined in instrumentalist terms where people’s mobilization of law is rather seen as 
a “powerful political strategy” to get what they want (Merry 1990b, 183). This lack of 
rights consciousness has come up in various moments during the interviews. In the 
context of the existing legal culture in Turkey, respondents more often than not 
referred to an absence of such consciousness that is usually defined in terms of people 
                                                 
228 Interview # 5, Interview # 21 
229 Interview # 25 
230 These narratives connote Keyder’s argument regarding the absence of ownership of rights in Turkey 
which he sees as the main consequence of the gap between the modernizing elite and the people. 
Remarks connoting his association of this ownership with modernization can also be detected among 
these narratives especially in the context of referring to this rights consciousness as a feature of western 
societies that is claimed to be missing in Turkey.  
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being aware of their legal rights and mobilizing these rights when necessary. This 
awareness is intricately associated with the recognition of other people being entitled 
to same rights. Hence, it is imagined as a mutual recognition on behalf of the parties 
that what is demanded by one party is at the same time a liability on the other party. 
This relation between rights and responsibilities is in this sense considered to be an 
essential feature of such an awareness that is imagined to be absent among the people. 
 This discourse of rights consciousness has quite often been coupled with 
comments on the low level of education of people in Turkey. Education, however, is 
imagined beyond getting a formal training (Koğacıoğlu 2003). It is rather seen as a 
life long learning process that starts with early childhood, where all institutions of 
socialization are engaged in a collective enterprise of raising citizens who are aware 
of the rights they have, who have internalized these rights, who can defend these 
rights and who are conscious enough to mobilize them whenever necessary.231 In one 
narrative, for instance, the respondent argued that people have not yet been able to 
meet their subsistence needs let alone develop a consciousness of their legal rights.232 
As such the respondent explained in detail how there are still a lot of people who 
simply want to earn enough money to feed themselves or who are just concerned 
whether their social security premium is paid or not. 
                                                 
231 In the context of legal professionals’ perceptions of the ways in which the urban poor engage with 
the law, Koğacıoğlu demonstrates how education is imagined as a culture of the learned groups which 
inevitably means that not all groups will be transformed enough to be able to become a part of this 
culture (2003). 
232 In his work on the semiology of modernization of Turkey, Hilmi Yavuz cites examples from some 
of the landmark literary pieces since Tanzimat. In the context of Yaban, for instance, which is 
considered as one of the classics, Yavuz argues that the conflict between the “enlightened” main 
character and the villagers around him is in fact symbolic of an imagined tension between the 
“modern” and the “primitive”. In this sense, the author depicts villagers as “creatures” who only have 
“instinctual” or “primary” needs and a “prelogic” mindset. In the context of similar examples, Yavuz 
argues that modernization in Turkey is in fact not westernization but “orientalization” (2002, 213).   
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There are three main needs: Eating, drinking and shelter. As a society 
who has not yet solved these issues, we have not been able to raise 
our heads and look at what is going on in the world. Education is 
important; we need to be educated in our social life, in terms of self 
development, in order to be enlightened people. A big part of the 
society is not there yet. There are people who simply work to feed 
themselves. Just to feed themselves. In such a society how would it 
matter if he knows law or not? He is just interested if his social 
security premium is paid, if he gets his salary although it is minimum 
wage. That is what he looks at. All he knows is the number of the bus 
he takes, the address of his factory. He works, comes home, his wife 
would already have prepared his dinner, he eats and drinks, lives the 
same life and actually believes that this is living. And he would not 
be interested in anything else. Now, why would it matter if this 
person knows what law is, what his rights are?233 
 
 This type of an education is imagined to be the antidote of all irrational codes of 
meaning making that are imagined to exist within the society. Hence, if people are 
educated about their rights, about how to use their rights and how to mobilize these 
rights for placing demands upon the administrators, then they can start to make sense 
of their actions in reference to formal rational law rather than certain “fatalist” -as in 
the case of people interpreting damages caused by the earthquake in terms of ill 
fortune234- or religious axes of meaning making as in the case of people who “refer 
the opposite party to Allah” rather than seeking remedies.235 One respondent even 
argued that these axes exist beyond religious identities and that they are rather deeply 
inscribed in the “genetic codes” of people in Turkey. Within this context, the 
respondent argued that even if there is some sort of a rights consciousness among the 
people in Turkey, it is rather based on an understanding of “haram”236 and “halal” 
which is imagined to be a common denominator of the habitus of all social actors 
whether they are illiterate or professors, whether they are Muslim or Christian.237 
Insofar as these discourses point out to an imagined transformative capacity of law, 
                                                 
233 Interview # 7 
234 Interview # 8 
235 Interview # 4 
236 What is religiously forbidden and culturally accepted as such. 
237 Interview # 7 
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they are also relevant for the next issue that has come up in the context of legal 
culture, i.e. social change through law.  
 Instead of such an awareness, the mobilization of formal judicial mechanisms by 
the people is rather imagined in instrumentalist terms in the sense of people trying to 
get what they believe is their due without being equally concerned about the rights of 
the other party. In this context, regarding the second dimension of imagined legal 
culture, legal professionals talk about the mobilization of law in the resolution of 
disputes as a strategy deployed by social actors for getting what they want. In this 
sense, Merry’s use of the term management of disputes instead of their resolution 
becomes relevant in understanding these strategic actions (1979). By taking their 
disputes to courts, people are imagined to be managing their disputes by making the 
other party suffer as the process itself becomes the punishment238, by prolonging the 
dispute, delaying the payment of the debts etc.239 
 At the same time, courts are also depicted as mechanisms that are only 
approached as a last resort, out of weariness240, when the dispute has become too 
complicated to be solved by other means241, when deadlock has become the rule242 or 
when there is nowhere else to go.243 In these narratives, people’s mobilization of the 
law and judicial mechanisms are rather explained in terms of a desperation, in terms 
of a necessity. Hence, as in the case of narratives on how people mobilize law in a 
strategic fashion, in these narratives that explain people’s use of the law and judicial 
                                                 
238 I borrow the term “process is the punishment” from Malcolm M. Feeley (Feeley 1992). 
239 Koğacıoğlu also demonstrates how among a multiplicity of ways in which the urban poor deal with 
their disputes like “mafia, mediation or religious morality”, bringing a case to the court -like these 
other techniques- is not the norm but a strategic act employed by these actors (2003, 173). 
240 Interview # 22 
241 Interview # 4 
242 Interview # 7 
243 Interview # 20 
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mechanisms in terms of a desperation, the mobilization of law has rarely been 
explained in reference to a rights consciousness.  
 These explanations for people’s expectations from courts and the imagined role of 
law in the resolution of disputes have also been accompanied with observations on the 
relation between judges and people in Turkey. The uniqueness of this relation -
especially with respect to other legal professionals’ relations with the people- has 
come up at different moments, in different contexts throughout the narratives and the 
discourse analysis. This relation has previously been discussed in the context of the 
feeling of trust that legal professionals attribute to people’s approach to judges. On a 
similar terrain, in the narratives the legal professionals have talked about the whole 
experience of standing in front of a judge, telling him about your dispute and 
expecting him to find a remedy to your problem as a practice that makes sense to 
people.   
 What seems to be a shared feature in all these explanations regarding the legal 
culture in Turkey is a certain distance that is imagined to exist between law and the 
people. In the context of people’s expectations from law and the imagined role of law 
in dispute resolution, an implicit reference to a gap between the people and the law 
can be detected. Narratives on the absence of rights consciousness, on the pragmatic 
use of law, on the absence of an ownership of a formal rational normative order or on 
the significance of a life long education for the establishment of such a culture of 
ownership all seem to refer to a rather authoritarian presence of law in the lives of 
people in terms of the ways in which it has been created and applied.  
 In this sense, the type of legal culture that legal professionals seem to imagine 
when they think and talk about the ways in which social actors move in and around 
the world of law seems to be painted with an image of law that does not constitute an 
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integral feature of the normative framework within which people make sense of their 
actions. As such, law and its operations rather emerge as an alternative system of 
norms and institutions that is mobilized by social actors in a pragmatic fashion as in 
the case of getting what is their due or being proven right or when they have nowhere 
else to go. Within this context, this imagined gap between people and the law that is 
detected in the debates around mediation can be interpreted against the backdrop of 
another prevalent discourse employed by legal professionals when imagining law, i.e. 
the discourse of change through law and its implications for the relation between the 
people and the law in Turkey.  
 
ii. Social Change Through Law 
 
 The second discourse that is observed in narratives concerning the way in which 
legal professionals imagine the law is the possibility of changing society through law. 
This transformative capacity of law has become visible in the discourse of absence of 
rights consciousness among the people in Turkey. In these narratives, legal 
professionals quite often resorted to this absence to explain why people expect courts 
to serve their interests or how law is mobilized strategically rather than as the 
guardian of rights, duties and liberties. In the absence of such an inscribed 
consciousness, legal professionals talk about a legal culture that is highly pragmatic, 
highly instrumentalist, highly vindictive. This absence has quite often been explained 
in reference to a certain lack of ownership of rights by the people which requires a 
recognition that with rights comes duties. In this sense, the type of legal culture that is 
imagined by legal professionals seems to be compatible with Keyder’s explanation of 
the gap between people and the law in the context of people’s lack of ownership of 
the norms that shape their lives. As Keyder argues that this gap can only be abridged 
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if the people are endowed with full citizenship rights not only in theory but also in 
practice, legal professionals are also quite often engaged in suggesting possible 
remedies for this distance between people and law.  
 Education, for instance, has been explained as one of the crucial measures that can 
be employed to create such an ownership. Law has emerged as another significant 
means for the creation and the sustenance of a culture of rights among the people. At 
different moments during the interviews, legal professionals have referred to the 
social functions of law as a regulating mechanism, as an instrument of social control, 
as an institution that maintains order within the society, as a normative order that 
shapes the ways in which people relate to each other and to the state. As it has been 
discussed in the preceding sections on how legal professionals think and talk about 
the society and its legal culture, formal rational law and the guarantees that are 
imagined to be provided through its codified structure and systematic nature emerge 
as significant tools for the creation of a cultural environment that is rights conscious.  
 There is, in this sense, a crucial discrepancy between the type of legal culture that 
legal professionals believe to exist among the people and the ways in which these 
professionals think and talk about the role of law in the society. In this sense, legal 
professionals’ depiction of a highly pragmatic and instrumentalist legal culture is in 
contrast with the ways in which they imagine the potential of formal rational law and 
its accompanying structures. The explanation of this gap between what legal 
professionals claim to exist within the society and their idealized image of law can be 
found in narratives that referred to the failure of Republican project to create an 
ownership of rights. This failure is explained in reference to the top-down character of 
modernization through law in the sense that it has created a certain tension with the 
dynamics of the society that can even be observed in contemporary Turkey.   
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Our difference with the practice in America or Western Europe is 
that our legal system is in conflict with the dynamics of our society. 
When you look at Western Europe, there is the French Revolution, 
Industrial Revolution, the emergence of bourgeoisie etc. There the 
society is setting the law in motion. It is a social structure that is 
constantly pushing the law. When you turn to us, the law since 
Tanzimat, since the Republic is always in conflict with the dynamics 
of this society. When you look at in terms of clothing, it becomes an 
absurd thing, do not wear that on your head, wear this, in the case of 
Hat and Clothing Reform. Today, you see a paradox with these 
patterns, there is an accumulated tension.244 
 
 In this context, the respondent identified the existing tension between the law and 
the people in Turkey with the authoritarian ways in which the law and through it the 
society has been modernized in Turkey. This gap between the people and the law is 
imagined to have contributed to a repression but not the clearance of sociocultural 
dynamics and modes of living. As such, these traditional values and practices are 
claimed to have resurfaced and created an ongoing tension between institutions of 
modern law and accustomed practices within the society and the meanings that people 
attach to these practices. In this sense, although it has managed to have created the 
modern legal framework, the Republican project is nevertheless imagined to have 
failed in the creation of a social habitus that is compatible with the modernization of 
law.  
 In another narrative, this type of legal modernization has been interpreted as an 
indication of Turkey being a third world country in the sense that rules that have 
followed social developments in other societies have, in the case of Turkey, been 
introduced in a top-down fashion without taking into consideration the specific 
sociocultural norms of the people.245 Hence, the transformative capacity of law is 
recognized; but given that in the socio-legal history of Turkey this capacity has been 
imposed upon the people; its practical effects on the transformation of the society are 
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imagined to have produced serious dilemmas between the legal system and its users. 
As such, these foreign norms that have been transferred from other contexts have not 
been completely internalized by the society at large as a result of which the people 
have failed to develop an ownership of these norms.  
 This imagined gap between the people and the law seems to be a continuing 
feature of the socio-legal history of Turkey. It is dated back to the early Republican 
period when people were introduced to completely foreign set of norms and is 
imagined to define the ways in which law is mobilized for social change in 
contemporary Turkey. As such, the transformative capacity of law has never been 
activated by the demands of the people. These comments on the legacy of an 
authoritarian legal modernization have been framed in reference to the discourse of 
judicial reform that is employed to define the recent developments in the legal field in 
Turkey with a particular emphasis on the changes introduced in the national 
legislation during the EU process. 
 Within this context, a prevailing discourse that seems to emerge in the narratives 
is an interpretation of recent developments as changes in the legal corpus with 
relatively insignificant effects upon practice. This skepticism about the quality and the 
magnitude of changes taking place seems to be shared by legal professionals who 
have displayed a firmly opposing attitude towards mediation as well as those 
respondents who were less skeptical of and even supportive towards the practice. As 
such, majority of the respondents refused to define this period as one of judicial 
reform in the sense that a reform is imagined to require long term transformations, 
with planned effects and the establishment of a structural framework that can allow 
for the realization of these effects. In these narratives, respondents frequently referred 
to the absence of a policy behind these changes, a lack of vision; they commented on 
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the incompatibility of the existing infrastructure with the changes, incapacity of 
practitioners to make sure that these changes do not remain on paper, exclusion of 
legal professionals from this process and the absence of a social demand for these 
changes.  
 Within this context, the Draft Law is also seen as an extension of this mentality of 
legal modernization from above in the sense that it is not a product of social needs or 
demands. The fact that the introduction of the practice is also quite often justified in 
the context of EU requirements is considered by some respondents to be symbolic of 
the absence of a demand from the people. In this sense, mediation as well as other 
new institutions or other changes introduced in the legal corpus and the legal system 
are rather imagined to be reflections of an ongoing mentality that introduces legal 
changes in a top-down fashion without taking into consideration the compatibility of 
the existing social structure with these new norms and institutions. 
Law is the way we perceive life. If you are used to urban law, to the 
urban way of living, can you get used to the law of the village? I 
mean you should not overlook the fact that law is a science that lives 
in the society…If you cannot align your law with the EU law, it will 
not accept you. Why? Because that law will determine the way you 
live your life…It determines the direction you will go. This is the 
reason why Turkey is caught in-between. You cannot turn to the east 
for your life and to the west for your law because if you interpret the 
law of the west in the context of the rules of the east, then you will 
have this kind of an amorphous system.246 
 
 Within this context, there seems to be a shared belief in the transformative 
capacity of law in the sense of changing the society. In the case of Turkey, however, 
the way in which this capacity has been mobilized is imagined to have created a gap 
between the people and the law which can be observed in the absence of an ownership 
of the rights that have been introduced through legal reform. Respondents quite often 
referred to the failure of legal change from above to replace the sets of meaning that 
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circulate in the lives of the people through which they make sense of their actions and 
their relations. While this failure has sometimes been explained in reference to the 
existing elements of “backwardness” in the society, sometimes it has been explained 
in the context of an authoritarian relation between the state and the people. In any 
case, law is imagined to be a powerful means to determine the direction that the 
society will take; however the realization of its potential is imagined in conjunction 
with the norms and practices that define the ways in which people operate within the 
existing social order.  
3. Imagining Legal Profession 
 Last but not least, the legal consciousness of these actors seems to be shaped by 
the ways in which they think and talk about the legal profession in general and how 
they imagine its role within the society in particular. In this context, various 
representations of mediation and the narratives suggest two main issues that have 
come up in relation to the ways in which legal profession and its relation to the 
society at large is imagined. The first issue is concerned with how legal professionals 
describe the current legal education in Turkey and how they imagine an ideal legal 
education. Legal education is imagined to be a cornerstone in raising generations of 
qualified legal professionals; but it is hardly seen as sufficient on its own. The ways in 
which these respondents imagine their profession also have to do with the 
characteristics they attribute to the members of their profession. In this context, the 
second issue that has come up in relation to the ways in which the profession is 
imagined is how these actors talk about what it means to be a legal professional and 
how they imagine their role in the society.  
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i. Legal Education 
 
 Among legal professionals, there seems to be a shared concern about the quality 
of legal education in Turkey. One of the major criticisms about the education in law 
faculties seems to be the emphasis on doctrine. This emphasis is particularly criticized 
with regards the lack of practical knowledge in law faculties. Respondents have 
complained about the practical difficulties that graduates have to face at the end of a 
four year training that mainly concentrates on law in the books. Legal education has 
even been interpreted as vocational training by some respondents who claimed that 
these faculties could at best raise lawyers not legal professionals or that they should 
be called “law high schools” rather than law faculties.247 Some respondents have even 
explained this as an overall problem of education system in Turkey. In such 
narratives, deficiencies in legal education have been explained in reference to a 
general lack of quality in Turkey’s education system.  
This is the consequence of giving a vocational training just like in 
primary school, secondary school and high school and raise stupid 
brains that have no other function than storing information. I mean 
they always say you know, computers are not clever machines. They 
take what you load. Because it does not have its system of thought. It 
has a program system. We load kids with information. We load 
people with information in college. But we do not develop their 
ability to connect this information to each other and use them in real 
life.248 
 
 In these comments, the gap between theory and practice that is imagined to be 
reproduced through legal education is criticized for creating a cadre of legal 
professionals who “have not seen a court petition until the first day of their 
internship”, who have not been to the court throughout their four years at law faculty, 
who do not know “how they should act when they become judges or prosecutors” etc. 
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Most of the time these comments have been coupled with remarks on how the 
internship period for lawyers is usually wasted and how new graduates try to get used 
to the atmosphere rather than finding real opportunities for applying what they have 
learned in theory. 
 In this sense, the law that is taught in these faculties and the whole legal education 
in general is imagined to be distant to the realities of everyday life. Theoreticians are 
criticized for being trapped in their ivory towers where they are only interested in the 
normative word of law without being concerned about its implications in practice. 
They are criticized for not training their students about courtroom operations, about 
how they should approach their clients or the people who appear before them in courts 
or about how they should behave as a judge, as a prosecutor or as a lawyer etc. 
Practitioners on the other hand are criticized for only caring about “what comes to 
their desk” without considering the general social, cultural, economic realities that 
shape everyday lives of the people.  
 This gap between law in books and law in practice is further criticized in the 
context of graduates being too young to become legal practitioners. This concern has 
been raised particularly for judges since after four years at law faculty and less than 
two years of internship graduates can start their service on the bench as long as they 
pass the qualifying exam. This in effect means that at their early twenties graduates of 
law faculties can start practicing law as judges, prosecutors or lawyers which brings 
together the possibility of making mistakes in procedures that concern people’s lives, 
relations, properties etc. One respondent for instance talked about how in the rural 
areas where younger judges at the beginning of their careers serve in line with the 
existing system of judicial appointment, these judges are “scared” of lawyers who are 
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most of the time older and more experienced than them.249 In this sense, more often 
than not legal professionals have made suggestions regarding the extension of legal 
education or turning it into second education or requiring graduates to work as clerks 
before they can start practicing law on their own. 
 These problems are considered to be intensified with the increasing number of law 
faculties all around the country. The speedy increase is usually explained in reference 
to political maneuvers since opening a law faculty does not require much financial 
investment as is the case for schools of medicine for instance. As such, in line with 
certain political considerations like increasing votes or getting financial support from 
the affluent families of the region, establishment of law faculties has become quite a 
common situation all around the country. One respondent even argued that higher 
education in general has been sacrificed for the populist interests of different political 
tendencies.  
While creating tons of white collars, we tend to forget about the 
blues. Although they are the people who will carry the real weight of 
the society, now everyone gets a bachelor degree to the extent that it 
has become a mass education. And we are now trying to create the 
qualified labor force through masters or doctorate degrees which is a 
huge time and money loss. I mean what needs to be achieved at the 
bachelor level has become a part of doctorate degree in our country. 
Our university education has turned into a mass education.250 
 
 Within this context, legal professionals mostly complain about how these faculties 
are established in the absence of necessary academic staff and equipment which 
ultimately leads to a decrease in the quality of legal education. With professors of 
literature becoming deans of law schools, new faculties opening without any titled 
academician under their roof, with practicing lawyers teaching as full time faculty or 
“flying professors” who travel between faculties and other similar scenes that can be 
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observed in the current state of legal education in Turkey, these professionals express 
their concerns about a legal education that lacks established traditions and the 
necessary structure for continuing the mentor system between professors and their 
assistants. Given the prevalence of doctrinal perspectives in the teaching of law, this 
emphasis on the master-apprentice relation that allows for the development of a sense 
of belonging to the faculty and hence for the continuation of legal traditions is 
considered to be vital. At the same time, in the absence of a Bar exam all graduates 
start practicing the profession which ultimately leads to smaller shares in the market 
of disputes. Decreasing shares is imagined to be an important factor in the decreasing 
quality of the profession in the sense that lawyers start working with low fees in order 
to survive in this market which not only brings about a low quality of legal services 
but also a decrease in the “prestige” of the profession.  
 All of these concerns regarding the existing situation of legal education in Turkey 
have implications for the ways in which legal professionals think and talk about an 
ideal legal education which in turn has implications for the ways in which they 
imagine their profession. Within this context, these narratives seem to suggest that 
legal education is again imagined beyond a formal training. Similar to the way in 
which education of the public has been explained as a life long process, legal 
professionals seem to think and talk about an ideal legal education as a continuing 
enterprise that cannot be constrained by four years of formal training. One respondent 
for instance argued that it is more proper to call the current system as one of “national 
teaching” rather than “national education” in the sense that education is a much more 
overarching phenomenon that is usually imagined to spread to a life time. In this 
sense, no matter what you teach at law faculties if your overall education level is low 
as a society, if you are still failing to educate your people about the basic rules of 
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social conduct then the chances that your are going to improve yourself through a four 
year university education are imagined to be quite low. 
Today there is no such thing as education in Turkey. There is only 
teaching. I say this everywhere. It is in fact the Ministry of National 
Teaching not National Education. Education is something different. 
You can educate a person who has never been to school; he would be 
illiterate but he would know how to hold a fork, how to shake hands, 
which shoe would go with which sock. This is education. It is about 
life. On the other hand, you take a person, teach him something, load 
him up with information from books, with professional information. 
He will become a governor but he will not become a ‘man’. Being a 
governor is a consequence of a teaching, but being a man requires an 
education. And education is a process that starts with the family and 
lasts until death. Teaching is limited to certain periods. There are 
very few people who still go to primary school or to college at their 
forties... So if the people you will be teaching are not educated 
enough, no matter how hard you try the results would be the same... 
If the child does not want to be a lawyer ever since primary school, if 
he does not know why he wants to be a lawyer then going to law 
faculty just because he scored enough points is not good enough. 
This is unacceptable. It is like the situation of an old maid. I mean, I 
will marry whoever comes along! This is unacceptable. I mean, law 
is really a life style. You have to plan it well, you have to be well 
educated... Here what you do is you try to teach people you have not 
been able to educate. I mean if the man holds the fork like this, if he 
does not know how to address people, if he is trying to maintain the 
authority of the bench not through his personal talent and respect but 
through crudeness, then you might just as well make him the 
President of Court of Appeals! What difference would it make if you 
make a President of Court of Appeals out of an uneducated man, 
even if all his decisions are correct?251 
 
 Within this context, a proper legal education as it is imagined by these 
respondents more often than not has implications for the type of legal professional 
that exists in the legal consciousness of these respondents. Narratives suggest for 
instance that a sine qua non element of any legal education is imagined to be the 
internalization of the “notion of law” by students. This notion is above all imagined to 
be composed of certain traits such as “thinking, discussing and judging 
independently” which requires developing a capacity for analytical thinking and legal 
reasoning. In this sense, the ways in which these actors think and talk about the legal 
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professional, how they define him, what kinds of attributes they identify with this 
professional is almost never just a matter of formal legal education. Beyond formal 
training, legal professionals are also imagined to hold certain attributes some of which 
are personal in nature while some are imagined to be requirements of the practice as it 
is made sense of in relation to its role within the society.   
 
ii. Legal Professional  
 
 In light of the imagined implications of legal education for the type of legal 
professional that exists in the legal consciousness of these respondents together with 
the general references to the profession throughout the interviews, narratives 
designate two main lines of thought with regards the ways in which respondents 
imagine the legal professional. One of these is the question of how to define a legal 
professional which ultimately calls for an assessment of the types of symbolic capital 
that legal professionals are imagined to embody. The second issue is the imagined 
role or function of legal professionals within the society.  
 In the context of the former issue, respondents have quite often referred to the 
difference between being a graduate of a law faculty and being a legal professional. In 
these narratives, it has commonly been argued that not everyone with a law degree 
can in fact become a legal professional or can call himself one. One respondent, for 
instance, gave the example of how not every graduate of literature department can in 
fact become a writer or how all graduates of a conservatory at the end of their 
education can play an instrument but not all of them can become virtuoso. In the same 
way, graduating from a faculty of law is a prerequisite of being a legal professional 
but it is not enough on its own to attain that label which is more often than not 
accredited with quite superior attributes. Legal professional is imagined to be the 
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person who has a capacity for legal reasoning and analytical thinking, who has an 
excellent command of the notion of law, who can be solution oriented and patient, 
someone who can keep his sentiments, his reactions under control and who can work 
in a disciplined fashion to serve the justice needs of the people. Such a professional 
has to be engaged in a process of life long learning that will allow him to develop 
sociological, psychological and philosophical foundations for his legal thinking. His 
self development should be his primary motive in life in the sense of catching up with 
the novelties in the world of law as well as in other spheres of life, knowing his 
people, and understanding and keeping up with the demands and expectations of the 
society that he lives in so that he can serve those people. In some of these narratives, 
it has been even claimed that “being a legal professional means everything” in the 
sense that you have to be a sociologist as well as a philosopher, a therapist as well as a 
doctor; you have to have command of the law as well as mathematics and logic and 
that you have to be the “engine” of the society.252 
 Within this context, the legal professional is imagined to be someone with 
exceptional qualities so that he can be respected and recognized in the society; 
otherwise his competence as a legal professional would be questioned by the people. 
This reference to social recognition brings to mind Bourdieu’s emphasis on the 
significance of the acceptance of the capacity of legal professionals to find impartial 
solutions to social conflicts. In Bourdieu’s formulation, such a recognition is vital for 
the maintenance of law’s efficacy in the operations of the social universe in the sense 
that it allows for the legitimation of legal procedures and decisions.  
In order to be a legal professional, you have to be a special person in 
the society. If you are not a special person, then your legal 
professional identity would be questioned. You have to be special. 
You have to be respected; your words should be listened; you should 
                                                 
252 Interview # 7, Interview # 12, Interview # 21 
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know how to sit down, how to stand up properly. Look, I am still not 
talking about legal knowledge. You have to be like this so that you 
can gain recognition in the society, so that you can be effective. After 
all, if you are recognized as such and effective, you will have a 
leading position in the society anyway. People will talk with you, 
consult you and you will get an opportunity to lead the society.253 
 
 In such narratives, reference is usually made to “becoming” or “evolving into” a 
legal professional rather than being one in the sense that it is imagined to be a life 
long journey. This journey is never complete and should never be complete in the 
sense of learning, improving yourself, catching up with the changes in the world and 
attending to the needs of the society. As law is imagined to exist in all spheres of life, 
the legal professional is imagined to be the one who “creates life”, the one who “talks 
about life”, the one who “regulates all relations between people and all those relations 
that concern humanity”.254 Since legal professionals are the “decision makers” in a 
society, they need to be in touch with social realities so that they can “lead” the 
society.255 
 As such, legal profession is not imagined as a job that you can retire from or as an 
identity that you can easily leave behind. It is rather, as it has been previously 
displayed, imagined to be inscribed in the deepest levels of habitus. The difference 
between a graduate of a law faculty and a legal professional is precisely imagined 
along this axis of getting a formal training and being able to operate within the mental 
space of law. This in turn requires a “tacit acceptance” of the rules of the game and a 
willingness to commit to the internal logic of this field (Bourdieu 1987). In the case of 
mediators, regardless of the duration or the intensity of the formal legal training that 
they can get, their capacity to operate within this world is questioned given their 
strangeness to this habitus that is imagined to be shared among legal professionals.  
                                                 
253 Interview # 21 
254 Interview # 25 
255 Interview # 21 
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 These comments on the specific traits of the legal professional and the difficulty 
with which they can be attained have sometimes been coupled with remarks on the 
“divine” character of the profession. In these narratives, the profession has been 
painted with rather godlike features in the sense of shaping the destiny of the people. 
This has been explained in the context of the power to decide on the lives of the 
people as well as in reference to the penetration of law in every sphere of life that in 
turn allows these professionals to exercise this power extensively. One respondent, for 
instance, commented on how legal professionals get to decide on matters that may not 
be their specialty yet are matters of law because of their regulation by formal rational 
legal framework. This is explained as an almost natural superiority of the legal 
profession over other professions. While other professions have authority in the 
particular fields of their expertise, legal professionals have a say in their fields as well 
given the extensive authority of formal rational law over all types of relations.  
Let me explain it very simply. I always say this. Above there is God, 
here on the ground there is us. I mean there is no other person who is 
more important than a legal professional on this world... Because 
look, an operation by the most famous doctor of the world is assessed 
by a judge. Or a lawyer pleads that the greatest musical piece is 
stolen, another lawyer defends and ultimately a judge decides. Now, 
which architect, even if he has built the biggest building of the world, 
even if he makes a comment on a simple legal issue, can decide on 
that issue? But I can comment and decide on if the building that he 
has built is proper or not...Now, in that sense a legal professional is 
an exceptional person. I do not say this in the sense of a 
superiority...But no matter what they say, a legal professional is a 
person who has a place that is very different from all other 
professional groups and -again no matter what they say I will say it 
anyway- who is above them all but is modest enough not to act 
superior.256 
 Within these narratives, the legal professional has almost always been imagined in 
relation to his social responsibilities and the role of the profession in the development 
of the society in general. As a servant of the society he lives in, a legal professional 
                                                 
256 Interview # 25 
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has to be aware of his responsibilities in the society. The profession is in this way 
more often than not imagined as a social service in the sense of treating the interests 
of the society, the needs and expectations of the people above its own benefits. Since 
law is imagined to exist in all spheres of life, legal professionals are also imagined to 
be concerned with all social matters, all social problems that in one way or another 
relate to their field of operation.  
I associate it with the society. The legal professional, the lawyer has a 
social responsibility. He definitely has such a responsibility. He 
needs to consider himself and the society as a whole. The legal 
professional should not fall behind his social responsibilities. It is not 
just about supporting your family or making money. There are social 
duties. He should in fact approach every incident in this way. I mean 
I believe that a legal professional should attend to everything because 
law is in the demolished houses in Sulukule257 as well as in a nearby 
traffic accident. There is law when someone makes a pass at a lady in 
front of this office or when you go to a market and something you 
purchase turns out to be bad or broken. There is law in everything, 
there is the need for a right to legal remedies in everything.258 
 Within this context, the uniqueness of the profession which is sometimes 
expressed as a sign of superiority is also from time to time imagined in the context of 
a social mission of leading the society. As the legal professional is imagined to be the 
ultimate “remedial authority”, he has to be able to undertake a mission of leadership 
in the society based on his notion of law, extensive experience in the field of disputes 
and his proximity to social matters.259 In fact, being a legal professional has even been 
defined as a mission on its own in the sense of always being on the side of “rights” 
which requires standing up against state authority as well as “other instances of 
injustice raised by money, capital or exploitation.”260    
                                                 
257 A historic neighborhood of Istanbul that is mostly inhabited by Roma communities. The 
neighborhood is currently being evacuated in the framework of an overall urban transformation project 
where the inhabitants who are most of the time landlords are dislocated and moved out to housing 
projects in outskirts of the city 
258 Interview # 19 
259 Interview # 11 
260 Interview # 20 
 268
 This mission is in this sense generally explained in the context of establishing a 
rule of law order where democratic values and relations are internalized by the people 
and protected by the word and the institutions of formal rational law. In these 
narratives, there have also been occasional references to the modernizing mission of 
these professionals. Legal professionals have been sketched as enlightened actors who 
“burn with the love of western science” and who are as such the embodiment of 
rational values that are imagined to be vital for fighting against remnants of 
backwardness and underdevelopment. “Social engineers” or “social machinists” as 
they are, legal professionals are imagined to be “corner stones” in establishing order 
within the society as well as creating respect for the rule of law and consolidating 
democratic values.         
 The discourse of gap that prevails in the narratives -between law and society, 
between an ideal legal education and what exists in reality, between law in books and 
law in practice etc.- seems to appear once again the context of the gap between the 
legal professional that is described by the respondents and the one that is actually 
observed in real life. The attributes that have been associated with the legal 
professional and the social role that the members of this profession are imagined to 
play have more often than not been explained as idealized images or normative 
expectations. The decreasing quality of legal education and hence the growing 
incapacity of legal professionals to give their profession its due, the insufficiency of 
judicial infrastructure, the political pressures upon judiciary have all been cited as 
possible explanations for the existing gap between the ideal legal profession and its 
real life repercussions. Nevertheless, despite an overall disappointment with the state 
of the legal education or with the quality of legal professionals, more often than not 
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there seems to be an overall tendency to preserve a common faith in the meaning of 
the profession and its specific role within the society. 
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Chapter 8 
Beyond Mediation: Legal Professionals and Republican 
Trajectories  
 
 The fact that a Draft Law has aroused serious controversies among interested 
parties is nothing particularly interesting on its own. For one thing, such deliberative 
processes are always composed of battles between holders of different political 
agendas, professional interests, social priorities etc. The debates that I have analyzed 
in this dissertation, however, cannot be understood simply as struggles around a 
particular legislative process. The fact that holders of various positions in these 
debates around mediation are “vocal actors” who have shown an interest in the 
emergence of this institution -rather than political figures who deliberate on whether 
the Draft Law should be passed or not- requires a reading of these debates beyond 
legislative struggles.  
 On the other hand, the Draft Law on Mediation is certainly not the first or the last 
controversial item on the agenda of different political, professional or social groups in 
Turkey. In the field of Alternative Dispute Resolution, to say the least, the institution 
of victim offender mediation introduced in 2005 also provoked serious reactions from 
different groups. The institution has been introduced with the changes in the Criminal 
Code and the Criminal Code of Procedure and has been criticized particularly for 
being “imported” to the national legal system without taking into consideration 
existing “social structure and dynamics” (Ayata 2009, 67). During the deliberative 
sessions in the Grand National Assembly, parliamentarians have reacted to this 
institution on the grounds that “it will lead to irreparable consequences”, that it will 
completely “damage the justice system”, that it will mean “the privatization of the 
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judiciary”, that it will jeopardize the “independence of the judiciary” or that it will 
allow for the “appropriation of the legal system to brutal capitalism” (Ayata 2009, 
67).  
 After the enactment of the institution, legal theoreticians and practitioners have 
also opposed the practice regarding its possible consequences upon the existing legal 
system. It has been argued that this practice might lead to the prolonging of the 
criminal investigation procedure, to an increase in the workload of the prosecution 
offices or to a violation of the principle of presumption of innocence or the right to a 
fair trial. Legal professionals have also raised their concerns on the possibility of 
parties -especially in the case of women and juvenile victims- being forced into victim 
offender mediation which can eventually pose an obstacle to the right of access to 
justice (Ayata 2009).   
 Consequently, these struggles around the emergence of new institutions almost 
never emerge as purely technical debates or professional struggles for the monopoly 
of the right to determine law and what it can regulate. Within this context, an overall 
assessment of debates around mediation in general and the Draft Law in particular 
reveals that the struggles between the actors of the juridical field almost always have 
implications for the ways in which they imagine the society, the law and the legal 
profession. Hence, the boundaries of the juridical field seem to be determined 
relationally in the context of the struggles within the field over the monopoly of the 
form and the practice as well the struggles with external forces that constitute a 
challenge to the boundaries of this field.  
 In this sense, what I find most interesting about these debates around the 
emergence of new institutions is rather the opportunity they provide for an exploration 
of the struggles that actors within the juridical field are engaged in among themselves 
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as well as with external forces. Such an enterprise is also meaningful in the context of 
historicizing the struggles within the juridical field. Bourdieu’s employment of the 
concept of juridical field is argued to be transcending the particularities of the French 
case in the sense that he intended to provide a “a case study of a larger system, and of 
a broad series of patterns in the ‘juridical field’ in general” (Terdiman 1987, 806). 
Nevertheless, his inquiry still needs to be considered against a backdrop of historical 
particularities of each case to which it is applied as a general theoretical framework. 
For instance, his observations on the French and the Italian legal profession regarding 
the “membership of judges in the dominant class” and his interpretation of this 
situation as a universally noted one, fails to find a similar reciprocity in the position of 
judges in Turkey. Bourdieu argues that under the Old Regime, the magistrates holding 
noble titles by birth were usually members of aristocracy. Similarly, he presumes that 
a study on the social origins of those magistrates who joined the profession before 
1959 would also display that these people more often than not come from families in 
legal profession (Bourdieu 1987). As it has been previously mentioned, research on 
the social and economic origins of members of legal profession in Turkey, on the 
other hand, has consistently displayed the middle or lower middle class backgrounds 
of these professionals who come from families with relatively low number of 
members in the legal profession (Tan 1972; Cirhinlioğlu 1997; Sancar and Atılgan 
2009).  
 In this sense, while employing Bourdieu’s conceptual framework for an 
understanding of the struggles within the juridical field and their implications for the 
larger universe of power relations in Turkey; it is also important to realize the 
particularities of the juridical field in this context. Therefore, for the purpose of 
putting into context what the data that mediation representations as well as narratives 
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have revealed with regards the professional, social and ideological dispositions of 
legal professionals, this last chapter will provide an inquiry into the relevance of 
Republican trajectories for the legal consciousness of these actors operating within the 
juridical field.   
I. Binary Oppositions, Modernist Recollections 
 
 The brief historical account of Turkey’s experience with modernization has 
demonstrated the prevalence of a nationalist and statist paradigm in the development 
of the discourses, practices and institutions of the new regime. Within this context, 
law has played a significant role in the realization of the imagined social 
transformation. As the reception of western legal corpus and the establishment of new 
legal institutions in line with this new system of norms has been considered one of the 
primary means of establishing a modern state and creating a new national community, 
a new cadre of legal professionals has been raised as the carrier and the distributor of 
the principles of the new Republic. Consequently, the legal professional has quite 
often been portrayed as the embodiment of developmentalist aspirations of the 
Republic and the guardian of its nationalist and laicist foundations. In this sense, legal 
professionals have been mobilized de facto as carriers of secular law, legal institutions 
and norms within the society and as such have become significant actors in the 
regime’s battle with all that is imagined to be traditional, backward and irrational.  
 As the profession has been created by the regime for the purpose of consolidating 
the principles of the new secular legal system, in this foundational alliance between 
the legal profession and the state the former has been depicted primarily as an agent 
of the latter. This almost organic relation, however, has not remained uncontested in 
the face of changing turfs of power between the profession and the state. The political 
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inclination of the legal profession, however, seems to remain intact as can be 
observed in the frequent engagement of the judiciary in the world of politics and in 
administrative matters. Within this context, the fact that the state as the raison d’être 
of the legal profession has gradually lost its legitimating potential and that it has more 
and more come to be perceived as a rather controversial entity by the legal 
professionals does not seem to have produced an equally skeptical attitude towards 
the ideals of the Republican regime. Hence, in the face of transformations that the 
profession has been undergoing -mainly in tandem with the effects of globalization in 
general and its implications in the world of law in particular-, and the rapid increase in 
the intensity as well as the visibility of debates around the judiciary in Turkey, the 
question of how legal professionals make sense of their profession and its position 
vis-à-vis the state and the people remains to be valid. This question above all 
necessitates an inquiry into the legal consciousness of these professionals in order to 
understand to what extent -if at all- they make sense of their practice and of their role 
within the society in the framework of their original missionary identity.  
 In this context, my reading of the data from representations of mediation and the 
interviews suggests that the legal consciousness of these professionals is still very 
much shaped in reference to the modernist paradigm of the Republic with regards the 
ways in which they imagine the society, how they picture the role of law and the legal 
profession in this social imaginary. The implications of mediation debates for the 
legal consciousness of these professionals seem to suggest the prominence of three 
binary oppositions around which these actors frame their opinions on society, on law 
and on the profession: Public/private, formal/informal and modern/traditional. In one 
way or another, all of these divisions are relevant in the context of the ways in which 
the new Republic has imagined its new state, new nation and the relation between the 
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two. All three divisions are symbolic of the ways in which the modernist paradigm 
that has been definitive in the founding and the maintenance of the new Republic has 
been reproduced in the legal consciousness of legal professionals.  
1.  Public/Private 
 Debates around the scope of mediation in particular have quite often been framed 
by legal professionals in the context of a public/private divide. The distinction is an 
essential one in civil as well as common law traditions. As a generally accepted 
definition, the axis of private usually refers to areas that remain outside the scope of 
state’s regulation as these are matters that concern the relations that people establish 
with each other under equal conditions and with equal rights. Matters that concern the 
interest of the public, on the other hand, are generally defined as interactions between 
the state and the people and between different state organs; and precisely because of 
their “public” nature these areas are regulated by rules, regulations and sanctions that 
require state intervention. 
 Sociology has long proven the controversial relation between the public and the 
private. Feminist theory in particular has for a long time now problematized this 
distinction in the context of its implications for the political. This categorization, 
however, is also quite crude from a legal perspective as well. Above all, the 
distinction between these two areas around the presence or the absence of state 
intervention fails to recognize many overlapping areas. Abortion debates particularly 
in the USA, for instance, have raised serious controversies around the divide in the 
sense of protecting the individual rights of the mother and her right to privacy under 
the auspices of private law; while the life of the fetus has been considered as an issue 
of public interest in the context of protection of life (Turkel 1988).  
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 The liberal logic behind this distinction calls for the recognition of individual 
rights which should remain outside the scope of state’s intervention (Mnookin 1982). 
This initial explanation, however, is again almost always accompanied with a warning 
that such a division does not necessarily -neither in theory nor in practice- translate 
into a total absence of the state in private affairs or that all matters under public law 
are devoid of external checks and balances. Critical Legal Studies movement, for 
instance, with its roots in legal realism has consistently defamed this categorical 
approach which they identify with liberalism in the context of its failure to grasp the 
structural inequalities that are reproduced in these binary oppositions. Feminist branch 
of the movement has shown a particular interest in the implications of such a strictly 
categorical approach upon the reproduction of inequalities and the legitimation as 
well as the normalization of violence in the domestic sphere as it has been 
prototypically been entrapped in the scope of private law. Along the same lines, the 
state vs. non-state distinction that is claimed to be implied by this dichotomy -mainly 
in reference to issues of privatization that brings about the “disengagement” of the 
state in certain areas- has also been criticized for failing to recognize the transitional 
nature of matters that fall into these categories as in the case of state’s diminishing 
monopoly over the maintenance of security due to the partial transfer of this power 
into the hands of private enterprises (Law Commission of Canada  2003).  
 Given the prevalence of these controversies regarding the public/private division 
in the realm of legal theory and doctrine, the juridical field in Turkey has also been 
engaged in these debates on the implications of this division for legal interpretation. 
In the context of Turkey’s legal framework, for instance, the Civil Code of Procedure 
is considered to have elements of public law although in general it is considered to 
belong to the field of private law based on its relevance for disputes that concern the 
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free will of individuals. The fact that parties are free to file a lawsuit, to continue with 
it or to withdraw from it is considered to be the feature of Civil Code of Procedure 
that falls under the category of private law. On the other hand, with the filing of the 
lawsuit a “procedural relation” between the parties and between the parties and the 
judge is established which is in essence considered to be a matter of public law in the 
sense these relations are regulated by rules that include “imperative provisions” that 
the parties and the judge are all obliged to follow (Pekcanıtez, Atalay and Özekes 
2009, 56).  
 In this sense, the emergence of the public/private distinction in the representations 
of mediation and the narratives can be read in the context of the prominence of such a 
division in the legal consciousness of these actors operating within the juridical field. 
What is eminently more important from a socio-legal dimension, however, is not the 
division between public law and private law as such or the complications this division 
has aroused for legal interpretation. Narratives suggest that legal professionals’ take 
on this division cannot be understood simply in terms of legal interpretational 
differences. Instead, in the debates around the scope of the practice and whether 
disputes that are eligible for mediation should be listed or not, legal professionals 
almost always seem to approach the issue in the context of the possible implications 
of this vagueness upon the existing structure of social relations. Hence, in a number of 
instances, respondents have engaged in debates on the dynamic nature of the concept 
of public order on the one hand; while on the other they have argued for the necessity 
of listing the disputes within this category. In the former group of narratives, for 
instance, reference has been made to the above mentioned transitional nature of these 
matters given their imminent relation with the changing demands and relations in the 
social, political and economic fields. In this context, it has been argued that the fact 
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that what was once considered a criminal act could today be considered as a matter of 
civil law attests to this ambiguity of the division between public interest and personal 
disposition. Hence, what is considered to be one of the central questions of political 
theory and moral philosophy, i.e. the question of “what activities should be 
considered ‘private’ and why”, appears to be a fundamental issue of debate between 
legal professionals as they think and talk about the emergence of mediation (Mnookin 
1982, 1429).  
 In this particular context, the question has emerged as a key issue in determining 
what is left to the control of the state and what the parties can decide by themselves. 
At this point, the main line of controversy revolves around concerns regarding the 
possibility of matters that are imagined to be in the interest of the public being 
interpreted as matters of personal disposition and hence being exempt from state’s 
regulatory power. Hence, it is not that some legal professionals believe that the state 
should be regulating all areas of life; rather, it is a question of how this division 
between the public and the private will be established and maintained in practice. In 
this sense, a possible misinterpretation of matters of public interest as private disputes 
-which is imagined to be a realistic possibility in the context of people lacking a legal 
education becoming mediators-, is considered to be a potential threat for the 
sovereignty of the state that is above all imagined to be symbolized by its judicial 
authority. In fact, the word “alternative” has quite often been approached in reference 
to state’s monopoly over disputes through its formally established and recognized 
judicial institutions. Within this context, there have been occasional remarks on how 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms cannot be and should not be seen as 
alternatives to the official judicial power of the state.  
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 This reference to the judicial power of the state as an integral symbol of its 
sovereignty and autonomy has come up at different moments during the interviews. 
Sometimes it has been expressed in the context of constitutional provisions on the 
judiciary as a symbol of the sovereignty of the state or in reference to a continuing 
legal tradition that has since Roman times established explicit rules and regulations on 
the use of state power for the protection of rights; while sometimes it has been 
explained in the context of mediation being a legitimate way of weakening the state 
by weakening its power to distribute justice. Some respondents imagined this 
sovereignty from a Weberian perspective in the context of state’s monopoly over the 
legitimate use of force; while some others explained it in reference to law being the 
foundation of the state.  
…ultimately you represent the autonomy of a state with its flag and 
its judiciary. I mean the state has two symbols, has two prerequisites. 
One is its flag that is the symbol of its independence and the other is 
the judiciary that is representative of national law. No matter how 
much you accept international law, every country or maybe even 
every state has its own unique laws and judicial authorities. You can 
bring a sculptor from England, you can bring a doctor from Chile, 
you can bring a chemist from America but you cannot bring a judge 
or a prosecutor. You cannot bring a lawyer. And you cannot send one 
from Turkey either. Law is the private sphere of every nation, of 
every state. And the judicial authority is exercised in the name of the 
nation by specially empowered officials…Now, are we going to get 
somewhere by asking others to solve our problems that we fail to 
solve? Can a person who lets others solve his problems get 
anywhere? What about a state? Here the state will say ‘I cannot fulfill 
my obligation to dispense justice, you go and find yourself an 
arbitration judge, or what have you and you solve it on your own. 
This is the declaration of state’s failure!261 
 
 Within this context, threats that are imagined to be posed against this sovereignty 
have been explained in reference to external forces as well as certain internal 
dynamics. In this sense, while some respondents argued that these novel institutions 
like mediation have been “enforced” by external pressures as in the case of demands 
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of the EU; some others claimed that as a new, thriving, attractive market Turkey has 
been approached as a new economic opportunity and a new potential “zone of 
hegemony” for foreign powers. In the context of internal threats, on the other hand, 
legal professionals have referred to the possibility of the emergence of multiple 
jurisdictions and the privatization of law. Both of these threats have been imagined in 
reference to the possibility of extralegal, informal, quite often conservative -as in the 
case of imams as mediators-, violence-prone -as in the case of mafia raising its own 
mediators-, or highly traditional -as in the case of feudal relations controlling the 
mediation process- formations challenging the judicial authority of the state. In these 
narratives, the “public” is more often than imagined as the legitimate sphere for state 
operations. Hence, mediation as an alternative mechanism is imagined to constitute a 
challenge to state’s claimed monopoly. This perceived threat has been expressed by 
an opposing respondent in the context of a challenge to the prevailing mentality of 
“statism”. The respondent argued that as in the economic or the political field, in the 
field of law statism has also been a typical feature of policies and practices.  
 Within this context, it is also important to recognize that the public/private 
division has always been a controversial issue of politics in Turkey. As the image of 
the strong state, the father state, the state as the educator has been one of the defining 
characteristics of the Republic; the project of creating a unified political community in 
line with the ideals of the new regime has more often than not been carried out in an 
authoritarian fashion in the sense of sacrificing the individual -hence the private- for 
the sake of the state, i.e. the public. In this context, the public has always been the 
main performance sphere for the new state where modernist symbols of the regime 
have been circulated without significant transformative effects upon the relations and 
practices defining the private. In this sense, as the new Republic was above all a 
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modernist project that intended to create a break with the past by eliminating all 
representations of backwardness, traditionalism and irrationality identified with this 
past, its main target has been the transformation of the public sphere as the “window” 
of the new modern outlook of the state and the nation. 
 In this way, by confining the remnants of the past in the private sphere, the 
Republic has controlled the ways in which public life has been experienced by the 
people. The fundamental principle of laicism, for instance, has been realized by 
eliminating all religious symbols from the public sphere and keeping religion under 
the strict control of the state through institutional steps like the establishment of the 
Presidency of Religious Affairs under the Prime Ministry and including compulsory 
courses on religious culture and ethics in primary and secondary schools. Similarly, 
while serious steps have been taken in the field of women’s rights, these have been 
criticized as nominal initiatives in the sense that women have been taken as the 
primary feature of a modern outlook, but their individuality, their role in the domestic 
sphere, the prominence of patriarchal relations of power have not been tackled as 
issues of political and social urgency on their own.  
 In this sense, the controversies around the public/private divide that have emerged 
in the narratives can be interpreted in the context of this characteristic feature of the 
Republican project. The fact that new identity claims and their increasing visibility 
have turned the public into an even more controversial sphere further contributes to 
the intensity of the concerns around a possible ambiguity in the distinction between 
the public and the private. As it has been discussed in the preceding sections, in 
several instances during the interviews debates on the (in)clarity of disputes that are 
eligible for mediation have been interpreted in the context of the possible implications 
of such an ambiguity upon the existing social order. In this sense, the reemergence of 
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multiple jurisdictions or the reproduction of feudal ties and patriarchal relations have 
been raised as possible consequences of the mediation process especially if people 
who are not legal professionals are to become mediators. Such consequences are 
imagined to be symbolic of the state losing its grip over the public as informal, 
extralegal and traditional relations and ways of resolving disputes start to penetrate 
into the formal legal system through the institution of mediation. This possibility is 
imagined to be a threat to the law of the state that is -as characteristic of 
developmentalist nation state models- imagined to be symbolic of national 
sovereignty (Koğacıoğlu 2007).  
2.  Formal/Informal  
 The dichotomy of formal/informal has emerged as another useful heuristic tool to 
understand the ways in which the practice of mediation and its relation with the 
existing judicial framework has been imagined by legal professionals and how these 
imaginaries can be interpreted in relation to Republican trajectories. Given that during 
the establishment of the Republic law has been mobilized as one of the motor forces 
behind the imagined social transformation, claiming that the “power of the formal” 
has occupied a special place in the modernist framework of the regime would not be 
irrelevant. Within this context, the frequent appearance of the formal/informal 
dichotomy in the narratives can be read in the context of the continuing impact of 
modernist sentiments and developmentalist aspirations of the regime in shaping the 
legal consciousness of these professionals. Narratives quite often refer to the power of 
the formal vis-à-vis the informal which has been explained particularly in the context 
of three main issues: The power of codification, the authority of judicial mechanisms 
of the state and the significance of legal formation.   
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 In the context of the first issue, the questions of which disputes will be eligible for 
mediation and whether or not these disputes should be listed have quite often been 
approached in reference to the power of formal law symbolized in the codification of 
rules and procedures of mediation as a separate legal text. The codification of the 
rules and the processes of the institution as such are imagined to create an effect of 
predictability, consistency and impartiality all of which are imagined to be 
characteristic features of formal law. In this sense, narratives have quite often referred 
to the significance of these effects in the context of creating a feeling of trust towards 
the institution which is considered to be vital for its social recognition.  
 Within this context, the fact that mediation is being introduced as a formal 
institution with legally outlined rules and procedures as well as supervisory 
mechanisms is considered to be an encouraging factor for the people. This feature is 
imagined to be further reinforced with the legal guarantees introduced with the 
opportunity of taking the mediation agreement to a Court of Enforcement. In this 
sense, it has been previously noted that respondents who have disagreed on the legal 
quality of the mediation agreement nevertheless seem to share a common conviction 
on the power of formal law and its official mechanisms in the field of dispute 
resolution. Hence, similar to the ways in which codification has been imagined as a 
potentially encouraging feature of formal law, its recognized mechanisms -courts 
being the most significant ones- have also quite often been regarded as essential for 
the consolidation of the institution. In this sense, even those respondents who argued 
that the nature of mediation practice is not compatible with judicial review 
nevertheless expressed the need to institutionalize this practice within a codified legal 
framework and to allow its outcomes to be reviewed by official judicial mechanisms.  
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 In this distinction between the formal and in the informal, however, the power of 
the formal has not always been approached positively particularly in the context of the 
implications of this formalization upon the imagined boundaries between the juridical 
field and mediation. While on the one hand the codification of the practices and the 
inclusion of judicial review in the process have been interpreted as significant legal 
guarantees that will make the institution more trustworthy in the eyes of the people; 
on the other hand, it has also been argued that this formalization will possibly bring 
about the institutionalization, the legitimation and the normalization of informal 
methods of dispute resolution. In this sense, narratives on how mediation will lead to 
multiple jurisdictions, how it will allow for the reproduction of different types of 
inequalities through a formal state mechanism and how all of this in effect means the 
declaration of the state’s incapacity to perform one of its basic functions -the 
distribution of justice- have quite often approached formalization as a dangerous 
issue. As it has been discussed in the preceding sections, these narratives have quite 
often referred to the existence of feudal ties, patriarchal relations and sectarian 
identities within the society. These social structures are always imagined to be 
symbols of the backwardness, the irrationality or the conservatism of the people and 
being so they are more often than not depicted as threats for a modern society which 
remains to be a shared ideal among legal professionals.  
 In this sense, even in narratives where the respondents were rather supportive of 
the introduction of mediation and approached its formalization in a positive fashion, 
responses were also framed in reference to the possibility of controlling such informal 
practices and sets of meaning through a formally regulated practice of mediation. 
Hence, the power of the formal has been recognized by respondents with opposing 
positions towards the practice. While some seemed to be concerned about the power 
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of the formal in the sense that it might be mobilized to legitimize precisely the 
practices that it set out to make irrelevant in the first place; others claimed that the 
power of the formal in the sense of controlling these practices can still be realized if 
mediation is introduced as an institution with codified rules and official mechanisms 
and actors.  
 These discourses that interpret the issue of the formalization of mediation quite 
differently yet share a common conviction in the power of the formal are also relevant 
for the monopoly of the state over disputes and hence the sovereignty of the state. In 
the analysis of the public/private dichotomy, this issue has come up in the context of 
mediation posing a challenge to the state’s monopoly over the “public” given the 
imagined possibility of disputes that concern public interest being interpreted as 
matters of personal disposition. In the context of the formal/informal distinction, on 
the other hand, the monopoly of the state is both imagined to be threatened and 
reinforced through the codification of mediation practice and its regulation within a 
formally established structure. With regards the positions towards formalization as a 
possible way to legitimize informality, the state’s monopoly -hence its sovereignty- is 
imagined to be threatened by the possible diffusion of extralegal elements into the 
legal domain. Positions that approach this formalization as an opportunity for 
controlling these extralegal formations, on the other hand, seem to suggest a 
reinstitutionalization of the monopoly of the state over these areas that have been left 
to the personal and the traditional through a formalized practice of mediation. 
 In the context of the imagined power of the formal, one last issue also appeared to 
be quite easily detectable. This is the significance attributed to a formal legal 
education in particular and to an overall legal formation in general. With respect to 
the issue of codification, for instance, the technical competence of legal professionals 
 286
has quite often been imagined as the necessary symbolic capital that allows for the 
determination of which disputes concern the public interest and which can be left to 
the will of the parties. The significance of legal formation has become particularly 
evident in the debates on the power of the formal upon the existing traditional 
relations and the social inequalities that are imagined to be their consequences. 
Respondents who raised their concerns on the possibility of people lacking a legal 
education becoming mediators were particularly insistent about the particular types of 
symbolic capital that are imagined to be operational in the juridical field. These 
narratives have quite often identified the field of formal dispute resolution with the 
official practice of law and hence they imagined mediation as an essentially juridical 
practice. Within this context, these respondents claimed that people who are not 
trained in the word of law, who have not been through a process of internalization of 
the “notion of law” and who have therefore not developed a mechanical state of mind 
that would allow them to remain impartial in the process of dispute resolution would 
ultimately contribute to a reproduction of existing inequalities.  
 Even though the association between a legal formation and the power of the 
formal has been less explicit in the sense that there have also been quite a number of 
respondents who did not believe that mediators need to be legal professionals, still the 
fact remains the formal/informal dichotomy has also been made sense of in the 
context of certain characteristics that are imagined to belong to legal professionals 
only. Within this context, it is possible to argue that the power of the formal -whether 
it is associated with codification, with official judicial mechanisms or with certain 
attributes of the legal profession- has been imagined as a significant force major in the 
face of particular informal practices and mechanisms of dispute resolution that are 
almost always identified with structured inequalities. In this sense, the Republican 
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project’s emphasis on the power of formal rational law, on its mechanisms and on the 
creation of a professional cadre that is expected to operate within this formal rational 
framework can still be observed in these debates around mediation.  
 Representations of mediation as well as the narratives have displayed that the 
power of the formal is more often than not imagined to be particularly crucial in a 
society that is imagined to be carrying the remnants of the past that the Republican 
project set out to replace with new sets of meaning and new practices. In this context, 
as the Republican elites wanted to create a new political community from scratch 
which required a top-down project of social transformation, the conservative powers, 
the feudal relations, the irrational sets of meaning making that existed among the 
people constituted their primary targets. Debates on mediation, however, display that 
legal professionals still imagine the social structure to be operating around these 
features as they quite frequently frame their opinions on the power of the formal in 
reference to these features. In this sense, the formal law, its institutions and actors still 
constitute a special place in the legal consciousness of these professionals when they 
imagine the society.  
3.  Modern/Traditional 
 The modern/traditional dichotomy has been one of the founding dilemmas of the 
Republic since its establishment. It has been previously discussed how the new 
regime in particular set out to abolish the remnants of the Ottoman past that have been 
characterized as backward, traditional and irrational. As the new regime was a project 
of state building as much as society formation in line with the ideals of the new 
Republic, it aspired to create an official break with the past for the attainment of the 
ideal of catching up with the western civilization which in effect brought about a 
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massive top-down social transformation. In this sense, the modern/traditional division 
has emerged as one of the defining dilemmas for the elites of the new Republic and as 
such it constituted the main axis of operation for the new regime. Within this context, 
an exploration of how legal professionals make sense of this opposition as they think 
and talk about the emergence of mediation is significant for an inquiry into the extent 
to which the legal consciousness of these professionals is still shaped from within 
modernist sentiments of the Republican regime.  
 The modern/traditional division can first and foremost be observed in the debates 
around the existing forms of dispute resolution within the society and how these 
mechanisms have been explained in relation to the emerging formal institution of 
mediation by legal professionals. Respondents have quite often framed their opinions 
on the compatibility of mediation with the existing social structure in Turkey in the 
context of the existing local traditions of mediation where a third party is involved in 
the resolution of a conflict between members of a family, a community, an aşiret, a 
sect etc. These traditional mechanisms have been approached by some respondents as 
a positive feature of the social structure in the sense of making it easier for people to 
get used to the institution of mediation given their cultural familiarity with similar 
methods of dispute resolution. In these narratives a culture of conciliation is imagined 
to be a part of the social structure; but it is usually referred to as a feature of a distant 
memory of the way that the society used to be in the past before massive waves of 
urbanization, intensifying economic struggles and the weakening of social control 
mechanisms disrupted its structure. In this sense, the formal mechanism of mediation 
has even been imagined as an opportunity for reawakening that culture of conciliation 
among the people since it will offer them an alternative way to resolve their disputes.  
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 These same mechanisms have also been approached in a negative fashion by some 
respondents in the sense that they have been imagined to be symbolic of the low level 
of education and development in the society which in turn have been associated with a 
general cultural backwardness. In these narratives, these observations on the society 
have quite often been framed in the context of a low penetration of formal law into the 
local practices of the people. In this sense, formal law has not been able to become a 
defining set of meaning or a meaningful category of social practice in the lives of the 
people and thereby traditional methods of dispute resolution remain to be influential. 
Within this context, in these narratives as well as in the narratives that approach these 
traditional mechanisms in a rather positive fashion, there seems to be a prevalent 
discourse of developmentalism.  
 In the context of the former category of narratives, this discourse is more often 
than not shaped around the conviction that by educating people about their rights and 
by making them more conscious, a culture of conciliation can be created within the 
society. This developmentalist discourse is reinforced by common reference to the 
situation in European societies where people are imagined to be more rights conscious 
and more conciliatory. In the narratives that openly target traditional methods, on the 
other hand, this discourse becomes even more explicit in the context of an imagined 
tension between these traditional sets of meaning and practices and modern 
imaginaries that the Republic has set out to establish within the society. This tension 
has been explained in the context of the incompatibility of these traditional elements 
within the society with the legal norms and institutions that have been imported from 
the West since they are symbolic of a totally different cultural context.  
 Overall, these narratives have emphasized the significance of a culture of 
conciliation for the formal practice of mediation to be internalized by the people in 
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Turkey. In this sense, they have often referred to the situation in the West, particularly 
in European societies, where people are imagined to be more respectful of each 
others’ rights, where they have internalized democratic values and where they are 
more educated and more socially conscious. These social characteristics are imagined 
to be absent in Turkey given the prevalence of traditional mechanisms, relations and 
practices all of which are associated with the low level of social development.  
 These observations on the tension between the traditional and the modern which 
in some cases has even been explained as a reason for the incompatibility of 
mediation with the existing social structure in Turkey have also been coupled with 
comments on the prominence of collective identities shaped within feudal ties, 
patriarchal relations and sectarian affinities. These traditional structures have all been 
explained in the context of structural inequalities that they reproduce. Within this 
context, these structures have usually been explained as remnants of a traditional 
society that operates within a conservative, patriarchal, irrational frame of mind 
instead of modern, laicist and positivistic one. One of the respondents, for instance, 
explained how the people still see themselves as “subjects” of the state rather than its 
citizens.262 The respondent argued that this was in fact what the Republic set out to 
accomplish in the first place but that “the importance of the West, of modernization 
and of catching up with the civilization” has not been recognized by anyone but 
Mustafa Kemal himself. This in effect means that the Republican project as imagined 
                                                 
262 This opposition of subject vs. citizen is a commonly employed axis of comparison between the 
Ottoman Empire and the new Republic. In this comparison, the Republic is usually glorified for having 
turned subjects who did not hold any individual or collective rights into citizens who are endowed with 
civil, social and political rights and who can practice these rights under legal guarantees. This transition 
however has also been challenged in the context of the public mobilizing the law in the Ottoman 
Empire. For instance, through an analysis of the earliest complete law court register available for the 
city of Istanbul and environs, Yvonne Seng argues that as opposed to the commonly held stereotypes of 
Ottoman women as “closeted and powerless victims of law and customs”, there appears to be a reverse 
reality of the court as the protector of women and the consciousness of women about their access to the 
court (Seng 1994). 
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by Atatürk was in fact not internalized by his cadres or followers which is the main 
reason why contemporary Turkey is still dealing with the remnants of these traditional 
structures, values and practices.263 
 All in all, the three dichotomies that can be detected in the debates that legal 
professionals engage in as they position themselves with respect to the emerging 
institution of mediation designate the relevance of modernist and developmentalist 
aspirations of the Republican project for the legal consciousness of these actors. 
These dichotomies reveal how in the struggles around mediation the legal 
professionals are not only competing for the right to determine the boundaries of their 
field of operation; but they are also imagining the society, the law and their profession 
within a modernist framework. The controversial relation between the public and the 
private, the conviction in the power of the formal over the informal and the promise of 
the modern to replace the traditional can all be read as signifiers of the prevalence of 
this framework. The Republican belief that through the mobilization of the formal 
law, through the control of the public as the face of the modern nation and through the 
eradication of all that is considered to be traditional, a new state with a new nation 
could be created and maintained seems to find its reflections in the legal 
consciousness of these professionals as they position themselves in the debates around 
mediation. 
                                                 
263 Interview # 25 
 292
Chapter 9 
Summary and Concluding Remarks  
 
 At the beginning of this research, I was mostly interested in understanding the 
struggles that revolve around the emergence of a new field in Turkey. My initial 
observations on mediation have led me to believe that the practice was emerging as a 
new field that is imagined to be challenging the boundaries of the existing juridical 
field in Turkey. The more I got involved in the debates, however, the more I realized 
that mediation was in fact not emerging as a field on its own in the sense that the 
debates around mediation rather revolved around how this new practice can be 
situated within the existing framework of the juridical field and what types of 
implications it has upon the legal profession. In this sense, rather than signaling the 
emergence of a new field, the debates around mediation seem to focus on the 
compatibility of this new institution with the existing legal system and the 
repercussions of this practice upon existing modes of operation in the juridical field.  
 On that account, the question whether mediation will emerge as a field on its own 
in Bourdieusian sense is yet an open one. At this point, it is not possible to talk about 
experts and the particular type of capital(s) that are recognized within this space; there 
are no established structures, accepted modes of operation or unique rituals. 
Nevertheless, it has still been possible to talk about what kind of an expertise is 
imagined -what kinds of symbolic capital are envisioned in order to be operating 
within this space-, who are considered to be the relevant actors -what will be the axes 
of competition for the right to determine what mediation will be about- and what kind 
of a relation is imagined with the existing juridical field as well as the social structure. 
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In this sense, an exploration of the axes of competition for the right to determine what 
mediation will look like in turn allowed for an empirical understanding of the 
recognized sources of authority, accepted modes of operation, valued types of 
symbolic capital within the juridical field in Turkey.  
I. Summary of Analyses  
 
 In the framework of these objectives, through an analysis of the struggles around 
mediation I first set out to explore how the boundaries of the juridical field are 
imagined by legal professionals as they engage in debates around mediation. Since 
these debates primarily emerged in the context of the Draft Law, I have taken it as the 
primary axis of contestation around which the actors have taken different positions in 
line with their professional interests as well as social, political and ideological 
dispositions.  Overall, the representations of mediation in various channels as well as 
the data from the interviews with actors who have been active in the debates around 
mediation have allowed me to decipher three main controversial issues in these 
debates around the Draft Law: Scope of mediation, agreement to be signed at the end 
of the process and potential mediators.  
 From within a Bourdieusian framework, I have considered the struggles around 
these issues to be symbolic of the competition within the juridical field for the right to 
determine law. In the debates around which disputes can be eligible for mediation, 
around the legal quality of mediation agreement and around the technical competence 
of potential mediators, legal professionals seemed to be submerged in competitive 
struggles for the control over the means through which the authority of this field is 
sustained. This in effect has implications for the boundaries of the juridical field 
through which its relative autonomy is reaffirmed.  
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 In this sense, contestations around which disputes can go to mediation and 
whether or not these disputes should be clearly outlined in the Draft Law point out to 
the significance of the distinction between public interest and personal disposition for 
determining the areas in social life that are under legal regulation. In the debates 
around the borders of the conversion of prejuridical interests into juridical ones, legal 
professionals seem to be simultaneously engaged in a struggle for determining the 
boundaries of law’s relative autonomy from other systems of dispute resolution. 
Hence, the struggles around naming the disputes that are eligible for mediation are at 
the same time reflexive of a concern for codification and formalization which in effect 
are considered to be the producers of law’s efficacy. The controversies around the 
limits of legal regulation among the actors operating within the juridical field are in 
fact constitutive of the field in the sense that as these actors take different positions 
with respect to the form, they are at the same time engaged in a mutual enterprise of 
contributing to the relative autonomy of the field. 
 In the context of mediation agreement, on the other hand, the struggles among 
legal professionals seem to revolve around the legal quality of this agreement. These 
debates have also displayed a certain shared interest in the power of formal law and 
its institutions. In this sense, actors with opposing views on the legal quality of this 
agreement seem to share a common conviction in the power of legal guarantees to 
encourage people to use mediation services. Even in responses that questioned the 
necessity of including legal guarantees in the Draft Law, there emerged a certain 
belief in the power of formal law and its mechanisms to create a sense of trust towards 
mediation as it will be institutionalized in an official structure and regulated within a 
formal rational framework. This common conviction is again symbolic of the ways in 
which the boundaries of the juridical field are imagined by legal professionals. In this 
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conviction in the power of formalization and institutionalization lies the imagined 
neutrality and autonomy of law that not only unifies legal professionals despite their 
internal competition for the monopoly to determine law, but also contributes to the 
social recognition of law’s efficacy. This social recognition is in turn what allows for 
the maintenance of the relative autonomy of the juridical field. This autonomy is 
“never complete and must be reaffirmed constantly” and it is in these struggles among 
the actors operating within the juridical field that this reaffirmation takes place 
(Dezalay and Garth 1996, 281).  
 Last but not least, the qualities of mediators seem to constitute the most 
controversial issue for legal professionals. The debates around the qualifications of 
mediators not only designate the significance of legal formation as a recognized 
symbolic capital of the juridical field; but they are also reflexive of the ways in which 
the boundaries of this field are imagined by legal professionals. In the narratives, legal 
formation has almost always been imagined beyond a formal legal education in the 
sense that it has been explained as a life long learning process through which legal 
professionals aspire to reach the level of sophistication that the study and the practice 
of law calls for. In this sense, it has been explained in relation to particular traits such 
as impartiality and trust that are imagined to be acquired through participating in the 
“game”. Bourdieu argues that “the long dialectical process, often described as 
‘vocation’, through which the various fields provide themselves with agents equipped 
with the habitus needed to make them work, is to the learning of a game very much as 
the acquisition of the mother tongue is to the learning of a foreign language”. In this 
sense, the earlier the agent enters the game, the more is his unawareness of the 
presuppositions of the game and his ignorance of “all that is tacitly granted through 
his investment in the field” (Bourdieu 1990b, 67).  
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 Within this context, the conviction in the power of the formal and the codified as 
well as the faith in the power of legal formation to endow actors with traits of 
impartiality and trust which are in turn imagined to be acquired through a legal 
formation that is never complete both connote Bourdieu’s depiction of “belief” as an 
integral part of “belonging to a field”. In this depiction, “belief” constitutes a 
condition for entry that is imposed by the field not through sanctions, but through 
“arranging things” in practice so that the operations of the field and its “fundamental 
presuppositions” receive an undisputed compliance from agents entering the field. In 
this sense, the rules and practices of the game together which constitute what 
Bourdieu calls a “feel for the game” can only be acquired “by birth or by a slow 
process of co-option and initiation which is equivalent to a second birth”. In this sense 
Bourdieu sees this practical faith in the game as a “state of the body” rather than a 
“state of the mind” that cannot be understood in the context of a simple “adherence to 
a set of instituted dogmas or doctrines” (Bourdieu 1990b, 68). It is in this sense that in 
the debates around the mediators, legal professionals outline the type symbolic capital 
that is required for operating within the juridical field that cannot be acquired solely 
through a legal training or through a competence over the word of law for that matter.  
 In the second part of my analysis, I contextualized these debates in the larger 
universe of social relations. This was explained in reference to Bourdieu’s theoretical 
framework that sees the positions within the field in terms of their objective relations 
with each other that are defined in terms of “specific profits at stake in the field” as 
well as by their objective relations with the larger universe of power (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992, 97). At the same time, this contextualization was also justified in 
reference to the particular choice of mediation debates as the main unit of analysis. 
Within this context, I explained this choice in relation to the rather marginal character 
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of disputes that are eligible for mediation. In this sense, the fact that these disputes 
exist on the margins of formal law has been explained as the reason why the debates 
around them almost always have implications for the ways in which the legal 
professionals imagine the society, the law and the legal profession.  
 As legal professionals engaged in debates around mediation, two themes about the 
ways in which they imagine the society seemed to be particularly observable in their 
narratives. In the context of mediation’s compatibility with the existing social 
structure, legal professionals quite often framed their opinions in reference to a 
culture of conciliation and the feudal structure of society.  
 In relation to the former, the presence of traditional dispute resolution 
mechanisms in the society has come up as a common issue in the narratives that has 
been acknowledged by most of the respondents. However, while some professionals 
explained the presence of such mechanisms in a positive fashion in the sense that 
given their traditional familiarity with alternative mechanisms the people would have 
an easier time adopting to the institution of mediation; other professionals referred to 
these mechanisms in quite a pejorative fashion mainly explaining these mechanisms 
as signs of backwardness and insufficient penetration of formal law in the value 
systems and practices of the people. In both lines of narratives, however, a common 
reference to a culture of conciliation has been observed. This culture has either been 
imagined as waning due to massive social and economic transformations and the 
weakening of social bonds; or it has been imagined to be nonexistent among the 
people all together. In either case, the waning or the absence of such a culture has 
been explained in the context of an overall lack of social consciousness which has 
been framed in a discourse of developmentalism. Overall, respondents associated this 
culture of conciliation with a society that has managed to reach a certain level of 
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development where people respect and trust each other, are ready to make sacrifices, 
are conscious about their legal rights and able to mobilize them when necessary. 
Mediation, in this respect, has been imagined as a practice that is much more 
compatible for such a social order. In the absence of such values and practices, the 
power of the formal law and its institutionalized practices and mechanisms are 
attributed an even more crucial importance.  
  This power of the formal becomes even more explicit in the context of the feudal 
structure of the society. Either in the form of tribal institutions, sectarian networks or 
patriarchal relations, a prominent feudal structure is imagined to exist within the 
society and as such is seen as the main source of existing inequalities in social 
relations. In this context, some of the respondents explained their opposition to the 
Draft Law in reference to an overall concern about the penetration of such relations 
into the mediation process especially if the mediators are not required to be legal 
professionals. In these narratives, the power of the formal has been recognized and as 
such it has been feared that it might be misused by people who lack the necessary 
capital to operate in this field. In this sense, the fact that mediation will be an 
officially institutionalized mechanism with codified rules, regulations and supervisory 
mechanisms has been interpreted as a possible opportunity for the legitimation of 
extralegal forms of dispute resolution.  
 At the same time, legal professionals who were less skeptical about the 
penetration of such forms into the formal framework of law also focused on the power 
of formalization; but this time in reference to positive effects of such formalization 
upon these feudal structures. In these narratives, given its formalized and codified 
structure, mediation was instead seen as a possible countercheck for these 
mechanisms in the sense that people who are unable to resist authority under these 
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structures can in fact be empowered through this formal process of dispute resolution. 
Similar to the remarks on the culture of conciliation, the ways in which legal 
professionals think and talk about the compatibility of mediation with the existing 
feudal structures also evoke a prominent developmentalist discourse. In this sense, the 
presence and the influence of these feudal structures in the lives of the people has 
more often than not been explained in reference to the low level of education and 
development in the society. The power of the formal has again been imagined to be all 
the more important in the face of a sociocultural structure that remains to be operating 
within primordial ties.  
 The debates around mediation also have implications for the ways in which legal 
professionals imagine law and its relation to the society at large. Here again, it was 
observed that two discourses were particularly prominent in the representations of 
mediation and the narratives of legal professionals: Legal culture and social change 
through law. In the previous debates about the compatibility of mediation with the 
social structure, aside from the particular image of society that exists in the legal 
consciousness of these professionals, a certain type of legal culture also emerged as a 
prominent feature of the ways in which these actors imagined this compatibility. This 
culture was mainly explained in reference to people’s expectations from law and the 
role of formal rational law in dispute resolution. In the context of the former, legal 
professionals referred to people’s pragmatic mobilization of law that is explained in 
reference to concerns about getting what they want, proving that they are right or 
hurting the other party. In line with these depictions, the role of law in dispute 
resolution has also been imagined primarily as a vengeance mechanism that is 
approached as a last resort.   
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 This legal culture has more often than not been compared to one where people are 
more rights conscious and hence they mobilize the law because they actually try to 
settle their disputes. In the absence or weakness of a culture of conciliation among the 
people, expectations from law and the role of formal legal mechanisms in people’s 
lives have rather been imagined in instrumentalist terms where people are more 
concerned about getting what they want than ending the dispute in a conciliatory 
fashion. Within this context, this absence of rights consciousness among the people 
has again been explained as a feature of underdevelopment in the sense that people 
are not educated enough to assume the responsibilities that come with rights. Law in 
this sense has been imagined as a rather distant element in people’s lives. Rather than 
being an inherent feature of their value systems and modes of operation, law has been 
imagined as a pragmatic tool in people’s lives that is employed either when other 
means fail or when they need an affirmation of their case by a superior authority.   
 This imagined gap between the people and law has become more observable in 
the second discourse that was prominent in the ways in which legal professionals 
imagined law. In the context of the imagined absence of a culture of rights 
consciousness among the people, law has been imagined as one of the primary means 
through which such a culture can be established and maintained. In this sense, the 
ways in which legal professionals explained the existing legal culture and how they 
explained the transformative capacity of law and the empowering character of formal 
rational law and its mechanisms displayed a discrepancy between what is believed to 
exist and what is imagined as the ideal. This gap between the actual and the ideal is 
indicative of a prevailing conviction in the power of formal law to change the society. 
This conviction, however, does not seem to find much application in reality. This 
failure has more often than not been explained in reference to the authoritarian nature 
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of legal reforms in the history of Turkey where people have been introduced to a set 
of norms and practices from above without being an active part of the process of 
change.  
 This issue of gap between the people and law which is imagined to translate into a 
gap between the inherent transformative potential of law and its realization in practice 
has also been brought up in the context of the third feature of the legal consciousness 
which is related to the ways in which the legal profession has been imagined by actors 
as they engaged in debates around mediation. How these actors talked about the 
existing legal education and how imagined an ideal one as well as the ways in which 
they have described what it means to be a legal professional have come up as two 
significant lines of discourse. In the context of the existing situation of legal education 
in Turkey, legal professionals have almost always displayed a critical attitude. In this 
sense, the gap between legal theory and practice, the unsatisfactory quality of teaching 
staff, the increasing number of law faculties with insufficient means and personnel, 
the absence of quality checks for professional conduct have all emerged as issues that 
have been strongly criticized by legal professionals.  
 These issues have at the same time been coupled with depictions of an ideal legal 
education as imagined by legal professionals. In such narratives, legal education has 
almost always been imagined beyond a four year training at a law faculty. It has, 
instead, been depicted as a life long learning process that requires those who enter it 
to internalize the notion of law and perform accordingly. In these idealized depictions 
of legal education there was always a particular image of the ideal professional. In 
this sense, the idealized picture of legal education that seemed to prevail in the legal 
consciousness of these actors almost always had implications for what it means to be 
a legal professional and the imagined role of this professional in the society.  
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 In this context, with regards the question of what it means to be a legal 
professional, the above mentioned issue about the difference between a law graduate 
and a legal professional has been employed as a common axis of definition by these 
actors. In this sense, the legal professional has been attributed certain traits beyond a 
legal education such as capacity of legal reasoning, having internalized the notion of 
law that requires one to be solution oriented, patient, impartial etc. Thus, the legal 
professional in the consciousness of these actors appeared to be a full fledged persona 
who not only had an excellent command of law and legal practice, but was also 
intellectually equipped and socially observant. Inscribed in the deepest levels of 
habitus, the profession is imagined as a life long journey of learning and evolving. In 
this sense, quite often imagined as “superior” to others, legal profession has more 
often than not been associated with certain social responsibilities such as contributing 
to the development of the society and keeping the interests of the people above the 
ones of the profession. In some cases defined in terms of a social mission and in some 
as a guardian in the face of injustice, despite the disappointments with the current 
situation of the profession, there seems to remain an overall conviction in what it 
really means to be a legal professional and the importance of its role in the society.  
 At the beginning of this research, I also argued that understanding these debates 
and how they can be read as indicators of the ways in which these actors imagine the 
society, the law and the legal profession would consequently be relevant for an 
inquiry into the prevalence of Republican trajectories in the legal consciousness of 
these professionals. I argued that such an enterprise is significant for historicizing and 
contextualizing the juridical field in Turkey in the sense of situating these elements of 
legal consciousness within the larger universe of historical, social and political 
developments. As it has been covered in a detailed fashion in Chapters 1 and 2, law 
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and the legal professional have played crucial missionary roles in the transformation 
of the society in the early days of the Republic. I have tried to display how the 
profession continues to display political tendencies especially in the sense of guarding 
the regime and its principles. In this context, I used the data from representations of 
mediation and the interviews to explore the extent to which- if at all- legal 
professionals still make sense of their practice and their role within the society in 
reference to a modernist paradigm as shaped by the Republican project.  
 Overall, I observed that there are three principal dichotomies that seem to prevail 
in the debates around mediation: Public/private, formal/informal and 
modern/traditional. These dichotomies are not only meaningful in the context of the 
centrality of dualisms in modern thinking, but they are also symbolic of the ways in 
which the Republican ideology has been shaped in reference to the modernist 
paradigm. In this context, these dualisms have been central in the creation of the new 
state as well as the new political community. Hence, the fact they can still be 
observed in the ways in which legal professionals think and talk about an emerging 
practice can be considered as an indication of the continuing prominence of 
Republican trajectories in the legal consciousness of these actors. 
II. Concluding Remarks  
 
 In the end, the contribution of this dissertation to the existing body of scholarship 
can be found in its attempt to use Bourdieu’s theoretical framework for an exploration 
of the boundaries of the juridical field in Turkey. It is hard to talk about a socio-legal 
scholarship among academic circles in Turkey in the sense of looking at law as an 
object of study on its own. Law seems to be an epiphenomenon in the works of most 
social scientists; and hence the normative frameworks outlined by legal thinking and 
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the concentration on questions of policy by political scientists seem to dominate the 
study of law in Turkey. On top of this negligence of social scientists, Bourdieu’s 
overall theoretical approach and his particular work on the juridical field have not 
found much enthusiasm either. The possibilities offered by the concept of juridical 
field for an empirical observation of the ways in which law as a particular field of 
power reproduces itself in the struggles of actors operating within this field have been 
overlooked by scholars in Turkey.  
 Within this context, this dissertation is above all an attempt to contribute to the 
filling of this void in scholarship. I believe that since Bourdieu’s discussion of the 
juridical field mainly focuses on how actors within this field struggle over the control 
of the means, symbols, discourses and practices that define the field, his analysis 
becomes particularly useful in the context of judicial reform processes where all that 
is solid has the possibility of melting or being redefined or replaced. In this sense, his 
emphasis on the struggles within the field becomes a useful approach for an 
understanding of what goes into process of making law beyond the legislative 
disputes. My analysis of the debates around mediation as a newly emerging institution 
in the context of reform movements has displayed the struggles among actors who 
have been vocal in these debates for the right to determine what this new practice will 
entail and how it will be situated in relation to the dynamics of the existing juridical 
field. In this sense, debates around mediation have been tackled in reference to their 
implications for the ways in which actors operating within the juridical field imagine 
the boundaries of this field.  
 This analysis, however, goes beyond an exploration of the struggles within the 
juridical field for the right to determine what mediation will look like in the sense that 
these struggles are not handled merely as symbolic of the competition for technical 
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competence. It is argued that as diverse actors become engaged in struggles for 
gaining power through creating new symbols, discourses and capitals in the juridical 
field, the recent neoliberal reform process in Turkey becomes more and more a venue 
for technical intervention (Koğacıoğlu 2007). Law as a rather technical device has 
been employed by many for the establishment of new constitutional regimes, new 
democratic institutions and new political systems all around the world since early 
1990s. Against the instrumentalist takes on law that sees the developments in the 
juridical field as “a part, reflection or continuation of other economic or political 
transformations that go on in other social or political domains”, and against the 
formalist approaches to these transformations that concentrate on “law as a process 
where legal forms speak to each other”, Bourdieu’s discussion of the juridical field is 
claimed to offer a dual approach that allows for an exploration of the ways in which 
this technical capacity is imagined and constituted (Koğacıoğlu 2007). Nevertheless, 
my data suggest that the technical side of law remains to be either relatively less 
pronounced or is rather brought up in relation to other concerns mostly explained in 
the context of social and political dynamics.  
 Within this context, I believe that the analysis of debates around mediation from 
within a Bourdieusian framework is not only meaningful for the modest contribution 
it attempts to make to the study of law in Turkey, but it is also important in terms of 
its contribution to an understanding of the prevalence of a modernist paradigm in the 
legal consciousness of legal professionals. I have found out that as legal professionals 
engage in debates around mediation, they have almost always talked about their 
positions with respect to their larger perceptions of society, law and the profession. 
Hence, the struggles have almost never been shaped around purely technical issues or 
professional concerns for that matter. As legal professionals imagined the kinds of 
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threat posed by mediation to their existing capital and practices, and as they imagined 
the type of relation this new practice will have with their existing field of operation, 
they were at the same time engaged in acts of meaning making. It was in these 
constitutive moments that legal professionals participated in the construction of law as 
a particular type of social reality. My analysis suggests that this reality continues to be 
very much influenced by the modernist paradigm of the Republic that has not only 
taken law as one of the motors of social change but has also created a whole new 
profession mainly for the purpose of disseminating the values and the principles of the 
new regime.  
 In the dissertation, this point has been explored in the context of the legal 
profession’s almost organic relation with the state as it was mainly created for raising 
the ideologues of the regime. Within this context, I have shown how -in terms of state 
formation- the Republican project was a loyal follower of the strong state tradition 
that characterized Ottoman rule in the sense that the primacy of the state has been the 
official state discourse mobilized through the ideologues of the regime. In terms of 
society formation, this primacy has also been considered as the sine qua non element 
for the creation and the preservation of the unity of the new nation. I have also shown 
how this paradigm of strong state vs. weak society that defined the early Republican 
project has been contested by moments of social and political turbulence that put into 
question the strength of the state as well as by the global developments that led to the 
emergence of new collectivities.  
 Within this context, I have argued that these developments at the national and 
global level attest to the inadequacy of the Republican regime to catch up with the 
changing demands and claims particularly in political, social and cultural fields. 
While on the one hand, original bearers of the project as in the case of CHP seem to 
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have developed a rather controversial relation with the project particularly in the 
context of EU membership; on the other hand, representatives of those who were 
originally marginalized and even suppressed ironically seem to carry the flag of 
“catching up with the West”. Hence, the ideological rigidity of the regime seems to 
fail to capture the new social and political dynamics which results with a search for 
new grounds of legitimacy, the most apparent one being law. This frequent resort to 
law for the resolution of social and political dilemmas, however, seems to have 
created new questions of legitimacy in the sense of political as well as judicial actors 
moving further away from the people.  
These struggles have been particularly interesting to observe in the context of the 
legal profession’s foundational alliance with the state. I have argued that this alliance 
have been contested by legal professionals especially in terms of the state’s 
authoritarian presence in the organization of the profession. Nevertheless, the 
skepticism towards the state does not seem to have produced a similar attitude to the 
Republican regime. Within this context, on a similar terrain with previous works on 
legal profession in Turkey, I have argued that despite the degeneration in the original 
forms of alliance with the state, recent acts of judicial involvement in political affairs 
and the frequent uprisings of judicial actors against governmental steps can be read as 
the profession’s continuing dedication to the principles of the Republic and its 
conviction in the role of law and the legal profession as the guardian of these 
principles.  
Within this context, debates around mediation have displayed not only how legal 
professionals imagine the boundaries of the juridical field and the type of capital 
required to be a part of this field, but also how the ways in which they imagine these 
boundaries in fact have ramifications that cannot be understood purely as struggles 
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over technical competence. My observations on the implications of these struggles for 
certain types of imaginaries, and the prevalence of modernist dichotomies and 
Republican trajectories in defining these imaginaries are intended to contribute to the 
complexity of these struggles.  
Nonetheless, the shortcomings of this dissertation also need to be mentioned for 
the project to evolve into a more comprehensive analysis in the future. At the 
beginning of this research, I was also interested in the struggles between various 
institutional positions towards mediation. Within this context, my universe has 
included actors from universities, from Ministry of Justice and from various 
professional associations. Although, throughout the dissertation I have occasionally 
touched upon the differences in institutional approaches to the issue, I have not 
developed a “topography”264 of these positions. This is mainly due to the fact that as 
the research developed I found it more interesting to delve into the legal 
consciousness of these actors rather than understanding institutional struggles. I do 
believe, however, that a more comprehensive analysis of debates around mediation is 
still needed given that mediation is a newly emerging institution and as such it will 
remain to be a site for observing more complex struggles as more and more actors 
compete for the means to control this emerging field of practice.  
In this sense, more research will be needed for an exploration of how various 
other groups of professionals and institutional actors approach this emerging practice. 
This expansion will include other groups of legal professionals like practicing judges 
and prosecutors. These groups of professionals have not been included in this 
dissertation mainly because they have not emerged as vocal actors. Nevertheless, it is 
                                                 
264 I borrow this term from Koğacıoğlu (2007).  
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possible to claim that their take on mediation could introduce new dimensions to this 
discussion both in the sense that mediation has less potential of affecting their 
practice, but also in the sense that the relation of these professionals to the state would 
be quite different from most of the actors included here. At the same time, prospective 
research will also need to focus on those actors who are not “classical” owners of 
juridical capital understood as legal formation and technical competence, but who are 
nevertheless engaged in debates around mediation. Universities offering mediation 
trainings, private mediation enterprises and chambers of commerce that are interested 
in institutionalizing mediation practices as part of their scope of activity would in this 
sense offer new insights into these debates. On that note, as a newly emerging activity 
that already seems to have aroused significant controversies, I presume that mediation 
will remain to be a useful site for sociological exploration for a while.  
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